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OUTLINES OF ANCIENT HISTORY

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE
FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
IN THE WEST, A.D. 476

by

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Cambridge
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1914

ὥς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τὰ χρη-
εῖσι τελέηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ ὀλίγα
τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροις ἀποδεχόμενα, αἱ
γενήται.

■

TO
PROFESSOR EDUARD MEYER
OF BERLIN
IN RESPECTFUL ADMIRATION
OF HIS GREAT
GESCHICHTE DES ALTERTUMS.

■

PREFACE

THE present volume is one of a series of three Outline Histories, projected by the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press. Of the scope and aim of the book I have written in the Introduction; but I have a few further remarks to make, which seem to belong rather to a preface. The vastness of the period which my work covers naturally precludes any claim to high originality on my part; compelled, as I have been, to rely largely on the labours of others, I have endeavoured to use my best judgment in the choice of authorities and my utmost care and conscientiousness in the use of them. Wherever my own reading has made it possible, I have exercised an independent judgment; and, on some sections, where my own knowledge fell short, I have enjoyed the invaluable assistance of friends. That I have avoided all errors and partial statements is more than I dare hope: for all such sins of omission and commission I can only ask for a merciful judgment.

I must not close without discharging the pleasant duty of acknowledging obligations, both to men and books. Without attempting to give a full bibliography, I would gratefully admit my debt to Eduard Meyer's *Geschichte*

des Altertums, to Julius Beloch's *Griechische Geschichte*, to Mommsen's *History of Rome*, to Hermann Schiller's *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit*, to W. E. Heitland's *Roman Republic*, and to Professor J. B. Bury's *Student's Roman Empire* and *Later Roman Empire*.

And, finally, I owe the warmest thanks to Mr L. W. King and Mr H. R. Hall of the Egyptian Department in the British Museum for kind advice and criticism on the earlier sections of my work; and also to Mr A. W. A. Leeper, of the Egyptian Department, and to Mr E. S. G. Robinson, my colleague in the Department of Coins and Medals, for their friendly assistance in reading the proofs.

HAROLD MATTINGLY.

BRITISH MUSEUM,
May, 1914.

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ERRATA

p. 27 line 9 from bottom *for* 562 *read* 535

p. 252 „ 14 „ „ *for* B.C. *read* A.D.

INTRODUCTION

OF the whole of that vast period, during which man has lived on this globe, the domain of history forms nothing but an insignificant fraction. The "Golden Age" of those early nations that "had no history" can only be known by us, if at all, through the medium of archaeology. History, in fact, requires certain conditions, which only arise at a comparatively late date. In the first place, it presupposes the existence of forces of individuality and change in social life, which war with the tyranny of tradition and make the life of the morrow something different from that of yesterday and today. It deals with the particular, not the universal; and, though to trace the working of general principles is one of its chief tasks, it is yet only concerned with them in so far as they realize themselves in particular events. In the second place, it requires a tradition, and, as oral tradition must always be shifting and inexact, it postulates the existence of some form of writing. Now writing is a late discovery of mankind, and, even when invented, is for long restricted to the more immediate necessities of business life. It is only late, when actors in great events conceive the ambition of immortalizing their memory, that history, in the form of chronicles of kings and noble houses, arises; later still, when men become curious about past events that have already half fallen into oblivion, that mythological history attempts to lift the thick veil of time. Latest born of all

is contemporary history ; ranking at first as paltry and superfluous, it only comes to be written when the shock of some great event awakens men to the truth that the present can be as wonderful and majestic as the distant past.

The unit of history is the state ; with the smaller groups—clan or family—it is only concerned in their relations to the larger body. Its subject is the whole life of the state—the state's struggle for existence abroad against competing rivals—its struggle for existence at home, when torn between the conflicting forces of tradition and change. In intellectual and emotional life there is the conflict of new forms of thought with the traditional religion and morality ; in social and political life there is the eternal endeavour to harmonize the institutions of the past with the new conditions that arise with the change from nomadic to pastoral life, the uneven distribution of property, the growth of commerce, the invention of coined money and the new power of capital. In each of these spheres, "*Ἔρις*," that strife, which, for good or evil, is a necessary accompaniment of all active life, is king of all.

No one can write history at all, even on the humblest scale, without at least raising the vexed question as to the exact nature of his undertaking. Is history to be regarded as an exact science, or, even, as a science at all ? Or were the ancients correct in their general treatment of it as a branch of literature, pure and simple ? Any solution of this problem that is confined to a few lines of dogmatic assertion must of necessity beg the question ; but, if only to make our own standpoint clear, we will venture to offer ours. History, inasmuch as it deals with the particular and not with the universal, can never be an exact science. The chemist can assure us that, under certain known conditions, two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen will always form water. Not so the historian. It is not his

special task to define the conditions under which aristocratic misrule and popular discontent will produce a revolution ; he has, rather, to analyse the special conditions under which particular revolutions have taken place. And, again, the facts of history are not only particular, but they are human. They cannot be measured with scientific accuracy ; and, until some instrument has been invented that can gauge the exact strength of human motives and the exact values of human good and evil, the historian must rely on his taste and judgement as much as on his powers of accurate observation. That there is such a thing as "the scientific method" in history, and even, in a restricted sense, a "science of history," we would not deny ; to do so would be to turn one's back on a century of memorable achievement in historical studies. But it is as fatal a mistake for a workman to over-estimate as to disparage the efficiency of his tools. And, lastly, as a corollary to what has been said, we do not believe in impartial or dispassionate history. Human facts are the proper subject of moral judgements and cannot be released from them. The historian can try to be honest in his criticisms ; he cannot be absolutely neutral. He knows that the strong wind of his own convictions is always tending to deflect his bullet from the mark ; he can allow for the wind, but he cannot command it not to blow. The historian who would narrate events without passing any sort of moral judgement on them is like the scientist who should describe the dimensions of a body, because they can be stated with scientific accuracy, but omit to mention its colour or its texture, because they cannot.

In conclusion, it need only be said that this work on Ancient History follows the ordinary geographical acceptance of that term, including the history of the Nearer East, of Europe and the north of Africa, but excluding the outlying civilizations of China and India.

CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNINGS OF HISTORY

SECTION I. BABYLONIA

THE chief influence which worked on the early history of Nearer Asia came from the land lying between the Tigris and Euphrates on their lower courses, which we name, after its chief city, Babylonia. Our knowledge of its history is derived from several sources—the cuneiform (or “wedge-shaped”) inscriptions written on clay tablets, foundation-records, and stone monuments, the “*Βαβυλωνιακά*” of the Babylonian priest Berossus, who flourished about 290 B.C., and various references in Greek and Hebrew writers; but much remains unknown and the earlier centuries in particular are periods of darkness, interrupted only by an occasional ray of light. At the dawn of history we find in Lower Babylonia (or “Sumer”) a highly developed civilization familiar with the use of metals, an organized government and a number of populous cities; although the earliest known date in Babylonian history can hardly be much earlier than 3000 B.C., it is clear that already at that remote period centuries of civilized life lay behind. The earliest inhabitants of the land, whose origin and racial character we can claim to recognize clearly, were Semitic immigrants from Arabia; but the Babylonian civilization was certainly not their creation, but that of the “Sumerians,” who had been forced to give place to them. Who these Sumerians were is a question that cannot be answered with certainty; it has been suggested



Gudea, patesi of Lagash

that they came originally from India. Their language, an agglutinative one, remained in use for centuries after their disappearance, though it was continually being invaded by Semitic forms. At the beginning of our historical knowledge we find a number of independent cities in Lower Babylonia, ruled by governors (*patesis*), whilst occasionally in one city or other a superior ruler ("*lugal*" or king) appears, with a number of "*patesis*" under his suzerainty. Dynasties of such kings are known first at Opis and at Kish, then at Lagash. The dynasty of Lagash, after wars with Elam and the rival city of Umma, succumbed to the latter enemy, and the king of Umma transferred his seat to Erech and assumed the title of "King of Sumer." Political power then passed to Upper Babylonia (*Akkad*), where the great kings of tradition, Sargon and Narâm-Sin of Agadé, ruled at some date round about 2700 B.C. After an interval of comparative darkness, during which Erech regained the supremacy, the whole country was for a time dominated by a rival Semitic kingdom established in Guti to the east of Babylonia. Lagash in the south appears to have been among the first to achieve her independence, and there a line of "*patesis*," in which the chief name is that of Gudea, ruled from about 2500 B.C. This royal line gave place to a new dynasty at Ur; Dungi, its second king (2386-2328 B.C.) fought against Elam and bore the title of "King of Sumer and Accad." Dynasties followed at Isin and Larsa; the appearance of an Elamite name in the latter about 1950 B.C. suggests an Elamite conquest of Babylonia. But, if so, Elam could not retain her conquests for long. A little before 2000 B.C. Babylon had declared her independence under a line of Semitic kings, and reduced in turn the cities of Sippar, Kutha, Nippur and Isin. The chief king of this line, Hammurabi (fl. c. 1945 B.C.) had wars to wage with the Elamite king of Larsa and was recognized as suzerain in Assyria and Mesopotamia. After


his death, Babylon began to decline, an independent chief arose in the "Land of the Sea" (on the Persian Gulf), and, about 1746, Babylonia, after having been weakened by a successful Hittite raid from the north-west, during which Babylon itself was taken and sacked, was conquered by the Kassites, Indo-European invaders from the mountains of western Persia. This conquest marks the end of the older Babylonia, and we may pause a moment to glance at its civilization, which was certainly mainly Sumerian, not Semitic, in its origins. Though the ancient religion had its great nature-gods—Ana, Entil and Enki, or Ea, with the goddess Ninni, the earlier equivalent of Ishtar—its local gods played a far more prominent *role* than in later ages. Marduk, the god of Babylon, only attained his pre-eminence with the rise of that city to power. In addition to the pantheon, which was under constant revision and faithfully reflected any political change, there was a host of minor spirits or daemons. The most individual feature of the system, at any rate in the later periods, was the interest taken in the stars, in which the gods were supposed to work, and the consequent importance of astrology. Literature consisted mainly of religious hymns and legends; writing was hardly used as yet for history, being confined to the uses of practical life, including magic and divination; but it may be noted that elaborate dynastic lists had already been compiled in the third millennium. Babylonian art can best be understood by a visit to a good museum; its special characteristic was a predilection for the grandiose, the grotesque and the unnatural. Nothing gives us so vivid an idea of the high degree of civilization attained at this remote age as the existence under Hammurabi, the great law-giver, of an extensive and complicated code of private law; for the use of written laws in any form marks a distinct stage in social development.

The Kassite dynasty of Babylon began to rule about

1700 B.C., and was not expelled for some six hundred years; but of most of its rulers we know nothing but the names. About 1580 the Sea-Land on the Persian Gulf was conquered, but to the north and west the influence of Babylon declined. The kingdom of Mitanni, probably Indo-European in origin, arose in Mesopotamia, and Assyria began to draw away from the southern kingdom, at first as a vassal of Mitanni, later in complete independence. Of the relations of king Burraburiash (c. 1400) of Babylon with Egypt we hear something from the Tell-el-Amarna tablets. His grandson and successor, Kadashman-kharbé, was a son of the daughter of Assur-uballit, king of Assyria; when Kadashman fell victim to a conspiracy, the Assyrian king interfered and placed the dead king's son Kurigalzu on the throne. Assyria thus began to assert a predominance over Babylon; but Kurigalzu, in the later years of his reign, seems to have resented this relation and fought with Assyria for possessions in Mesopotamia. The Kassite dynasty was followed by a native Babylonian (the so-called "dynasty of Pashe," c. 1130-1000), its most famous member being Nebuchadnezzar I, and three ephemeral dynasties, of which the last at least was Elamite (c. 1000-960). Of the years between 1000 and 885 we know practically nothing; but the struggle with Elam and Assyria must have continued, and, probably at this period, the Chaldaeans, a new race of Semitic immigrants, entered the south of Babylonia. They add a new factor to the political problem and are generally found attempting, with Elamite help, to contest the claims of Assyria over Babylonia. Between the years 885 and 854 a certain Nabu-aplu-iddin, probably a Chaldaean, ruled in Babylon and held his country against Assyria. But, on his death, one of his sons, Marduk-nadin-shum, called in Shalmaneser II of Assyria to help him against his brother, and, having disposed of his rival, ruled as Assyrian vassal.

The same tale is now repeated over and over again ; Elamites and Chaldaeans intrigue against Assyria, Assyria, welcomed by a large section of the native Babylonians, makes attempt after attempt to secure her rule. Between 763 and 746 a series of revolts broke the Assyrian influence ; but a reaction followed and Nabonassar (747-734) was reduced to vassalage by Tiglath-pileser IV. In 730 the great Assyrian king crushed a new revolt and reigned himself as king of Babylon till 727 under the name of Pulu. Shalmaneser IV, like his father, ruled in Babylon (727-722), but the troubles that followed on the usurpation of Sargon gave Assyria's enemies their chance, and Merodach-baladan, a Chaldaean, ruled, under Elamite protection, from 721-710. Sargon drove out this prince in 710 and ruled as "governor of Babylon" until his death in 705. Sennacherib suppressed a revolt in 703, defeated Merodach-baladan, and his allies, the Elamites, and set up Bel-ibni, a Babylonian, as vassal-prince. But the new king revolted and was deposed, and a son of Sennacherib reigned from 699 to 694. In 694 war broke out again and this time Sennacherib, resolved to end the constant trouble, destroyed Babylon (689) ; but his successor, the humane Esarhaddon, restored the famous city in 681. In 668 Shamash-shum-ukin, a son of Esarhaddon, became king in Babylon, while his brother Assurbanipal ruled in Assyria ; in 652 he revolted and was defeated, and Assurbanipal ruled in his stead (648-626). After his death, Assyrian rule soon broke down ; in 625, Nabopolassar, a Chaldaean, seized the throne and the ancient glory of Babylonia revived after many days. The long ambition of the Chaldaeans, the complete mastery of Babylonia, was at length realised.

In alliance with Cyaxares, the Mede, Nabopolassar turned on the failing Assyria, and, after the sack of Nineveh by the Medes in 606, entered on the southern portion of her inheritance. His son Nebuchadnezzar,



From Hehn's History of the World by permission of Mr W. Hehnemann

NEARER ASIA, c. 800 B.C. The double line marks the boundaries of the Assyrian Empire


acting as his captain, put down revolts against the new authority in the west, and drove Necho II of Egypt out of the territory he had occupied in Palestine. On the death of Nabopolassar, Nebuchadnezzar II became king and reigned from 605-562. He was a vigorous and able ruler; he rebuilt Babylon on a new and grander scale, drew the famous "Median Wall" from the Euphrates to the Tigris and maintained his empire undiminished. In 597 Judah revolted, in vain reliance on assistance from Egypt, and was conquered. The great mass of the wealthier classes were carried into captivity, and, when the remnant of the nation rebelled again in 586, a second band was hauled away into exile. Tyre, which also revolted, finally submitted after a twelve years' siege (585-573). With Nebuchadnezzar died the promise of the new Babylonian Empire. The growing power of the Medes required able kings to resist it, and the successors of Nebuchadnezzar were men of little capacity. Nabunaid, a native Babylonian, who came to the throne in 555, is the last of the native kings of Babylon; an amiable antiquarian but no soldier, he devoted himself to reading inscriptions and building temples, while the Medes overran Mesopotamia. But it was the Persians, not the Medes, who were destined to succeed to Babylon's inheritance. Cyrus, after he had overthrown Astyages the Mede and defeated Croesus, turned his arms against Babylon (c. 546). Belshazzar, son of Nabunaid, was called upon to conduct the defence, and apparently the invaders were checked for some years by the conversion of the country round Babylon into a swamp. But at length in 539 the great city fell, and Cyrus, here as elsewhere a merciful conqueror, himself ascended the Babylonian throne.

Of the great civilization of Babylonia much might be written, but a few words must suffice here. The Euphrates district was in ancient times a land of great fertility, but

dependent for its success on a good artificial water-supply ; from early times, therefore, the land was intensively cultivated and an elaborate system of canals provided the necessary water. The life of the land centred in its cities, each of which had its own god, who was considered to own the city and to assign lands to its kings and priests. Temples were the principal buildings, and brick, not wood or stone, was the chief building material. The important caste of the priests controlled all intellectual life and made the astronomical observations for which Babylonian civilization is famous. Of Babylonian religion as a system we cannot speak with confidence ; the names of many gods are known, but their relations to one another are not easily defined. One interesting feature is the spread of the worship of Marduk with the growth of his city, Babylon. That the Babylonians were capable of deep religious feeling is certain ; Judaism grew up largely on Babylonian soil. Of the mythical epics, the tale of Gilgamesh, the Babylonian Hercules, with its episode of the Flood, is the most interesting.

SECTION 2. ASSYRIA

Hitherto our attention has been concentrated on the land of Babylonia proper : we must now look north and west to lands, which, although within the circle of direct Babylonian influence, yet pursued mainly independent political destinies. The recent excavations at Ashur, the ancient capital of the country, have revealed to us the names of Assyrian rulers extending back into the past beyond the rise of the Dynasty of Babylon. They already speak and write a Semitic tongue, but they maintain close connexions with settlements in Cappadocia, and in the population there appears to have been a strong admixture of northern blood. Later, about 1430, the Tell-el-Amarna



Letter from king Tushratta of Mitanni to
the king of Egypt

tablets show us a king Tushratta of Mitanni, who ruled in Mesopotamia and corresponded with the kings of Egypt, claiming suzerainty over Assyria. To the north and west of him lay the Hittites, but his own kingdom was probably Indo-European. This kingdom may have been founded as early as about 2000 B.C.; it fell before the Hittites in 1350. It was at some date round about 1700-1650, during the troubled years which followed the close of the First Babylonian Dynasty, that Assyria shook off her dependence on Babylonia and asserted her independence. The Assyrians were largely Semites and show the characteristic "Jewish" type. The political and military strength, which the country developed, was probably due to the existence of a free peasantry, which supplied a strong national army. About 1400 we find Assur-uballit claiming recognition in Egypt as an independent king. We have seen above¹ how he intervened in Babylonia and placed his great-grandson, Kurigalzu, on the throne. His successor, Bel-nirari, had wars to wage with this same Kurigalzu. The next king but one, Adad-nirari I, made the first great addition to the Assyrian power; he conquered the territory of Mitanni and successfully rebuffed the efforts of Babylonia to question his conquest. His son, Shalmaneser I, maintained his hold on Mesopotamia and made conquests and founded Assyrian colonies to the north in Armenia; he also transferred his capital from Assur to Kalkhi (Calah). Tukulti-ninib conquered Babylonia (c. 1250) and placed his vassal on the throne; but the Hittite power was still strong and aimed at interference with Assyrian plans of expansion. After a short reign, the Assyrian king was murdered, as it seems, in a mutiny, and for the time the kingdom declined and Mesopotamia was lost. But Assyria soon recovered strength; Assur-dan and his successors reconquered Mesopotamia, and the great conqueror,

¹ See p. 7.

Tiglath-pileser I (c. 1100), pushed his arms as far west as Syria; he conquered Babylon, but was then defeated and lost Mesopotamia. Under his successors, Assyria was weak and unpretentious and kept the peace with Babylon, while Mesopotamia was overrun by the invading Aramaeans.

But, about 950, a new Assyrian dynasty of kings arose, the most famous and powerful of whom was Assurnasir-pal II (884-860), an able but brutal conqueror, who suppressed the revolt of Bit-khadippi in Mesopotamia and subdued a number of princes in those regions. In 878 Akhuni, king of Bit-Adini in north Mesopotamia, was conquered, and in 877 an Assyrian expedition into Phoenicia forced Carchemish and other states to submit. Assur, which had again become the capital, gave place to Kalkhi.

Shalmaneser II reduced the rebel Akhuni of Bit-Adini and subdued most of the Aramaean princes of Mesopotamia. But in 854, in an expedition to the west, he was defeated by the allied forces of Damascus, Hamath and Israel, at the battle of Karkar, and a second attack on Damascus in the years 849-8 was equally unsuccessful. Later Jehu of Israel did homage to him, but Hazael, who had usurped the throne of Damascus, still made good his defence.

Further north, however, the states of Meletene and Patin acknowledged Assyrian supremacy. In 852-1 Babylon was attacked and reduced to vassalage. In 840 and 835-4 the king was warring in the Taurus district, and in 851, 850 and 845 took the field against the new power of Urartu, which had been founded around Lake Van in Armenia and was actually encroaching on the Assyrian possessions. Expeditions against the wild tribes to the north-east of Assyria fill in the years 860, 844 and 836. In 829 most of Assyria revolted against Shalmaneser under his son, Assur-danin-apli, but another son, Shamshi-Adad, starting as king in Mesopotamia, regained Assyria (825) and undertook expeditions to the north and against



Assyrians besieging a city

Babylon. His son Adad-nirari III (812-783) fought against Arpad and Khazazi (Azaz) (806-5) and received tribute from Damascus, Tyre, Sidon, Edom, Israel and Philistia. Shalmaneser III (783-773) was mainly engaged in checking the growing power of Urartu. Assur-dan III (773-763) waged war with Damascus (773) and Babylon (771 and 767), and finally fell before a revolt in Assyria in 763. The next king, Assur-nirari III (754-746), again removed the court to Assur. As to the cause of the revolt against Assur-dan and its results we can only form conjectures. Probably the return to the old capital implies a victory of the priests over the military party. The old peasant class was rapidly dying out, and the struggle for power lay between the priests, who claimed respect for tradition and, above all, for their own vested rights, and the army, which only lived for war and conquest. Babylon took the opportunity of revolting in 763 and remained for a time independent. The victory of the priests was not a lasting one. In 746 the army reasserted itself and raised one of its captains to the throne, under the name of Tiglath-pileser IV. The new king, a great warrior, spent the whole of his reign in wars. Babylonia was reconquered in 745 and Arpad had to submit in 741-739. In 742 Tiglath-pileser defeated Sarduris II of Urartu and repeated the attack in 737-5. Assyrian supremacy was reasserted in Phoenicia, and Ahaz of Judah, besieged in Jerusalem by the armies of Israel and Damascus, appealed successfully to Assyria for protection. The siege was raised, Pekah of Israel fell, and a new king, Hoshea, was set up by the Assyrian party. In 734 Philistia was attacked, in 732 Damascus fell and in 731-729 Babylonia, after revolt, was again subdued.

Shalmaneser IV, the successor of Tiglath-pileser, reigned from 727 to 722 and, provoked once more by Israel, began the siege of Samaria. But, before the hostile capital fell, Shalmaneser had perished and a usurper, Sargon,

supported by the priestly party, had seized the throne. Sargon was a man of great energy and ability, and had to justify his usurpation by suppressing the revolts which broke out on every side. Babylon, assisted by Elam, rose against him; his first attack on it failed (721) and it was not till 710 that he drove out the Chaldaean Merodach-baladan. In 720 Sargon defeated the allied forces of Damascus, Hamath and Egypt at Raphia, and suppressed all discontent in that quarter. Samaria fell, and the bulk of the Israelite upper classes were carried into captivity. In 719-718, 716-715 and 714 Sargon took the field against king Rusas of Urartu. The power of the enemy had already been shaken by the invasion of the wild Cimmerians from the north, and in 714 it was finally broken; but Sargon's policy was a doubtful one, for the crushing of Urartu deprived Assyria of an invaluable protection against the barbarians who were swarming on her northern frontiers. In the west Sargon was consistently successful. In 717 Carchemish fell; in 711 an alliance, consisting of Egypt, Gaza and Ashdod was defeated, and, further up, Sargon advanced into northern Syria and Cappadocia. Sargon died, apparently in battle, in 705, and his son, Sennacherib, succeeded him (705-681). He suppressed the revolt of Babylon in 703, and finally in 689, to put an end to such revolts, took and destroyed the city. In the west Luli of Tyre and Hezekiah of Israel rose in revolt. Sennacherib hastened up to the scene and Luli fled to Cyprus; Hezekiah held out in his stronghold of Jerusalem but lost all the outlying parts of his territory. Late in his reign Sennacherib suffered a terrible disaster, probably due to pestilence, on an expedition against Egypt and Palestine, and was murdered by the priestly party in 681. Sennacherib it was who first made Nineveh a mighty city and a fit rival in splendour to the ancient Babylon. His son Esarhaddon, who succeeded him, was a man of a less



Sennacherib receiving prisoners

vigorous but more humane type; acceding, we may imagine, to the wishes of the priests, he at once restored Babylon (681), thus undoing his father's work. In the main, Esarhaddon was a peaceful ruler, intent on preserving rather than on extending his empire. The war that broke out with Elam in 674 was due to Elamite aggression and was speedily ended by an Assyrian victory. But the reign was marked by one great foreign enterprise, the long-expected attack on Egypt. Egypt had for years been the steady opponent of Assyria in Palestine, and peace could only be secured by her humiliation. Sidon revolted and was destroyed in 678 and in 670, Tyre, after a siege, submitted to pay tribute. The way was then clear for the attack on the arch-enemy. In 670 Egypt was invaded and the Ethiopian prince, Taharqa, was easily expelled, and vassal-princes were set up in the north. In 668 Taharqa returned, and Tyre seized the opportunity of revolting again; but, on the repulse of the Ethiopian, she made haste to submit. In 668 a revolt, fostered, no doubt, by the military party, broke out against Esarhaddon in Assyria, and his sons Assurbanipal and Shamash-shum-ukin were crowned kings in Assyria and Babylon respectively; Esarhaddon himself, now restricted to the command of the western army, died on the march for Egypt. Assurbanipal was the last great king of Assyria and became, for after times, under the Greek name of Sardanapalus, the type of Assyrian pomp and pride. Taharqa, we have seen, was again driven from Egypt, and his nephew Tanut-Ameri had no better success; he was driven south and Thebes was destroyed (? 667-6). But losses began to fall heavily on Assyria. To the north of Syria the Assyrian power was declining before the Cimmerians, and in Egypt the vassal-prince of Memphis and Sais, Psammetichus, revolted (c. 657) and founded a new independent kingdom of Egypt. In Asia Minor, a Phrygian kingdom, founded in the eighth

century by Indo-European invaders, had gone down before the Cimmerians, and the new power of Lydia, founded by Gyges in the early seventh century, had to continue the struggle against the barbarians. About 668 or 667 Gyges, hard pressed by these enemies, did homage and sought Assyrian aid, but, finding no help there and gaining a respite from his enemies, he threw off the nominal suzerainty of Assyria and showed a readiness to support the rebel Psammetichus. About 660 the Elamites invaded Babylonia, but were repulsed by an Assyrian army, which advanced up to the walls of Susa. In 652 Shamash-shum-ukin of Babylon rose against his brother, but was defeated, and Assurbanipal ruled as king in Babylon from 648 till his death in 626. Elam was made to suffer for its interference; its power was finally broken and Susa was captured (c. 648). But Assyrian power was fatally weakened by incessant warfare, and the crippling of Elam only opened the way for more dangerous enemies. Urartu to the north was already hard pressed by the Cimmerians, and on the whole of the eastern frontier the Medes and other tribes began to threaten. In the years 628-626 a horde of Scythian invaders swept over the Assyrian Empire from one side to the other, and, though it finally disposed of the other enemy, the Cimmerians, it must have helped to weaken the already shattered Assyrian power.

Assurbanipal himself, however, was not fated to see the destruction of his country's greatness; he died in 626, and it is only later legend that has invented the dramatic story of his death in the flames of his palace. His successors were weak and incapable of stemming the tide of attack. Babylon resumed its independence under Nabopolassar, and, in alliance with Cyaxares the Mede, threw itself on the hated tyrant. By 609 Mesopotamia was already in the hands of Nabopolassar, and, when in 606, Cyaxares attacked Nineveh, the city could make no resistance and

was razed to the ground. The Assyrian, who for centuries had conquered and ravaged other states, met a like fate himself. The nation had long since ceased to exist as a force by itself; Assyria had come to be simply a military power, and, with the fall of her supremacy, she vanished, leaving little behind her save a memory of fear and hate. The conquerors divided the spoils; to Cyaxares fell the east and the north from Elam to Asia Minor, to Nabopolassar, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine.


In civilization, Assyria was entirely dependent on Babylonia for inspiration. The one thing peculiar to her was her exceptional military efficiency, due, as has been already suggested, to a sturdy peasant class. With the gradual exhaustion of the peasantry the army became a mercenary one. The chief arms were the heavy-armed infantry, the war-chariots and the bowmen; cavalry played a relatively unimportant part. In her earlier days Assyria founded colonies in conquered territory; but later, when her population could no longer answer to the demand, she either contented herself with extorting tribute from her conquered enemies or else converted them into Assyrian provinces. Each province was placed under an Assyrian governor, but, apart from the payment of tribute, had no special connexion with the central government. The importance of Assyria in the world's history lies not in her constructive, but in her destructive powers. Everywhere she appeared as a ruthless and brutal destroyer; to break national resistance, she would either stamp out an entire population or ruthlessly uproot it and transfer it to a distant part of the empire. Such a policy can certainly claim no deliberate merit; but it was of vast and far-reaching consequence, inasmuch as it stamped out distinct nationalities in a large part of the Nearer East, and prepared the way for a new cosmopolitan civilization, in which not race

but religion was the principal force. Seldom has poetic justice been so completely satisfied as when Assyria perished, as she had lived, by the sword.

SECTION 3. ELAM

The country known to us as Elam lies to the east of Babylonia and to the north of the Persian Gulf. Of the nationality and language of the Elamites we have no sure knowledge; for, though Elamite inscriptions, written in cuneiform, are found, they give us little information and we can only trace the history of the land in its relations with Babylon and Assyria. At an early date the Elamites began to invade Babylonia—always from the north—and, at a date near 2400, temporarily won that country and possibly raided as far west as the Mediterranean. Again, about 1950, we find an Elamite king reigning in Larsa, and fighting, with varying success, against Hammurabi of Babylon. The Kassite invasion seems to have extended to Elam but did not lead to any political union between it and Babylonia. Kurigalzu of Babylon waged war with the Elamites; but, after his time, they again conquered Babylonia, and, a little after the year 1000, an Elamite prince ruled in Babylon itself. A period of weakness seems to have ensued; when Elam again appears on the scene, we find her king, Khumbanigash (743-717) placing a vassal, Merodach-baladan, on the throne of Babylon. His successor, Shutur-nakhundi (717-699), was defeated by Sargon and forced to abandon his support of Merodach-baladan; he replaced him on his throne in 703 but was once more defeated and repulsed by Sargon's successor, Sennacherib.

The next king of Elam, Khallushu, rebelled against Assyria and placed a vassal on the Babylonian throne;



Battle between Assurbanipal and Teumman

but in 694 Sennacherib declared war, defeated the Elamites and destroyed Babylon (689). Elam, however, continued to support the Chaldaeans against Assyria, until Urtaku (676-665) changed his policy and courted Assyrian friendship. But Urtaku's brother, Teumman, succeeding, it would seem, by violence, to the throne, started to massacre the dead king's family; when Assyria gave refuge to Elamite exiles, war broke out again and Assurbanipal defeated Teumman in a great battle near Susa. When Shamash-shum-ukin of Babylon revolted against his brother, Assurbanipal, the Elamites joined in the rebellion. But they shared in the defeat of the Babylonian king (652) and, finally, late in his reign, Assurbanipal captured Susa and thus shattered the Elamite power. It was probably at about this time (c. 635) that the Medes broke in and took possession of the country; the Assyrians, in fact, in crippling Elam, only paved the way for a more formidable foe. The one definite fact known about Elamite civilization is that the influence of Babylonia was predominant.

SECTION 4. MEDES AND PERSIANS

The land of Media, the "Anzan" of the Babylonians, consisted in early times of a number of small independent kingdoms, inhabited by a race probably akin to the Elamites. We cannot fix precisely the original home of the Medes, but they were without doubt Indo-Europeans, and may have followed the earlier invaders of that race who in the first half of the second millennium already begin to make their appearance in Nearer Asia. At least as early as the ninth century B.C. they occupied Media and appear from 836 onwards in Assyrian inscriptions. They were a brave and warlike people; but at first they were divided into a number of small independent cantons and, though never really conquered by Assyria, were

occasionally constrained to pay tribute. Another Indo-European tribe, the Ashkuza, came into Armenia in the seventh century and founded an empire that stretched west as far as Syria, until it finally fell before the Medes. Deioces and Phraortes are named by Herodotus as the first kings of a united Media; their territory included Elam and Persis and marched on the west with the empire of the Ashkuza. Cyaxares, son of Phraortes, was the first to make Media a great power; he subdued the Ashkuza, and, then, in alliance with Nabopolassar of Babylon, destroyed the Assyrian Empire and sacked Nineveh (606). The whole of the north of that empire as far west as the Halys fell to his share, and in 585 he fought a drawn battle with his new neighbour, king Alyattes of Lydia; Babylon and Cilicia negotiated an armistice between the rivals. Astyages, the successor of Cyaxares, attacked Harran in Mesopotamia but was surprised and overthrown by a pretender Cyrus, at the head of the Persians (c. 550). The victor had started his career as a vassal of the Median king, and it has been suggested that he may even have been himself a Mede and only have been associated in later legend with the Persian noble house of the Achaemenids. This is perhaps going too far, and certainly his victory meant the national triumph of the Persians. Their original home was the little land of Persis to the east of the ancient Elam, and, before the time of Cyrus, they had never been a serious political power. They now succeeded to the empire of the whole of the Nearer East; but the Medes ranked with the Persians as the aristocracy in the new state, and the Greeks learned to describe the empire indifferently as "Persian" or "Median." The sudden advance of Cyrus must have aroused the bitter jealousy of every rival power, and a coalition of Babylon, Lydia and Egypt threatened to crush him. But he struck before his enemies had had time to concert their action. Lydia was

the first to be assailed ; Croesus, confident of victory, met Cyrus on the Halys, but was compelled, after a stubborn battle, to fall back on his capital city of Sardis (547). Cyrus pushed on in pursuit, gained a second victory, and captured the city, before Croesus's allies could stir hand or foot to help him (546). Leaving his general Harpagus to impose Persian dominion on the Greek cities of the coast, Cyrus himself turned to settle with his next enemy, Babylon. The campaign lasted over several years, and the Babylonians, under Belshazzar, offered a stubborn resistance. But in 539 the city fell and Cyrus succeeded to the throne as lawful king. The rest of Cyrus' life was devoted to the east of his empire, where he probably extended his frontier to Gedrosia and the river Jaxartes : it was in battle against the savage Massagetae on his north-eastern bounds that he met his death in 530. His son and successor Cambyses completed his father's work by the conquest of Egypt (525). But, while he was still in the conquered land, a revolt broke out against him at home. He had put to death, on suspicion of treachery, his own brother Smerdis, and his enemies, consisting largely of priests (magi), set up a pretender Bardiya (pseudo-Smerdis), giving him out to be the king's brother whose death was not generally known. Cambyses died on his way home to suppress the revolt and, for the moment, the pseudo-Smerdis held his place. But Darius, son of Hystaspes, the next heir, conspired with six fellow nobles, overthrew the usurper and, probably in the course of a single year, established his sovereignty over the whole of the Persian Empire¹.

¹ For the subsequent history of Persia see below *passim*.

CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNINGS OF HISTORY

SECTION I. BABYLONIA

THE chief influence which worked on the early history of Nearer Asia came from the land lying between the Tigris and Euphrates on their lower courses, which we name, after its chief city, Babylonia. Our knowledge of its history is derived from several sources—the cuneiform (or “wedge-shaped”) inscriptions written on clay tablets, foundation-records, and stone monuments, the “*Βαβυλωνιακά*” of the Babylonian priest Berossus, who flourished about 290 B.C., and various references in Greek and Hebrew writers; but much remains unknown and the earlier centuries in particular are periods of darkness, interrupted only by an occasional ray of light. At the dawn of history we find in Lower Babylonia (or “Sumer”) a highly developed civilization familiar with the use of metals, an organized government and a number of populous cities; although the earliest known date in Babylonian history can hardly be much earlier than 3000 B.C., it is clear that already at that remote period centuries of civilized life lay behind. The earliest inhabitants of the land, whose origin and racial character we can claim to recognize clearly, were Semitic immigrants from Arabia; but the Babylonian civilization was certainly not their creation, but that of the “Sumerians,” who had been forced to give place to them. Who these Sumerians were is a question that cannot be answered with certainty; it has been suggested



Gudea, patesi of Lagash

that they came originally from India. Their language, an agglutinative one, remained in use for centuries after their disappearance, though it was continually being invaded by Semitic forms. At the beginning of our historical knowledge we find a number of independent cities in Lower Babylonia, ruled by governors (patesis), whilst occasionally in one city or other a superior ruler ("lugal" or king) appears, with a number of "patesis" under his suzerainty. Dynasties of such kings are known first at Opis and at Kish, then at Lagash. The dynasty of Lagash, after wars with Elam and the rival city of Umma, succumbed to the latter enemy, and the king of Umma transferred his seat to Erech and assumed the title of "King of Sumer." Political power then passed to Upper Babylonia (Akkad), where the great kings of tradition, Sargon and Narâm-Sin of Agadé, ruled at some date round about 2700 B.C. After an interval of comparative darkness, during which Erech regained the supremacy, the whole country was for a time dominated by a rival Semitic kingdom established in Gutí to the east of Babylonia. Lagash in the south appears to have been among the first to achieve her independence, and there a line of "patesis," in which the chief name is that of Gudea, ruled from about 2500 B.C. This royal line gave place to a new dynasty at Ur; Dungi, its second king (2386-2328 B.C.) fought against Elam and bore the title of "King of Sumer and Accad." Dynasties followed at Isin and Larsa; the appearance of an Elamite name in the latter about 1950 B.C. suggests an Elamite conquest of Babylonia. But, if so, Elam could not retain her conquests for long. A little before 2000 B.C. Babylon had declared her independence under a line of Semitic kings, and reduced in turn the cities of Sippar, Kutha, Nippur and Isin. The chief king of this line, Hammurabi (fl. c. 1945 B.C.) had wars to wage with the Elamite king of Larsa and was recognized as suzerain in Assyria and Mesopotamia. After


his death, Babylon began to decline, an independent chief arose in the "Land of the Sea" (on the Persian Gulf), and, about 1746, Babylonia, after having been weakened by a successful Hittite raid from the north-west, during which Babylon itself was taken and sacked, was conquered by the Kassites, Indo-European invaders from the mountains of western Persia. This conquest marks the end of the older Babylonia, and we may pause a moment to glance at its civilization, which was certainly mainly Sumerian, not Semitic, in its origins. Though the ancient religion had its great nature-gods—Ana, Entil and Enki, or Ea, with the goddess Ninni, the earlier equivalent of Ishtar—its local gods played a far more prominent *rôle* than in later ages. Marduk, the god of Babylon, only attained his pre-eminence with the rise of that city to power. In addition to the pantheon, which was under constant revision and faithfully reflected any political change, there was a host of minor spirits or daemons. The most individual feature of the system, at any rate in the later periods, was the interest taken in the stars, in which the gods were supposed to work, and the consequent importance of astrology. Literature consisted mainly of religious hymns and legends; writing was hardly used as yet for history, being confined to the uses of practical life, including magic and divination; but it may be noted that elaborate dynastic lists had already been compiled in the third millennium. Babylonian art can best be understood by a visit to a good museum; its special characteristic was a predilection for the grandiose, the grotesque and the unnatural. Nothing gives us so vivid an idea of the high degree of civilization attained at this remote age as the existence under Hammurabi, the great law-giver, of an extensive and complicated code of private law; for the use of written laws in any form marks a distinct stage in social development.

The Kassite dynasty of Babylon began to rule about

1700 B.C., and was not expelled for some six hundred years; but of most of its rulers we know nothing but the names. About 1580 the Sea-Land on the Persian Gulf was conquered, but to the north and west the influence of Babylon declined. The kingdom of Mitanni, probably Indo-European in origin, arose in Mesopotamia, and Assyria began to draw away from the southern kingdom, at first as a vassal of Mitanni, later in complete independence. Of the relations of king Būrraburiash (c. 1400) of Babylon with Egypt we hear something from the Tell-el-Amarna tablets. His grandson and successor, Kadashman-kharbé, was a son of the daughter of Assur-uballit, king of Assyria; when Kadashman fell victim to a conspiracy, the Assyrian king interfered and placed the dead king's son Kurigalzu on the throne. Assyria thus began to assert a predominance over Babylon; but Kurigalzu, in the later years of his reign, seems to have resented this relation and fought with Assyria for possessions in Mesopotamia. The Kassite dynasty was followed by a native Babylonian (the so-called "dynasty of Pashe," c. 1130-1000), its most famous member being Nebuchadnezzar I, and three ephemeral dynasties, of which the last at least was Elamite (c. 1000-960). Of the years between 1000 and 885 we know practically nothing; but the struggle with Elam and Assyria must have continued, and, probably at this period, the Chaldaeans, a new race of Semitic immigrants, entered the south of Babylonia. They add a new factor to the political problem and are generally found attempting, with Elamite help, to contest the claims of Assyria over Babylonia. Between the years 885 and 854 a certain Nabu-aplu-iddin, probably a Chaldaean, ruled in Babylon and held his country against Assyria. But, on his death, one of his sons, Marduk-nadin-shum, called in Shalmaneser II of Assyria to help him against his brother, and, having disposed of his rival, ruled as Assyrian vassal.

The same tale is now repeated over and over again ; Elamites and Chaldaeans intrigue against Assyria, Assyria, welcomed by a large section of the native Babylonians, makes attempt after attempt to secure her rule. Between 763 and 746 a series of revolts broke the Assyrian influence ; but a reaction followed and Nabonassar (747-734) was reduced to vassalage by Tiglath-pileser IV. In 730 the great Assyrian king crushed a new revolt and reigned himself as king of Babylon till 727 under the name of Pulu. Shalmaneser IV, like his father, ruled in Babylon (727-722), but the troubles that followed on the usurpation of Sargon gave Assyria's enemies their chance, and Merodach-baladan, a Chaldaean, ruled, under Elamite protection, from 721-710. Sargon drove out this prince in 710 and ruled as "governor of Babylon" until his death in 705. Sennacherib suppressed a revolt in 703, defeated Merodach-baladan, and his allies, the Elamites, and set up Bel-ibni, a Babylonian, as vassal-prince. But the new king revolted and was deposed, and a son of Sennacherib reigned from 699 to 694. In 694 war broke out again and this time Sennacherib, resolved to end the constant trouble, destroyed Babylon (689); but his successor, the humane Esarhaddon, restored the famous city in 681. In 668 Shamash-shum-ukin, a son of Esarhaddon, became king in Babylon, while his brother Assurbanipal ruled in Assyria; in 652 he revolted and was defeated, and Assurbanipal ruled in his stead (648-626). After his death, Assyrian rule soon broke down; in 625, Nabopolassar, a Chaldaean, seized the throne and the ancient glory of Babylonia revived after many days. The long ambition of the Chaldaeans, the complete mastery of Babylonia, was at length realised.


In alliance with Cyaxares, the Mede, Nabopolassar turned on the failing Assyria, and, after the sack of Nineveh by the Medes in 606, entered on the southern portion of her inheritance. His son Nebuchadnezzar,



From *Helmolt's History of the World* by permission of Mr W. H. Helmolt

Cambridge University Press

NEARER ASIA, c. 800 B.C. The double line marks the boundaries of the Assyrian Empire




acting as his captain, put down revolts against the new authority in the west, and drove Necho II of Egypt out of the territory he had occupied in Palestine. On the death of Nabopolassar, Nebuchadnezzar II became king and reigned from 605-562. He was a vigorous and able ruler; he rebuilt Babylon on a new and grander scale, drew the famous "Median Wall" from the Euphrates to the Tigris and maintained his empire undiminished. In 597 Judah revolted, in vain reliance on assistance from Egypt, and was conquered. The great mass of the wealthier classes were carried into captivity, and, when the remnant of the nation rebelled again in 586, a second band was hauled away into exile. Tyre, which also revolted, finally submitted after a twelve years' siege (585-573). With Nebuchadnezzar died the promise of the new Babylonian Empire. The growing power of the Medes required able kings to resist it, and the successors of Nebuchadnezzar were men of little capacity. Nabunaid, a native Babylonian, who came to the throne in 555, is the last of the native kings of Babylon; an amiable antiquarian but no soldier, he devoted himself to reading inscriptions and building temples, while the Medes overran Mesopotamia. But it was the Persians, not the Medes, who were destined to succeed to Babylon's inheritance. Cyrus, after he had overthrown Astyages the Mede and defeated Croesus, turned his arms against Babylon (c. 546). Belshazzar, son of Nabunaid, was called upon to conduct the defence, and apparently the invaders were checked for some years by the conversion of the country round Babylon into a swamp. But at length in 539 the great city fell, and Cyrus, here as elsewhere a merciful conqueror, himself ascended the Babylonian throne.

Of the great civilization of Babylonia much might be written, but a few words must suffice here. The Euphrates district was in ancient times a land of great fertility, but

dependent for its success on a good artificial water-supply ; from early times, therefore, the land was intensively cultivated and an elaborate system of canals provided the necessary water. The life of the land centred in its cities, each of which had its own god, who was considered to own the city and to assign lands to its kings and priests. Temples were the principal buildings, and brick, not wood or stone, was the chief building material. The important caste of the priests controlled all intellectual life and made the astronomical observations for which Babylonian civilization is famous. Of Babylonian religion as a system we cannot speak with confidence ; the names of many gods are known, but their relations to one another are not easily defined. One interesting feature is the spread of the worship of Marduk with the growth of his city, Babylon. That the Babylonians were capable of deep religious feeling is certain ; Judaism grew up largely on Babylonian soil. Of the mythical epics, the tale of Gilgamesh, the Babylonian Hercules, with its episode of the Flood, is the most interesting.

SECTION 2. ASSYRIA

Hitherto our attention has been concentrated on the land of Babylonia proper : we must now look north and west to lands, which, although within the circle of direct Babylonian influence, yet pursued mainly independent political destinies. The recent excavations at Ashur, the ancient capital of the country, have revealed to us the names of Assyrian rulers extending back into the past beyond the rise of the Dynasty of Babylon. They already speak and write a Semitic tongue, but they maintain close connexions with settlements in Cappadocia, and in the population there appears to have been a strong admixture of northern blood. Later, about 1430, the Tell-el-Amarna



Letter from king Tushratta of Mitanni to
the king of Egypt

tablets show us a king Tushratta of Mitanni, who ruled in Mesopotamia and corresponded with the kings of Egypt, claiming suzerainty over Assyria. To the north and west of him lay the Hittites, but his own kingdom was probably Indo-European. This kingdom may have been founded as early as about 2000 B.C.; it fell before the Hittites in 1350. It was at some date round about 1700-1650, during the troubled years which followed the close of the First Babylonian Dynasty, that Assyria shook off her dependence on Babylonia and asserted her independence. The Assyrians were largely Semites and show the characteristic "Jewish" type. The political and military strength, which the country developed, was probably due to the existence of a free peasantry, which supplied a strong national army. About 1400 we find Assur-uballit claiming recognition in Egypt as an independent king. We have seen above¹ how he intervened in Babylonia and placed his great-grandson, Kurigalzu, on the throne. His successor, Bel-nirari, had wars to wage with this same Kurigalzu. The next king but one, Adad-nirari I, made the first great addition to the Assyrian power; he conquered the territory of Mitanni and successfully rebuffed the efforts of Babylonia to question his conquest. His son, Shalmaneser I, maintained his hold on Mesopotamia and made conquests and founded Assyrian colonies to the north in Armenia; he also transferred his capital from Assur to Kalkhi (Calah). Tukulti-ninib conquered Babylonia (c. 1250) and placed his vassal on the throne; but the Hittite power was still strong and aimed at interference with Assyrian plans of expansion. After a short reign, the Assyrian king was murdered, as it seems, in a mutiny, and for the time the kingdom declined and Mesopotamia was lost. But Assyria soon recovered strength; Assur-dan and his successors reconquered Mesopotamia, and the great conqueror,

¹ See p. 7.

Tiglath-pileser I (c. 1100), pushed his arms as far west as Syria; he conquered Babylon, but was then defeated and lost Mesopotamia. Under his successors, Assyria was weak and unpretentious and kept the peace with Babylon, while Mesopotamia was overrun by the invading Aramaeans.

But, about 950, a new Assyrian dynasty of kings arose, the most famous and powerful of whom was Assurnasir-pal II (884-860), an able but brutal conqueror, who suppressed the revolt of Bit-khadippi in Mesopotamia and subdued a number of princes in those regions. In 878 Akhuni, king of Bit-Adini in north Mesopotamia, was conquered, and in 877 an Assyrian expedition into Phoenicia forced Carchemish and other states to submit. Assur, which had again become the capital, gave place to Kalkhi.

Shalmaneser II reduced the rebel Akhuni of Bit-Adini and subdued most of the Aramaean princes of Mesopotamia. But in 854, in an expedition to the west, he was defeated by the allied forces of Damascus, Hamath and Israel, at the battle of Karkar, and a second attack on Damascus in the years 849-8 was equally unsuccessful. Later Jehu of Israel did homage to him, but Hazael, who had usurped the throne of Damascus, still made good his defence.

Further north, however, the states of Meletene and Patin acknowledged Assyrian supremacy. In 852-1 Babylon was attacked and reduced to vassalage. In 840 and 835-4 the king was warring in the Taurus district, and in 851, 850 and 845 took the field against the new power of Urartu, which had been founded around Lake Van in Armenia and was actually encroaching on the Assyrian possessions. Expeditions against the wild tribes to the north-east of Assyria fill in the years 860, 844 and 836. In 829 most of Assyria revolted against Shalmaneser under his son, Assur-danin-apli, but another son, Shamshi-Adad, starting as king in Mesopotamia, regained Assyria (825) and undertook expeditions to the north and against




Assyrians besieging a city

Babylon. His son Adad-nirari III (812-783) fought against Arpad and Khazazi (Azaz) (806-5) and received tribute from Damascus, Tyre, Sidon, Edom, Israel and Philistia. Shalmaneser III (783-773) was mainly engaged in checking the growing power of Urartu. Assur-dan III (773-763) waged war with Damascus (773) and Babylon (771 and 767), and finally fell before a revolt in Assyria in 763. The next king, Assur-nirari III (754-746), again removed the court to Assur. As to the cause of the revolt against Assur-dan and its results we can only form conjectures. Probably the return to the old capital implies a victory of the priests over the military party. The old peasant class was rapidly dying out, and the struggle for power lay between the priests, who claimed respect for tradition and, above all, for their own vested rights, and the army, which only lived for war and conquest. Babylon took the opportunity of revolting in 763 and remained for a time independent. The victory of the priests was not a lasting one. In 746 the army reasserted itself and raised one of its captains to the throne, under the name of Tiglath-pileser IV. The new king, a great warrior, spent the whole of his reign in wars. Babylonia was reconquered in 745 and Arpad had to submit in 741-739. In 742 Tiglath-pileser defeated Sarduris II of Urartu and repeated the attack in 737-5. Assyrian supremacy was reasserted in Phoenicia, and Ahaz of Judah, besieged in Jerusalem by the armies of Israel and Damascus, appealed successfully to Assyria for protection. The siege was raised, Pekah of Israel fell, and a new king, Hoshea, was set up by the Assyrian party. In 734 Philistia was attacked, in 732 Damascus fell and in 731-729 Babylonia, after revolt, was again subdued.

Shalmaneser IV, the successor of Tiglath-pileser, reigned from 727 to 722 and, provoked once more by Israel, began the siege of Samaria. But, before the hostile capital fell, Shalmaneser had perished and a usurper, Sargon,

supported by the priestly party, had seized the throne. Sargon was a man of great energy and ability, and had to justify his usurpation by suppressing the revolts which broke out on every side. Babylon, assisted by Elam, rose against him; his first attack on it failed (721) and it was not till 710 that he drove out the Chaldaean Merodach-baladan. In 720 Sargon defeated the allied forces of Damascus, Hamath and Egypt at Raphia, and suppressed all discontent in that quarter. Samaria fell, and the bulk of the Israelite upper classes were carried into captivity. In 719-718, 716-715 and 714 Sargon took the field against king Rusas of Urartu. The power of the enemy had already been shaken by the invasion of the wild Cimmerians from the north, and in 714 it was finally broken; but Sargon's policy was a doubtful one, for the crushing of Urartu deprived Assyria of an invaluable protection against the barbarians who were swarming on her northern frontiers. In the west Sargon was consistently successful. In 717 Carchemish fell; in 711 an alliance, consisting of Egypt, Gaza and Ashdod was defeated, and, further up, Sargon advanced into northern Syria and Cappadocia. Sargon died, apparently in battle, in 705, and his son, Sennacherib, succeeded him (705-681). He suppressed the revolt of Babylon in 703, and finally in 689, to put an end to such revolts, took and destroyed the city. In the west Luli of Tyre and Hezekiah of Israel rose in revolt. Sennacherib hastened up to the scene and Luli fled to Cyprus; Hezekiah held out in his stronghold of Jerusalem but lost all the outlying parts of his territory. Late in his reign Sennacherib suffered a terrible disaster, probably due to pestilence, on an expedition against Egypt and Palestine, and was murdered by the priestly party in 681. Sennacherib it was who first made Nineveh a mighty city and a fit rival in splendour to the ancient Babylon. His son Esarhaddon, who succeeded him, was a man of a less



Sennacherib receiving prisoners

vigorous but more humane type; acceding, we may imagine, to the wishes of the priests, he at once restored Babylon (681), thus undoing his father's work. In the main, Esarhaddon was a peaceful ruler, intent on preserving rather than on extending his empire. The war that broke out with Elam in 674 was due to Elamite aggression and was speedily ended by an Assyrian victory. But the reign was marked by one great foreign enterprise, the long-expected attack on Egypt. Egypt had for years been the steady opponent of Assyria in Palestine, and peace could only be secured by her humiliation. Sidon revolted and was destroyed in 678 and in 670, Tyre, after a siege, submitted to pay tribute. The way was then clear for the attack on the arch-enemy. In 670 Egypt was invaded and the Ethiopian prince, Taharqa, was easily expelled, and vassal-princes were set up in the north. In 668 Taharqa returned, and Tyre seized the opportunity of revolting again; but, on the repulse of the Ethiopian, she made haste to submit. In 668 a revolt, fostered, no doubt, by the military party, broke out against Esarhaddon in Assyria, and his sons Assurbanipal and Shamash-shum-ukin were crowned kings in Assyria and Babylon respectively; Esarhaddon himself, now restricted to the command of the western army, died on the march for Egypt. Assurbanipal was the last great king of Assyria and became, for after times, under the Greek name of Sardanapalus, the type of Assyrian pomp and pride. Taharqa, we have seen, was again driven from Egypt, and his nephew Tanut-Amen had no better success; he was driven south and Thebes was destroyed (? 667-6). But losses began to fall heavily on Assyria. To the north of Syria the Assyrian power was declining before the Cimmerians, and in Egypt the vassal-prince of Memphis and Sais, Psammetichus, revolted (c. 657) and founded a new independent kingdom of Egypt. In Asia Minor, a Phrygian kingdom, founded in the eighth

century by Indo-European invaders, had gone down before the Cimmerians, and the new power of Lydia, founded by Gyges in the early seventh century, had to continue the struggle against the barbarians. About 668 or 667 Gyges, hard pressed by these enemies, did homage and sought Assyrian aid, but, finding no help there and gaining a respite from his enemies, he threw off the nominal suzerainty of Assyria and showed a readiness to support the rebel Psammetichus. About 660 the Elamites invaded Babylonia, but were repulsed by an Assyrian army, which advanced up to the walls of Susa. In 652 Shamash-shum-ukin of Babylon rose against his brother, but was defeated, and Assurbanipal ruled as king in Babylon from 648 till his death in 626. Elam was made to suffer for its interference; its power was finally broken and Susa was captured (c. 648). But Assyrian power was fatally weakened by incessant warfare, and the crippling of Elam only opened the way for more dangerous enemies. Urartu to the north was already hard pressed by the Cimmerians, and on the whole of the eastern frontier the Medes and other tribes began to threaten. In the years 628–626 a horde of Scythian invaders swept over the Assyrian Empire from one side to the other, and, though it finally disposed of the other enemy, the Cimmerians, it must have helped to weaken the already shattered Assyrian power.

Assurbanipal himself, however, was not fated to see the destruction of his country's greatness; he died in 626, and it is only later legend that has invented the dramatic story of his death in the flames of his palace. His successors were weak and incapable of stemming the tide of attack. Babylon resumed its independence under Nabopolassar, and, in alliance with Cyaxares the Mede, threw itself on the hated tyrant. By 609 Mesopotamia was already in the hands of Nabopolassar, and, when in 606, Cyaxares attacked Nineveh, the city could make no resistance and

was razed to the ground. The Assyrian, who for centuries had conquered and ravaged other states, met a like fate himself. The nation had long since ceased to exist as a force by itself; Assyria had come to be simply a military power, and, with the fall of her supremacy, she vanished, leaving little behind her save a memory of fear and hate. The conquerors divided the spoils; to Cyaxares fell the east and the north from Elam to Asia Minor, to Nabopolassar, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine.


In civilization, Assyria was entirely dependent on Babylonia for inspiration. The one thing peculiar to her was her exceptional military efficiency, due, as has been already suggested, to a sturdy peasant class. With the gradual exhaustion of the peasantry the army became a mercenary one. The chief arms were the heavy-armed infantry, the war-chariots and the bowmen; cavalry played a relatively unimportant part. In her earlier days Assyria founded colonies in conquered territory; but later, when her population could no longer answer to the demand, she either contented herself with extorting tribute from her conquered enemies or else converted them into Assyrian provinces. Each province was placed under an Assyrian governor, but, apart from the payment of tribute, had no special connexion with the central government. The importance of Assyria in the world's history lies not in her constructive, but in her destructive powers. Everywhere she appeared as a ruthless and brutal destroyer; to break national resistance, she would either stamp out an entire population or ruthlessly uproot it and transfer it to a distant part of the empire. Such a policy can certainly claim no deliberate merit; but it was of vast and far-reaching consequence, inasmuch as it stamped out distinct nationalities in a large part of the Nearer East, and prepared the way for a new cosmopolitan civilization, in which not race

but religion was the principal force. Seldom has poetic justice been so completely satisfied as when Assyria perished, as she had lived, by the sword.

SECTION 3. ELAM

The country known to us as Elam lies to the east of Babylonia and to the north of the Persian Gulf. Of the nationality and language of the Elamites we have no sure knowledge; for, though Elamite inscriptions, written in cuneiform, are found, they give us little information and we can only trace the history of the land in its relations with Babylon and Assyria. At an early date the Elamites began to invade Babylonia—always from the north—and, at a date near 2400, temporarily won that country and possibly raided as far west as the Mediterranean. Again, about 1950, we find an Elamite king reigning in Larsa, and fighting, with varying success, against Hammurabi of Babylon. The Kassite invasion seems to have extended to Elam but did not lead to any political union between it and Babylonia. Kurigalzu of Babylon waged war with the Elamites; but, after his time, they again conquered Babylonia, and, a little after the year 1000, an Elamite prince ruled in Babylon itself. A period of weakness seems to have ensued; when Elam again appears on the scene, we find her king, Khumbanigash (743-717) placing a vassal, Merodach-baladan, on the throne of Babylon. His successor, Shutur-nakhundi (717-699), was defeated by Sargon and forced to abandon his support of Merodach-baladan; he replaced him on his throne in 703 but was once more defeated and repulsed by Sargon's successor, Sennacherib.

The next king of Elam, Khallushu, rebelled against Assyria and placed a vassal on the Babylonian throne;



Battle between Assurbanipal and Teumman

but in 694 Sennacherib declared war, defeated the Elamites and destroyed Babylon (689). Elam, however, continued to support the Chaldaeans against Assyria, until Urtaku (676-665) changed his policy and courted Assyrian friendship. But Urtaku's brother, Teumman, succeeding, it would seem, by violence, to the throne, started to massacre the dead king's family; when Assyria gave refuge to Elamite exiles, war broke out again and Assurbanipal defeated Teumman in a great battle near Susa. When Shamash-shum-ukin of Babylon revolted against his brother, Assurbanipal, the Elamites joined in the rebellion. But they shared in the defeat of the Babylonian king (652) and, finally, late in his reign, Assurbanipal captured Susa and thus shattered the Elamite power. It was probably at about this time (c. 635) that the Medes broke in and took possession of the country; the Assyrians, in fact, in crippling Elam, only paved the way for a more formidable foe. The one definite fact known about Elamite civilization is that the influence of Babylonia was predominant.

SECTION 4. MEDES AND PERSIANS

The land of Media, the "Anzan" of the Babylonians, consisted in early times of a number of small independent kingdoms, inhabited by a race probably akin to the Elamites. We cannot fix precisely the original home of the Medes, but they were without doubt Indo-Europeans, and may have followed the earlier invaders of that race who in the first half of the second millennium already begin to make their appearance in Nearer Asia. At least as early as the ninth century B.C. they occupied Media and appear from 836 onwards in Assyrian inscriptions. They were a brave and warlike people; but at first they were divided into a number of small independent cantons and, though never really conquered by Assyria, were

occasionally constrained to pay tribute. Another Indo-European tribe, the Ashkuza, came into Armenia in the seventh century and founded an empire that stretched west as far as Syria, until it finally fell before the Medes. Deioces and Phraortes are named by Herodotus as the first kings of a united Media; their territory included Elam and Persis and marched on the west with the empire of the Ashkuza. Cyaxares, son of Phraortes, was the first to make Media a great power; he subdued the Ashkuza, and, then, in alliance with Nabopolassar of Babylon, destroyed the Assyrian Empire and sacked Nineveh (606). The whole of the north of that empire as far west as the Halys fell to his share, and in 585 he fought a drawn battle with his new neighbour, king Alyattes of Lydia; Babylon and Cilicia negotiated an armistice between the rivals. Astyages, the successor of Cyaxares, attacked Harran in Mesopotamia but was surprised and overthrown by a pretender Cyrus, at the head of the Persians (c. 550). The victor had started his career as a vassal of the Median king, and it has been suggested that he may even have been himself a Mede and only have been associated in later legend with the Persian noble house of the Achaemenids. This is perhaps going too far, and certainly his victory meant the national triumph of the Persians. Their original home was the little land of Persis to the east of the ancient Elam, and, before the time of Cyrus, they had never been a serious political power. They now succeeded to the empire of the whole of the Nearer East; but the Medes ranked with the Persians as the aristocracy in the new state, and the Greeks learned to describe the empire indifferently as "Persian" or "Median." The sudden advance of Cyrus must have aroused the bitter jealousy of every rival power, and a coalition of Babylon, Lydia and Egypt threatened to crush him. But he struck before his enemies had had time to concert their action. Lydia was

the first to be assailed ; Croesus, confident of victory, met Cyrus on the Halys, but was compelled, after a stubborn battle, to fall back on his capital city of Sardis (547). Cyrus pushed on in pursuit, gained a second victory, and captured the city, before Croesus's allies could stir hand or foot to help him (546). Leaving his general Harpagus to impose Persian dominion on the Greek cities of the coast, Cyrus himself turned to settle with his next enemy, Babylon. The campaign lasted over several years, and the Babylonians, under Belshazzar, offered a stubborn resistance. But in 539 the city fell and Cyrus succeeded to the throne as lawful king. The rest of Cyrus' life was devoted to the east of his empire, where he probably extended his frontier to Gedrosia and the river Jaxartes : it was in battle against the savage Massagetae on his north-eastern bounds that he met his death in 530. His son and successor Cambyses completed his father's work by the conquest of Egypt (525). But, while he was still in the conquered land, a revolt broke out against him at home. He had put to death, on suspicion of treachery, his own brother Smerdis, and his enemies, consisting largely of priests (*magi*), set up a pretender Bardiya (*pseudo-Smerdis*), giving him out to be the king's brother whose death was not generally known. Cambyses died on his way home to suppress the revolt and, for the moment, the *pseudo-Smerdis* held his place. But Darius, son of Hystaspes, the next heir, conspired with six fellow nobles, overthrew the usurper and, probably in the course of a single year, established his sovereignty over the whole of the Persian Empire¹.

¹ For the subsequent history of Persia see below *passim*.

SECTION 5. ARMENIA

From early times we hear of "kings of Gutium," ruling in the country known to us as Armenia. It was under Tiglath-pileser I that Assyria first came into contact with the tribes of these regions—peoples of Hittite affinities to the west, Medes to the east of Lake Van. The kingdom of Urartu, with its centre on Lake Van, was founded about the middle of the ninth century, and Shalmaneser II took the field against its kings on three or four occasions. The new power expanded to the north and east, and under Sarduris I and his successors began to push southward against Assyria and to exchange the rôle of assailed for that of assailant. In 742, however, Sarduris II was defeated by the Assyrians in an expedition to the west, and his successor, Rusas, was broken by the repeated attacks of Sargon in the years 719-714. In its last days, under Sarduris III, Urartu sought the help of its old enemy Assyria against invaders from the north; it was probably finally swept away by the Medes. It was after the fall of the Assyrian Empire that the Armenians, an Indo-European race who held the country in later times, first took possession.

SECTION 6. ASIA MINOR

The east of Asia Minor forms a rough mountain-land, which has never for long formed a political unity. It was here, that, at some date before 1800, the Hittite Empire arose; its centre was at Pteria (Boghaz-Keui) and the Hittites of Syria were simply an offshoot from this power. We know of a number of other tribes, Iberians, Albanians and Colchians in the north, Pisidians, Isaurians and Lycaonians in the south. But ethnology, apart from history, must not detain us, and the writer of an outline

history must wait until his authorities have some definite results to offer him. To the west of the Halys lay a number of tribes, of common Indo-European stock, forming a certain racial unity—the Phrygians, the Mysians, the Lydians, Carians and Lycians. The Hittite Empire, at its zenith (1350–1250), may have extended almost to the western coast. After its fall arose the Phrygian kingdom of Midas, known to us only in myth and by a few allusions in Assyrian annals. The Cimmerians, the wild invaders from the north, swept away this power not later than the early seventh century, and the Lydian kingdom of Gyges (c. 700–655), which succeeded it, had to take over the struggle against the barbarian invaders. Gyges himself fell in battle against them, and his successor, Ardys, was perpetually plagued by their attacks. But at last the danger passed, and the succeeding kings, Sadyattes, Alyattes and Croesus were able to found the Lydian power on a firm basis and encroach on the liberties of the Greek cities of the coasts. Alyattes was already a powerful monarch and fought a drawn battle with Cyaxares the Mede in 585. How Lydia fell before the rising power of Cyrus we have seen in an earlier section¹.

SECTION 7. SYRIA

By Syria we denote the country bounded on the west by the Mediterranean, on the east by the Euphrates, on the north by the Taurus range and on the south by Lebanon. The independent history of the country begins with the coming of the Hittites—a people, distinct, apparently, from both Indo-Europeans and Semites, which had founded an empire in Asia Minor round its central fortress of Pteria (Boghaz-Keui)². At about 1400 the Hittites profited by the decline of Egyptian power in north Syria to force

¹ Cp. § 4 above and also, for the later kings, the history of Greece.

² Cp. § 6 above.

their way into the land; they subdued the kingdom of Mitanni and substituted their own supremacy for that of Egypt. Seti I (1327-1317) and Ramses II (1317-1250) attempted to oust the usurpers, and the latter gained a great victory at Kadesh. But the Hittites gained compensating successes and Ramses was glad to conclude peace and alliance with them on equal terms in 1297-6. The fact that Egypt formally renounced her claim to north Syria proves conclusively that the Hittites had, at the worst, fought a drawn battle. The Hittite power in Syria finally collapsed before the great horde of tribes that swept down through Syria on Egypt in the reign of Ramses III (c. 1192). The Hittites still held on in Carchemish; the new masters of Syria speedily fell under Assyrian rule. But a new national element was already on the scene; from about 1500 the Aramaeans had begun to encroach on Syria from the south-east, and had founded a kingdom of Patin, which stretched its boundary as far north as the Taurus, till it fell a victim to Assyria. The kingdom of Damascus, founded by Rezon, was Aramaean from the start and waged constant war with the kingdom of Israel. Benhadad (c. 885-844) succeeded in rallying Hamath and Israel to his assistance and repulsed Shalmaneser II at the battle of Karkar (854). Hazael, who succeeded to the throne by revolt, had to face the Assyrian attack single-handed. But he was equal to the task; he repelled the Assyrians and waged bitter war against Israel, which had done homage to the foe. After an interval, however, we find Damascus reduced to paying tribute to Assyria (738). A few years later came a revolt and king Rezin joined with Pekah of Israel in an attack on Judah, then a vassal of Assyria (735). Tiglath-pileser, however, came to the assistance, raised the siege of Jerusalem and in 732 captured Damascus; the last independent state of Syria was gone.

Of Hittite civilization we cannot as yet form any clear picture, though we see that it had features to distinguish it from the Egyptian and Babylonian; the Aramaeans, who succeeded the Hittites, had certainly no independent culture of their own. The system of small states in Syria hindered the growth of a national life; and Syria shows us, as might have been expected, little more than a blend of Egyptian and Babylonian influences.

SECTION 8. PHOENICIA

Phoenicia, the country bounded on the east by the Syrian desert, on the north by Syria, on the south by Anti-Libanus, on the west by the Mediterranean, was, in early times, a region of small states, inhabited by kinsmen of the Babylonian Semites. The great Canaanitish immigration came in two waves—the former, the Phoenician, which swept into the land c. 2500 B.C., and was pushed on to the coast by the Canaanites of the Bible—the latter, the Hebraic, including, beside the Israelites, the Ammonites, Moabites and Edomites, which may be assigned approximately to the early 14th century B.C. The chief city states founded by the Phoenicians were Arpad, Gebal, Beirut, Tyre and Sidon. The two latter, always deadly rivals, were, as a rule, the chief powers in the land; the use of the term “Sidonians” to describe the whole race may point to an early religious supremacy of Sidon. The Egyptian domination in Palestine, founded by the 18th dynasty, is reflected for us in the Tell-el-Amarna letters; even when Egyptian power in Syria declined, Phoenicia was still retained and Ramses II successfully defended it against the Hittites. In the 11th century Tyre and Sidon came into prominence; Hiram of Tyre dominated the whole of the Phoenician coast and cultivated friendly relations with the new kingdom of David and Solomon. For some years

after this we know nothing of Tyre beyond the names of its kings ; a certain Ithoba'al, who was king c. 900, gave his daughter Jezebel in marriage to Ahab of Israel. In the ninth century Sidon, which had become a vassal of Tyre, resumed her independence, but Assyria had now stretched her hand over Phoenicia and in 842 both cities paid her tribute. In 738 Tyre is again found in control of Sidon and in 730-729 king Metten II risked a war with Assyria, which ended in his discomfiture. In 679-8 Sidon revolted against Assyria and was destroyed ; the old religious supremacy passed to Tyre. In 673 Ba'al of Tyre joined Taharqa of Egypt in resistance to Esarhaddon, and again revolted when Taharqa returned to Egypt in 668 ; but on both occasions, after the defeat of his ally, he hastened to make peace. The fall of Assyria reawakened hopes of independence, and Tyre stood a siege by the Babylonians from 585-573, but was at last forced to pay tribute. The victorious Cyrus restored Sidon and destroyed the political independence of Tyre. Under Persian rule Phoenicia enjoyed an unambitious prosperity, and even some political importance, as the chief recruiting ground for the Persian fleet.

The deep obscurity that involves the early history of Phoenicia gives free scope to the hypotheses of the modern scholar, with the result that the Phoenician race has received alternately praise and blame far in excess of its probable deserts. At the time when the Greeks first took to the sea, the Phoenicians were the great merchant-adventurers of the world, and had already visited most of the shores of the Mediterranean in the search for gain. Before their gifted rivals the Phoenicians soon gave ground, and only in the further west could Carthage hold the national inheritance. But, even if the accounts of the early glories of Phoenician commerce have been exaggerated, there is no excuse for going to the other extreme and reducing them from the

start to paltry proportions. The Phoenician religion, as far as we can grasp it, seems to have been cruel and lascivious and to have corresponded truly to the national character. The one great contribution of the land to the civilization of the world is the alphabet; for from the Phoenician through the Greek all our modern European alphabets are derived.

SECTION 9. CARTHAGE

At an early date, fixed by tradition in the year 845, the great city of Carthage was founded by Phoenicians on the African coast, nearly opposite the toe of Italy; the true date is probably much earlier. The foundation myth, which makes Dido (or Elissa) the founder, is quite unhistoric; Dido is nothing but the goddess Astarte in human form. We must regard Carthage as a colony of Phoenicia in general; it was only after the supplanting of Sidon by Tyre that she honoured Tyre as her parent city. Of the other cities of the African coast, Utica, Hadrumetum, Leptis, the two Hippos, it is probable that Utica, at least, was an earlier foundation than Carthage; even when, with the rest, she fell under Carthaginian domination, she always retained a certain *amour propre*. Our information is scanty and hardly begins before about 600, when the Greeks first came into touch with the Carthaginians. About 562 Carthage, in alliance with Etruria, compelled the Phocaeans to abandon their foundation of Alalia in Corsica, and the Carthaginian general Malchus fought in Sicily and Sardinia and set a limit to the Greek expansion. The constitution of Carthage was aristocratic, and the rule was entirely in the hands of a limited ring of great families. Malchus, supported by the army, attempted to break their power, but fell in the attempt, and we next find the house of Mago at the head

of the state—commanding in the wars and representing the Families. The later history of Carthage will be best considered in connexion with that of Greece and Rome.

SECTION IO. ISRAEL

The history of the Hebrews in Palestine is known to us mainly from the historical books of the Old Testament, and we must start with a few words about those interesting documents. They fall into two distinct sections, (1) the so-called "Prophetic" History, written in connexion with the Book of the Law which was published by Josiah in Judah in 621 B.C., and including the bulk of the Hexateuch, most of Judges, most of Samuel I and II and I and II Kings, and (2) the "Priestly" History, associated with the Law of Ezra and Nehemiah, which was proclaimed in 444 B.C., and including parts of the Hexateuch, I and II Chronicles, Ezra and Nehemiah. The "Priestly" History is of little value except for the later events of Jewish history, which are chronicled in the two books last-named above. The "Prophetic" Books have a far higher historical character; apart from a mass of ancient national myth and legend, they supply us with the oldest genuine historical memorials of the race, the tales of great men such as Gideon, Saul and David, or songs of triumph, such as that of Deborah, and, further, with a valuable consecutive account of the history of the nation under its kings from the time of David to the Captivities. They are animated by a strong religious spirit, but, fortunately for us, show, beside the bias of the partisan, a regard for historical fact.

The Hebrews formed part of the latter section of the great Canaanitish immigration and pressed in from the desert upon Palestine, together with the Amorites, Ammonites, Moabites and Edomites, at a date possibly not

much later than 1400 B.C. The tale of the sojourn in Egypt and the wanderings in the desert, which formed part of the nation's firm belief, is usually rejected by modern scholars, as insufficiently attested by evidence; but it seems to be at least possible to believe with Hall¹ that the Hebrews may have dwelt in Egypt during the Hyksos period. At any rate a section of the tribes, which invaded the country from the south and not from east of the Jordan, may for long, as nomads, have occupied the eastern fringe of the Delta. On entering Palestine, the Hebrews found in possession a number of tribes of Canaanites, racially akin to themselves but morally and religiously repellent; they therefore refused to treat them as kinsmen and, whenever possible, rooted them out. But we must not forget that room was left for peaceful amalgamation; and that the northern tribes, in particular, found no great difficulty in settling down among the Canaanites. After long struggles the Hebrews secured a firm hold on Palestine and gradually founded a number of separate city-kingdoms. The fierce struggles of this early period of occupation are mirrored in the Book of Judges; the Hebrews were as yet disunited and weak, but later ages celebrated the great deliverers—Gideon, Jephthah, Samson—who from time to time arose to smite the nation's enemies. Naturally, when the attempt to expel the Canaanites failed and the Hebrews were forced to live side by side with them, they lost much of their abhorrence for alien customs and absorbed much of the Canaanitish culture. The coast was never securely occupied; and, about 1190 B.C., the Philistines, a section of the great horde of the invaders of Egypt, settled there and, with their five great cities, Gath, Gaza, Ascalon, Ashdod and Ekron, soon became a strong power. For

¹ In his *Ancient History of the Nearer East*.

the time the Israelites were compelled to bow to the Philistine yoke ; but a national reaction against oppression ensued and, under Saul, the Benjamite, as king, the Hebrews reasserted their independence. During the reign of Saul, a new power was founded at Ziklag in the south by the national hero, David. Starting thence, David gained possession of Judah and Jerusalem and, when Saul fell in battle against the Philistines (a little before 1000 B.C.), put to death his son, Ishbaal, and seized his kingdom. During Saul's lifetime, David had been compelled, as Saul's weaker rival, to court the Philistine protection ; but, once undisputed king in Israel, he took up the national struggle and speedily confined the Philistines to their possessions on the coast. Supported by good captains and a brave army, David conquered Damascus, Ammon, Amalek, Moab and Edom and made his kingdom supreme over all his near neighbours. Later in the reign, David's favourite son, Absalom, rebelled against his father but lost his life in the revolt. When David died (c. 974), his son Solomon was placed on the throne by the priestly party, while the general Joab and his nominee Adonijah were both put to death. In legend, Solomon figures as the model of wisdom and has come down to us, in later myth, as the great master of magic, whose spells could command demons. In the cold light of history, however, he appears as a typical eastern monarch, luxurious and ostentatious, mainly interested in his harem and in lavish building. The power of David continued with his son, but began to show traces of decay ; Edom revolted and an independent kingdom arose at Damascus. The building of the temple at Jerusalem by Solomon had great consequences for the future ; for it marked the definite adoption of Jahve, the god worshipped above all others by David, as the national god and the beginning of the religious struggle for a pure monotheism, in contrast to the cruel and often debased

polytheism of the surrounding tribes. It was in this age of national strength and union that the scheme of the Twelve Tribes, associated with the sons of Jacob,—certainly not strictly an historical one—was first generally accepted. On the death of Solomon (c. 934) the unity of the kingdom broke down ; the more highly civilized north (Israel) found a king of its own in Jeroboam, while only the rougher south (Judah) remained faithful to Solomon's son, Rehoboam. With the political connexion with Jerusalem the northern tribes discarded also the exclusive worship of Jahve, and Jeroboam made a policy of fostering the old cults of Dan and Bethel. The two kingdoms were for years at constant feud ; Israel was decidedly the stronger and Judah was hard put to it to maintain her independence. The dynasty of Jeroboam ended with his son Nadab, who was murdered (c. 910) by Baasha. Baasha had a long and successful reign, but his son Elah was murdered by a pretender Zimri, who himself fell a victim to the general, Omri (c. 884). Under this new monarch Israel prospered greatly ; Omri, though probably a vassal of Damascus, conquered Moab, and his son and successor Ahab reduced Judah to vassalage. In 854 Ahab joined with Benhadad of Damascus and Irkhulina of Hamath to check Shalmaneser II at the battle of Karkar ; but shortly afterwards he rebelled against Damascus and, after some successes, fell in battle against its armies. The successors of Ahab, Ahaziah and Jehoram, again became vassals of Damascus. Ahab's reign was certainly far from inglorious ; but he had married Jezebel, a princess of Tyre, and was devoted to the worship of the god Ba'al ; this called down on him the furious opposition of Elijah and Elisha, the prophets of Jahve, and later tradition has judged Ahab's career almost entirely from this one point of view.

The history of Judah is mainly that of its relations with Israel. Early in the reign of Rehoboam, Sheshenk

of Egypt invaded Judah, captured Jerusalem and carried off temple treasures, but the raid had no lasting results. Asa repulsed an Egyptian attack and, by seeking the aid of Damascus, protected himself against Israel; but Jehosaphat and Jehoram were again vassals of the Northern Kingdom and the latter married Athaliah, daughter of Ahab. During Jehoram's reign Edom successfully revolted against Judah. Moab¹ revolted against Israel under Ahaziah, and his successor Jehoram, with his ally Jehosaphat, attempted, without success, to reconquer it. In Damascus, Hazael rose by rebellion to the throne and defeated Jehoram of Israel and Ahaziah of Judah in battle. At this moment a great national and religious movement, that had roots in both kingdoms, found vent in violent action; Jehu, the general in command of the armies at Gilead, was anointed to be king by Elisha, the prophet of Jahve, and, gaining the support of the army, he put the kings to death and seized the throne of Israel (c. 843 or 842). Jehu was a vigorous and not ungifted ruler. He did homage to Shalmaneser II, when he attacked Damascus, but later had to reckon with Hazael of Damascus and lost his territories east of Jordan. He seems to have started his reign with a genuine zeal for religious reform; but, in course of time, as practical difficulties arose, he abandoned his enthusiasm and reverted to the old cults of the Northern Kingdom. Jehu's successors, Jehoahaz and Joash, secured the protection of Assyria against Damascus, and Joash defeated Amaziah of Judah and restored Israelite supremacy. Under Jeroboam II Israel enjoyed its last taste of prosperity and power and recovered much of its lost territory; but after this long reign troubles came without intermission. A number of short reigns followed, until Pekah established himself firmly on the throne. The main question of foreign policy

Mesha, the Moabite king, has left us an account of his revolt on the so-called "Moabite Stone," now in the Louvre.

was the choice between the friendship of Damascus and the friendship of Assyria. Hitherto, the tendency had been to prefer the latter; but Pekah reversed the policy and took the field with Damascus against Assyria. The new policy was not justified by success. The allies were defeated, in 732 Damascus fell before Assyria and the north of Israel was lost. Pekah was overthrown by the party friendly to Assyria and Hoshea raised to the throne. As a vassal of Assyria, Israel might have continued to exist indefinitely; but Hoshea, misled by illusory hopes of assistance from Egypt, suspended the payment of tribute; in 724 the Assyrians began the siege of Samaria, in 722 the city fell and the flower of the population was transported to the neighbourhood of Harran in Mesopotamia, while strangers from Babylonia filled the vacant places. Thus the long agony closed and the Ten Tribes disappeared out of history. The distresses and terrors of the times had done much to deepen and purify religious feeling and the prophets had begun to teach that Jahve, though able, was not willing to save his people because of their sins; but this interesting religious development was abruptly ended by the destroying Assyrian.

We must now turn back and pick up the thread of history in Judah. The revolution that raised Jehu to the throne was planned to extend to Judah too; but there the queen-mother Athaliah defended herself with rare energy, thwarted the rebels, massacred the royal family and ruled in her own right for six years. But one son of Ahaziah, the little prince Joash, had escaped the massacre and had been kept in safety by the priests in the temple. They now brought him out of hiding, proclaimed him king and sent Athaliah to her death. Amaziah, the successor of Joash, reconquered Edom but was defeated and captured in a rash attack on Israel (c. 793). Judah again became vassal to Israel, and Edom revolted and remained


unsubdued. Ahaz, at first allied with Israel and Damascus, then turned aside to seek the Assyrian friendship. Besieged by Rezin of Damascus and Pekah of Israel in Jerusalem (c. 735), he was saved by Assyrian intervention. It was in these days of stress, that in Judah, as in Israel, the prophetic movement grew, as the expression of the deepest religious feelings of the nation, in revolt alike against debased popular conceptions of God and the stereotyped traditions of the priests. In politics, the only sane policy—and the prophets were usually wise enough to see this—was submission to Assyria. But Hezekiah, who became king c. 720, followed the counsels of the priestly party; relying on aid from Egypt, he revolted more than once against Assyria and, although the Assyrians failed to take Jerusalem, Hezekiah in the end had to submit. Manasseh, his son, who succeeded him c. 680, was the enemy of the priests and resumed the position of Assyrian vassal. His son Amon was slain by the priests in c. 743 and the young Josiah was made king. The power of Assyria was now rapidly on the decline and all over the country men began to dream of prosperity and liberty restored. This rebirth of national hopes was attended by a great religious revival; the priests, largely influenced by the prophetic movement, from which they had at first stood quite aloof, induced Josiah to publish and authorise in 621 the Book of the Law, in which the true worship of Jahve was taught; purity of religion was restored and various ancient abuses were mercilessly abolished. About 608 Josiah fell in battle against Necho of Egypt at Megiddo; his son Jehoahaz was deposed by the victor, who set up another son of Josiah, Jehoiakim, in his place. The fall of Assyria in 606 excited false hopes of liberty, but Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon soon proved to the world that nothing had taken place but a change of masters. Jehoiakim revolted in 603 but had to submit.

His successor Jehoiachin revolted again but was defeated (597), and a large part of the population was carried off captive. Mattaniah, a son of Josiah, reigned, under the name of Zedekiah, over the remnant of the nation; but in 586 he too rebelled and the fatal end came. Jerusalem was taken by the Babylonians and all the rest of the population that was of any account was dragged into captivity. The forebodings of the darker-visioned among the prophets had fulfilled themselves; Judah had not repented and her God had delivered her into the hands of her enemies.

It was in the exile in Babylonia that the religion known to us as Judaism was born. The religion of the Jews, similar in its origin to that of other Semitic tribes, had in course of time acquired a higher moral and spiritual character; the priests of Jerusalem taught that Jahve was a jealous God, demanding ceremonial purity of his worshippers; the prophets went further, declaring that he was a righteous God and required righteousness. It was the priests who, in exile, developed the ideas which animated the later Judaism, and their influence is predominating; but the abiding effects of the prophetic movement are seen in some of the higher moral conceptions of the new religion. The one thing that held the exiled Jews together was the hope of a return, and, as the political view changed and new powers appeared on the horizon, that hope became keen and lively. When Cyrus finally conquered Babylon in 539, the Jews were ready to welcome their deliverance. In 538 Cyrus, with his usual generosity in religious matters, gave the permission to return, and some forty-two thousand adults, including thirty thousand males, journeyed to Palestine under the lead of Sheshbazzar (probably a corruption of the name Sinbalusur), son of Jehoiachin. The exultation at this unexpected fulfilment of ancient hopes is revealed to us in the magnificent religious poem which

we know as "Second Isaiah"; Israel is the "servant of the Lord," despised but not forsaken, destined to show forth the glory of God among the nations. But the returning exiles found grievous disappointments awaiting them. The land was desolate and hostile neighbours looked on them askance from Edom, Moab, Ammon and Samaria. The building of the temple was begun, but the Persian king, Cambyses, was induced by the Jews' enemies to suspend the work. Finally Darius decided in favour of the Jews, and Zerubbabel, son of Sinbalusur, completed the building, in 515. But fresh troubles arose, Zerubbabel was deposed and the community at Jerusalem fell into a state of stagnation. The impulse towards a revival did not come for many years and, when it came, it came from without. The Jews of Babylonia, who formed a large and flourishing class, still looked to Jerusalem as the centre of the national religion; for the sake of pure Judaism, true religion must prevail there. In 458 they won over king Artaxerxes¹ to their views and Ezra, the priest, was despatched to introduce the "Book of the Law of Moses" as a royal law to the Jews. Ezra journeyed with a large company to Jerusalem and, by chidings and entreaties, induced the majority of the Jews to "purify" themselves, by abandoning illegal practices and, especially, by dissolving marriage-alliances with the heathen. But the neighbouring peoples threatened trouble, and, when Ezra, without royal authority, began to rebuild the decayed walls of the city, Recham, governor of Samaria, appealed to the court against him and caused the work to be suspended. But, in 446, Nehemiah, a devout Jewish layman, who stood high in the royal favour, received permission to go and complete the building. He succeeded in overriding all opposition; the walls of Jerusalem were rebuilt, and, after Ezra had

¹ I follow Eduard Meyer, who accepts the tradition, and does not transfer the whole story to the reign of Darius.



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
EGYPT

read aloud the Book of the Law, the nation solemnly bound itself to the strict observance of it (445). Thus was Judaism founded; the Jewish nation became a church, with priests and high-priest at its head, as a privileged caste. National hopes were postponed to the future day, when the Messiah should come; for the time the one duty of the good Jew was an unswerving obedience to ceremonial. Naturally enough there was opposition and in this even the priests, blind to their own true interests, sometimes joined; in 433 Nehemiah received a second mission to enforce the observance of the law. But gradually the new order came to be accepted; the nation enjoyed peace at home and prospered greatly abroad, pushing forward into Philistia, Peraea and Galilee. The Samaritans, the mixed population of part of the old Northern Kingdom, adopted a law, similar in its essence to that of the Jews; but they claimed Mt Gerizim, instead of Jerusalem, as the centre of worship and lived on terms of the bitterest hostility with men of an almost identical religion. Beyond the bounds of Palestine the Jews of the "Diaspora" kept themselves distinct from other men; the tribal religion had expanded into something wider and Jahve had become the god of the whole world, but the Jews were still his peculiar people. The keynote of this religion was the uncompromising submission of man to the will of God, as manifested in the law. That deep religious feelings could grow in it is proved by such documents as the Psalms and the Book of Job; but gradually external form and ceremony obscured the ideas that underlay them, and the Law came to act as a stifling check on all true moral and intellectual progress.

SECTION II. EGYPT

Egypt, the country of the Nile, the great river on which its fertility and prosperity depend, must be regarded, from every point of view but the strictly geographical, as an Asiatic and not an African state; its civilization and its political career are alike intimately connected with the great states of ancient times in Nearer Asia. The beginning of Egyptian history lies far back in the mists of antiquity; the latest date assigned to it is several centuries before 3000 B.C.¹ But, although Egyptian records cover so vast a period, they are really extremely scanty in amount. The one native authority in literature, Manetho, the priest (285-247 B.C.), who wrote a book entitled "*Αἰγυπτιακὰ ὑπομνήματα*," often gives us nothing but bare and almost unintelligible lists of kings; still, in the scarcity of our materials, he has been invaluable. Greek references to Egypt are quite untrustworthy for all events earlier than about 650 B.C. The one other great source of information is the native monuments, tombs, temples, statues, etc., with their hieroglyphic inscriptions. This hieroglyphic script can now be read by scholars with something like absolute certainty. It consists of three separate elements: (1) picture-signs and arbitrary signs for ideas, (2) arbitrary signs for syllables, (3) signs for letters, forming the basis of an alphabet but never used to the exclusion of (1) and (2). But, unfortunately, though the treasury of Egyptian literature has been unlocked, it has been found to contain comparatively little of a historical character, and the result is, that, at best, we have little more than the complete skeleton of history and often not even that. Egyptian chronology is far too difficult a subject to discuss in anything but a book for specialists; here we must simply accept the suggestions of others. Egyptian religion and civilization

¹ Some scholars would go back as far as c. 4800 B.C.



Mycerinus

will receive passing references ; but these subjects, again, are too complicated to be treated adequately in so short a space, and we must refer our readers, for a fuller treatment, to special treatises.

Of the period of perhaps some 400 years, represented by Manetho's first three dynasties, we cannot be said to know much. In North (Lower) Egypt the population seems to have been partly Semitic, partly Libyan, and akin to the early inhabitants of Crete ; the North formed originally a separate kingdom, probably centred at Buto. The nationality of the first inhabitants of South (Upper) Egypt has been much debated ; probably they were immigrants from the south-east, and akin to the Ethiopians, not, as has been suggested, Semitic invaders from Arabia. The one certain historical event of this time is the conquest of the North by the South and the foundation of a united Egypt, an achievement traditionally assigned to Manetho's first human king, Menes. Of the general conditions of this earliest Egyptian state a little more can be said. It had for neighbours, on the west the Libyans, in the deserts to the east of the Delta Semitic nomads, to the south and south-east the Nubians and Ethiopians. Agriculture was the basis of life, and land was mainly in the hands of a wealthy class, with many serfs dependent on it. The whole country was divided into a number of small districts (nomes)—each under its governor, each with its own special customs—which served as the units of government. The king enjoyed great state and was regarded with religious awe as the incarnation of a god ; his government was largely carried out by a bureaucracy of royal officers in towns and nomes. The chief gods of Egypt were the gods of light, and first among them the Sun-God, revered under many names¹, whose daily rising and setting were imaged

¹ E.g. Rā, Harmachis, Tmu ; Horus, originally the god of the whole sky, also acquired a peculiarly solar character.

in a number of myths. The most famous Egyptian god was Osiris, god of the dead, whose cult was at first localized in the Delta and at Abydos; he was represented as slain by the evil god Set, and avenged by Horus, his son by Isis. Characteristic of the Egyptians was the tendency to worship gods under animal forms; we need only mention the lion-headed Sekhet and the dog-headed Anubis. The Egyptians supposed the connexion of soul and body not to be entirely broken at death; therefore the body had to be carefully embalmed and preserved in a place of safety, that the soul might find it intact when it returned. The rich man, of course, was at pains to build himself a fine and durable grave. The kings naturally went even further; the grandest of all Egyptian monuments, the pyramids, were simply designed to be royal tombs.

To the next dynasty—Manetho's 4th—belong the great pyramid-builders, the kings Snefru, Khufu (Cheops), Khafra (Chephren) and Menkaura (Mycerinus). The pyramids all lie between Gizeh and the north-east corner of the Fayûm on the west bank of the Nile; round them lie the "mastabas," or tombs, of the officials of the court. The 5th dynasty was, like the 4th, one of pyramid-builders and probably arose at Heliopolis. The 6th dynasty, to which belong Teta, Ati, Pepi I and II, returned to Memphis and waged war against Libya and Nubia and also eastward in Palestine¹. With this dynasty closes the so-called Old Empire; its fall is supposed to have been due to the insubordination of the great nobles who surrounded the kings. The chief religious changes during the close of this period seem to have been the transference of Râ, the Sun-god of Heliopolis, to the head of the Egyptian pantheon, in place of the older Horus, and the spread of the worship of Osiris.

¹ Approximate dates: 1st-3rd dynasty, ? c. 3300-2900; 4th dynasty, c. 2900-2820; 5th dynasty, c. 2820-2700; 6th dynasty, c. 2700-2500.



Usertsen III

The Middle Kingdom, embracing the 7th to 17th dynasties, starts for us with a period of almost absolute darkness; from the 6th to the 12th dynasties we have little information beyond lists of kings. The 7th and 8th dynasties reigned at Memphis, the 9th and 10th at Heracleopolis. Then came civil war between kings of Heracleopolis and Thebes, ending in the establishment of the 11th dynasty, to which belong the kings Antef and Mentuhetep, in the latter city. Probably there came next a dynasty, erroneously reckoned by Manetho as the 13th, which ruled in Crocidopolis and made conquests in the south. The 12th dynasty apparently originated in Thebes, but later transferred its seat to the Fayûm. Light now dawns on the hitherto dark scene and Egypt appears, for the first time, as a fully united and organized kingdom. The old oligarchy of landed nobles has lost its prominence, and, in its place, we find a well-organized class of royal officials. Amenemhat I, the founder of the line, reigned from about 1995-1965; his son Usertsen (Senusert) I, who from 1975 ruled with his father, waged wars in Nubia and the Sinaitic peninsula and is known as a great builder at Abydos and Hieraconpolis. Amenemhat II was co-regent with his father Usertsen in 1933, and king from 1931 to 1898. Usertsen II (co-regent 1901, king 1898-1882) saw the arrival in Egypt of a horde of Semitic nomads (1895). Usertsen III (1882-1847) fought against the Nubians and built forts on the Nile to secure Egypt from invasion from the south. Amenemhat III reigned from 1847-1802 and Amenemhat IV ruled, as co-regent or king, some nine years in all. After his death, his wife Sebekneferu reigned for several years and with her the dynasty ended (c. 1792)¹. The 12th dynasty saw the prime of ancient Egyptian literature and art, and has left us many great building

¹ Approximate dates: 7th-11th and 13th dynasties, c. 2500-1995; 12th dynasty, c. 1995-1792.

memorials—such as temples at Karnak, Bubastis and Heliopolis—and such interesting literary documents as "The Praise of Learning" and "The Instructions of Amenemhat I." Its glory shines the brighter in contrast with the dark days that followed it.

The fall of the 12th dynasty is, in fact, followed by a period of several hundred years, of which we have the scantiest knowledge. It was an age of sorrow for the Egyptians; for the country fell under the rule of the "Hyksos" or "Shepherd Kings," foreign invaders, who established their power in the Eastern Delta and for a time ruled all Egypt. They were always regarded as usurpers, and, after their fall, every effort was made—and all too successfully—to consign the inglorious time of foreign rule to oblivion. Lower Egypt was probably not for long under the power of the Hyksos and, at last, a dynasty (Manetho's 17th) arose in Thebes, which asserted its independence and finally expelled the foreigners. Amasis, coming to the throne of Thebes about 1562, drove out the Hyksos (c. 1559) and founded the 18th dynasty—with which the so-called "New Empire" begins. The foreign rule left no characteristic mark on Egypt; the Hyksos, in fact, seem simply to have assimilated the civilization of Egypt. The chief feature of the time was the decline of living impulse in all branches of life; religion, literature, art, the conduct of life itself, all fell under the ban of minute and formal regulations.

The new dynasty, having recovered Egypt, turned its victorious arms against enemies abroad. Hitherto, the Egyptian troops have been nothing but national levies called out, at need, for special campaigns; now we find a regular army—the first necessity for a policy of foreign conquest, such as that on which the new rulers of Egypt embarked. Amenophis I, the successor of Amasis, who reigned 1537–1516, fought mainly in Nubia; Thothmes I



Thothmes III

(1516-1503) continued the Nubian war and then, invading Syria, carried the Egyptian arms as far north as the Euphrates. Thothmes II had a short and uneventful reign; his son and successor Thothmes III¹, who was a mere boy when Thothmes II died, was compelled to marry his father's widow Hatshepsut, and, until her death in 1481, was practically in a state of tutelage. Hatshepsut was the real ruler of Egypt, as long as she lived; she offended the army by pursuing a policy of peace, but governed wisely and took a special interest in the development of trade and in building. When, on her death, Thothmes found himself free to follow his own bent, he plunged boldly into a great career of foreign conquest. He invaded Syria on several occasions and attacked the kingdoms of Mitanni, Arwad and Kadesh (between the years 1478 and 1463). His wars in this quarter were mainly successful and enhanced Egyptian prestige; in his later years, wars in Nubia distracted him from the eastern conquests. Thothmes III was a man of energy and ability, and a thoroughly capable soldier; he was also noted as a builder on the grand scale, and Thebes, Memphis and Heliopolis, in particular, gained by his generosity. Under the next kings, Amenophis II (c. 1449-1428) and Thothmes IV (c. 1428-1419), the wars in Syria and Nubia continued; but there was already a certain weariness of the constant wars, and the class of scribes, especially, began to grumble at the professional army. Amenophis III reigned from about 1419-1383; to his reign belong the bulk of the Tell-el-Amarna tablets, which contain the correspondence of various princes of Asia with Egypt, and throw much light on the diplomacy of the time. A number of states in Syria

¹ The exact facts cannot be made out with certainty. Probably Thothmes II reigned for a year or two after 1503. Thothmes III was probably co-regent with his father from 1503, then, on his death, nominal king under the influence of Hatshepsut, finally after 1481 ruler in his own right.

appear as vassals of Egypt; with important kingdoms, such as Babylon and Mitanni, Egypt maintained good relations by sending handsome presents of gold. It is interesting to find Tii, the foreign queen of Amenophis, an honoured and influential personage. Amenophis IV, the son of Amenophis III and Tii, succeeding to the throne as a boy, was largely under his mother's influence. We find king Tushratta of Mitanni attempting to make light of certain slights that he had put on the Egyptian king, before his succession was assured; and a quarrel between Egypt and Babylon seems to have had a similar cause. But Amenophis had no interest in war and diplomacy; through his neglect the Egyptian power in Syria gradually declined, and the Hittites were free to secure an entry for themselves into the north of Syria, first by intrigue and then by open force. The king was, in fact, no soldier; he was a poet and an idealist, and a deep thinker on religious problems. He conceived a distaste for the prevalent polytheism and adopted and developed the cult of Aten, the god revealed in the visible solar-disk—a strict and pure monotheism which was then being preached by a class of priests. This step naturally brought the king into violent conflict with religious orthodoxy, and, above all, with the priests of Amen of Thebes, who had made their god the chief in Egypt and enjoyed an enormous influence. A fierce struggle was inevitable, but the king did not shirk it. He removed his court from Thebes to Akhetaten in Middle Egypt, changed his own name to Akhenaten¹, placed a loyal governor in Thebes and fiercely persecuted the worshippers of Amen. Akhenaten gained a certain temporary success for his reforms; but, on his death (c. 1366), there followed a time of strife and short reigns, until, about 1355, Ai, a favourite of Akhenaten, gained the throne. He seems to have returned to Thebes

¹ I.e. "The Spirit of Aten."



Akhenaten

and may have begun to restore Amen to his rights; but about 1350 he was slain by Horemheb, his general and governor in Northern Egypt. Horemheb was already a middle-aged and experienced man when he assumed the crown; the chief feature of his sober reign was the full restoration of Amen worship and the persecution of the Aten heresy. Thus ended the attempt of Akhenaten to impose on his people a more spiritual religion; there is something compellingly attractive about this royal visionary; yet, when we see his neglect of his royal duties, we can understand the contempt in which most of his subjects held him, and can only say that he was a fine character, born out of his time or set in a false position. Horemheb died about 1329, and, on his death, a new dynasty, the 19th, was peacefully inaugurated by Ramses I—perhaps a native of Memphis (1329–1327). His successor, Seti I (1327–1317), resolved to restore the lost glories of Egypt abroad. He fought in Nubia and, in 1325, took the field against the Hittites, under their king Mursil, in Palestine; as a result of his wars, Palestine was definitely recovered. Ramses II (1317–1250), was, as Seti too had been, a great builder and built largely at Thebes, Tanis and Memphis; not content with his own achievements he tried to steal the credit of many works of earlier kings. The chief task of Ramses consisted in checking the Hittite advance in Syria and, in this, he was at last successful. The Hittite wars lasted, with varying success, from about 1317–1296; the Egyptians won a great victory at Kadesh, but the Hittites gained countervailing successes, and, at last, in c. 1296, Ramses and the Hittite king Khattusil agreed to conclude a peace and alliance on equal terms. The Hittites were, indeed, checked and the possession of Palestine was secured to Egypt; but the war, it was clear, had ended in a draw. Ramses himself was a man of honourable character but quite mediocre talents, and

the successes of his reign were largely due to a well trained bureaucracy and able princes of the royal house. The reign of Ramses II was the golden age of the new Egyptian empire. But, in spite of all its great achievements, notably in architecture and art, the curse of artificiality rested on it; it had no progressive life of its own, and therefore the inevitable decline that followed was hopeless and final. Ramses' successor, Merenptah (c. 1250-1240), fought in Nubia and Palestine, and repulsed from Egypt a dangerous invading horde¹ allied with the Libyans and Shitani, who frequently served Egypt as mercenaries. Under a later king, Seti II, Palestine was lost to Egypt, and, after his death, came a time of anarchy. Finally, a little before 1200, a certain Setnekht², probably a member of a side branch of the royal family, seized the throne and bequeathed it to his son, Ramses III. Ramses' long reign (1200-1168) was troubled but not unprosperous; he defeated the Libyans in 1195, and, c. 1192, repulsed another great horde of invaders³, who, with their wives and children, swept down through Syria and hurled themselves, by land and sea, on Egypt. Ramses followed up this successful stroke with a second victory in south Palestine, but, before he could gain any permanence for his success, was called home to crush a Libyan revolt. Later in his reign, he was threatened by a dangerous conspiracy but just contrived to surprise and suppress it. This great king was succeeded by a line of kings, bearing the same name (Ramses IV-XI), but showing nothing of his ability, whose reigns cover the period from 1168 to c. 1085. Towards the close of this time the monarchs of Tanis, in the north, began to assert their independence of the royal house; while, in the south,

¹ In it were included Akaiwasha (? Achaeans) and Thuirsha (? Tur-senians).

² Founder of the 20th dynasty.

³ We hear of Thuirsha, Shakarusha, Danuna and others in it.



Ramses II

the high-priests of Amen at Thebes claimed a similar freedom. The dynasty of Tanis, the 21st, including in all nine kings, is reckoned to extend from about 1085 to 950; the high-priests of Amen¹, though practically independent, seem normally to have acknowledged the Tanite princes as the legitimate Pharaohs. The Tanite dynasty was overthrown in 950 by Sheshenk², the captain of the Libyan mercenaries of Bubastis. He was a great warrior and invaded Palestine, captured Jerusalem and made Judah tributary. He did not directly reunite Upper Egypt to his kingdom; but he appointed one of his sons high-priest of Amen, and this practice became usual under later kings. His successors could not maintain his efficiency; Osorkon I was defeated by Asa in an attack on Judah (c. 895), and later, home troubles distracted the attention of the rulers. The dynasty dragged on a precarious existence until about 720, when it finally succumbed to an enemy from the south. As early as about 750 the Ethiopians captured Thebes; then, about 720, Piankhi, the Ethiopian king of Napata, attacked and conquered northern Egypt. But his success was not permanent; a number of independent princes ruled in cities of the north, and one of them, Tefnakht of Sais, the founder of the 23rd dynasty, attempted to free Egypt from the Ethiopian danger. For a time the deliverer was successful; but the Ethiopians returned to the attack and, about 712, Shabaka³, a successor of Piankhi, made himself ruler over all Egypt. Assyria was now looming on the Egyptian horizon, and Egypt adopted a steady policy of hostility to her in Palestine. An Assyrian attack was repulsed (c. 700), but Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal of Assyria made a final reckoning with their old enemy. Taharqa, who rose by

¹ Best known of them Herihor (c. 1085 onwards) and his son Pianchi.

² The Shishak of the O. T., founder of the 22nd dynasty.

³ Founder of the 25th dynasty.

rebellion to be king of Egypt (c. 693), was driven from his kingdom by the Assyrians in 670 and, returning in 668, was again chased away. His nephew Tanut-Amen, continuing his uncle's struggle, was driven from Thebes (c. 667-6). But the Assyrian rule was short-lived. Assyria had established a large number of vassal princes in Egypt, on whose loyalty she hoped to base her power; but they had no love for the foreign conqueror and were only bound to Assyria by present interest. One of these princes, Necho, the ruler of Sais and Memphis, established a certain independence; his son, Psammetichus I, by the aid of Lydian mercenaries, conquered the other Assyrian vassals and declared himself king of Egypt. Assyria was too weak to challenge him; but Thebes in the south remained for the time in the hands of the Ethiopians. During the reign of Psammetichus (c. 651-610), the Greeks began to appear in Egypt as mercenaries and traders and soon became interested in the fascinating history of that strange and ancient land. The Greek knowledge of Egypt only dates from about this time and is naturally not very reliable for the remoter past. Under Psammetichus a horde of Scythian invaders was repulsed from Egypt; at home, Memphis succeeded to the old supremacy of Thebes and, as a result, Amen lost ground before the northern deities, Ptah, Osiris and Horus. Necho II (610-595) invaded Palestine in 608 and defeated and slew Josiah of Judah at Megiddo. But the new and reinvigorated Babylonia now replaced the effete power of Assyria; and in 605 Nebuchadnezzar routed Necho's troops at Carchemish and put an end to his dreams of an Asiatic Empire. Psammetichus II (594-589) is known to have advanced far south; an inscription of his Greek mercenaries has come to light at Abu Simbel. His successor, Apries, returning from an unsuccessful expedition against Cyrene, was overthrown by his general Amasis, who raised

the native Egyptians against the Greek and other foreign mercenaries (c. 570). But Amasis, although he came to the throne on the tide of a nationalist movement, was no enemy of the Greeks; he assigned Naucratis as a centre to Greek traders and, for a time, cultivated the friendship of Polycrates, tyrant of Samos. Amasis died about 526 and his successor, Psammetichus III, had at once to face the Persian invasion. He could make no stand before Cambyses; Egypt was conquered and made a Persian province (525). Darius put down a rebellious Persian governor in 517; but revolts continued to be common, and, during the whole period of nominal Persian rule, native dynasties are frequently found reigning over at least a part of the country.

SECTION 12. THE EARLIEST AGE OF GREECE. CRETE AND CNOSSUS

The knowledge that the Aegean was the home of an independent civilization, centuries before the dawn of the classical period, has only come to us of late, and it is archaeology, and not history, that has brought it. For all that we know of this "earliest age of Greece" we are indebted to the excavations of a series of devoted explorers¹. Occasionally we can connect some features of the finds with some point of Greek myth; but in the main we must confine ourselves to the broad results which archaeology unaided can offer us. In dealing with a field that is as yet so imperfectly explored, in which, any day, some new discovery may shake reigning theories, one cannot

¹ We may mention particularly Schliemann, the first to attain important results at Troy and Mycenae, and Sir Arthur Evans, the excavator of Cnossus and its Palace.

summarize results with any feeling of security; one can only, in all diffidence, offer the inferences which our present knowledge seems to justify, prepared, all the while, to adapt oneself readily to any fresh evidence¹. As early as the fourth millennium B.C., there existed in the Aegean a civilization of the Bronze Age, probably the creation of a southern people of African connections and developed directly out of the Neolithic Age in the Aegean itself. Traces of the Neolithic Age in Greece have been found in Cnossus, Troy and the Peloponnese, but not in the Cyclades. There may, perhaps, have been from the first an Indo-European race in the north of Greece; but, even so, this race must have remained in the culture of the Stone Age and had no direct share for centuries in the civilization we are about to discuss. The centre of this civilization lay in the island of Crete—a fact which is confirmed by the Greek legends of the sea-power of the Cretan king Minos; from his name is taken the term “Minoan,” now commonly used as a description of the art of the times. The chronology of the finds in Crete depends upon two sources of evidence: (1) connexions with Egypt, which enable us to date them from Egyptian evidence, (2) the development of the Cretan art itself. Starting from these premises, Sir Arthur Evans has drawn up a system of chronology, which is, at least approximately, accurate and forms a basis for study. He recognizes three distinct periods, Early, Middle and Late Minoan, and subdivides each of these into three smaller sections; thus we have Early Minoan I, II, III, Middle Minoan I, II, III and Late Minoan I, II, III. Early Minoan I is dated roughly 4000–3000 B.C.; its chief artistic feature is a black ware, with dull white designs painted on it. Early Minoan II

¹ It should be remembered, however, that the work of Sir Arthur Evans in Crete has given the whole subject a far surer basis than it had before.

shows a freer style of art and some curious shapes of vessels¹. Early Minoan III (? 3000-2500) belongs to the same period as the "second" city of Troy and a number of finds in the Cyclades; spiral decoration here makes its appearance. Middle Minoan I shows us polychrome designs on a black ground and a more naturalistic art. Middle Minoan II, the age of the first palace of Cnossus, ended with a catastrophe, in which the palace was destroyed by fire. This period certainly overlapped with the time of the 12th dynasty in Egypt, and cannot have ended until some years after 2000 B.C. Middle Minoan III is the great age of Cnossus, when a brilliant court dwelt in the grand palace of the king and a great civilization, which strikes us, in some of its aspects, as strangely modern, grew and flourished. It was probably at about this time, judging from the evidence of finds, that Cretan art gained a foothold on the mainland of Greece. Late Minoan I and II synchronize with the 18th dynasty of Egypt (c. 1550 onwards). Many finds in Greece (at Orchomenus, Mycenae, Tiryns, etc.) belong here; the art was marked by a fine strain of naturalism and great architectural improvement. Late Minoan II marks the zenith of Cretan civilization; it ended in the sack of Cnossus, probably due to Cretan emigrants returning home with reinforcements from Greece. Late Minoan III can be equated with the 18th to 20th dynasties of Egypt (ending, that is, about 1100). This is the true "Mycenaean" age, in which the art, though on the down grade, is still Cretan but in which political supremacy has passed from Crete to Argolis. What race built the great palaces of Mycenae and Tiryns cannot be certainly stated; it was presumably a mixed stock, part Cretan, part Indo-German. Towards the close of the 12th century B.C. began the great migrations which mark the transition from the

¹ E.g. the beaked jugs "Schnabel-kannen."

Greece of this remote past to that of historical times. Indo-European tribes, whom we may, for convenience, call by the time-honoured name of Achaeans, pushed from Thessaly into the Peloponnese. Other disturbances of population followed. The legend of the Trojan war may well have arisen out of the attempt of settlers from Greece to conquer Aeolis. The great horde that swept down on Egypt and was repulsed by Ramses III (c. 1192) probably came largely from Greece and Crete, and the Philistines, a splinter of this great mass, who settled on the coast of Palestine, have been definitely connected with the latter place. To the same age belong the first Greek settlements in Ionia, Pamphylia and Cyprus. And now, too, iron came into Greece and brought the Bronze Age to a close. Whether we are to associate it with the Dorians and to attribute their conquests of the Achaeans as due to their superior arms, or, whether the Achaeans already knew iron and were really an advance guard of the Dorian migration, cannot be decided with certainty. But the change itself is certain. Greece was conquered by peoples of inferior civilization in all respects except the vital one of war; and a long period of semi-barbarism was to ensue before a new civilization developed, under new national influences, on the basis of the old.

We will conclude this section with a brief glance forward and backward. Looking back to the Minoan civilization, we see it as an independent and vigorous growth, which, however, influenced and was in turn influenced by Egypt and, in a lesser degree, by Babylonia. When, if ever, the pictographic script of Crete is deciphered, we may expect a little more definite information, to enable us to sharpen and define our outlines. Looking forward, we find the Minoan civilization overthrown by Indo-European peoples from the north, a branch of the great national group, to which Celts, Teutons, Slavs, Latins and Umbrians

alike belong, pastoral folk, distinguished by their worship of the sky-god, the goddess of the hearth and various gods of light. The poems of Homer probably show us the civilization of a rather later age; but certain features, as for example the ambiguity as to the use of iron or bronze for weapons and the practice of cremation or burial for disposing of the dead, suggest that they have their roots in the age of transition from Bronze to Iron.

CHAPTER II

GREECE FROM THE DORIAN INVASION TO THE END OF THE PERSIAN WARS

SECTION I. THE AGE OF THE DORIAN INVASION

THE "Earliest Age" of Greece really lies beyond the bounds of history; our knowledge of it is supplied by archaeology and is limited to generalities. The period on which we now enter lies on the border-line between history and myth. We know enough of it to form a fairly accurate idea of its life and manners, but can only sketch the course of events in the vaguest outline. The term, "Greek Middle Ages," has been suggested as an apt description of it, and the analogy, if not pushed too far, may prove illuminating. Like the Middle Ages of Europe, this period of Greek life starts with the incursion of barbarous tribes, who overthrow an ancient civilization, and ends with a new civilization, founded by these invaders on the ground of the old. In Greece, the "Middle Ages" begin with a great migration of peoples from the north-west of Greece to the south—chief among them the Dorians. The account of the Dorian migration, as given by Ephorus, bears the stamp, not of history, but of historical myth. It runs thus. Heracles, by conquest, had established claims to sovereignty over a large part of the Peloponnese, but, on his death, his children were deprived of their rights by enemies and driven into exile. They were kindly received by Aegimius, king of Doris in central Greece, who adopted Hyllus, son of Heracles, as his son. Aided by the Dorians,

the children of Heracles attempted to force their return to the Peloponnese, but were met at the Isthmus by the Peloponnesian levy, defeated and compelled to postpone their expedition for a hundred years. After the lapse of that term, their descendants repeated the attack, this time by sea from Naupactus, and now their efforts were successful. The whole of the Peloponnese, except Achaea and Arcadia, was conquered and allotted among the victors. Argos was assigned to Temenus, Laconia to Eurysthenes and Procles, Messene to Cresphontes, while Elis fell to the Aetolian Oxylus, who had been their guide. Corinth, conquered at a later time from Argos, was assigned to Aletes; and the other cities of Argolis—Sicyon, Phlius, Troezen—came one by one, by conquest or peaceful convention, into Dorian hands. Such is the legend, as Ephorus renders it: what are we to make of it? That there is genuine fact underlying it may be taken as certain. A very acute and able German scholar¹ has devoted great pains to trying to prove that the whole legend is baseless. Against the weight of tradition his arguments are weighed and found wanting. He fails utterly to shake the traditional belief, and, at the most, succeeds in suggesting a way in which the legend, if unhistorical, might have come into being. Taking refuge from scepticism in criticism, we will adopt the view of another great German scholar, Eduard Meyer. The legend, as we have it, is a blend of two distinct stories. One traces the Dorian state, with its laws and customs, back to the mythical king, Aegimius; the other bases the Dorian claim to possess the Peloponnese on inheritance from Heracles. Now Heracles was probably, originally, a nature-god, worshipped in central Greece. Out of the god grew the figure of the hero, and the new Heracles, hero but not god, was widely honoured in the Peloponnese and became the ideal type of Dorian manhood.

¹ Julius Beloch.

But the point to be observed is, that the god Heracles has no original connexion with the Peloponnese at all, and, therefore, that the legend of the children of Heracles is a later addition to the original story of the Dorian migration.

The home of the Dorians was certainly in the north-west of Greece; the little territory of Doris in central Greece must have been occupied by a small section of the invaders on the march south. The invasion of Peloponnese was probably made by land, and was not so speedy and decisive as the legend suggests. For a time, the Dorians may have maintained a close alliance, based on the common cult of Apollo Carneius. But if so, it broke down at an early date, and the chief Dorian states pursued their development along independent lines. The "lot of Temenus" included originally not only Argos but Corinth, Sicyon, Phlius, Epidaurus and other cities. Corinth soon established her independence, and Megara, occupied by the Dorians of Corinth, gradually drew away from her parent city. The other cities of Argolis claimed more and more of independence, as time went on, but it was long before the claims of Argos to suzerainty were entirely forgotten. In some cities of Argolis, the old pre-Dorian population had been rooted out; in others, for example in Sicyon and Phlius, a peaceful union of old and new settlers took place, whilst, in a few cities such as Hermione, the old inhabitants, the Dryopians, held their ground and only gradually acquired a Dorian tinge of character from their neighbours. In Laconia, Amyclae, and then Sparta, were the first places occupied; the rest of the land was only conquered by slow degrees. It has been suggested that the Perioeci and Helots in Laconia, and the corresponding classes in Argolis, were the remains of the old possessors of the land. This theory probably contains a kernel of truth. But the distinction between Spartiates on the one

hand and Perioeci and Helots on the other was not so much racial as political. The conquered inhabitants of Messene, themselves Dorians, became Helots of Sparta, and the Perioeci cannot be shown to have belonged to a different race. We must suppose, then, that, when Sparta became the capital of Laconia, the inhabitants of the land, who had not Spartan citizenship, fell *ipso facto* into a condition of political inferiority. Messene was the third great Dorian settlement; we know nothing of its history until its conquest by Sparta in the eighth century B.C. From the Peloponnese the Dorians pushed on to Crete, to Thera and Melos, and to the southern part of the coast of Asia Minor, where Rhodes and Cos and a few points on the mainland, such as Cnidus and Halicarnassus, were occupied; but in the interior the Carians held their ground and, further south, the Lycians checked the Dorian advance. Of the original religion and character of the Dorians we can form no clear conception. The Dorian meets us later as a clearly defined type; but we cannot determine what elements in it are original and what acquired. Not even the god Apollo or the hero Heracles¹ can be claimed as specifically Dorian in origin.

In the centre of the Peloponnese, the hill country of Arcadia, the old inhabitants held their ground. On the north coast we find the Achaeans, according to our legend the exiled inhabitants of Laconia and Argolis. On the north-west coast come the Eleans, certainly akin to the Aetolians and perhaps sharers in the Dorian invasion. A few centuries later they are found steadily encroaching on their neighbours to east and south. The date of the Dorian migration cannot be fixed with accuracy; 1200–1100 B.C. will not be far from the mark.

In northern and central Greece, too, displacements of population were taking place. The Thessalians, starting

¹ See above p. 55.

from Epirus, probably at a rather later date, settled, as a ruling aristocracy, in the cities of Thessaly and enslaved the natives. The chief influence in the cities fell to the great noble families, of which the Aleuadae and Scopadae were the chief. Only in time of war was the whole land united under an elected "Duke" (*ταγός*). Thessaly fell into the four divisions of Thessaliotis, Pelasgiotis, Hestiaeotis and Phthiotis; the Perrhaebians in the north, the Magnes in the east, and the Achaeans of Phthiotis in the south became dependent on the conquerors. Tradition has also to tell of the conquest of Thebes and the expulsion of the old population, the Cadmeians, by the Boeotians; but modern scholars are inclined to doubt whether any such change of population took place in Thebes.

SECTION 2. THE LIFE OF THE GREEKS IN THE PERIOD C. 1100-700 B.C.

For some centuries after these migrations the history of Greece is practically a blank. The little that our authorities tell us, of wars in the Peloponnese and the like, is quite untrustworthy; not till the close of the eighth century does the darkness begin to lift, and only from about 600 onwards does our knowledge begin to be consecutive. For the present, we must be content with a sketch of the political and social conditions of Greece in this period, so far as we can realize them. Politically, Greece was composed of a number of small states, developing peacefully, engaging in no great enterprises and troubled by no wars more serious than frontier squabbles with neighbours. From abroad came no strong influence to disturb them; Greece, for a season, was almost isolated from the ancient civilizations of the East. The city, as yet, plays no large part in national life. The political unit is the country district, composed of villages; from the union of a number

of these villages many of the later cities arose. Life was mainly agricultural and pastoral. The land was owned by the community as a whole and assigned for cultivation in lots to the citizens. Originally, only the king had a private estate (*τέμενος*). But these primitive conditions gradually gave way to more complex ones. Settled life led to the growth of private property, and the equality of landed possessions disappeared. Inequalities of wealth became more and more marked, and aristocracies of big landowners exerted an increasing influence on social and political life. Cavalry developed as a separate arm, and this expensive form of service became a new mark of the wealthy man. Beside the earliest units of the state, the tribe (*φυλή*) for political, the phratry for social life, we now find the clan—an extension of the family—with rights and religious observances of its own. In the clan the nobles are the natural leaders; the common man ranks only as a client. The state and all unions within the state are traced back to an eponymous founder, and a certain confusion in genealogy arises; a nobleman, for instance, might claim one ancestor as citizen of his state, another as member of his clan. In two states, Sparta and Crete, the development followed a different line; the old social equality long survived and the citizens continued to share in the old common meals (*συσσιτία, ἀνδρεία*).

At the head of the state stood the king, the chief general, priest and judge. His power is blessed by divine sanction, but is limited by custom; and, in course of time, new magistrates, appointed originally as royal deputies, absorb portions of his activity. The Council of Elders, at first simply the king's adviser, becomes aristocratic and steadily encroaches on the royal power. Finally the kingship falls, and the aristocracy inherits its power. The change, as a rule, seems to have taken place without violence, and the kingly office often survived, shorn of its

glories, as a subordinate magistracy. One man may still be appointed to represent the state as its official head ; but such new offices are not hereditary and are usually limited in tenure to a year. Often only a section of the aristocracy, the royal house, for example, inherits the royal power. In the case of Athens, we fortunately have a clear record of this political change, and, as it is probably typical, we will briefly describe it. The first restriction imposed on the king lay in the appointment of a polemarch and thesmothetae. Then, c. 750 B.C., the post of king, while still reserved for the royal house of the Medontidae, was subjected to the rule of a ten years' tenure. Later, c. 710 B.C., it was thrown open to the whole nobility, and, finally, it became an annual office, and a new magistrate, the archon, was appointed to be official head of the state. Similar must have been the course of events in many other states. Only in Sparta did the old kingship of the heroic age live on into historic times, and, even there, it was with sadly abated powers. Sparta had the curious institution of a double monarchy, the origin of which is no longer traceable ; possibly it arose from the union of two originally distinct communities. At some date a little before 700 magistrates named ephors were appointed, probably to assist the king in his official duties, and their power steadily grew, till in the fifth century it quite overshadowed that of the kings. The aristocracies, which displaced the monarchy, varied in character with varying local conditions, and were based on such differing qualifications as birth, wealth or cooption. The popular assembly was politically impotent ; important decisions were laid before it, but there was no genuine debating, and its rôle was limited to giving a direct answer of "yes" or "no." At Sparta, its power was practically abolished by the decision, laid down in the eighth century, that a "crooked" decision of the assembly might be set aside by the kings and the

Council—in other words, that it might only vote as they judged fit. The magistrates, who took the place of the kings, held full royal powers within their limited sphere, but the short duration of their office brought them into dependence on the permanent Council of Elders, which ranked as the representative of the aristocracy. Written law there was none; everything depended on the personal decision of the judge, guided by tradition and equity.

In course of time, the old tribal unity began to break down. In Elis, Arcadia and the west of Greece as a whole, it was replaced by new geographical divisions. But in the rest of Greece its place was taken by the city state. The growth of material wealth led, here as everywhere, to a concentration of the population, and the city, once only the strong place of defence in time of danger, became the permanent centre of political life. The wealthier classes transferred their abode to the city, and the poorer folk, who stayed on the land, sank into political inferiority. Such formations of cities (*συννοικισμός* was the Greek term) took place at very varying dates in the different parts of Greece. In Laconia and Attica, the change was carried through very early in history. From the very beginnings of the historical period, both Sparta and Athens appear as monopolizing political rights; inhabitants of the two countries, if citizens at all, hold their citizenship in the two capitals. The *συννοικισμός* of Attica was attributed to the great Athenian hero, Theseus; the date is quite uncertain, but must have been early. In Boeotia the change also took place early; but the old tribal union of the Boeotians was partially preserved in the league of cities, in which Thebes claimed, but could not always assert, her hegemony. In Elis, Arcadia, Locris and Phocis the transition had not fully taken place in the fifth century B.C.

The relations of states with one another in these early times were simple. There were, as has been observed

above, no big federations and no big wars. The chief cause of disputes between neighbouring cities lay in the absence of any general code of international law. Each state had its own legal system, and no provision was made for the citizen of one state to secure justice in another. Only comparatively late were such questions regulated by special treaties. The only federations of the time were the Amphictyonies, religious rather than political unions, bound together by the worship of a common deity at a common shrine. The most important were those of Onchestus, Calauria, Delos and Anthela. The last-named became closely associated with the oracle of Apollo at Delphi and retained a certain importance down into the fourth century B.C. A similar bond of union lay in the joint celebration of some great religious festival. The earliest and most important of all was the festival celebrated under the presidency of the Pisatans, and later of the Eleans, at Olympia near Elis. It was reorganized in 776, and, from 720 onwards Greek states began to participate in it freely, until at last it became one of the chief external evidences of the unity of the Greek race.

While pastoral and agricultural life still occupied most of the people's activity, industry gradually extended its operations, although for a long time it ranked as socially degrading. Over-sea commerce slowly rose; but, for a long time, the profession of pirate, not that of merchant, was the only one for the gentleman. The east—Pontus, the Aegean Sea, Cyprus, Phoenicia, Egypt—were tolerably familiar; but the west was still the half-discovered new world, the home of myth and fable.

In social life there was little freedom; the individual was under the ban of tradition. Under the aristocracies, luxury and display increased, and art, after a period of decline, began to revive. So far as the East touched Greece at all, Egypt was the dominating force; from about 850

onwards Assyria began to exert some influence. One great acquisition came to Greece from the East—the art of writing. An alphabet, borrowed from the Phoenician and adapted to Greek purposes, came into use not very long after 1000 B.C. But the new art of writing was long confined to commerce and public services; not till c. 700 B.C. did it enter at all largely into private life.

Our great source for the knowledge of these conditions is the Greek heroic Epic, known to us in its masterpieces, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. This great school of poetry developed on the coasts of Asia Minor, notably in Ionia, but traces of an earlier stage survive, in which Aeolis was its chief home. Although the point of view is that of the Asiatic Greek, the recollection of the home in Greece was fresh and vivid in the minds of the bards. Modern criticism has separated the *Iliad* from the *Odyssey*, and broken up both of these poems into a number of independent lays. Those who will may still believe in the existence of a single great bard, named Homer, who left his own mark on the mass of Epic material. But for us, today, the Epic must rank as the product, not of one poet, but of whole schools and generations of poets. These bards formed a professional class of travelling singers, who chanted their lays for the delectation of their noble patrons. The sentiment is throughout aristocratic; the common man serves only to give a background to the great heroes. Contemporary names and references were, as far as possible, avoided, and a deliberate attempt was made to create out of the relics of myth and tradition the picture of an older and nobler world. But no poet can really get outside his age, and, therefore, the society that these poems picture must have been, in its main outlines, that of the times the singers lived in. Of the great Cycles of Epic song, only the Trojan has come down to us, but we hear of others that centred round the legends of Heracles, of the Argonauts and of

Thebes. Carried over Greece by its errant minstrels, the Epic gave Greece a common literary language, a common system of genealogy and a common theology. It attained its zenith in the period from c. 950-750. From 750-600 it fell into decline. The bard was replaced by the rhapsode, that is, declamation took the place of singing. And a deeper change entered into the very spirit of Epic. A didactic school arose, of which Hesiod is the great representative, which aimed at giving instruction under the form of the narrative poem. In his two chief works, the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*, Hesiod attempted to teach the truth about the gods and the practical wisdom required for everyday life. His is the first clear personality which meets us in the Grecian world. His spirit is no longer keen and fresh as that of the earlier Epic; his view of life is realistic and inclined to sadness.

One great service of the Epic, we have observed, was the creation of the Greek Pantheon. The characters of the deities were fixed and their provinces were defined. But the religion of the Epic was obviously not that of the life of the people. The special local cults, so scrupulously ignored by the Epic, lived on and enjoyed the same devotion as of old. Zeus, in the poems, is the one supreme ruler of gods and men; but the Zeus who was worshipped, under so many subsidiary titles, at so many places in Greece, was anything but a single conception—his character and attributes varied enormously from place to place. An interesting development is seen in the growing worship of the demi-god, or hero, usually, in the first place, a god, who, while still enjoying divine honours at his original seat of worship, becomes known to wider circles and enjoys there the lesser honours due to a hero. There was no priestly caste, but many of the priesthoods were monopolies of noble families. We begin to hear, also, of the oracles, Lebadea, Dodona, Delphi, which enjoy an ever-increasing reputation.

SECTION 3. THE AGE OF COLONIZATION, ETC.

Shortly before 700 B.C., a great change began to move over this quiet conservative world. Commerce and sea-faring grew steadily in importance, and the power passed from the continental to the maritime states. Greece awoke out of her isolation and sowed her colonies over the shores of all the known seas. In Asia Minor, the Ionian cities of Miletus and Ephesus, Colophon and Phocaea, in Greece, Chalcis and Eretria, Corinth and Megara took the lead. Of the land powers, Sparta, alone, by extension of her territory at the expense of her neighbours, increased her power. In a war, known to us only in late and untrustworthy tradition, she attacked and conquered her Dorian kinsmen in Messene and made that fruitful land her own (c. 725). Elis, too, dispossessed the Pisatans of the Olympian festival and sought to be ruler over the neighbouring districts. Meanwhile the maritime states, seeking an outlet for their expanding population, threw themselves into the work of colonization. The sending out of a colony was a formal and solemn matter; the advice of the Delphian oracle was sought on the choice of a site, and the colonists, led by their founder (*οἰκιστής*) went forth under the protection of Apollo into their new home. The colony remained, for a time, dependent on the mother-city; but this tie usually relaxed, and friendship sometimes gave way to positive hostility. The age of colonization may be assigned roughly to the period from 750 to 600; but the traditional dates assigned to particular cities must not be taken as having much claim to exact truth. There were several great spheres, over which the movement extended. In the North-east, on the shores of the Black Sea and the Propontis, Miletus took the lead, founding, among other cities, Sinope, Trapezus, Cyzicus and Abydus. Lampsacus was founded

by Phocaea, Perinthus by Samos. The little city of Megara on the Isthmus took a large part, and was the mother-city of Chalcedon, Selymbria, Heraclea Pontica and the important Byzantium. On the northern shores of Pontus a line of flourishing cities, many of them colonies of Miletus, sprang up; such were Olbia, Panticapaeum, Tomi, Odessus, Dioscurias, Tanais and Phasis. The Black Sea regions produced raw materials—corn, flax, timber, metals and fish—in abundance, and the trade thus arising soon led the new foundations to prosperity. On the Thracian coast, Abdera, Aenus and Maronea were the chief colonies; the important island of Thasos was colonized from Paros. But, in this quarter, the warlike barbarians of the interior set a check on the Greek adventurers. Westwards towards Macedon the coast was thickly dotted with Greek cities. The peninsula of Chalcidice, with its three prongs, Pallene, Sithonia and Acte, was mainly occupied by colonies from Chalcis and Eretria. Pydna and Methone in Macedon were also Euboean, whilst Potidaea, built on the neck of Pallene, was a daughter of Corinth. The west coasts of Greece, too, were occupied; the Euboeans led the way to Cephallenia and Ithaca, the Achaeans to Zacynthus. But in course of time Corinth took the lead here, founding Corcyra and a whole line of important trade settlements. In the Further West, in Sicily and south Italy, the Greeks found rivals already in possession; the Phoenicians had long been trading in the western Mediterranean and had founded their factories here and there along the coasts. But before the Greek advance they had to give ground; in Sicily, in particular, they lost the whole of the east and were restricted to a narrow strip round Soloeis, Motye and other settlements in the west. Here, the Euboean cities, Chalcis and Eretria, were the leaders. Cyme in Campania, Naxos, Leontini, Catana, Zancle and Rhegium in Sicily and south Italy were their settlements. Other cities

followed. Megara founded Megara Hyblaea and Selinus, Corinth Syracuse, Rhodes Gela. The new colonies themselves joined in the movement; Zancle founded Himera and Mylae, Syracuse founded Camarina, Acrae and Casmenae. Thus the east of Sicily became a part of the Greek world; in the west, beside the Phoenicians, the Elymi, in Eryx and Segesta, kept their place, and the old inhabitants of most of the island, the Sicels and Sicani, retained their territory in the centre. These colonies in Sicily were mainly founded by commercial states for commercial purposes. In south Italy, the case was rather different. There the great fertility of the soil offered easy wealth, and many colonies were founded, that from the first lived by agriculture. The colonizers in this region came from other homes than those of Sicily. Croton, Sybaris and Metapontum were planted by Achaea, Locri Epizephyrii by Locris, and Tarentum by Sparta. These new cities themselves became colonizers, and a series of later colonies, including Posidonia, Hipponium, Medma, Pyxus and others, rose on the eastern and western coast of the toe of Italy. The prosperity of this new world was phenomenal, and Magna Graecia, as it came to be called, attained an extraordinary height of material prosperity, long before central Greece had attained its full commercial development. To complete the picture, we must add one or two isolated settlements. In Cilicia, a few cities, e.g. Tarsus and Soli, claimed a Greek origin: and in Africa, to the west of Egypt, Cyrene was colonized from Thera c. 630 B.C.

The result of this movement was to bring the Greeks into lively relations with the whole of the Mediterranean world. Barbarian tribes, in the far North-east and the West, hitherto unknown, came under the Grecian view; and Greece herself began to feel anew the strong force of influence from Asia. In Asia Minor, the Greek cities of

the coast felt the pressure exerted by a new great power. The dynasty of the Mermnadae, founded (c. 700) by Gyges, made Lydia a powerful kingdom. The Lydian power was checked for a time by the incursion of the Cimmerians, who poured down on Asia Minor from regions to the north of the Black Sea. Gyges fell in battle against them (c. 657) and Sardis was stormed. Ardys, the successor of Gyges, began to beat off the attack, and, under his successors, Sadyattes and Alyattes¹, Lydia recovered her strength, and began to encroach on the Greeks. Colophon and Magnesia were attacked and stormed. At about the same time, Psammetichus I of Egypt restored his country's independence; he depended largely for support on Greek and Carian mercenaries, and from about this time (c. 660), a new and keener intercourse between Greece and Egypt begins.

This stirring of national life abroad could not fail to react on conditions at home. The days of disunion and petty politics were drawing to a close. In contact with foreigners, the Greeks felt themselves brothers; it is at about this time that the general name of the nation, "*Ἕλληνες*," comes into current use. Sea-power began to excite the ambition of states. The chief maritime cities built ships of war, and Corinth and her disloyal colony Corcyra engaged in the first naval war of Greek history. The chief struggle of the age was the so-called "Lelantine" war, fought between Chalcis and Eretria for the possession of the Lelantine plain. Both parties were supported by allies, Chalcis by Corinth, Samos and Croton, Eretria by Megara, Miletus and Sybaris, and the struggle assumed the aspect of a general mercantile war. The result was the defeat of Eretria, but the victorious Chalcis profited nothing by her victory. Corinth deserted her alliance for that of an old rival, Miletus, and soon usurped her place.

¹ Dates: Ardys, c. 650-600, Alyattes, c. 600-560.

SECTION 4. POLITICAL EVENTS IN GREECE. SOCIAL CHANGES, ETC.

In Greece itself there were lively movements in the Peloponnese. Sparta and Elis had naturally come into alliance, as the two conquering powers, whilst the other states endeavoured to rally together against them. About 660 B.C. a great coalition against the oppressors was formed by the Pisatans, the Argives and the Arcadians: at the same time, the Messenians revolted from Sparta and joined the opposition. The struggle was long and doubtful. At first, success inclined towards Sparta's enemies. The Spartans were defeated by the Argives at Hysiae (? c. 669) and the Pisatans temporarily recovered control of the Olympian festival. The Messenian rebels, too, more than held their own; Sparta was discouraged almost to the pitch of despair, and the crisis called forth the patriotic war-poetry of Tyrtaeus, who raised the cry of "Death or Victory." But, in the end, Spartan resolution and valour triumphed. Messene was crushed and again reduced to slavery, and Elis recovered her supremacy over Pisatis. Argos, we must suppose, lost all that she had gained. Originally the chief Dorian state, she had been steadily on the decline for centuries. Her revival in the seventh century is probably to be attributed to her great king Pheidon, who, apart from his military exploits, enjoys the fame of having introduced a new system of weights and measures into the Peloponnese. The dates assigned to him vary over more than a century; but we know that he celebrated the Olympian festival in defiance of the Eleans, and it seems probable, therefore, that his activity belongs to the period from c. 660 onwards, and that the subsequent decline of Argos was the result of his death. Argos had a special neighbourly quarrel with Sparta over the coast of Cynuria, in the east of Laconia,

at that time in Argive possession. Frontier wars between the two powers were frequent, and Sparta enjoyed the support of the smaller cities of Argolis, such as Tiryns and Asine, which Argos was attempting to reduce to subjection.

The change that was setting in was not merely external, but penetrated deep into Greek life. Commerce and industry grew and flourished. There was a rising demand for cheap labour, and slaves began to be employed in large numbers. The old system of barter began to be replaced by the use of coined money, which, invented during the seventh century in Lydia or Ionia, rapidly spread over the Greek world. Money as a force by itself began to be felt. The landed aristocracy declined, and, in its place, rose a new class, whose claim to consideration was based primarily on wealth. "*Χρήματα χρήματ' ἀνὴρ*," "It's money makes the man," was the bitter scoff of an aristocrat of the old school. But, grumble as one might, money had become a force in social and political life, which could not be withstood. Commercial cities, of the type of Corinth, underwent this social change first; but even cities that depended on agriculture soon felt the new influence. New parties appear on the scene: on the one hand the comparatively limited class of the wealthy, who claim special political privilege—on the other, the mass of less fortunate and discontented citizens, the people or *δῆμος*, clamouring for complete political equality.

The chief grievance of the discontented in internal politics was the absence of written codes of law. The need for certainty on this important matter was strongly felt, and the demand that arose for it was too powerful to be resisted. To the Greek mind a legal system was, in its final form, the natural work of a single lawgiver; and so we find men appointed in various cities to formulate and classify the laws, under which the citizens were to live. Thus we hear of Dracon and Solon as lawgivers at Athens,

of Zaleucus at Locri, Charondas at Rhegium and Pittacus at Mytilene. Even in states, where the legal code was certainly not, in point of fact, the work of a single lawgiver, the figure of one was inserted in early history. Sparta attributed her whole constitution to the great Lycurgus, who was supposed to have lived at some date round about 800 B.C. and to have introduced his code either from the oracle of Delphi or, according to a varying account, from Crete. It is now generally recognized that this Lycurgus is no historical figure but simply an old Spartan god or demi-god. All the codes of this period, bear the same general stamp. Penalties were fixed for criminal offences, but the state still left the task of prosecution to the private citizen. Only in the case of murder was an exception made. The "uncleanness" that clung to the murderer was felt to extend to the state, and special courts were, therefore, appointed to try such cases. Of the arrangements made at Athens for such trials we have fairly full information. Different classes of murders were carefully distinguished and a special court was provided to try each. Public morality, in general, was strictly regulated; and participation in commerce, which still ranked as more or less dishonourable, was often restricted or even forbidden altogether.

In war, too, changes took place, which helped to break down the old social order. Cavalry ceased to be the chief arm, and gave place to the solid body of heavy-armed spearmen. In ancient times, the ability to bear arms for the state was always an important qualification for citizenship. The aristocrats, who had monopolized the costly service in the cavalry, lost ground, and the middle-class, which supplied the hoplites, profited by their loss. This development was first completed at Sparta. That state lived mainly for war and by war, and the Spartan hoplites, with their thorough training and discipline, were invincible

in the field. Most of Greece soon followed in the same direction; only here and there, as in Thessaly, did the cavalry retain its old importance.

The awakening of Greece found expression in a richer and more varied intellectual life. The individual began to count for more than he had done, and the new forms of poetry which succeeded the epic—the lyric, the reflective and the didactic—are all strongly imbued with the spirit of individualism. The old state religion was celebrated with increasing pomp. But ritual and ceremony were no longer everything, and the ethical questions of the moral duty and the destiny of the individual man came into the foreground. Great moral conceptions, such as that of the pride (*ὑβρις*) that leads men to destruction, were born; and the desire for personal immortality began to find expression. Art made great strides. Stone came into general use in architecture; and sculpture, based on the study of the human body, advanced in power and skill.

SECTION 5. THE TYRANTS

All these causes, which we have been discussing, led to a widespread discontent with the political privilege of the aristocracy. Out of this discontent arose the institution of the tyranny, which was simply the monarchy, restored in the form of the absolute power of an individual, based on the support of the masses. The one great evil of the tyranny, which made and will always make it an abomination to the idealist, was its lack of limitation. One man, as tyrant, disposed, at his own good will and pleasure, of the lives and properties of his fellows, and this, to the freedom-loving Greek, was an unnatural horror. Many of the tyrants were, without doubt, brutal and oppressive. Others, on the other hand, were men of wide outlook and high abilities, whose services in the internal and foreign

development of their cities may fairly be held to outweigh the temporary loss of liberty. The tyrants were, in many cases, great builders, friends of commerce, able generals and diplomatists and munificent patrons of art and literature, and we must always be prepared to discount the stories that are told of their atrocities.

It was probably in Ionia that the tyranny first struck root; we only hear of a few tyrants by name, as, for instance, of Thrasybulus in Miletus, but, during the sixth century, most of the Ionian cities fell into their power. But these factious cities, unable to unite for mutual defence, were no match for the rising power of Lydia under Alyattes and Croesus. Smyrna was destroyed (c. 675 B.C.) and most of the cities had to own Lydian supremacy. Miletus successfully withstood a siege by Alyattes, but was compelled in the end to make terms with her enemy. But this subjection to the inland power was no great misfortune for the Greeks. The kings of Lydia were wise and temperate rulers, and had nothing to gain in oppressing the important commercial cities of the coast. Relations between Greece and Lydia became very intimate, and Croesus (c. 560-546) was a generous donor to the oracle of Delphi and plays a large part in the historical anecdotes of the time.

In Greece itself, Corinth was one of the first cities to experience the revolution. About the year 657, a nobleman, named Cypselus, placed himself at the head of the discontented populace, overthrew the ruling aristocracy of the Bacchiadae, and made himself tyrant. His son Periander, succeeding his father c. 600, ruled till 588. Periander's nephew and successor, Psammetichus, was murdered in 585, and with him the tyranny fell. Reading between the lines of the unfriendly tradition, we see that Cypselus and Periander were men of character and ability, competent to conceive and execute great political schemes.

Their guiding principle was to confiscate the wealth of the nobles and to conciliate the masses by good government and care for their material interests. Police regulations must have been strict and vexatious—the tyrants were compelled to safeguard their irregular position—but the tyrants of Corinth seem to have shown little of the base cruelty of the typical despot. Abroad, a policy of expansion was steadily pursued. Corcyra, a colony of Corinth, which had broken loose from the mother-country, was reconquered, and Apollonia, Epidamnus, Ambracia, Leucas and Anactorium were founded on the western coasts of Greece. Periander cultivated friendly relations with foreign princes, and among his friends were Psammetichus of Egypt and Thrasybulus of Miletus. His private life was unhappy. He murdered his own wife, and this tragedy led to an irreconcilable feud with his favourite son. On the fall of the tyranny, the power fell into the hands of a cautious plutocracy, which made commerce its chief object. Corcyra again asserted her independence, but the rest of the Corinthian Empire in the west of Greece was retained.

In the neighbouring city of Sicyon, the house of the Orthagoridae ruled from about 660 onwards for more than a hundred years. We do not know the exact names or sequence of the earlier rulers; the only tyrant of Sicyon who survives as a clearly defined historical character is Cleisthenes. His reign was marked by great vigour both in home and foreign affairs. He threw off the supremacy of Argos, made Sicyon an independent power and took the leading part in the Sacred War¹. Sicyon was one of those cities in which the old population survived by the side of the Dorian conquerors. Cleisthenes, himself not a Dorian, degraded the three Dorian tribes, giving them, we are told, new and offensive names, and bestowed high honours on his own tribe. These reforms must have meant a definite

¹ See below, p. 80.

set-back to Dorian influence in Sicyon, but, nevertheless, they seem to have lasted for some fifty years or so after his death. Of the end of the dynasty we have no account; but it is probable that, about the year 530, the old order was restored under Spartan influence. That other cities of the Peloponnese also had their tyrants is only attested by a few names, such as those of Leon of Phlius and Procles of Epidaurus. Megara, the busy little commercial city of the Isthmus, had the same fortune as Corinth. A certain Theagenes, profiting by the support of the wealthy middle-class and the oppressed peasantry, overthrew the aristocracy and founded a tyranny (c. 640). But he did not succeed in founding a dynasty, and, after his fall, a moderate oligarchy came into power. Soon afterwards, the demus rose and made itself master of the state. The citizenship was extended to classes hitherto unprivileged, but abroad Megara was sorely vexed by feuds with Corinth and Athens, and to the latter enemy she had finally to resign the island of Salamis. The party-struggles in Megara are vividly pictured in the elegiacs of Theognis.

Of the conditions prevailing in other Greek cities we catch only occasional glimpses. Of Mytilene in Lesbos, the home of the lyric poets Alcaeus and Sappho, a little more is known. The aristocracy fell, and a number of tyrants, Penthilus, Myrsilus and Melanchrus, rose and fell in quick succession. Finally, a certain Pittacus was appointed "*αἰσυμνήτης*," or "orderer," of the state, that is to say, he was constitutionally invested with absolute power, until he should have restored peace and order. Unpopular at first in many quarters, he performed his task honestly and successfully and gave Mytilene internal peace.

SECTION 6. ATHENS: SOLON AND PISISTRATUS

Our narrative brings us at last to speak of that city which ranks for all time as the very type of the Greek genius, Athens. She entered comparatively late on the full tide of commercial and political life, and, though she was probably already a city of some size when the Dorians invaded the Peloponnese, and tradition tells of the welcome she extended to Peloponnesian exiles and the resistance she offered to the Dorian attack, it was not till the close of the seventh century B.C. that she began to play a notable part in Greek politics¹. About 636, a nobleman, named Cylon, son-in-law of Theagenes of Megara, attempted to make himself tyrant. His attempt failed and he and his adherents were seized and put to death. But their execution was the outcome of a flagrant breach of faith—for they had been promised their lives—and, soon afterwards, the great noble family of the Alcmaeonidae, which had been responsible for the crime, was sentenced to perpetual banishment. The exiles soon returned to Athens, but the old evil story was not forgotten and was always waiting to be cast in the teeth of their descendants. Some twelve years after the attempt of Cylon, Dracon was appointed to draw up a code of laws. His work, except in so far as it touched the law concerning murder, was not lasting. The only definite remembrance of his laws was that they had been amazingly severe; they were, it was said, written in blood. Athens had not attained to a settled peace. The commercial revolution was making itself bitterly felt, and the poorer peasants, under the operation of the savage laws governing debtors, were losing their financial independence and even their personal liberty. To these woes were added foreign troubles. A fierce struggle was being waged with

¹ For the early constitutional history of Athens see above, p. 60.



Athens and the Acropolis

Mytilene for the possession of Sigeum on the Troad; Periander of Corinth was finally invited to arbitrate and decided in favour of Athens. More serious and more bitter was the feud with Megara. That city held the island of Salamis and completely dominated the harbours of Athens. The possession of Salamis was clearly a vital question for the Athenians. Spurred on to new efforts by the statesman Solon they conquered the island; but it was some time before Megara consented to surrender her claims. Solon had found occasion to signalize his merits during this war, and, in 594, he was called by the unanimous voice of the citizens to draw up a new code of laws. He was a remarkable man, and the blend of idealism with sound common sense in his character admirably qualified him for the work he had to do. The first and most important question was that of debt. Here Solon resorted to radical measures. He declared a remission of all debts resting on a man's land or person, and brought back many debtors who had been sold into foreign bondage; this was the famous "*σεισάχθεια*" or "shaking off of burdens." But, whilst running counter, to this extent, to the wishes of the wealthy, he steadily refused to consent to that redistribution of property for which many were clamouring. His chief claim to remembrance rests, however, on his reform of the constitution. He retained the three property-classes of Pentacosiomedimni, Hippeis, and Zeugitae, already in use in Athens, added to them a fourth class, the Thetes, and made them the basis of a new constitution. The chief office, the archonship, and the important post of "Treasurer of Athena" were reserved for the first class; other offices were open also to the second and third, and the lowest class of all, the Thetes, while excluded from office, could take part in the meetings of the Ecclesia and Council. In the competency and organization of the magistracies Solon made little change. The archon stood

at the head of the executive, the king-archon officially represented the state, the polemarch was the chief general and minister of war; the junior archons, or Thesmothetae, were employed in civil jurisdiction. The old aristocratic council, the Areopagus, into which archons passed after office, lost its deliberative functions, but retained a high political prestige and a general right of supervision over state affairs, as a sort of revising Second Chamber. A new Council of Four Hundred, chosen from the first three classes, was appointed to discuss proposals and prepare them for discussion in the Ecclesia. The Ecclesia itself, the general assembly of all free citizens, had the final voice in all political questions. At the same time, Solon founded the jury-courts (Heliæa), the members of which were selected from the mass of the citizens. He also introduced the lot as a means of political selection, but did not give it unchecked play; the archons and probably the Four Hundred were chosen by a procedure in which lot and election were combined. Solon himself founded a timocracy rather than a democracy; but it was on the foundations laid by him that the Athenian democracy was erected, and the democrats hailed him, not without reason, as their first patron. Conservatives, on the other hand, looking back on his constitution, with all its moderation and checks on precipitate action, could easily persuade themselves that the days of Solon were indeed the good old times. Apart from these constitutional provisions, Solon left a mass of general legislation, much of which lasted long after his death. Restrictions were placed on the possession of landed estates, luxury was checked, a new system of weights and measures, the Euboean, was substituted for the Aeginetan.

Solon wound up his work by proclaiming a general amnesty, under cover of which the Alcmaeonidae, among others, returned. He then bound his countrymen by oath to observe his laws for ten years, and went abroad on his

travels, that he might not be pressed into granting fresh changes. But Solon's wise and moderate action had not satisfied the extremists on either side, and political strife began to rage again. The fight raged round the tenure of the chief magistracy, the archonship, and, from 583 to 581, a certain Damasias profited by the disorder to retain his office and attempt to found a tyranny. After his fall a compromise was effected between the opposing parties, but it soon broke down and faction raged once more. Three distinct sections can now be traced at Athens; the "Men of the Plain" (πεδιακοί), the party of the aristocratic land-owners, the "Party of the Coast" (παραλοί), representing the mercantile classes, and beside these two chief rivals, a third faction, that of the "Hills," representing the smaller farmers. Abroad, the war with Megara continued to go well for Athens; Salamis was held and Nisaea, the port of Megara, captured. In the end, Sparta was called in to arbitrate, and, while assigning Salamis definitely to Athens, ordered the surrender of Nisaea to Megara. In 561 the political strife reached a climax. Pisistratus, a youthful friend of Solon, at the head of the Hillsmen, secured a bodyguard for himself, by vote of the Assembly, seized the Acropolis and became tyrant. Solon, we are told, protested in vain against the outrage on his constitution. Many political opponents of Pisistratus left the city; Miltiades, head of the great house of the Philaïdae, founded an independent principality in the Thracian Chersonese.

SECTION 7. THE SACRED WAR. CYRENE AND THE WEST


Here we must leave the history of Athens for the moment to observe the events that were taking place in other parts of Greece. The chief event at home was the

so-called "Sacred War." Crisa, a member of the Phocian League, claimed control over Delphi and its oracle. The Delphians objected and enlisted the support of the Amphictyonic Council of Anthela in their support. The people of Crisa were accused of offences against Apollo, and, in holy league, Cleisthenes of Sicyon, Thessaly, Athens and other allies destroyed the offending city and declared Delphi independent (c. 586).

With Lydia and with Egypt Greece had intimate relations. Of Croesus we have already spoken. In Egypt, Amasis rose against his master Apries, as he returned from an unsuccessful expedition against Cyrene, and, supported by the Egyptians against Apries' foreign mercenaries, made himself king. He ruled as an up-to-date and enlightened sovereign, welcomed Greeks in Egypt and assigned them Naucratis as a port of trade.

The age of Greek colonization was drawing to a close, but there are a few colonies that must still be mentioned. Cyrene, herself a colony, as we saw, of Thera, founded Barca and Euesperides. Cyrene was ruled at first by kings, bearing the names of Arcesilaus and Battus. Under Battus III (c. 537), in consequence of internal feuds, Demonax of Mantinea was called in as lawgiver. He established democratic institutions, but spared the royal office and left it certain honorary rights. Arcesilaus III, the successor of Battus, was expelled and fled to Samos; but, returning with a mercenary army, he regained his position and overthrew the constitution of Demonax.

In Magna Graecia, a bitter feud raged between the great rival Achaean cities of Sybaris and Croton, ending in the destruction of the former. In Sicily, Gela founded Agrigentum and Selinus Heraclea Minoa. Here the Chalcidian cities, Naxos, Leontini and others, were losing their early power, and the Dorian colonies, notably Syracuse, were fast outstripping them. Camarina, the




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colony of Syracuse, was defeated and laid waste, after an attempt to gain independence. Tyrants begin to appear sporadically—Panaetius in Leontini and Phalaris in Agrigentum; but, for the most part, the holders of political power were the great land-owners. Further West, along the south and east coasts of Spain and south along the coast of Africa, the Phoenicians had founded their trading depôts and monopolized the trade of the countries. The first Greek city to challenge their supremacy was Phocaea, which entered into commercial relations with the Tartessi of south Spain and founded Massalia on the coast of Gaul (c. 600) and Alalia in Corsica (c. 565).

Most of the Phoenician settlements were small trading centres, which never developed into cities of any size. But on the coast of Africa, nearly opposite Sicily, there was one notable exception. There Carthage from about 600 onwards began to unfold a remarkable activity. The earliest history of the city has been dealt with in an earlier section¹. The subjugation of the native Africans of the interior provided Carthage with a considerable extent of fertile ground, which she utilized to the full by the help of a ruthless but effective system of farming; and abroad the Carthaginians were firmly established in Sardinia and the west of Sicily. A common jealousy of the Greeks led Carthage and Etruria into alliance, and, about the year 535, a great naval battle was fought between their allied fleets and that of the Phocaeans near Alalia. The Phocaeans, though not actually defeated, were so weakened that they abandoned Alalia and departed to found the city of Elea in southern Italy. It was the first decisive set-back to the Greek advance in the West. The ruling power in Carthage was a commercial aristocracy. The chief elements in the constitution were the two chief magistrates (the Suffetes) and the aristocratic council; the general assembly of citizens

was practically powerless. The one serious threat to the established oligarchy came from the army, in which a distinguished officer might establish an independent power. Such a power was founded by Malchus, a general who fought for Carthage in Sicily and Sardinia; but, in the end, he fell and the constitution remained unaltered (late sixth century?). After his death, the house of Mago, as generals of the state and representatives of the Great Families, held power for more than a century. But it was felt that the army might again, under the influence of ambitious officers, threaten the civil government, and a regulation was made to exclude the nobility from all but officers' posts in the army; the bulk of the troops were mercenaries, supplied in plenty by the subjects of Carthage. Of Etruria, next to Carthage the chief maritime power of the West, we shall have more to say in a later chapter¹.

SECTION 8. THE CULTURE OF THE SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

The social life, the literature, the philosophy and the art of a people are all parts of its history, and the historian need offer no excuse for bringing them within his survey. In an outline, such as this, it is, of course, impossible to adventure far upon these pleasant by-paths of history; but it may perhaps be worth while to give, at intervals, brief sketches, that make no claim to completeness, of Greek progress along intellectual lines. In the early part of the sixth century B.C. the individual begins to figure largely in history. Popular interest, in fact, was directed mainly towards the striking personalities of the time; and the history of the age, as it has come to us, is richly equipped with anecdotes and details of personal interest. Typical for the age are

¹ See below, p. 255 ff.

the "Seven Wise Men"—Solon, Thales, Periander, Chilon, Pittacus, Bias and Cleobulus, according to the most authoritative list—who were not, however, so much philosophers as men of practical wisdom and experience. Their "wisdom" was summed up, not in philosophic systems, but in short gnomic maxims, each enshrining some important principle of life; such were the famous maxims "*Γνώθι σεαυτόν*" and "*Μηδὲν ἄγαν*," truisms, perhaps, to us, but once, no doubt, illuminating and inspiring. A mass of legend grew up round the figures of these sages, and they were brought into relations—often in defiance of historical possibility—with such great foreign princes as Croesus of Lydia and Amasis of Egypt. Through art and literature pulsed a new and joyous life. It was the great age of Greek Lyric Poetry. Most of its poems are lost to us, but a mere list of names—Alcaeus, Sappho, Alcman, Mimnermus, Stesichorus—gives one a conception of its original fertility. New moral ideas found expression in literature. Suffering was conceived of as the direct result of sin, and the ideal was sought in the rational and sober enjoyment of the pleasures of life, with due observance of the golden mean. On the whole, it was an age of confidence and joy; only in the poets of Ionia do we catch the first notes of that pessimism that dogs the path of advancing civilization. In religion new tendencies become apparent. The old religion, with its uncouth and often barbarous myths, began to cause offence to thinking men and a new interpretation was sought, which should harmonize traditional belief with the new ethical demand. But, beyond this, the individual craved for a deeper satisfaction of his personal hopes and aspirations than could be found in the old faith. Old forms of nature worship, above all, the cults of Demeter and of Dionysus, were revived under new forms and fed the hungry soul with their wild emotional rites and their mysterious promises of personal salvation in

this life and beyond. The worship of Demeter and her daughter centred in the shrine of Eleusis in Attica, and the Eleusinian mysteries attracted an ever widening circle. The worship of Dionysus had its home in Thrace and Boeotia, and expressed itself in great festivals and in the private revels of bands of intoxicated worshippers (*θίασοι*). Answering to these new religious ceremonies a new mythology arose, which was attributed to old mythical seers, such as Orpheus and Musaeus, and is known to us as the "Orphic." It was a curious blend of old native and foreign myths, permeated by the spirit of religious mysticism and touched by the nascent philosophy of the time. Its chief god was Dionysus, who was equated with the world-god Zeus. It taught the doctrine of immortality, in the form of the transmigration of souls, and promised salvation through initiation into the mysteries. In its earlier form the new system revealed a remarkable depth of thought and emotion; but, as too often happens, it degenerated rapidly into low fraud and charlatanism. Had this school of thought continued to flourish without a rival, Greece might have fallen under the sway of a new religion of emotion. But another and a more healthy spirit was awakening to life, which checked its further development—the spirit of free inquiry into the causes of natural phenomena—the spirit of pure philosophy. Its earliest home was in Ionia, and its first representatives were Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes. The first philosophic systems were crude and simple and attempted to trace back all things to a single root cause—Thales, for example, made water the primal element. But the importance of these thinkers lay not so much in their actual achievement as in the spirit that prompted them: they stood for the right of the human mind to interpret the world according to its own requirements, unfettered by the tyranny of the emotions. Other great figures of the

age were Hecataeus, the "father of Greek history," who rehandled the old legends in a rationalizing spirit, Pherecydes, who, in his "*Πεντάμυχος*," attempted to effect a compromise between religion and philosophy, and Xenophanes, who preached a strict Monotheism and poured ridicule on the absurdity and immorality of the old myths.

SECTION 9. SPARTA. CYRUS. CROESUS

From this digression we return to follow the course of history from about 550 onwards. New forces of magnitude appear in the political world. Sparta, in particular, advanced year by year in power. Her constitution was admirably adapted to her requirements, for the prevalent evils of party strife and tyranny had left her untouched. The dual kingship still survived, but its power was checked by the growing influence of the Council of Elders and of the ephors. The state was young and vigorous, and had a clear field of expansion before it. Later, as Sparta's territory increased and her influence with it, it became essential for the welfare of the state that the basis of citizenship should be broadened. But the conservatives triumphed, and Sparta fell short of her full growth, simply because she refused to make use of her natural resources. About the year 550 she gained a decisive victory over Argos and won the disputed frontier land of Thyrea; the strip of coast called Cynuria and the island of Cythera had already passed into her possession. At about the same date, after long and hazardous wars, she gained the upper hand of her northern neighbour, the Arcadian city of Tegea. Whether through stress of circumstances or by deliberate choice, Sparta here inaugurated a new foreign policy. She no longer attempted to incorporate new territory in her own, as she had done with Messene, but strove instead to establish a political predominance over the smaller states

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of the Peloponnese. The result of this new policy was the formation of the Peloponnesian league, of which we shall have soon to speak.

Meanwhile, the Persian power had appeared with startling suddenness on the east of the Greek world. Cyrus, the great conqueror, threw off the Median supremacy, overthrew Lydia (546) and Babylon (539) and established the Persian Empire. After Croesus had been captured in his capital, the Greek cities, hitherto careless of the danger, sought to make terms with Cyrus. But the time for covenanting had passed, and Aeolis and Ionia, with Lycia and Caria, had to submit to Persian rule. It was a distinct change for the worse. The Lydian kings had been lovers of Greek civilization and their rule had not been felt as an oppression; the rule of the Persian meant undisguised servitude. The plan suggested by Bias of Priene—that the Greeks should leave Asia Minor and sail to found a new great city in Sardinia—was never seriously contemplated. But isolated cases of migration did occur; the Phocaeans went west to Alalia, and then to Elea¹, and the people of Teos migrated to Abdera and Phanagoreia. Cyrus himself did not advance further west, and his son Cambyses devoted his short reign to the conquest of Egypt. But the Persians had not yet marked off their western frontier, and the threatening attack on Greece was only deferred until the coming of Darius, the second founder of the Persian Empire.

SECTION 10. PISISTRATUS AND HIS SONS. POLYCRATES. GROWTH OF SPARTA

Pisistratus became tyrant of Athens in 561, but his rule was not unquestioned. An alliance formed by him with a rival, Megacles, had no long life, and, after a few

¹ See above, p. 81.

years of rule, he was driven out of Athens by a league of the parties of the Plain and the Coast. Some eleven years later (about 546 B.C.) he returned to Athens and established a lasting power. Tradition has to tell of three periods of Pisistratus's rule, broken by two intervals of exile, but modern scholars are, on the whole, agreed that this is a case of repetition and that Pisistratus's tyranny was only once broken by expulsion. Pisistratus was anything but the wicked tyrant of tradition: to later generations his rule seemed a veritable golden age. The constitution underwent no actual change; Pisistratus simply contrived to fill the chief offices with his own nominees. He took good care of the agricultural classes and handsomely patronized their festivals. Abroad, he pursued an enterprising commercial policy. Sigeum on the Hellespont was secured, and Miltiades I and his son ruled in the Thracian Chersonese as vassals of Athens. With Argos, Thessaly and Macedon good relations were maintained. Pisistratus was a great patron of art, letters and religion; he caused a new edition of the Homeric poems to be issued, he built new temples, reorganized the worship of Eleusis, and founded the two great festivals ("City" and "Country") of Dionysus. His younger son Hipparchus had a special partiality for poetry and entertained, among others, Simonides, Lasus and Anacreon at his court. On the death of Pisistratus in 528 his elder son Hippias succeeded him unquestioned.

In the Aegean, a new naval power rose suddenly into brief splendour. Pisistratus had assisted a certain Lygdamis to make himself tyrant of Naxos, and Lygdamis, in his turn, helped the three brothers, Polycrates, Pantognostus and Soloson to make themselves masters of Samos. Polycrates, the ablest and most unscrupulous of the three, soon pushed his brothers aside and reigned alone as tyrant of Samos. He built a powerful fleet and practised piracy

on friend and foe alike. His proverbial good luck and his friendship with Amasis of Egypt are illustrated in the famous story of Polycrates's ring, for which we must refer our readers to their Herodotus and their Schiller. Like other tyrants, Polycrates kept a brilliant court and enjoyed reflected glory from the men of letters who gathered round him.

In the Peloponnese, Sparta advanced without looking back. All Arcadia acknowledged her supremacy, Corinth, Sicyon, Megara and Aegina began to look to her as their political leader. Argos was as ever rancorous and bitter, but was too weak to cause alarm. The Peloponnese, in fact, was rapidly becoming a rough political unity under the hegemony of Sparta. And further afield the fame of Sparta grew. About 519 the little Boeotian city of Plataea sought her protection against Thebes. Sparta, however, unwilling to make an enemy of Thebes, refused her assistance; Plataea then applied to Athens and obtained her protection, and, in the war that ensued, Athens defeated Thebes and pushed her northern frontier up to the Asopus (about 518). Of the organization of the Peloponnesian League under the presidency of Sparta we have no certain information in this early period. Probably there was no league constitution, in the strict sense of the word; the single states were each bound to Sparta by defensive alliances, and it was only in Sparta, as head, that they formed a unity at all. With this body at her back, Sparta seemed to have a great future in store. All that was required of her was intelligent and energetic leadership, and one of the two royal houses, that of the Agidae, was devoted to a policy of enterprise, even if it should involve internal reconstruction in the state. But the opposing party, represented by the ephors and the other royal house, the Euryontidae, putting the constitution above all else, steadily refused to contemplate any political action that seemed to

involve the smallest element of risk. With the gradual triumph of this conservative party, Sparta forfeited her claims to political greatness.

Polycrates of Samos, by his shameless piracies, had earned the bitter enmity of Corinth and Aegina, and these states used all their influence at Sparta to procure a declaration of war by Sparta against him. When, about 525, a body of Samian exiles applied to Sparta for help, she decided to take definite action and despatched a strong force against the tyrant. But Polycrates, safe inside his fortifications, braved the attack and the expedition returned home unsuccessful. The tyrant, however, was destined soon to fall. He sent troops to assist the Persians against Amasis of Egypt, once his friend; but the Persians had no love for the unscrupulous and powerful tyrant, and Orodes, satrap of Sardis, contrived to decoy him into his power and put him to a cruel death. Maeandrius, steward of Polycrates, succeeded to his power but was soon overthrown and applied in vain to Sparta for restitution; Soloson, brother of Polycrates, held Samos in his place.

SECTION II. HIPPIAS AND SPARTA, CLEOMENES AND CLEISTHENES. GELON

Hippias, we have seen, succeeded Pisistratus without question at Athens. The early years of his reign were peaceful and prosperous, but in 514 Hipparchus, his younger brother, was murdered by two Athenians, Harmodius and Aristogeiton, in revenge for a private wrong, and Hippias, who narrowly escaped assassination himself, grew suspicious and hard; he disarmed the Athenian population and sought security in a close *rapprochement* with Sparta. The manner of his fall was a curious one. The Alcmaeonidae, living at the time in exile, were defeated in an attempt to return by force. Violent measures having failed, they had recourse

to craft. They contrived to win the hearty support of the Delphian priests; and, as a result, the Delphic oracle began to preach to Sparta the duty of expelling the tyrant Hippias. Reluctant, at first, to break with a friend, the superstitious Spartans, at last, consented to send an expedition. A corps, led by Anchimolius, sailed to Phalerum, but on landing was decisively defeated. Sparta's military honour was involved and Cleomenes, the Spartan king of the line of the Agidae, appeared in Attica in 510 with a powerful army and drove Hippias into banishment. But then the Spartan king committed a serious error. He abandoned the Alcmaeonid Cleisthenes and transferred his support to a rival noble Isagoras; Isagoras was set in power at Athens, and Cleisthenes and his friends were driven into exile. In 508 Cleomenes was again in Athens, engaged in an intervention in support of his friends. But his interference was bitterly resented; the Athenians rose against him, besieged him in the acropolis, and compelled him to retire under a convention; Cleisthenes returned to his home in triumph. Cleomenes's one thought was now of revenge for the personal shame he had incurred. He called out the forces of the Peloponnesian League, and, with his colleague Demaratus, led them in 507 into Attica; the old enemies of Athens, the Boeotians, supported by the Chalcidians, joined in the attack and, at about the same time, Aegina too declared war. But the states of the Peloponnesian League had no liking for a war which did not concern their interests and which had been declared without their consent. Corinth spoke out for the malcontents, other allies seconded her objections and king Demaratus himself gave his voice in their favour. The result was that the great army broke up at Eleusis and returned home. But Cleomenes would not yet acknowledge failure. He resolved to restore Hippias, the good friend whom Sparta had so unwisely discarded, and summoned delegates from the allies to the

Isthmus to decide on action. Once again Corinth offered a resolute resistance, which Cleomenes could not overcome; the attack on Athens had to be abandoned. Free from this danger, Athens had little trouble in settling with her other enemies. The Boeotians and Chalcidians were decisively beaten, and, though Aegina continued the war, she could cause nothing but slight annoyances. Hippias fled to Persia and gained the court over to his side. Cleisthenes, while the danger from Sparta lasted, had been forced to think of Persian help; but now that that menace was lifted, a decided refusal was returned to the Persian demand for the restoration of Hippias.

Cleisthenes had established his power by the support of the Athenian democrats, and in his hour of victory he instituted reforms which swept away most of the remaining aristocratic elements in the constitution, and made the democracy master of the state; they probably began as early as 508, but cannot have been fully realized in practice until some years later. His chief reform, which broke the aristocratic influence in the state, consisted in abandoning for political purposes the old tribes, in which the aristocrats predominated, and substituting for them ten new local tribes. Attica was divided into three districts—city, coast, and inland; each of these districts was divided into ten "*τριττῦες*"—each composed of small local divisions, named "demes"—and three of these "*τριττῦες*" were assigned by lot to each tribe. The new tribe, therefore, was not a solid geographical section of the land, but contained demes scattered over various parts of Attica; it was, in fact, essentially a political body. The old tribes, phratries and clans continued to exist, but only for social and religious purposes. The Council was raised in numbers from 400 to 500—50 from each tribe—and the year was divided into ten "prytanies," in each of which one tribe held the presidency. The archons were now appointed by election,

instead of by lot, and in 502 ten *strategi* were appointed to form a council of war under the presidency of the polemarch. To guard against the dangerous ascendancy of individuals, the curious institution of ostracism was created, by which any man, who seemed dangerous to the state, might, by a popular ballot, be exiled from Athens for ten years. The reforms of Cleisthenes met the new needs of the state and were carried through speedily and without bloodshed; they found their full justification in the increased vigour which they brought to the state, just as it entered on a momentous crisis of its fortunes.

A little light now breaks the darkness that enshrouds the early history of the Grecian West. In 515 Dorieus, a half-brother of king Cleomenes of Sparta, unable to endure a subordinate position at home, led out an expedition to found a colony at Cinyps on the African coast. Driven thence by Carthage, he attempted to settle at Eryx in western Sicily, but fell in battle against the Carthaginians, who continued to persecute him. In Magna Graecia, we hear of the activity of the great Pythagoras of Samos. An ethical teacher rather than a philosopher in the modern sense, he taught a high system of ascetic morality, with which he associated a severely aristocratic tendency in politics. He won great support and, with his followers, held power for a time in Croton and other cities; later, his cause suffered a set-back and he was driven from Croton to Metapontum. In Sicily the tyranny struck firm root, and tyrants appear, round about 500, in Zancle, Himera, Leontini, Agrigentum and Gela. A certain Hippocrates became tyrant of Gela (c. 505), and in 498 defeated the Syracusans on the river Elleporus. His son Gelon, succeeding him in 501, conquered Syracuse and transferred his court thither in 485, leaving his brother Hiero ruler in Gela. Gelon was an able but ruthless ruler. He based his power on the support of the moneyed classes and the army, held the reins tight, and

deported whole populations to enlarge Syracuse. He maintained a great army and fleet and was, at the moment, the strongest force in the Grecian world. Theron of Agrigento was his close ally; a rival party was formed by Anaxilaus of Rhegium, who, in 494, instigated Samian exiles to seize the city of Zancle—which was renamed Messana—and Terillus of Himera. But this party was decidedly the weaker, and Terillus was driven out of his city by Theron. The only justification—but that a powerful one—for the military despotism of Gelon lay in the danger threatening from Carthage. That Phœnician power had an understanding with Persia and was preparing to assume the aggressive against the Greeks of the West, while their homeland was being conquered by the Persians. Hellenism was to fight for its life over the whole Mediterranean, and emerge the stronger and fresher from the conflict.

SECTION 12. THE PERSIAN EMPIRE

Before we open this new chapter in the world's history, it will be well to attempt to gain a clear idea of the great eastern power, which was menacing Greece. Persia, the home of the Persians, was a realm of pleasant and fruitful uplands on the south-west of the great plateau of Iran. For centuries the Persians had lived a simple and unambitious life, until, early in the sixth century B.C., they had formed a little empire under the suzerainty of Media and, then, asserting their independence, had gone forth under Cyrus to conquer the world. We have already traced the growth of the Persian power down to the conquest of Egypt by Cambyses. That king had suspected his brother Smerdis of treachery and had had him put to death. But, while he was still in Egypt, a pretender arose against him, giving himself out to be the prince Smerdis, and Cambyses died


on his way to put down the revolt. The pretender, supported by the priestly caste of the magi, gained firm hold on power, and, for the moment, no voice was raised against him. However, Darius, son of Hystaspes, a close connexion of the royal house, conspired with six other nobles, murdered the usurper and assumed the crown. At the start, he had to fight for his position and contend with revolts in Babylonia, Elam, Media and Armenia; but, probably within a year, his sovereignty was universally recognized. Master at last in his own house, Darius embarked in 512 on a great expedition against the Scythians, with the object, it seems, of conquering the regions of south-east Europe as far north as the Danube. Tradition represents the expedition as a terrible failure and shows us Darius fleeing for his life before his victorious enemies. Scythia, it is true, was not conquered, and, so far, the project failed. But Thrace was definitely subdued and the incorporation of this new province in the empire had presumably been Darius' main object. The Greek cities of Ionia under their tyrants supported Darius loyally, and, if Herodotus is correct, rendered him a great service by guarding his bridge over the Hellespont until his return.

The Persian Empire had been founded by Cyrus, but it only received its final organization from Darius, and it bears his stamp clearly impressed upon it, when we first begin to see it clearly. It was the first empire that the world had seen which could fairly claim to be called universal. Its spirit was, on the whole, fine and civilized; the barbarous customs that disfigured it were the exception rather than the rule, and we should be committing an injustice if we simply accepted the Greek estimate of the Persians as barbarians. Persia itself was not sufficiently central to form the focus of the empire, and the seat of government was therefore transferred to Susa. Babylon and Ecbatana, however, ranked beside Susa as

royal capitals; and Persepolis, the old capital, served as a treasure-city and the burial place of the kings. The Persian nation formed the aristocracy of the empire and enjoyed various privileges, including exemption from taxation. The king bore the distinctive title of "King of Kings" and ruled the empire as an absolute monarch; but, in relation to his own Persians, he was the head of the nation, appointed by the god Ormuzd. He governed by right and tradition and was assisted by a council of nobles, in which the families of the six fellow-conspirators of Darius held the places of honour. Every able-bodied Persian was a soldier and young Persians of noble birth were trained at court for service as officers. The Persians began as a sound and vigorous race, brave, truth-loving and humane. But an extreme susceptibility to foreign influences, coupled with the enervating spells of prosperity, gradually blunted their finer qualities. The king, though not worshipped as a god, enjoyed a dignity far above that of the ordinary man. He was surrounded with pomp and ceremony and claimed homage from all men as his due. Like all eastern sovereigns, he kept a large harem, from which, in the days of decline, influences passed only too frequently into politics. Round him stood a throng of courtiers and court officials, chief among them the "Εἰσαγγελεύς," or lord high chamberlain, the "Χιλιάρχης," or captain of the guard, in later times almost an imperial vizier, and the "Βασιλέως Ὀφθαλμός," equipped with powers of general supervision. The king concerned himself even with the minutiae of government, and written documents were kept to assist him in administration. Darius, himself, could boast with justice that he had practised equity and humanity, had honoured his friends and revenged himself on his foes. To honour benefactors was a maxim of the Persian court and a list of such well-doers was always kept. At court, Persian was naturally the official language; but Aramaic was widely used in the

west of the empire, and, locally, the native languages were readily employed.

The empire was divided into great administrative sections, called satrapies. No authoritative list of the Persian satrapies can be given, for the divisions varied from time to time and our authorities do not always distinguish between satrapies and their subdivisions; we must refer the reader to the map of the empire at the beginning of the Persian wars. The satrap was at once general, governor and judge. He sent up the tribute to the court and controlled subordinate governors and native princes; in his own sphere, in fact, he was, on a small scale, a king. But a strict control was exercised; the secretary of the satrap acted regularly as a check on his superior and an elaborate system of espionage was maintained. In many places, for example in Cilicia and parts of Syria, native princes or ruling priests held power as satraps or subordinative governors. The Greek city state was a form of government which the Persians found it hard to understand, and, in the beginning, they preferred to encourage the rule of tyrants, as in Ionia. In practice, the cities enjoyed a large measure of autonomy; but this autonomy was not constitutionally guaranteed and was frequently infringed. Apart from the subject princes and cities, we find the vassal peoples, the immediate subjects of the empire, entirely devoid of political rights and committed to blind obedience. In most of the satrapies there were large tracts of private property belonging to the king or assigned by him to his friends; we need only instance the gift of cities to Demaratus, the Spartan king, and the Athenian statesman Themistocles. The Persian rule was not deliberately oppressive, but the vast cost of the government must have rendered the tribute a heavy burden. Local custom and law were consulted, but only capriciously; though in some countries, especially in Egypt and Judaea, great consideration was shown for native religious sentiment.




Based on Dr William Smith's Ancient Atlas (Murray, 1854)

Cambridge University Press

THE PERSIAN EMPIRE AND ITS SATRAPIES, c. 520 B.C.

THE BERGIAN EMPIRE AND ITS SALVAGING CORPS

Map of the Bergian Empire, showing the Salvaging Corps' 1st Division



To maintain the unity of the empire a magnificent system of royal roads was established, fitted with regular posting-stations. Such roads ran from Ephesus to Sardis, from Babylonia to the Indian frontier and from the Syrian coast along the Euphrates.

The army consisted of the Persian levy and of contingents of subject troops, drawn upon in accordance with the bidding of prudence and military efficiency. Each province maintained its own troops, which were commanded by the satrap; but for enterprises involving larger areas a single commander-in-chief, usually himself a satrap, was appointed. The independent military positions of the satraps became a serious danger to the later empire, when revolts became frequent. The chief weapons of the Persians were the bow and the lance; defensive armour consisted of nothing but a large square shield. The Persians themselves were brave soldiers but singularly unintelligent in their tactics; they fought in great squares and trusted for victory to their cavalry and their bowmen. The fleet, in its best times a formidable one, was furnished by Egypt, Cilicia, Phoenicia and the Asiatic Greeks.

Commercially, the Persian Empire fell into two great spheres—the Lydian, using coined money, and the Babylonian, using metal bars and rings. Darius made the gold coinage an imperial monopoly, and his new gold coin, the daric, became the chief gold currency of the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean. The corresponding silver coin was the “σίγλος” or shekel, the twentieth part of the daric. The tribute was first organized by Darius. Each province, after paying its own expenses, had to send in a certain sum to the treasury, and these sums were stored up in bullion, in Susa and Persepolis. Besides these money payments, large contributions in kind were exacted, and there were further expenses, such as those of entertaining the king and his court when he was travelling. The king’s hospitality was

on a gigantic scale; we hear of 15,000 men eating daily at his table.

Persian art grew up under Babylonian and Greek influences, but freely and not without a character of its own; it represented the empire, however, rather than the nation. Of the development of Persian religion under the empire we can say little. But the Persians learned from other nations to make images of their gods; and, beside the supreme god, Ormuzd, other figures, such as the sun-god, Mithras, gained an increasing hold. Their religion spread westward, notably in Cappadocia and Armenia. The Persian policy was one of strict tolerance, and often the government definitely sought support among the priests of the native religions. In Babylon, Cyrus succeeded to the throne of the native kings and ruled as the "chosen of Marduk." But frequent revolts showed the futility of conciliation in this instance, and, in 484, Xerxes finally abolished the kingship of Babylon. The Babylonian priests, known as the Chaldaeans, with their mythical histories, their astrology and their astronomy, exercised a profound influence on the empire, and, through it, on the history of the world.

We will close our sketch by taking a brief survey of the nations composing the empire. Darius's great task was to secure the frontiers. On the far north-east he subdued the tribes up to the Indus and made a profound impression on the peoples beyond that river. The Persian Gulf was explored and a lively trade grew up there. On the north of Iran, eastwards from the Caspian, dwelt Scythian tribes, Sogdiani and others, west of the Caspian, the Alarodi, Colchi and Chalybes. Several great trade routes, running along this line east and west, can be traced. Darius extended his rule to the Caucasus, founding two new satrapies in that quarter. Possibly, in his Scythian expedition, he may have dreamed of subduing the whole of the

tribes in the Black Sea-Caspian area; but we cannot be sure if we are right in crediting him with so wide-reaching a scheme. Of Iran itself and the eastern satrapies we hear little; there was constant, but unimportant, trouble with unsubdued tribes of the hills. The early Persian Empire had the enterprise to undertake various great schemes. A canal was dug to connect the Red Sea with the Nile, which afterwards became choked with sand; and the task of circumnavigating Africa was committed by Xerxes, as an ordeal, to a nobleman in disfavour, but was never executed.

Syria and Phoenicia were included in a single great satrapy. The Assyrians here had dealt a decisive blow at the local nationalities, and a certain cosmopolitan blend of population, mainly Aramaic in character, had taken their place. Chief among the cities were Tyre, Sidon, Damascus, Bambyce, Gaza and Aradus. The desert tribes of Arabia pressed continually in upon the civilized land. Arabia was of great commercial importance, both as a means of communication between Egypt, Syria and Babylon, and as the source of myrrh, incense and spices.

The old realms of Assyria and Urartu formed the satrapy of Armenia. Here, at an uncertain date, the Armenians, Indo-Germanic invaders, ousted the old Alarodian population. Cilicia, under a native prince, ruling as vassal of Persia, enjoyed a certain degree of independence. In Asia Minor, the two satrapies of Sardis and Dascylium were apparently united under one ruler down to a little before 400 B.C. Caria was thoroughly Greek and sturdily independent in spirit. The Lydian League was allowed to continue undisturbed. Many half-barbarous mountain-tribes of Asia Minor, Pisidians and Lycaonians, Bithynians, Paphlagonians and Mysians, were never permanently subdued.

Egypt was a country of the first importance to the

empire. On the west, Cyrene and its territory were brought under Persian rule, while to the south lay the independent Ethiopian kingdom of Meroe, where, in a certain sense, the old independent Egypt might be held to survive. Great consideration was shown by the Persians for the Egyptian religion; but in spite of all conciliatory efforts, revolts, especially among the Libyans of the West Delta, were frequent. When Xerxes crushed the great rebellion in 484, he appointed his brother Achaemenes satrap and instituted a severer rule than Egypt had yet known.

SECTION 13. THE IONIAN REVOLT AND DARIUS'S EXPEDITIONS AGAINST GREECE

Such, in its general outlines, was the empire founded by Cyrus and organized by Darius. From the day when Cyrus sacked Sardis and annihilated the Lydian power, Persia came into direct contact with the Greek world and, as a conquering power that had not yet sated itself with conquest, was bound to proceed, sooner or later, to direct attack. We have now to trace the course of events which actually led up to the great assault of the East on the West. One of the chief men in Ionia was Histiaeus, tyrant of Miletus, who, by loyalty shown in the hour of need, had won Darius's favour. But he had his enemies, who slandered him to Darius; and the king, though refusing to accept the tales as true, deemed it politic to summon Histiaeus up to court. Much against his will, the tyrant went into honourable captivity at Susa, and a certain Aristagoras succeeded him in Miletus. The new tyrant was a man of great ambition and mediocre capacity. He prompted the Persian satrap, Megabates, to an attack on Naxos; the expedition was a dismal failure and Aristagoras, fearing for his skin, decided to revolt. Histiaeus, desiring freedom at all costs,

did his best to egg on the rebels. Aristagoras laid down his tyranny in Miletus, the other tyrants were driven from their thrones, and Ionia and Caria rose joyfully against the hated foreigners. The next task was to find allies in Greece. Sparta steadily refused to be drawn into the desperate adventure; but Athens and Eretria both sent small contingents. Thus reinforced, the Asiatic Greeks marched inland and sacked Sardis, but suffered a heavy defeat on their retreat to the coast. Byzantium and Cyprus now joined the revolt; but Persia was ready to take up the war seriously, and the total lack of organization among the rebels made their defeat simply a matter of time. And so the war moved slowly to its natural conclusion. In 498 Cyprus was recovered, and, after victories in Caria, the Persian army could proceed to attack the Greek cities one by one. Aristagoras fled from Miletus and met his death in Thrace (496), and Histiaeus, after escaping from his captivity to the coast, died, after a series of adventures, in 493. The decision fell in 495, when the Persian fleet completely defeated the Greeks at Lade, near Miletus. In 494 Miletus fell, and the revolt gradually died down. Persian rule was everywhere restored, and the Persian general Mardonius, distrustful of tyrants, chose to rely for support on the popular parties in the cities.

Athens had compromised herself badly by her support of the rebels and had the vengeance of the victors to fear. Feeling in the city was divided. One party thought of reconciliation with Persia and acceptance of her *protégé*, the tyrant Hippias. A second, led by Miltiades, who fled to Athens from the Chersonese in 493 and at once took up a strong political position, trusted to the Athenian hoplite army for a successful resistance. A third party, led by the new man, Themistocles, saw that the one hope of final victory lay in the development of sea-power, and worked steadily for the creation of a great Athenian navy. In 493

Themistocles as archon proposed and carried the plans for a new harbour at Peiraeus. But for the moment he could do no more. The shifting of the defence of Athens from land to sea necessarily involved a shifting of the political balance in favour of the poorer classes, who manned the fleet. And here the opposition was too strong: the party of Miltiades carried the day. The Alcmaeonidae, ousted by new leaders from their position of predominance, opened secret negotiations with the national foe. Sparta had not yet broken with Persia, but she was bound to do so or admit subjection—and this latter course her pride would not allow. Argos was the chief danger, and might, in alliance with the Persians, prove fatal. In 493, therefore, Cleomenes attacked Argos and gained a complete victory, which crippled Argive power for a generation. The Argives were obliged to admit a number of Perioeci to citizenship, and Tiryns and Mycenae declared their independence. With Athens Sparta entered into close friendship. To secure the neutrality of Aegina, the enemy of Athens, Cleomenes demanded hostages from the island. Supported in secret by the other Spartan king, Demaratus, the Aeginetans refused. Cleomenes then secured the deposition of Demaratus, on the ground of his supposed illegitimacy; Leotychidas took his place, and Demaratus joined the body of exiles at the Persian court. Aegina had now to give hostages, who were placed by Cleomenes in Athens. In 492 Mardonius sent envoys to Greece to demand the symbols of subjection, earth and water. Sparta and Athens refused, and murdered the envoys; with few exceptions, the other cities of Greece obeyed the demand. Early in 492 Mardonius started on his way to Greece through Thrace, the fleet attending on the army; but a great shipwreck on Mt Athos ruined the fleet, and the expedition broke up. Mardonius was deposed from the command and, in 490, the new general, Datis, started on a fresh plan of invasion.

Sailing with a large fleet from Samos, he ravaged Naxos, sacked Eretria, and landed his troops at Marathon in Attica. Some ten thousand Athenians marched out under Miltiades to defend their land, and on the battlefield the full fighting force of gallant little Plataea joined them. No other help came, but an urgent demand for aid was sent off to Sparta. For several days the armies lay opposite to one another. Finally a battle ensued, and the Athenians, victorious on both wings, rallied their broken centre and drove the Persians to their ships. Even now there was some fear that the city might be betrayed, and the Persian fleet did, in fact, sail round Cape Sunium and appear off Phalerum. But Miltiades marched his victorious army hot-foot back to Athens, and the Persians sailed off to Asia. Shortly after the battle a corps of 2000 Spartans arrived. Sparta cannot fairly be blamed on the score of delay; she had not taken so long to mobilize after all.

Such was the battle of Marathon. The one great difficulty in the narrative, the question of what actually brought on the battle, can only be dealt with summarily here. There are three main theories: (1) that the Persians, knowing of the approach of the Spartans, attacked the Athenians; (2) that the Persians attempted to march past the Athenian army towards Athens, and were attacked while so doing; (3) that the Athenians attacked the Persians, presumably because they feared they would re-embark and sail round to Athens. The third view comes nearest to the narrative of our chief authority, Herodotus; the second view (suggested by Bury) is ingenious and may be right. At any rate, either seems preferable to the first, which is really an arbitrary reconstruction of the whole story. The battle was of great historical importance. It gave the Greeks confidence against a foe whom they had learnt to regard as invincible, and it saved Greece, for the moment, from impending enslavement. But it cannot be

singled out as the one "decisive" battle of the Persian wars. Had Salamis gone the other way, Marathon would have been fought in vain; and, in all human probability, Greece, as we know it, would never have been.

SECTION 14. THE INTERVAL, 490-480

Darius was in no way inclined to abandon his enterprise. He determined to revert to the plan of Mardonius, and began preparations on the largest scale. But in 486 a revolt broke out in Egypt, and in 485 Darius died. His successor, Xerxes, subdued Egypt in 484 and could then resume the interrupted preparations. But Greece had gained an invaluable breathing-space.

At Athens, Miltiades was triumphant; the conservatives were in power, and a man of their party, Aristides "the Just," was archon in 489-8. But Miltiades soon ruined his reputation; he engaged in an expedition against Paros, failed ignominiously, was prosecuted for high treason and sentenced to a heavy fine. While still under this cloud, he died; he had acted badly, but Athens, like many other states, was notoriously severe on its greatest men. After his death party-strife raged anew. Hipparchus and Megacles were banished in 487 and 486, and Xanthippus in 484. Important political reforms took place. In 487 or 486 the archonship ceased to be an elective office, and the chief archon lost his former importance. Five hundred candidates were now nominated by the demes, and from these the nine archons were chosen by lot. It was a great victory for democracy; for lot, as opposed to election, excluded considerations of personal reputation and merit, and tended to the levelling of political privileges. The polemarch lost his original military importance and the ten strategi took his place. Nine of them were elected by the *φύλαι*, the tenth was elected by the whole nation, and came

to rank as the virtual head of the state. To the command of the *φυλαί*, the original function of the *strategi*, *taxiarchi* were appointed.

At Sparta, the great king Cleomenes met a tragic end. Finding his position threatened, he left Sparta and prosecuted plans of revolution in Arcadia. His idea seems to have been to overthrow the existing Spartan constitution, to establish a broader basis of citizenship, and to make himself leader of a new and greater Sparta. The Spartan government seems to have tricked him into returning home by a sham reconciliation. Once in Sparta, he was arrested as insane, and, in his captivity, he committed suicide (probably in 489). Leonidas succeeded him, and Leotychidas, his colleague, powerless without his stronger ally, had to submit to the government. Tegea, however, was bitterly hostile to Sparta, and it is probable that the Helots made a vain attempt at revolt. Aegina had been an enemy of Athens since 507, and she was still bitter over the giving of hostages in 491. In 487 war broke out between the two powers and raged down to 480. Athens, supported by Corinth as a friendly neutral, gained a victory at sea, but suffered defeat by the Aeginetans, reinforced from Argos, in an attempt to land on the island. This naval war gave Themistocles his opportunity. He pressed for the building of a powerful fleet; Aristides, his chief opponent, was ostracized in 482, and the building began. The cost was amply covered by the recently increased produce of the silver mines of Laurium and, by 480, 180 ships were ready. Themistocles was a democrat, because the democracy happened to be essential to his plans for Athens abroad. The poorer classes, by service in the fleet, could lay the same claim to political privileges that the propertied classes had grounded on their services as hoplites.


SECTION 15. THE CAMPAIGNS OF SALAMIS AND PLATAEA

In 483 Xerxes began his preparations in grim earnest. A canal was cut through Mt Athos to spare the fleet from rounding that dangerous point, provisions were accumulated at suitable places in Thrace, and a rendezvous was fixed in the east of Cilicia for the gathering of the troops in the autumn of 481. At the same time, Carthage, undoubtedly in league with Persia, was preparing for war against the Greeks of Sicily. She had already successfully defended her own territories against the intruders; now she welcomed the chance of taking the offensive. Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, whose army and fleet probably formed the strongest power in Greece, was thus prevented from assisting the Greeks of the homeland. In 481 Xerxes sent envoys to all Greek states, except Sparta and Athens, to demand earth and water. A general feeling of dismay and hopelessness prevailed. Many despaired of successful resistance; many others, especially men of conservative tendencies in politics, looked on Persian rule as no very terrible evil; the Aleuadae of Larissa and the aristocracy of Thebes, for example, were open in their support of Persia. Corcyra promised help to the Greeks, but simply awaited developments; while Argos, feigning neutrality, certainly stood in secret league with Persia. The patriotic party consisted of Sparta and the Peloponnesian League—Achaëa was neutral—Athens, Chalcis, Eretria, Thespiæ, Phocis, Tanagra, Plataea, and a few islands. A conference of delegates from these states met at the Isthmus to discuss plans of defence. Outstanding feuds between the allies, notably that between Athens and Aegina, were settled. Sparta was elected leader by land and sea, and Themistocles carried the acceptance of his great scheme of campaign—to

avoid land battles and to seek the decision at sea. Early in 480 Xerxes left Sardis, crossed the Hellespont by a bridge specially built for him, and reached Therme in Macedon by about the end of July. Early in the year a Greek force, under the Spartan Euaenetus, was despatched to Tempe, to guard Thessaly, which promised loyal support if adequately defended. But the position proved, on closer inspection, to be untenable, and was soon abandoned. The next stand was to be made much further south. While the fleet, some 270 vessels strong, took up a position off Artemisium at the north of Euboea, a small land force of about 4000 men, consisting of Spartans, other Peloponnesians, Thespians and Thebans, occupied the narrow pass of Thermopylae. We hear much blame of the Spartans for sending so tiny a force; but, as a matter of fact, it was only designed to hold the pass until the fleet had had time to gain a victory. Xerxes now led on his troops, and faced the Greek forces by land and sea. The first attacks on Thermopylae were repelled, and a desperate sea-battle ended in favour of the Greeks, severe shipwrecks adding to the Persian losses. But Xerxes soon found a way for his troops to the rear of the pass, and Leonidas, with his Spartans and the Thespians, who refused to leave him, died a hero's death. The fleet fought a second severe battle, this time indecisive in result, and then, hearing of the disaster on land, sailed back to the Saronic Gulf: Xerxes was victorious, though at a considerable cost. Most of middle Greece, including Delphi and its oracle, which from the beginning had discountenanced resistance, submitted; only the Phocians, owing to their feud with the Thessalians, refused submission. Athens could not be held; the Athenians retreated with their wives and families to Salamis, Aegina and Troezen, and Xerxes captured and sacked the city. The Peloponnesians, under Cleombrotus of Sparta, had been engaged meanwhile in fortifying the Isthmus. The Greek

fleet took station by Salamis, and the Persians anchored in the Bay of Phalerum. At this moment, the Greek cause was very near collapse: there was a strong feeling among the Peloponnesians in favour of a retreat to the Peloponnesus, which must have spelt disaster, and it was all that the commanders could do to hold them in check. As it was, had the Persian fleet sailed on for the Peloponnese, all might yet have gone well with them. But Xerxes was infatuated by success, and insisted on an immediate fight, to yield him the certain victory on which he counted. Encouraged, we hear, by a message from Themistocles, who meant, at all costs, to force on a battle, Xerxes gave orders that a detachment should sail to the west of Salamis to cut off the Greek retreat. When news of this latest move reached the Greeks, on the 28th of September, 480, having no choice left them, they sailed out to meet the enemy. The Persians fought bravely, but were unable, in the narrow sea-space, to make their numerical superiority tell. The Greeks, fighting with the courage of patriotism and desperation, gained a complete victory. The Persian fleet scattered, and Xerxes himself resolved to retire by land to Asia; but, unwilling to admit complete defeat, he left Mardonius, with the land army, to winter in Thessaly and try the fortunes of a new campaign. The Greek fleet pursued the enemy as far as Andros; had Themistocles had his way, it would have sailed straight on to Asia and perhaps saved Greece another year of war; but the plan seemed too bold. But Themistocles was generally recognized as the saviour of Greece; and Sparta, in particular, paid him her highest honours.

Not less victorious had been the Greek cause in the West. Early in 480 the Carthaginian general Hamilcar landed with a great mercenary army at Panormus and marched against Himera. There Gelon of Syracuse, the general of the Greeks, met him and gained a decisive



Themistocles

victory. Hamilcar fell in the battle, and Carthage purchased peace by a heavy war indemnity. Tradition, not inaptly, places the battle of Himera on the same day as that of Salamis. The fact is unlikely; but it calls attention, in a striking way, to the deep connexion between the two events.

Mardonius' position in Greece was a difficult one. He was committed, for good or bad, to the conquest, but, with no fleet to support him, his prospects were anything but bright. His one great hope lay in breaking up the Greek coalition; and here circumstances helped him. Sparta seems to have adopted Themistocles' plan and to have put king Leotychidas in command of the fleet, with instructions to seek out the Persian fleet at Samos. But at this juncture Themistocles lost his hold on public opinion at Athens; his opponent, Aristides, was elected strategus for 479, and the fleet remained inactive. Mardonius, through the agency of king Alexander of Macedon, now offered Athens the most flattering terms, if she would join him. But she had not strained every nerve in the previous year simply in order to give the lie to her former policy at the moment of crisis; she abruptly declined Mardonius's offers, but, at the same time, pressed Sparta to put an army in the field for the protection of Attica. Sparta showed the most culpable negligence. No army appeared, and Athens had, for the second time, to be abandoned to the foe. At last, however, moved by the most urgent representations from Athens, Aegina and Megara, Sparta nerved herself to act. Pausanias, regent for Pleistarchus, the young son of Leonidas, was despatched with an army, and Mardonius withdrew from Attica into Boeotia. Argos, with the best will in the world, was too weak to stop the Spartans' march. The decisive battle was fought near the little Boeotian city of Plataea. Mardonius may have had some 50,000 to 60,000 men with which to oppose some 30,000 Greeks. Neither party

wished to attack, and some days were spent in complicated marches and counter-marches, which are rather difficult to understand. Finally, Mardonius attacked; but the valour of the Spartans, Tegeates and Athenians decided the day against him, and the Persian general fell in the battle. A large section of the defeated army made good its retreat into Thessaly; but the Persians had no thought now of anything but a safe retirement. The deliverance of Greece was complete. Thebes, under a small aristocracy, had supported Mardonius with zeal and the Greek allies now turned against it. Resistance was hopeless, and the heads of the Persian party were surrendered and executed at Corinth. To celebrate the victory a great festival, named the "Eleutheria," was founded at Plataea, and the territory of that city was solemnly declared to be sacred. Either before or just after the victory of Plataea, the Greek fleet under Leotychidas sailed for Asia Minor. In a great battle off Mycale, the Persian fleet suffered a decisive defeat; the Greeks then landed and repeated their triumph on land. Tradition places the battle on the same day as that of Plataea, and tells of a strange rumour of the land victory in Boeotia that spread through the army and nerved it to fresh efforts. Probably Mycale was fought some days later, and the news of Plataea may actually have arrived during the fight. All Ionia now rose in revolt against the Persians. Sparta proposed that those who would be allies should be settled, for their security, in Greece; but Athens defeated this tame proposal, and the Ionian Greeks were admitted to the Greek alliance. Most of the fleet now sailed home, but the Athenians stayed and took Sestos on the Hellespont; not till 478 did Xanthippus sail back to Athens.

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CHAPTER III

GREECE FROM 479-404 B.C.

SECTION I. THE FRUITS OF VICTORY

THE consequences of the triumphant resistance of Greece to the foreign invasion were incalculably great. Had Greece succumbed to the Persians, she must have fallen too much under foreign influences to develop her own inborn gifts to the full. Again, had no such danger of conquest ever threatened her, many sleeping possibilities of her character might never have been awakened into life. As it was, a wave of glad and enthusiastic self-confidence swept over the country. The Greek was free to think and act for himself; he stood in a world where he need fear no conqueror. The nation had found its unity in the resistance to a common foe, the old days of petty feuds must surely be over; peace and brotherhood among the Greeks, expansion and victory abroad were the new and dazzling hopes that beckoned to the imagination. Many of these hopes were doomed, indeed, to disappointment; but the moral gain could never entirely be lost. In every department of life, however, new problems arose, that divided the Greeks into sections and parties, as surely as the old and petty feuds had done. Everywhere arose the great struggle between the ideals of conservatism and progress. In politics, the conservatives clung to the state as they knew it, with its ideals of "*ἀρετή*" for the individual and "*εὐνομία*" for the

social whole. Practically, this meant the maintenance of the existing order—of the rule of the hoplite class in the more democratic or of the wealthy in the more oligarchic states. The friends of progress, on the other hand, were for free movement forward. Their ideals were “*ἰσηγορία καὶ ἰσονομία*,” free speech and equal rights for all. The individual was to enjoy the utmost possible degree of liberty consistent with the social welfare; political privilege must go, and all members of the state must share equally in its rights and duties.

In religion, too, there was a similar line of cleavage. But it must by no means be supposed that the conservative and progressive parties here were identical with those of political life. Many political conservatives were in the forefront of the progressive movement, and many democratic states were highly conservative, in matters of religion. The conservatives, here, stood for the belief in the old faith, modified, where necessary, by new and more rational interpretation. Different from them, but still one with them on the general principle of the need for religious faith, were the masses, who found their spiritual satisfaction in the newer and more emotional forms of religion. Opposed to both these classes were the progressives, who maintained the right of the individual to set up his own view of life and exercise his own criticism on tradition; few in number, but great in influence, they found their expression in philosophy, the free inquiry into the basis of the world and human life. The victory fell in the end to progress, and religion was compelled to subordinate itself to the state. The Delphic oracle had chosen the wrong side in the war, and, in spite of all attempts to explain and justify its attitude, it never quite recovered its old authority. Pindar and Aeschylus are representatives of the thinking conservative, trying to remodel his belief to suit new conditions. Both seek to remove difficulties, by restating and

reinterpreting the old legends; but Aeschylus advanced a step further than Pindar; we find in him the conception of the state as the highest moral power in the world.

In the sphere of international politics, of the interrelations of the Greek cities, the same struggle arose between the old ideas and the new. Greece, if she was to hold her right position in the world, must find some form of political union. But the Greek city loved its complete autonomy, its unlimited sovereignty in all matters affecting it, and, strangely enough, Sparta, the very power that seemed called upon to lead a united Greece, became the champion of these particularistic tendencies. The reason for this lay in the internal constitution of the Spartan state. In itself that state was a democratic one, composed of peers (*δμοιοι*). But the bulk of the population of the Spartan territory consisted of Perioeci and Helots, who had no share in political rights, and in relation to whom the Spartans appear as the strictest and most exclusive of oligarchies. Add to this that Sparta concerned herself only with war and neglected commerce, and we see how limited were the possibilities of a state so organized. Sparta held some two-thirds of the Peloponnese, and about a third of this was in the hands of the Spartiates. The numbers of the classes of the Spartan population in the early fifth century may have been something like 175,000 Helots, 80,000 Perioeci and 12,000 Spartiates. But the number of full citizens was steadily sinking, and, to retain their privileges, the Spartiates attempted to maintain the strictest conservatism, to shut out all influences from abroad, and to keep the Helots in control by such measures of barbarous repression as the secret police (*κρυπτεία*). Athens, on the other hand, threw herself into the main stream of progress. By yielding to the new forces of democracy she was enabled to draw upon the full forces of her population. Political progress led to the victory of progress in other spheres, and Athens became the great

representative of the modern spirit in all departments of life—the centre of thought, of art, of modern culture. Politically, she was led on to aim at nothing less than the sovereignty over the whole Grecian world. Athens against Sparta, the tyrant state against the champion of autonomy, —this is the new antithesis that dominates the whole of the next epoch.

For the time, Sparta and Athens strove honestly to work together. But a critical question at once arose. Prompted by her allies, Sparta suggested to Athens that she had no need to rebuild her walls; she had nothing to fear from her Greek allies, and a fortified city in Attica might serve as a basis for the Persians, if they came again. Themistocles outwitted the Spartans at the game of diplomacy. As envoy at Sparta, he made excuse after excuse, until the rebuilding of the walls was almost completed. Then he threw off the mask, and declared openly that Athens, with the best of motives towards her allies, must decide such matters by and for herself. Sparta had no choice but to accept the accomplished fact¹.

SECTION 2. THE ATHENIAN SEA-LEAGUE

A new occasion of friction soon arose. In 478 a Greek fleet under Pausanias and Aristides delivered Cyprus from the Persians, and then sailed north and took Byzantium. Pausanias had had his head turned by his victory at Plataea, and began to fancy himself the tyrant of all Greece. His offensive arrogance emphasized the distaste already felt by the Greeks of the fleet for Spartan command. In the winter of 478-7 the Greeks of the island- and coast-cities of Asia Minor transferred their allegiance to Athens. Pausanias was recalled to Sparta, but his successor, Dorcis, could

¹ The whole tale has lately been quite unreasonably questioned by some modern ultra-scientific historians.

do nothing, and Sparta, taking the reverse with a good grace, allowed Athens to assume the command at sea and prosecute the war against Persia—a task for which Sparta was certainly ill-equipped. In 477 Pausanias went out to Byzantium in a private capacity, and continued to nurse his schemes for personal aggrandizement.

Athens was now at the head of a great maritime league, existing with the main object of prosecuting the war against Persia. But the league needed organization, and this she gave it, mainly through the agency of Aristides. A few states—Naxos, Thasos, Lesbos, Samos, Chios and possibly a few more, supplied ships; the rest paid a tribute (*φóρος*)—which was assessed by Aristides at a total of 460 talents. The chest of the league was kept at Delos, and there too were held the meetings of delegates under the presidency of Athens: from this circumstance the league took its name of the Delian Confederacy. To administer the league's moneys, ten annual magistrates (*Ἑλληνοταμίαι*) were instituted at Athens. At first, the allies were content and the league was active in war. In 476 Cimon led an expedition against Thrace, Eion was stormed, and Maronea, Abdera and other cities joined the league; and between the years 475 and 472 Scyros and Carystus were taken. But the league very soon began to develop into something very like an Athenian Empire. From the start the whole power of initiative had lain in the hands of Athens. Gradually Athens bound her allies by commercial treaties to Athenian law and courts of law—in course of time, all important criminal charges were referred for trial to Athens; intervention in internal affairs followed (e.g. in Erythrae and Colophon, about 460), and the Athenian constitution became the model for democracies throughout the league. Discontent was naturally excited by these measures and found its first overt sign in the revolt of Naxos. But the island was soon conquered, lost its

autonomy and had to pay tribute, instead of supplying ships.

Of the internal politics of Athens in this period our tradition has little to say. But we can trace with some certainty the struggle between two policies, that of Cimon, the brilliant new general—war with Persia and alliance with Sparta—and the rival one of Themistocles—gradual suspension of the Persian war and strong assertion of Athenian claims in Greece. We may fairly suppose that Themistocles was one of the first to perceive that a trial of strength between Sparta and Athens must inevitably follow.

SECTION 3. SPARTA AND THE PELOPONNESE.

PAUSANIAS, THEMISTOCLES, CIMON

Sparta, meanwhile, was occupied with serious troubles in the Peloponnese. Argos was, as ever, hostile, and in Arcadia there was a strong party of opposition to Sparta. Sparta had first to fight against Argos and Tegea (c. 473), and gained a victory near the latter city. Again in 471 a war against all Arcadia, with the one exception of Mantinea, ended in a brilliant Spartan victory at Dipaea. Spartan supremacy was, so far, triumphantly re-asserted; the league now began to be organized on stricter lines, and, in particular, from about this time onwards we find Spartan officers (*ξενายοί*) sent round to bring in the contingents from the allies. But in Elis a successful democratic movement set back Spartan influence. Probably in the year 470 the old aristocracy was overthrown, the city of Elis was formed out of a number of villages, and ten new tribes and a council of 500 were instituted on the Athenian model. At the same time Argos had recovered to some extent from her losses, and conquered Tiryns (about 468). Pausanias had been living during these years in Byzantium, busy in intriguing with the Persians; he was prepared to become

the tyrant of a subject Greece. In 472 the Athenians, with the consent of the Spartan government, drove him from Byzantium, and he moved to Cleonae in the Troad. Shortly afterwards another great man fell. In 470 Themistocles was ostracized, and went to the Peloponnese, where he carried on a restless agitation against Sparta. It seems that Sparta and Athens must have agreed to offer up sacrifices to one another, Pausanias on the one hand, Themistocles on the other. Pausanias was recalled to Sparta. His intrigues with Persia were discovered, he was driven to seek refuge in a temple, and left to die of starvation there. It was said that letters compromising Themistocles were found among Pausanias's papers; at any rate Themistocles's enemies at Athens secured his condemnation on a charge of high treason. Pursued by the police of Athens and Sparta, he fled to Corcyra, thence to Epirus, and finally made good his escape to Asia. There he was well received by Artaxerxes I, the successor of Xerxes, and died as tyrant of Magnesia on the Maeander some years later. We need not believe that he seriously contemplated any attempt to undo his life's work and enslave Greece. It was bitter enough for him that his own country should have driven him to seek protection with the great national foe. In 469 Sparta sent an expedition into Thessaly under king Leotychidas against the Aleuadae of Larissa. The expedition was a dismal failure, the king having, it was said, taken bribes. At any rate he was found guilty and went into exile at Tegea; his grandson Archidamus succeeded him.

At Athens the party of Cimon had gained the day, and, as a result, the war with Persia was resumed with vigour. In 466 Cimon gained a great victory on land and sea at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia, and Caria and Lycia, with Ephesus, Lampsacus, Phaselis and other cities, joined the Athenian League. But even this great victory could not allay

discontent. In 465 the wealthy island of Thasos revolted, and Sparta, pressed by Corinth and Aegina, both jealous of the Athenian growth, was ready to invade Attica. Such was the loyal friendship of Sparta. But she was not allowed to prove it in action. In the summer of 464 a terrible earthquake at Sparta caused great loss of life; immediately afterwards the Helots rose in revolt and Sparta was on the very brink of destruction, when Archidamus rallied the citizens and encouraged them to hope on. A Spartan force of 300 men was cut to pieces at Stenyclarus, but a little later a victory at "the Isthmus" (place unknown) broke the enemy's resistance in the field, and the residue of the rebels were besieged in the stronghold of Ithome. Cimon was free, meanwhile, to deal with the Thasians undisturbed. He defeated the Thasian fleet, and in 463 brought the island to submission. It lost its territory on the mainland, including the valuable gold mines of Mt Pangaeus, and had to pay a heavy war indemnity and surrender its fleet. In the summer of 464 an attempt to found an Athenian colony on the Strymon ended in the terrible disaster of Drabescus, where the entire force was cut to pieces by the wild Thracian tribes.

SECTION 4. REVOLUTION IN ATHENS

At home in Athens a new movement of reform was gradually working up to the moment of execution. The constitution of Cleisthenes was, indeed, a democracy, but one in which the middle classes—the hoplite class—bore the main share of duty and held the lion's share of rights. Two circumstances had begun to change these conditions. The first was the creation of the Athenian navy and the bringing into the state service of numbers of the poorer classes, who had borne little part in land warfare. The second cause was an economic one. Agriculture in Attica

was on the decline and corn was imported in large quantities, particularly from the Crimea. Industry and commerce were on the increase, and new classes arrived thus at wealth and influence. Naturally, the power of capital grew, and the capitalist, commanding servile and free labour, began to exercise his illusive tyranny. The very rich cannot exist in a state without the very poor, and the very poor, too, must live. Relief therefore was found for them by sending them to form colonies and finding them state employment, and both parties, capitalists and victims of capital, concurred in clamouring for these palliative measures. The opposition was formed by the land-owners, great and small, who saw in capital their natural enemy and persisted in regarding the army as the one essential element in the nation's strength. This economic struggle naturally took definite political shape, and, as it happened, the fight centred round the ancient aristocratic council of the Areopagus. This council was recruited from past holders of the archonship, and, when that office came to be filled by lot, the reputation of the council naturally fell. Its reputation however still stood high, and all conservative elements in the state rallied to its defence. In foreign politics, the conservatives wanted peace at home, war with Persia, and reasonable and mild treatment of the allies. The progressives, on the other hand, became frank imperialists. The league was to become an empire, and Athens was to pursue her own path without fear of or consideration for Sparta. The democrats enjoyed the advantage of the offensive, and had natural allies in the democratic parties in other cities, such as Argos. But socially the old distinctions still counted for much, and, even in the developed democracy, the nobleman could, by judicious use of his position, arrive at place and power.

From about 469 onwards, Cimon was the leading man in Athens. But Pericles, the leader of the Alcmaeonidae, who

had worked with Cimon against Themistocles, now changed sides and joined forces with Ephialtes, the leader of the democratic party. When Cimon returned from Thasos in 463, he was prosecuted for neglect of duty, but warded off the charge. A new critical question soon arose. Sparta, unable to take Ithome, applied to her allies, Athens among them, for help. Naturally voices were raised against sending assistance to the very power that had planned to assist Thasos; but Cimon, staking his whole reputation, secured the despatch of a force under his own command (462). No sooner was Cimon out of Athens than Ephialtes brought in and carried a law depriving the Areopagus of its political powers. In the bitterness succeeding this important reform Ephialtes was murdered. But his party triumphed. Sparta, fearing treachery, dismissed the Athenian force with scant honour, and Cimon on his return to Athens was ostracized (461). The democrats now carried all their favourite proposals; pay was introduced for all offices to which election was made by lot, and, a few years later (457), the archonship was opened to the Zeugitae. Festival money (*θεωρικά*) was publicly paid to citizens to enable them to enjoy the public festivals. The powers of the Areopagus were divided between the Council of 500 and the Heliaea, which was now raised in number to 6000. The Athenian people, voting in the Ecclesia, was now sovereign lord in Athens, and Council and magistrates were no more than its servants. But capable administration depended entirely on the ability of the unofficial "leader of the people." As long as a strong man held this post, good government was possible. When it became an object to be sought by many and attained by none, something like political anarchy was the immediate and inevitable result.

SECTION 5. ATHENS AT WAR WITH PERSIA
AND THE PELOPONNESE

The conduct of Sparta in dismissing the Athenian troops had been deeply resented, and Athens definitely abandoned the old alliance of the Persian wars and entered into engagements with Argos and Thessaly. The war against Persia was also resumed. Xerxes was murdered in 465 by Artabanus, but the first act of the new king Artaxerxes was to execute the murderer. About 460 the Libyans of the West Delta revolted under two kings, Inarus and Amyrtaeus, and the Persian governor Achaemenes fell in battle at Papremis. Athens here stepped in to abet the rebels. A fleet of 200 ships was sent on from Cyprus to Egypt; the Persian fleet was destroyed, and the land army was besieged in the "Λευκὸν Τεῖχος" of Memphis. But, at the very moment when Athens was engaging in big adventures abroad, trouble arose in Greece. About 461 Argos conquered Mycenae and, assisted by Athens, defeated a Spartan relief force at Oenoe. The Mantineans formed their villages into a city; but this move seems to have driven their constant rival, Tegea, back into alliance with Sparta. In 460 the important city of Megara left the Peloponnesian League and joined Athens. Long walls were built from the city to its harbour Nisaea, and a democracy was set up. This new growth of Athenian power was more than Corinth and Aegina could endure, and war began in 459. The Athenians suffered defeat in an attempt to land at Halieis, but made good the loss by two naval victories, at Cecryphalea and off the coast of Aegina. A land-force proceeded to the siege of Aegina city. Corinth replied with an attack on Megara. But Athens refused to recall her troops from the island; Myronides led out the old men and boys and gained a

decisive victory over the Corinthians (autumn 459). To ensure the safety of Athens against an attack by land, long walls were now begun from the city to Peiraeus and Phalerum. Sparta, at last free of the lingering war against the Helots, intervened in the conflict. A Peloponnesian force crossed by sea to Phocis, ostensibly to protect the little cities of Doris against the Phocians, but really to act in concert with the oligarchs of Athens (457). Athens boldly replied by sending out an army to block the retreat of the enemy. At Tanagra the armies met in a fierce conflict, which ended in favour of the Spartans owing to the treachery of the Thessalian horse, but the battle saved Athens from danger. Tanagra was, in fact, a moral victory for Athens. Party strife was forgotten in a glow of patriotic enthusiasm; the friends of Cimon had proved their loyalty by desperate valour in action, and Pericles himself proposed the recall of his old enemy. Athens, united at home, pushed on to new victories. Sparta had taken up the cause of Thebes, which happened at the time to be that of democracy, in Boeotia. Athens espoused the cause of the oligarchs. In the autumn of 457 Myronides won a great victory over the hostile party in Boeotia at Oenophyta, and the whole land came under direct Athenian influence. The Locrians of Opus gave hostages, Troezen in Argolis joined Athens, and, in 456, Aegina at last surrendered and joined the Delian Confederacy. In yet one other arena of war Athens appeared with success. In the west of Greece, Corinth, with her colonies of Chalcis, Sollium, Ambracia, Leucas and Anactorium, and Epirus, Aetolia and Sicyon as her friends, was the dominant power. Corcyra, her enemy, was, however, strong enough to be independent, and found support in Acarnania and the Amphilochian Argos. In 456-5 the Athenian admiral Tolmidas undertook an expedition round Peloponnesus into the Corinthian Gulf. He sacked Gythium in Laconia, failed in an attack on Sicyon,

but took Chalcis. The Messenians of Ithome, who had had at last to give up their defence, were settled by Athens in the port of Naupactus. The first trial of strength between Athens and her enemies in Greece had ended in an unexpected triumph for her; the future seemed to lie in her hands. But we must remember that Sparta, the one great power on the other side, had borne little hand in the fighting. The energy and courage displayed by Athens in these years is so splendid, that we find it hard to censure her boldness. But she nearly lost everything by attempting too much. In 456 the Persians roused themselves to a great effort in Egypt. Megabyzus, the new general, relieved Memphis and compelled the besiegers to submit to a siege, in their turn, in the Nile island of Prosopitis. Two years later the place fell, and only a few survivors of the great Athenian army reached the coast. To complete the disaster, a new Athenian fleet of 50 ships was routed by the Persians. Egypt submitted anew; only Amyrtaeus held out for some time longer in the Delta. An attack by Persia in the Aegean was feared, and the chest of the league was transferred, under this pretext, from Delos to Athens. The Persians, however, had no mind to renew the offensive, and this terrible disaster, far from unnerving Athens, seemed to stimulate her to fresh activity. In 454 an expedition, sent to Thessaly to restore a certain prince, Orestes, proved a failure; but in 453 Pericles led a sea force against the coasts of the Peloponnese, and gained over Achaëa. A victory was won near Sicyon, but Oeniadae resisted an attack. From 452-450 the war languished, neither side caring to risk an advance. In 450 Argos, having nothing to gain by war, concluded a peace for thirty years with Sparta, and this was soon succeeded by a five years' armistice between Sparta and her allies and Athens. Athens took advantage of the respite for a new attack on Persia, and Cimon sailed with 200 ships for Cyprus.

But he died on his arrival, and the fleet had to gain a hard-won victory to secure its retreat. Cimon, the leading spirit of the war party, being dead, an arrangement between Athens and Persia became possible. Pericles held the chief power at Athens, and had realized by now that she must limit her ambitions or perish. Persia, on the other hand, had no inclination to fight for her lost possessions. A convention, the so-called "Peace of Callias," was therefore concluded; Persia ceded no territory, but, in point of fact, recognized the Athenian Empire in the Aegean and on the coasts of Asia Minor. It was a satisfactory, if not dazzlingly brilliant, end to the long war of deliverance.

The armistice in Greece was soon broken. In 449 Sparta intervened in favour of the people of Delphi against the Phocians; on her retirement Athens stepped in and reversed conditions in favour of the latter. But in 447 the Athenian land-empire broke up with the same abruptness with which it had arisen. All over Boeotia the enemies of Athens rose in revolt. Tolmidas fell in the defeat of Coronea (447); Athens was compelled to abandon all her claims, and the old Boeotian League, under the presidency of Thebes, was re-established. Blow followed fast on blow. Athens seemed to be tottering to her fall, and Megara and the important island of Euboea chose the moment to break off their allegiance. At the same time a Peloponnesian army, led by king Pleistoanax, invaded Attica. But Spartans were notoriously accessible to bribes, and Pericles seems to have resorted to this means of defence. The expedition turned back at Eleusis; king Pleistoanax and his adviser Cleandridas were put on trial at Sparta and banished. Soon afterwards a peace was arranged. Athens gave up Troezen and Achaëa, Pagæ and Nisæa, but held Aegina and Naupactus. Almost all her gains in the war were lost, but her sea-power still stood firm; her enemies were not yet prepared for a life-and-death struggle, and Athens

desperately needed rest. So peace was concluded for thirty years. Euboea, left to its fate, was reduced to submission by Pericles.

SECTION 6. SICILY AND THE WEST

Central Greece is the main centre of the history of this period; but events of no little importance were taking place in other parts of the Greek world, and to these we must now turn. Gelon of Syracuse died, soon after his great triumph, in 478, leaving his throne to his brother Hiero. Hiero was a man of culture and ability, a patron of literature and a diplomatist of great skill. His rule was, in the main, successful. In 474 he sent a fleet to Italy, which gained a great victory over the Etruscans at Cyme. But in 476 he had quarrelled with his brother Polyzelus, and Theron, Hiero's ally, was disposed to assist the rebel; peace was, however, finally preserved. In 476-5 Hiero transferred the inhabitants of Naxos and Catana to Leontini, and, in place of Catana, founded his new city of Aetna. These shiftings of whole populations were a feature of the policy of the Sicilian tyrants. Under Gelon and Hiero, Syracuse became a great city, gaining fresh citizens from Gela, Camarina and Megara Hyblaea, and the district of Achradina was brought inside the city walls. Theron of Agrigentum died in 472. His son Thrasydaeus entered on a war with Hiero, but was defeated, and Agrigentum and Himera regained their freedom. In 467 or 466 Hiero died. His life had been poisoned by suspicions and fears which even his elaborate system of espionage could not relieve. On his death the tyranny collapsed, for his brother and successor, Thrasybulus, was driven out within the year. Anaxilaus of Rhegium had died in 476 and left his power to his minister Micythus. The city shared in the terrible defeat inflicted on the Tarentines by

the Iapyges in 473. About 468 the sons of Anaxilaus, at Hiero's instigation, demanded an account from Micythus. He satisfactorily acquitted himself and retired to Tegea. From 467-1 the descendants of the great tyrant ruled, but in 461 they were expelled and tyranny in the West was, for a season, at an end.

The overthrow of the tyranny in Sicily led to bitter party-strife between the conflicting elements, the mercenaries and the civilians, the old and the new citizens. Many political changes took place. Naxos, Catana, and Camarina were destroyed, while Hiero's foundation at Aetna also perished. Not till about 461 had things resumed their settled order. In Syracuse the new constitution was democratic in the main; an institution called "*Πεταλισμός*," corresponding to the Athenian ostracism, was introduced, designed, as in Athens, to protect the state against possible tyrants. Profiting by the disunion of the Sicilian Greeks the native Sicels of the interior, under the able king Ducetius, formed a new power. Ducetius enlarged his territories and founded a new capital at Palici (453-2). In 450 he succumbed to an alliance between Syracuse and Agrigentum and was sent into exile at Corinth. The allies, however, soon quarrelled, and Syracuse gained the victory. In 446 Ducetius, probably with the secret connivance of Syracuse, returned to Sicily, and started about forming a new empire in the north. He died, leaving his plans unfinished, in 440. Syracuse was now easily the foremost power in Sicily, and, to secure some support against her, Leontini and Rhegium formed alliances with Athens in 433.

The culture of the Greeks in Sicily is sufficiently individual to deserve a brief characterization. It was based on great material prosperity due at once to flourishing agriculture and commerce. Its chief characteristics were its brilliance and its superficiality, its pomp and show, and its devotion to the allurements of the present. Yet even this

material civilization contributed its quota to Greek thought and literature. To Sicily belong the comedians Epicharmus and Sophron, the philosopher Empedocles and the great sophist Gorgias; and in Syracuse, under Tisias and Corax, was developed the art of rhetoric which played such a large part in the history of the following century.

Italian history belongs mainly to a following section and may be dismissed here with a brief mention. The danger from the Etruscans was rapidly passing. But the hardy Sabellian tribes were pushing down on South Italy and were becoming an even more urgent danger. In Croton, Metapontum and other cities the school of Pythagoras for a time held supreme political influence; but, at some date round about 450, a great popular rising annihilated their power. Tarentum, under democratic government, was a force in politics; Locri, at feud with Rhegium, maintained friendly relations with Syracuse. The culture of Magna Graecia was akin to that of Sicily and contributed its share to Greek literature and art; from here hailed the philosopher Parmenides and the painter Zeuxis.

Of Massalia, the outpost of the Greeks in the north-west, we know little. It was an important commercial city, enjoying a settled aristocratic form of government; it maintained a lively trade with Gaul, but lived in continual danger from the Ligurian tribes to the east. It maintained a strict sea-police to suppress piracy and, from an early date, cultivated the friendship of Rome.

Carthage, even after her great defeat of 480, continued to prosper. Massalia must have checked her progress in the north-west, but the west of the Mediterranean was entirely in her hands. She held a territory in Africa corresponding roughly to the modern Tunis, and owned, besides, the west of Sicily, Sardinia and ports in South Spain. In Africa she exploited the land by the use of a practical but merciless system of agriculture. The subject nations existed only to

supply her with men and money. The Phoenician cities of Africa stood on a higher grade; they enjoyed autonomy, but were compelled, as subject-allies, to renounce any real political independence. In Carthage herself a steady aristocracy ruled, and the mass of the people rested content with its exemption from taxes and military service. Political influence was centred for years in the house of Mago. But, about 450, Hanno, the representative of the house, was banished, and, probably with a view to making such personal power impossible in future, a new council of 104 members was established. Greek influence seems to have been slight; Carthage remained a semi-barbarous outpost of Asia in the West. Her one real contribution to civilization consisted in the voyages of discovery along the west coast of Africa and Europe, undertaken by such admirals as Himilco and Hanno.

Of Cyrene, that detached Greek post to the west of Egypt, we only know that, after Arcesilaus III had overthrown the democracy in 525, Battus IV and Arcesilaus IV succeeded him; the last-named king was driven out to Euesperides (c. 458), and here our knowledge of Cyrene for the time breaks off.

SECTION 7. THE YEARS OF PEACE

At Athens Pericles stood unquestioned at the head of the state. A certain opposition still existed, led by the honourable and capable Thucydides, son of Melesias; but, after his ostracism (c. 442), Pericles was practically the unofficial ruler until his death. The complete conception of democracy was realized; pay for public offices, employment in public work, the foundation of colonies, gave even the poorest citizen a share in the benefits of empire. The ideal was a grand one—the full development of each citizen in perfect obedience and devotion to the state. But

unfortunately its execution was imperfect ; the position of the leader of the people was too precarious and unofficial. A wise commercial policy granted favourable terms to metoeci and allies in private law. But even Athens was only liberal up to a certain point. She could not bring herself to extend Athenian citizenship, on a large scale, among the members of her empire. The Athenian demus valued its privileges, and Pericles himself, in 451, passed a law excluding from citizenship any whose mothers had been foreign, even where the fathers were Athenians.

The change in the character of the Delian Confederacy, which we observed in its beginnings a little earlier, was now fairly complete. The league had become an Athenian Empire, and Athens came to be regarded as the tyrant city, trampling on the liberties of enslaved subjects. Lesbos, Chios and Samos were still in name autonomous ; but in the empire at large Athens raised customs-duties, placed garrisons, confiscated land and interfered in internal government very much at her own discretion. From 476 onwards all Athenian settlements abroad (cleruchies) ranked as daughter-cities of Athens and paid no tribute. The older cleruchies—Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros—ranked half-way between allies and citizens. The newer ones—founded in great numbers from about 450 onwards, in Euboea, Naxos, Andros—were really permanent Athenian garrisons in allied territory.

The finances of Athens were flourishing. The ordinary state income may have amounted to about 1000 talents ; the tribute of the league brought in some 600 more. The temple treasure of the chief goddess of the state, Athena, formed a reserve fund, from which loans could be drawn in case of need. A second treasury, similar in character, that "of the other gods," was founded in 434. Pericles adopted the standpoint that Athens, while responsible for the safety of her allies, had no call to render account to them

of how she spent the funds ; if he used them to embellish Athens no one had any right to complain. It was on this point, particularly, that Thucydides, son of Melesias, challenged the policy of Pericles, until his ostracism in 442 ended his opposition.

The peace with Persia was not broken. The great king left the Libyan princes in the Delta undisturbed ; a revolt of Megabyzus in Syria (448) was soon ended by his reconciliation with the government. In Greece, too, the peace was loyally observed. But in the Peloponnese the democrats looked with hope, the oligarchs with hatred towards Athens. At some date in this period, probably about 443, Pericles attempted to call a Greek congress under Athenian presidency to discuss the rebuilding of the temples destroyed in the Persian wars ; but the scheme failed through lack of support. Pericles seems to have aimed at asserting in a pacific manner the claims of Athens to rank as "representative" (ἡγεμών) of Greece. In 442 Athens assigned Priene, a place disputed between Samos and Miletus, to the latter. Feeling ran high in Samos, and the Athenians thought it wise to intervene and replace the old constitution by a democracy. This only precipitated the impending outbreak. The expelled aristocrats returned, by the aid of Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis, and secured the island. Their only hope lay in securing the support of the enemies of Athens in Greece ; but, at the meeting of the Peloponnesian League which was called to hear the Samian envoys, Corinth, herself an imperial power, declared against interference between the ruling city and her subject-ally, and her strong lead determined the decision. Pericles took the sea, defeated the Samian fleet and began the siege of the city. But there was a persistent rumour that a Persian fleet was sailing from Phoenicia to the rescue. Pericles sailed south with a large part of his fleet to seek out the enemy, and, in his absence, the Samians gained a great victory and broke

the blockade. Pericles, however, finding no hostile fleet threatening, sailed back; great efforts were made, the siege was resumed and after some nine months Samos surrendered. The usual terms of submission were required—destruction of the city walls, the payment of an indemnity and the surrender of the fleet; at the same time a democracy was again established. Byzantium, which had joined in the revolt, hastened to surrender. But the rising had involved a certain loss to Athens; apparently at this time Lycia and part of Caria withdrew from the league.

The little that remains to be said of the history of these years (446–431) will find a fitting place in a brief survey of the Athenian Empire. In the north Athens stood on friendly terms with the empire of the Odrysae, under the kings Teres and Sitalces. Perdiccas II, who succeeded Alexander I in Macedon in 454, stood in shifting relations to Athens; in 432 we find Athens supporting two pretenders, Philip and Derdas, against him. In Pontus Athenian influence was strong and was further strengthened by the expedition of Pericles to those waters in 439–8. Athens imported vast quantities of corn from these districts and therefore aimed at controlling their commerce. The Greek cities to the north of Pontus, Olbia, Chersonesus, Panticapaeum, enjoyed a high degree of prosperity. In the west Athenian influence was steadily spreading. In 444 Athens took up the cause of the remnant of the Sybarites and founded Thurii on a site near the old Sybaris. Settlers from all Greece were invited to join, and a number of men of great distinction were among the citizens. But the new city did not long enjoy quiet. There was a struggle between the elements friendly and hostile to Athens; Athenian influence declined, and about 434 Thurii broke off all connexion with her mother-city. The more adventurous minds in Athens were already dreaming of great conquests to be made in Italy and Sicily. But Pericles set his face steadily against such wild ideas.

He did not attempt to confine Athenian action, and an alliance was concluded with Rhegium and Leontini, while on the west coast of Greece itself the Acarnanians and Amphilochians received Athenian aid against Ambracia. But he had seen too much of the dangers of overstrain, and refused to hazard vital interests in the pursuit of fanciful gains.

SECTION 8. THE AGE OF PERICLES AT ATHENS

The period which we call "the age of Pericles" was one of many great men ; but it is only natural that we should choose the name of the first Athenian statesman of the day to designate it. It will be well to pause a moment and try to form some idea of the national power and culture of Athens at this period of her intellectual bloom. Pericles was the unrivalled head of the state. Year by year he held the office of strategus, and was, practically speaking, a Prime Minister, standing without a rival. He was a man of noble and harmonious character, a great orator, and at least in his riper years a consummate statesman. He was of a retiring disposition and his private life was strictly reserved for himself. He enjoyed, on the whole, the wondering respect and love of the Athenian people ; even his worst enemies could not treat him as anything but a considerable power. The finances were in a brilliant condition owing to the steady growth of commerce. Athens, in 431, could show a fleet of 400 ships, an army of some 13,000 hoplites with as many more on the reserve, and 1000 cavalry, not to mention 1600 light-armed troops and 3000 hoplites supplied by the metoeci. The land army was ample for defence but was not nearly a match in the open field for the forces of the Peloponnesian League. Under Pericles Athens became the virtual capital of Greece, and Pericles devoted large sums out of the state balances

towards beautifying her and giving her an external glory to correspond to her fame. The magnificent buildings of the Periclean age have left remains that excite our wonder to the present day. The special goddess of Athens, Athena, was honoured with the wonderful temple, the Parthenon, on the Acropolis and with the gigantic statue, in gold and ivory, of Athena Promachus. Other great buildings were the temple of Athena Nike and of Hephaestus, an Odeon, and a new Hall of the Mysteries at Eleusis. A magnificent approach to the Acropolis, the Propylaea, was also erected. These great works gave employment to such a builder as Ictinus and such a sculptor as Phidias. Nor was use neglected for ornament. A third long wall was built, between the two centre ones, from Athens to the Peiraeus, and the harbour was equipped with new buildings for practical use.

The intellectual brilliancy of Athens outshone even her external grandeur. Athens was the centre of the culture of the age and strangers from all over Greece flocked in to her festivals, notably the great Panathenaea. Tragedy and comedy attained their highest development at the contests of the Great Dionysia and the Lenaea, and there was an enormous output of dithyrambs for the various festivals. Society was permeated with intellectual interests; its chief defect lay in the absence of the better types of womanhood. Education consisted mainly of music and gymnastics, but an inner circle studied such newly imported subjects as mathematics, astronomy and medicine. Athens was a deeply religious city and gave a ready welcome to new cults such as those of Bendis and Adonis. But men began to question the old naïve beliefs and to re-examine them in the light of reason. The first product of this examination was the amusing but rather superficial rationalism that so diverts us in the pages of Herodotus. The new interest for the individual can be clearly traced in the drama, as in the new

memoirs that now began to appear dealing with the personal lives of well-known men. Ethics and politics to the Greek were always closely allied ; and one of the main problems of the day was that of the relation of the individual to the state. Is law binding as a natural right or only as a useful convention ? The Athens of the age of Pericles was conscious of the new movements in thought, but yet clung to the old, and this position between two worlds of ideals gives it its especial interest. Its types are the poet Sophocles, a very human writer, with no titanic power of conception but with a genius for expressing his sane and level view of life in poetry, and Herodotus, the genial historian, with his rather self-conscious enlightenment, which appears to us as the most engaging childlikeness. Judging from the literature of the age, we might describe it as pessimistic in tone ; but there was a hearty capacity for enjoyment in the men of the time, which gave the lie to their theories. The more advanced thought, that saw in the gods of the old religion only daemons or phantoms, that despaired of all ideals and was in constant danger of abandoning all general beliefs and falling back on the theory that every man is his own law, with its corollary of the justification of ruthless egoism, was not yet triumphant. In prose it was represented by many of the sophists, in literature by the great tragedian Euripides, who devoted his life entirely to his art and played with all the latest philosophies without finding rest in any. He set the ordinary individual of normal life in the centre of his stage, and, though in so doing he wrecked the old drama, he sowed the seeds of new literary developments of vast scope for future times. In his life he was a force, but not a popular one ; the generations following found in him their chosen prophet.

The plastic arts reached their highest development. To this age belong the great sculptors Calamis, Pythagoras,

Onatas, Myron, Phidias and Polyclitus, while painting as an independent art was founded by Polygnotus and carried forward by Parrhasius and Zeuxis. After Athens, Argos was the second great centre of artistic activity. In sculpture the artist concentrated his attention on the human form and gained a perfect mastery in the treatment of it. The surpassing merit of the age lay in its combination of truthfulness with ideal characterization. In literature the epic and lyric forms were on the decline; for epic poetry had outlived its inspiration and lyric became more and more subordinate to its musical accompaniment. The typical poetry of the day was the drama. Tragedy, in the hands of Sophocles and Euripides, attained and passed its perfection. The chorus lost in importance and, in Euripides, came to act little positive part in the drama. The human interest received special emphasis, and both Sophocles and Euripides treated problems of human life in their own special manner. Comedy began as a sort of rough and rollicking farce, full of horse-play and buffoonery, mixed with political and social satire. Cratinus was the first to raise it to a higher artistic level, and his work was continued by Aristophanes and Eupolis. A bye-form—the comedy of the animal-fable—was especially developed by Crates and Phrynichus. Prose-writing was as yet only familiar in the form of history. Its conventional dialect was the Ionic, with its singular archaistic charm. Herodotus, its great representative, excels in narrative; but his mastery over the period is incomplete. Among the sciences, mathematics and its allied subject astronomy, and medicine, made rapid progress. To this period belongs the great body of medical writings attached to the name of Hippocrates, which are almost modern in their common sense and insistence on the value of empiric knowledge. Special writings on technical subjects—on music, on literature, on sculpture—appear. Philosophy flourished and pushed forward along a number of different lines.

Heraclitus of Ephesus, called the “σκοτεινός” from his love of dark and mystic sayings, questioned the reality of existence. To him the world was in perpetual flux, represented by the symbol of fire; he would not talk of Being in a world that is not the same from one moment to another; Becoming is the only reality of which we have evidence. Parmenides of Elea, following the inspiration of the great monotheist Xenophanes, taught, on the other hand, the unreality of change. The world of change, that our senses show us, can lay no claim to true being; it is all delusion. The world of true being is an eternal and unchanging whole, symbolized as a perfect round. In the great poet-philosopher Empedocles of Agrigentum we find the doctrine of the arising of the world out of the four elements under the influence of the forces of love and hate. Anaxagoras, the personal friend of Pericles, taught that change was nothing but the shifting of the innumerable seeds of things, and introduced “Νοῦς” or Intelligence as the moving force. Lastly, a philosophy, usually called the atomistic, which is singularly like certain modern theories, was expounded by Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera. They taught that the world consists of two things, void and atoms; atoms, moving in void, through their eternal shocks and counter-shocks give rise to all the forms of matter that we see. The human soul is composed of atoms and is therefore, like all other things, mortal. Allied to philosophy, but distinct from it in purpose, stood the sophistic movement. The sophists were the bearers of the higher education of the time. To them philosophy was a means, not an end, and the end which it served was the education of the pupil to play a useful and successful part in practical life. The great sophists—Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias—gained enormous prestige and considerable wealth by their teaching. They were, in the main, honourable men and their teaching must have had a considerable educational value. But it rested on a rotten

foundation. They denied the possibility of truth and taught that opinion is the one decisive power. Rhetoric, the art of influencing the opinions of others, thus becomes the prime force in life; and it is not surprising that the sophists were often arrogant and shallow, and condescended to impose on the public with theories which they did not themselves believe. The attacks made on them, as subverters of morality, had therefore a certain general justification.

SECTION 9. THE COMING OF THE WAR

This digression from the paths of strict history may perhaps be pardoned because of the light it throws on this most fascinating of ages. We must now return to our proper task. Athens was unpopular in Greece, but her enemies were not inclined to attack her without special provocation or special inducement. At home Pericles held his position unshaken and attacks could only be made on him indirectly through his friends. The sculptor Phidias was found guilty of peculation in 438 and went into exile, and Anaxagoras, too, had to leave Athens some years later through fear of a charge of impiety. Against Pericles himself the opposition did not dare to proceed. And, at last, foreign troubles arose that overshadowed all internal feuds. The great war that was to decide the future of Greece sprang from a seemingly insignificant cause. There was party strife in Epidamnus, the joint-colony of Corinth and Corcyra on the coast of Illyria. The aristocrats were expelled, but continued to wage war on the demus, and the latter appealed to Corcyra for aid. Finding no sympathy there, they turned to Corinth, who received them favourably and sent out a body of new settlers. The Corcyreans sent their fleet to help the aristocrats, and Corinth, assisted by Epidaurus, Elis and other cities, mustered a force of

seventy-five ships to oppose them. Corcyra sought in vain to preserve peace through the mediation of Sparta and Sicyon. War began, and the Corcyreans gained a great victory at Cape Leucimme (436), in consequence of which Epidamnus had to surrender. Corinth was resolved to avenge this disgrace and spent the two following years in vigorous preparations. Corcyra, fearing for her safety, turned to Athens for help and the Athenians, half reluctantly, granted her a defensive alliance; Athens had no wish to provoke Corinth, but feared to let her conquer Corcyra and annex the powerful Corcyrean fleet. In the early autumn of 433 the great Corinthian expedition sailed for Corcyra. The fleets met at Sybota, and Corinth had the advantage in a hard-fought action; but ten ships sent from Athens to watch events helped to protect the Corcyrean retreat, and a new squadron of twenty ships, arriving after the battle, compelled the Corinthians to retire without making use of their initial success. Shortly afterwards a new disturbance arose in the north of Greece. Potidaea, a colony of Corinth but a member of the Athenian Empire, had for some time been disaffected. An attempt on the part of Athens to forestall a revolt only hastened it on, and Potidaea revolted, trusting confidently to support from the Peloponnesian League. Corinth at once sent a strong corps to her aid under the able general Aristeus. This revolt was rendered more dangerous for Athens by the hostility of Perdiccas of Macedon, who instigated the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans to revolt against her and concentrate their forces in the city of Olynthus (June, 432). Athens attacked with vigour; several expeditions were despatched, the enemy were defeated in the field and the siege of Potidaea was begun. In 431 the commander Phormio returned to Athens, leaving 3000 men to finish the siege. Potidaea had revolted in full reliance on help from the Peloponnesian League. But Pericles had no mind to yield an inch in face

of threats and to make this quite clear he issued a definite challenge. Taking advantage of certain unimportant disputes with Megara, he passed the "Megarian Decree," excluding the Megarians from all the harbours of the Athenian Empire. Sparta, though none too quick to take up a challenge, was compelled at last to move. She summoned delegates from her allies to Sparta to lay their views before the Spartan assembly. Corinth insisted on her claims to consideration, and the war party in Sparta, in spite of the cautious opposition of king Archidamus, gained the day. A short time afterwards a formal council of the league was called and voted for war (autumn 432). War was now inevitable unless one party or the other abandoned its present attitude, but the forms of negotiation had to be observed. Sparta called upon Athens to cast out the "accursed" Alcmaeonid, Pericles; Athens replied with a reference to the murder of Pausanias at Sparta. Sparta then presented her serious demands—(1) the siege of Potidaea to be raised, (2) Aegina to be free, (3) the Megarian decree to be repealed. Pericles held firm and Athens peremptorily refused to submit to dictation on a single point. Sparta finally sent in her ultimatum; Athens must dissolve her empire or fight. Not wishing to commit political suicide, she chose the latter course.

On the side of Sparta stood an imposing array of allies—the Peloponnese, with the exception of Argos and Achaea, Boeotia, Locris and Phocis. She could put in the field a land-army which Athens dared not attempt to face; but she was fatally weak in two respects—she lacked money and a serviceable fleet. Athens with reasonable prudence could, at the very worst, prolong the war indefinitely—that is, as long as her supremacy at sea remained unquestioned. Syracuse and other cities of the West promised help to Sparta in the way of ships, but sent none; and embassies from Sparta to Persia failed to reach a definite result. On

the side of Athens stood, apart from the members of the Delian Confederacy, Plataea, Naupactus, Acarnania, Zacynthus, the Ozolian Locrians and, at least at the start, Thessaly. Her fleet was in excellent condition and held the seas unchallenged, but on land she was confined to a policy of strict defence.

SECTION 10. THE FIRST YEARS OF THE WAR,
431-424 B.C.

The war actually broke out in March, 431. The Thebans attempted to surprise Plataea by night and an advanced band gained admission to the city; but the Plataeans rallied, defeated the enemy and took the survivors prisoners. When the main Theban force arrived it was compelled to retire, on condition that the captives should be spared; but the Plataeans, alleging a breach of the agreement, put their prisoners to death. Early in May the Peloponnesian army mustered at the Isthmus and marched under the lead of king Archidamus into Attica. In vain did Archidamus attempt to draw the Athenians into a battle. Pericles kept back his troops within the safe defence of the walls, and after ravaging the country for a month the great army returned home. Athens retaliated with a sea expedition against the coasts of the Peloponnese, in which Sollium, Astacus and Cephallenia were won. Peace was concluded with Perdiccas and an alliance was made with the Thracian prince Sitalces. The inhabitants of Aegina were expelled from their island; Sparta gave them settlements in the territory of Thyrea. The invasion of Attica was avenged by a devastation of Megarian territory, which was repeated year by year.

In the following year the Peloponnesians again invaded Attica and submitted the land to a merciless plundering. Pericles retorted with an expedition, which he himself led,



Pericles

against the Peloponnese and made a futile attempt to capture Epidaurus. He was recalled to Athens by the outbreak of the plague. This terrible epidemic which came from the East was probably greatly assisted by the over-crowding of the city with refugees from the country. The loss of life was appalling and the spirit of the Athenians sank very low. Pericles sent on his fleet with an army to Potidaea, but it carried the plague with it and had to be recalled. The Peloponnesians, to avoid the risk of infection, retired from Attica and escaped any serious loss from the plague. The Delphian oracle had promised help in the name of Apollo to the Peloponnesians, and the "Far-Darter" was fulfilling his promise with terrible effectiveness. Athens in her despondency sued for peace, but Sparta would grant no reasonable terms and the war had to continue. The bitter feeling at Athens vented itself in an attack on Pericles. He was sentenced to a fine for peculation and was first suspended and then deposed from his office as general; the extreme radicals came into power. In the winter of 430 Potidaea at last surrendered. Phormio was sent to Naupactus with 20 ships to maintain Athenian interests in the Corinthian Gulf. Early in 429 Pericles was again elected general; but a few weeks later he died of the plague and Athens was left without a leader. Alcibiades, a close kinsman of Pericles, a brilliant but irresponsible young man, the darling of Athens in spite of his insolence and egoism, was clearly marked out as Pericles's political heir; but for the moment he was too young. The immediate successors of Pericles were men like Lysicles and Eucrates, and later Cleon and Hyperbolus, persons of low social standing, who by fearless and unscrupulous leading gained temporary influence, but could never win such an assured position as Pericles had enjoyed. The direction of affairs—too hard a matter for the Ecclesia—thus shifted from hand to hand, and Athens was without

a settled government for years to come. The results of this evil were seen in a multiplication of unscrupulous political prosecutions and in a growing tendency to inconsistency and extravagance in political action. Another serious evil was the separation of military and political control that now took place. Pericles had been general as well as leader of the people: his successors were politicians only. The new generals—Demosthenes and Nicias prominent among them—lacked the direct support of the Ecclesia, and this mischief had a laming effect on the general conduct of the war.

In 429 Archidamus took the field against Plataea. He attempted without success to win the Plataeans to an agreement, then, failing to take the city by storm, he invested it and began a formal siege. In the north of Greece the Athenians were defeated at Spartolus; but Sitalces, their ally, marched against Chalcidice with an imposing force and spread terror far and wide; after a month of plundering, however, the barbarian army broke up and went home. In the autumn an attempt of the Peloponnesian fleet to surprise the Peiraeus narrowly failed. In the west of Greece Athens gained decided successes. The Peloponnesians failed in an attempt to conquer Acarnania, and Phormio with his small fleet gained two brilliant victories over the enemy at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf. The decided superiority of the Athenian sailors in manoeuvring gave them the advantage even against vastly superior numbers. The spring of 428 saw the usual invasion of Attica by the land-army of the enemy. And at this point a serious blow from an unexpected quarter struck Athens; the great city of Mytilene in Lesbos revolted and Sparta promised her energetic support. To prevent further defections in the league, it was essential that Athens should strike at once. She put out every ounce of her strength; Sparta signally failed to respond,

and in the autumn of 428 the Athenian general Paches could begin the siege of Mytilene. In 427 the Peloponnesians again invaded Attica. But this could not help Mytilene and it was resolved to try relief by sea; Alcidas, the Spartan admiral, ventured as far as the coast of Asia Minor with his fleet, but grew timid at his own daring, and, on hearing of the fall of Mytilene, beat an ignominious retreat. Athens was bitterly incensed with her ally and Cleon succeeded in carrying the savage proposal of putting to death all the adult male population. But on the very next day the assembly relented and annulled its first decision. A second message following fast on the first arrived just in time to save a tragedy. But, even so, the punishment of the rebel city was severe enough; Mytilene lost its independence and had to surrender its fleet, and about a thousand men were put to death. Plataea meanwhile was reaching the limits of its resistance. During the winter half the garrison had effected a bold escape, but soon afterwards the remainder were compelled to surrender. Sparta sacrificed them to Theban vengeance; after a trial, which was the barest of mockeries, they were put to death. In the west Corcyra was the scene of terrible events. The Corinthians had captured two hundred and fifty of the Corcyrean oligarchs; they now sent them back to the island and the oligarchic party there, thus strongly reinforced, began to work for peace with Corinth. Party strife broke out into open violence, and after fierce fighting the democrats were left victors. An Athenian squadron appeared, but was threatened for a time by the Peloponnesian fleet under Alcidas. Finally Eurymedon arrived from Athens with sixty fresh ships, the Peloponnesians retired, and the oligarchs of Corcyra were brutally massacred by their enemies. These events in Corcyra were only typical of what was going on, under one form or another, in most cities of the Grecian world. Simultaneously with the

political a fierce class warfare was being waged, and nearly every city had its oligarchic party looking for support to Sparta, and its democratic fixing its hopes on Athens. In 426 Sparta did not invade Attica, but founded Heraclea Trachinia as an advanced post in middle Greece; the Thessalians fiercely opposed the new colony, which never attained to any great growth. The Athenian general Nicias failed in an attack on Melos, and an expedition against Boeotia came to nothing. The able Demosthenes compromised his reputation by a daring attack on Aetolia, which ended in signal failure; but chance soon gave him the opportunity of redeeming his fame. In the autumn of the same year the Peloponnesians equipped a strong force for operations in the West, and Demosthenes had the greatest difficulty in defending Naupactus against the enemy. The Peloponnesians assisted by the men of Ambracia then attacked Amphilocheian Argos. The Acarnanians opposed them and called in Demosthenes to take the command. The enemy suffered crushing defeats, and the Peloponnesians saved their lives, but sacrificed their honour, by abandoning their allies. Ambracia was brought so low that Corinth had to send out fresh settlers. Early in 425 Demosthenes returned in triumph to Athens and was elected general for the following year.

For some time Athens had bestowed a considerable amount of attention on the affairs of Italy and Sicily. Some modern scholars would have us believe, on rather slight evidence, that the real cause of the Peloponnesian war was the desire of Athens to secure the trade-routes to the West and the consequent jealousy and opposition of Corinth. This is certainly an exaggeration; but there is no doubt that such considerations had their weight in influencing Athens to accept the appeal of Corcyra for alliance. In Sicily the Dorian cities of Syracuse, Messana and Gela were engaged in war with the Chalcidian—Leontini,

Naxos and Catana—and with Camarina, the rebellious colony of Syracuse. Athens was unwilling to see the fall of the party friendly to her interests, and sent Laches in 427 with twenty ships. Laches gained Messana and fought with success against Locri (426); but in 425 he was repulsed in an attack on Himera, and was, very unjustly, recalled to Athens and condemned for peculation. His successor Pythodorus lost Messana and fought an indecisive battle in the straits.

Of the internal condition of Athens during these early years of the war we have much interesting knowledge. In spite of the excellence of her finances Athens began to feel the strain of constant expense, and had to resort to raising an income-tax. She was bitterly hated in Greece, men resented her rule in spite of its general moderation and called her the tyrant state, and she retaliated with an equally bitter hatred. At the same time party faction, which had been held in bounds during the later years of the ascendancy of Pericles, burst out in new and more violent forms. The democracy became more extreme and less just, always ready to make a scape-goat of the general, if an expedition failed. The oligarchs for the most part were loyal and, at least for the time, content with the existing form of government; but they were impatient of the bad times, and came gradually to think of peace. There was an extreme wing of the party, that took no active and open part in politics but organized itself in clubs, which was working for a thorough reform of the constitution, for the limitation of active rights of citizenship and the abolition of pay for state offices. But for the present this extreme party was compelled to work in the dark. The oligarchic opposition found vent in the political comedies of Aristophanes and Eupolis, with their furious attacks on the demagogues, above all on the most eminent of them all, Cleon, and in enthusiastic pictures of the good

old days of the men of Marathon or of a remoter past. The complete lack of any settled policy is shown by the changes in the annually elected board of strategi. Nicias, cautious and uninspired, but efficient in operations that he understood, was the pet nominee of the moderate oligarchs: Demosthenes, a man of a bolder and able type, came to rely on the support of the democratic party.

Archidamus of Sparta had died in 426 and it was his son Agis who led the invading force into Attica in 425. The Peloponnesians despatched a fleet of 60 ships to assist the exiled oligarchs of Corcyra who had established themselves in Istone, whilst the Athenians sent a force under the supreme command of Eurymedon to the support of their friends on the island. Demosthenes, who accompanied the expedition, was nursing the plan of fortifying a port on the coast of Messenia, which might serve as a centre for revolt among the Helots. A storm delayed the fleet near the place he had in mind; the rough natural fortress of Pylus was fortified and Demosthenes left with five ships and a small garrison to guard it. On the news of this invasion of their territory the Spartans returned at once from Attica and proceeded to the attack. To the general amazement Demosthenes made good his defence. The Athenian fleet returned to help its comrades, defeated the Peloponnesians, and cut off a garrison of some 420 men, including about 190 Spartans, who had been placed in the island of Sphacteria, lying opposite the coast of Pylus. Something very much like accident had given the Athenians the first big success of the war. Sparta wished to save her imperilled citizens at almost any price; and, with the Athenian fleet commanding the sea, she could not rescue them in war. She therefore concluded an armistice and sent an embassy to Athens to treat for peace. There is no doubt that Athens had here a unique opportunity of ending the war with honour and advantage; Sparta was

willing to make any reasonable sacrifice, and, by granting moderate terms, Athens might have secured her good-will for the future. But Cleon was the dominating influence in the Athenian assembly and, intoxicated with success, he could not see where to stop. On his advice impossible concessions were demanded, and Sparta reluctantly resumed the war. Athens, in contravention of the terms of the armistice, refused to give up the remnant of the hostile fleet, which had been given her in pawn. She proceeded to secure her prize. But supplies of food were smuggled into the island and the winter was slowly drawing on. Cleon protested against the incompetence of the Athenian general and Nicias, to shift the responsibility, invited the demagogue to undertake the task himself. Pushed on by friends and foes alike, Cleon was compelled to accept the greatness thus thrust upon him. Men laughed when Cleon boasted that he would bring the prisoners to Athens within forty days, and called him a madman. But there was method in his madness. Demosthenes had a plan ready mapped out for effecting a landing on the island, and Cleon took care to avail himself of his valuable aid. Everything turned out as Demosthenes had hoped. He made good his footing on Sphacteria with a large force of picked light-armed troops. Harassing the Spartan hoplites, but refusing to come to close quarters, he at last drove them into a corner; and 292 men, including 120 Spartans, surrendered. It was a terrible blow to Spartan prestige. That Spartans were invincible in the field and that no Spartan would prefer life to honour were clear articles of faith in all Greece. Both beliefs were now proved false, and the ensuing reaction of feeling was as extreme as the former confidence had been. Athens was flushed with success, and in hope of a speedy and complete victory over all her foes began to adopt a general offensive policy. The tribute of the allies was doubled. The appeals of

Sparta for peace were treated with scant respect. Exiled Messenians were placed as a garrison in Pylus. In Corcyra there was a massacre of oligarchs, connived at by Eury-medon. The general Lamachus undertook an expedition to Pontus and brought new tributary states into the Athenian Empire. Nicias gained a victory over the Corinthians at Solygeum, fortified the port of Methana near Troezen, landed in Thyrea and defeated the Aeginetans there, and captured the island of Cythera to the south of Laconia. When Megara, almost broken by the war, began to treat with Athens and the harbour of Nisaea was actually betrayed to an Athenian force, it seemed that a complete triumph was not far distant. But at this very moment a reaction set in. Megara held back before entrusting herself to the Athenians, and Brasidas, a Spartan captain, who had already distinguished himself on several minor occasions, hurried up troops to the rescue, offered battle to the Athenians, and, when they declined it, was received into Megara. This important city was thus saved for Sparta. The demus was overthrown, the exiles returned and a narrow oligarchy was established. A more serious set-back to Athenian hopes followed. The enterprising Demosthenes planned a great combined attack from three points on Boeotia; but the combination failed, and the main Athenian army suffered a heavy defeat at Delium (424). In Sicily, too, there was a general feeling of uneasiness in regard to Athens. A congress met at Gela, and, under the influence of the great statesman Hermocrates of Syracuse, concluded a general peace. The Athenian force had no choice but to retire. It will be convenient to anticipate here a little and narrate at this point the events of the next few years. New troubles soon arose and Syracuse again began war with Leontini. In 422 Phaeax was sent from Athens to raise a new coalition against Syracuse, but his only success was the conclusion

of a peace with Locri. If Athens desired great successes in the West she must devote larger forces to their achievement; but the war in Greece left her no sufficient surplus of strength, and when later she actually embarked on the great adventure she was, all unconsciously, entering on the path that led to disaster.

SECTION II. THE WAR, 424-1. BRASIDAS

Sparta would gladly have chosen peace with honour, but as Athens allowed her no choice she resolved to continue the war with energy. Brasidas was the one man of ability at her disposal and he it was who assumed the direction of affairs. A corps of cavalry and light-armed troops was formed. To guard against danger 2000 Helots were murdered, and a large number more were freed and put at the disposal of Brasidas. Brasidas had a plan in view, which was to distract the attention of Athens to another quarter. In the north of Greece, among the cities of Chalcidice, there was already grave discontent with Athenian rule. Brasidas resolved to appear among them with an army and break up the Athenian Empire in the North. Himself a man of liberal tendencies and winning personality, he could inscribe on his banner the ever popular cry of "Autonomy for the Greeks" and could honestly represent himself as the heaven-sent deliverer from tyranny. With his enfranchised Helots and a corps of Peloponnesian troops he pushed his way through Thessaly, without waiting for the permission of the Thessalians, in the autumn of 424. His success in the north was instantaneous and prodigious. He won over Acanthus and Stagirus, surprised and captured the great city of Amphipolis and took Torone. Given effective support, he might have achieved immense success. But at Sparta the peace-party, headed by king Pleistoanax, who


had returned from exile in 427, was gaining ground; and as the lovers of peace in Athens were also winning strength from the ill-success of the war, an armistice was concluded in April 423 on the basis of the "status quo." But a very few days after the conclusion of the armistice Scione and Mende joined Brasidas, and he naturally refused to deliver them up. Athens, however, would not relinquish her claims, and sent a large force, which soon took Mende and began the siege of Scione. Brasidas, as ally of Perdiccas, was forced to share in an expedition against Arrhabaeus of Lyncestis; his ally treacherously left him in the lurch, and Brasidas had some difficulty in extricating himself from a nasty position. Worse still, Perdiccas made peace with Athens and began to use his influence in Thessaly against Sparta. In the autumn of 422 Athens resumed the war with vigour, sending Cleon with a strong force to attack Brasidas on his chosen ground. Cleon was energetic and intelligent, but no general, and he lacked the confidence of his men. He soon recovered Torone and Galepsus, but, when he moved north to recover Amphipolis, Brasidas brought him to action in an unfavourable position and gained a splendid victory. Cleon fell in the battle, and Brasidas himself, severely wounded, only lived long enough to hear that his men were victorious. Thus the heads of the war-parties in Athens and Sparta fell in the same battle, and the chief obstacle to peace was removed. Negotiations were resumed, and in March 421 the war was concluded by the "Peace of Nicias." The general principle adopted was that either side should keep what it had conquered. But Athens was to receive back Amphipolis and Sparta Pylus and Cythera. Thebes refused to abandon Plataea, on the ground that it had been surrendered and not taken, and on the same plea Athens retained Nisaea, Sollium and Anactorium. Prisoners were to be exchanged—an important clause, as it meant for Sparta the recovery of the

captives of Sphacteria, which was her main motive for desiring peace. Panactum, taken by the Boeotians in the winter of 423-2, was to be restored to Athens. On the whole, Athens could reckon the peace as a considerable diplomatic success. It freed her from further fear of revolts in the north and left her in a position stronger than that which she had held at the beginning of the war. More important still, it sowed the seeds of disunion in the hostile coalition. For Corinth, Megara, Boeotia and Elis, from one cause or another, raised objections and refused to swear to the peace. The Peloponnese as a whole was in a state of unrest, and already in the winter of 423-2 Mantinea and Tegea had waged desperate but indecisive war with one another. There was every sign of coming trouble.

SECTION 12. RESULTS OF THE WAR

On the intellectual life of Greece the war had worked in diverse ways. It tended to embitter party strife and introduce a new and evil element of discord. But at the same time it gave new life and vigour to thought. Only at Athens can we follow its effects at all closely. The mirror of the politics of the age was the great political comedy of Aristophanes and his peers. With unparalleled audacity and coarseness these able writers held up their political enemies to ridicule and contempt. Cleon, a particular enemy of Aristophanes, was the chief butt of satire, and the whole play of the *Knights* is devoted to a merciless attack on his character and policy. In matters of thought and religion the Athenian demus was as conservative as could be, and Aristophanes's unfair attack on Socrates, as the representative of modernism, in the *Clouds* found general public approval. To the early years of the war belongs the beginning of Socrates's public

activity. He believed that he had a mission and that that mission was to teach men, by the method of inquiry and confutation, the truth about human life. Philosophy, to his mind, had entered upon a false track and, in attempting to discover the nature of the universe, was essaying a work beyond its powers. He brought philosophy down to earth and gave it for a task the practical inquiry into human conduct and ethics. He had a firm belief in the reality of general concepts and hoped, by careful discrimination of the true from the false, to arrive at results that would hold good in practice. True to his great paradox that virtue is identical with knowledge he trusted, by removing ignorance, to cure its result, wrong-doing. He had faced scepticism and passed beyond it to the higher ground of criticism. A deeply religious nature, assured of the truth of his "*δαιμόνιον*," the divine sign that controlled his actions, he yet could not be held to believe in the gods of the state. It was his fate to be identified with the very men against whom his whole activity was directed, the sophists, and it was as a sophist, as an unscrupulous tamperer with traditional belief and morality, that Aristophanes ridiculed him and that his countrymen later put him to death. But his work lived after him and has left its indelible mark on human thought. To this period belongs too the early activity of Thucydides, the great historian to whom we owe our knowledge of the Peloponnesian war. By substituting a sane criticism for an indiscriminating scepticism he founded the scientific study of history and set a model that found few imitators until as late as the last century. Himself a moderate in politics, he had a deep aversion to the extreme democracy and in especial to the great demagogue Cleon. But it is probable that some personal bitterness enters into his attack on the latter. Thucydides was in command of the Athenian fleet in the north when Brasidas took Amphipolis, and was afterwards called to



Socrates

account for neglect of duty and banished ; and it is highly probable that it was Cleon who procured the condemnatory vote.

SECTION 13. PEACE OF NICIAS. BATTLE OF MANTINEA

It had been decided by the drawing of lots that Sparta should be the first to restore the places specified in the peace. Here difficulties at once arose. Sparta withdrew her garrison from Amphipolis, but, whether honestly or not, declared herself unable to restore the city. At the same time she was unsuccessful in her endeavours to bring her allies to accept the peace. And meanwhile her prisoners were still in captivity at Athens. Anxious to secure their surrender at all costs she now entered into a defensive alliance for fifty years with Athens, and thereupon the men were restored : Athens, though sore over the affair of Amphipolis, was still guided by the counsels of the peace-party under Nicias. The union of the two great powers roused general discontent in Greece, and a rival league was formed around Argos, into which Corinth, Mantinea and Elis entered. Argos seemed for a moment to have an opportunity of gaining her long-coveted hegemony in Peloponnese ; her refusal to participate in the war had enabled her to nurse her strength, and the allies of Sparta were discontented and ripe for a new policy. But Tegea declined to join the league, and the defections from Sparta ceased. We have now to unravel a curious web of political moves and counter-moves, quite perplexing in their intricacy. New alliances are formed and broken with equal readiness, and we find one and the same state in alliance, at one and the same time, with powers hostile to one another. At last a great war breaks up the new political combinations, and the powers return to their

older and more natural groupings. Perhaps the best policy for Athens would have been to cling to good relations with Sparta at all costs and prosecute the war vigorously in the north for the recovery of Amphipolis. This was not done. Scione, indeed, was recovered, but Amphipolis was left untouched; and instead Athens plunged into a new policy of adventure nearer home. The war party at Athens, led by Alcibiades, who hoped to realize his ambitions most readily in this camp, agitated against Sparta as a dishonest and untrustworthy ally. The captives had already been surrendered; but Pylus and Cythera were retained. At Sparta too a party opposed to peace began to show its head. In the autumn of 421 the allies met again at Sparta but failed to arrive at any conclusion. But before the Corinthian envoys left, the leaders of the Spartan war-party laid a new plan before them. Corinth should induce Boeotia to enter the Argive confederacy; Boeotia should surrender Panactum to Athens, and Sparta would then recover Pylus; this accomplished, Sparta herself would join Argos, and Athens would find herself isolated. It is obvious that it was not without cause that some men at Athens mistrusted Sparta. The project, however, fell through. The Argives received it with eagerness, but the four Boeotian Councils, representing the Boeotian League, which had to vote on it, misunderstood the situation and refused to take a step which apparently involved a breach with Sparta. The Boeotians yielded to Spartan pleading so far as to restore Panactum to Athens, but they first demolished the fortress, and Athens naturally resented the mockery. Argos was becoming anxious about her position, and, fearing isolation, was thinking of making terms with Sparta, when news came that Athens was ready to join her. The war-party, profiting by Sparta's most equivocal conduct, had gained the upper hand and was working steadily towards a breach. When a new Spartan embassy arrived

in Athens, Alcibiades tricked them into a public contradiction of their own statements and succeeded in discrediting them entirely. Nicias went once more to Sparta, but could not affect anything of importance, and in the summer of 420 Athens concluded a defensive alliance for one hundred years with Argos, Mantinea and Elis. Corinth, not welcoming the new turn of events, began to return to her old loyalty, and a new and more natural grouping of the powers began to emerge, with the democratic states on the one side and the oligarchic on the other. A quarrel arose between Sparta and Elis over a Spartan garrison which had been placed in Lepreum—a small city then at feud with Elis. The Eleans found occasion to inflict a fine on their adversary for a breach of the "Truce of God," which preceded the Olympian festival, and when Sparta refused to pay it excluded her from participation in the games. The allies of Elis sent armed forces to guard the festival against possible interruption (August 420). In middle Greece Boeotia placed troops in Heraclea Trachinia to save it from falling into hostile hands, a step which Sparta not unnaturally resented.

Alcibiades was now the moving spirit in Athenian politics. A man of no settled political creed except that of his own ambition, he simply used the democracy as a convenient stepping-stone to greatness. In foreign policy he was a bold but reckless adventurer, a framer of grand schemes which outran actual possibilities, but yet so daring and so original that no one could ever say when his inventive faculty was exhausted. With a little extra luck he might well have carried some of his plans to a successful ending; we may be fairly certain that he could never have achieved any lasting result. For his was the restless ambition that never stops till it has overleapt itself. Early in 419 he appeared in the Peloponnese, to give life and energy to the opposition to Sparta. Argos had a private

quarrel with Epidaurus, and in the winter of 419-418 Sparta sent a garrison to defend her ally. In the spring of 418 Agis of Sparta undertook a great expedition with his allies against Argos. He outmanoeuvred the enemy and had victory well-nigh safe within his grasp; but at the last moment, for reasons which we cannot fairly gauge, he opened negotiations, concluded an armistice and led off his troops. It seems that Athens had so far deliberately held back. But after the retirement of Agis Alcibiades brought up an Athenian army of reinforcement, and the allied troops, Athenians, Argives, Mantineans and Eleans, took Orchomenus. After this success Elis, vexed at the refusal of her allies to attack Lepreum, drew off her troops; the rest of the allies turned against Tegea. Sparta roused herself for a great effort. Agis had been severely censured for his weak leadership in the previous campaign, but was given another opportunity to retrieve his reputation. Nor did he miss his chance. In a great battle near Mantinea he defeated the enemy decisively. Spartan military prestige was brilliantly vindicated; the opposing league broke up; Mantinea submitted to her old leader, Argos made peace, and only Elis still held aloof. Shortly after the peace an oligarchy, friendly to Sparta, overthrew the democracy in Argos, and Athenian influence in the Peloponnese was at an end. Oligarchy was triumphant over democracy, and Sparta intervened in favour of her political supporters in Sicyon and Achaea.

SECTION 14. AFTER MANTINEA. THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION

In the summer of 417 the Argive demus overthrew the oligarchs, an Athenian force came to assist them, and long walls were built from the city to the sea—only to be destroyed a little later by Agis. In 416 and 415 the feud

between Sparta and Argos continued without any decisive result. With Athens Sparta refused to break. The two states had been at war indirectly, as allies of belligerents, but war had never actually been declared between them. At Athens the party-strife between Alcibiades and Nicias came to a head, and a decision between them was sought in a resort to ostracism. At the last minute the rivals, both lacking confidence in themselves, effected a reconciliation and combined to ostracize the leading demagogue Hyperbolus. It was a scandalous misuse of a constitutional safeguard, and after this farce ostracism ceased to be employed. Athens still refused to send an expedition to recover Amphipolis. But in 416 she attacked and conquered Melos, one of the few islands which had so far refused to enter her empire. The attack was brutal and unprovoked, and her treatment of the conquered was barbarous in the extreme. Thucydides with rare dramatic effect represents this act of violence as a symptom of that insolence which precedes disaster.

The disaster which in due course fell on Athens was entirely of her own seeking. The wise counsels of Pericles, who discountenanced all too-adventurous foreign enterprises, were long forgotten. Men's minds were full of the extravagant hopes and ambitions which Aristophanes parodies so charmingly in the *Birds*, and wild dreams of conquest were greedily welcomed. The scene of these fancies lay in the West, and primarily in Sicily. Selinus, in alliance with Syracuse, was at war with Segesta, and envoys from Segesta and the deserted Leontini appeared in Athens to solicit help. Alcibiades threw himself into this new enterprise. Athens was to conquer Sicily, then Italy, then the whole of Greece, and Alcibiades, who was to win these gigantic victories, would be recognized as universal tyrant. Naturally all were not so reckless; Nicias in particular preached caution, and an embassy was first despatched to investigate the

position. But when the envoys returned with exaggerated accounts of the resources of Segesta the assembly was induced to vote an expedition of sixty ships. Nicias, hoping to frighten off his hearers, pointed out that a much larger force was needed to accomplish the desired object. To his chagrin, his advice worked otherwise than he had intended. The assembly voted an expedition on the great scale which he had suggested, and appointed Alcibiades, Lamachus and Nicias himself generals. Early in 415 the great force of 100 ships carrying 5000 hoplites was ready to start. But on the very eve of the expedition an event occurred which deeply shocked the Athenian mind. The statues of Hermes which stood in the Athenian streets were discovered one morning mutilated, and report accused Alcibiades of being the culprit. A committee of inquiry was appointed and a large number of arrests were made. Alcibiades claimed an immediate trial, but his enemies succeeded in postponing it, wisely calculating on an easier victory when the brilliant young general was himself away. In the summer of the year the great fleet set sail for Corcyra, which had been fixed as a general rendezvous; apart from the men from Athens and her allies, there were a few volunteers from Argos and Mantinea; it was, indeed, an imposing force—sufficient, to all appearances, for almost any enterprise.

The expedition had originally been designed simply to assist Segesta; but it had outgrown its original idea, and it was clear that nothing less than the conquest of all Sicily was intended. Syracuse showed singular nonchalance. Hermocrates raised a warning voice, but his opponent, the democrat Athenagoras, denounced him as an interested alarmist, and no preparations for defence had been made when the great armada appeared on the coast of southern Italy. Tarentum and Locri refused to have any dealings with the invaders; Rhegium temporized, but in Sicily Naxos and Catana soon joined Athens, and a base for

operations was thus secured. The Athenian generals now held a council of war. Nicias's plan was to give Segesta the promised help, make a display of Athenian power, and then retire with honour and without risk. Lamachus pressed for an immediate attack on the one really important enemy, Syracuse. Alcibiades stood for a waiting policy; he wished to win over as many cities as possible by diplomacy, and then, and only then, proceed to action against Syracuse and Selinus. The plan of Lamachus was probably the most hopeful, while that of Nicias was at least safe; but unfortunately that of Alcibiades, the most hazardous of all, was the one finally adopted. And, most fatal of all, Alcibiades himself, the one man who might have made his policy a success, was suddenly withdrawn from the command. The affair of the Hermae had been agitating Athens, and a notorious informer, Diocleidas, had been alarming all peaceful citizens with his denunciations. No one felt himself safe until at last a young aristocrat, by name Andocides, gave full information about the outrage which was accepted as genuine. The culprits were punished and the alarm was allayed. The enemies of Alcibiades, however, did not rest. They were mainly members of the extreme radical party, they mistrusted his intentions and bore him a bitter grudge for the ostracism of Hyperbolus. They now secured his conviction on a charge of impiety in having profaned the Eleusinian mysteries. The state trireme, the *Salaminia*, was sent to bring him to Athens for punishment; but, on the way home, he escaped and sought refuge at Sparta, where he devoted all his great abilities to the undoing of his ungrateful country.

In Sicily precious time was wasted in profitless delay. At last, in the autumn of 415, Nicias landed south of Syracuse and gained a victory in the field, which was prevented from being decisive by the excellence of the Syracusan cavalry. He returned to winter-quarters at

Naxos. Syracuse at last realized the full danger, appointed Hermocrates with two colleagues to the supreme command and sent to ask help from Sparta and Corinth. Athens failed to win Messana by force and could not succeed by diplomacy in bringing Camarina to her side. The only course left was to attack and conquer Syracuse. Early in 414 Nicias landed, this time to the north of the city, and defeated the hostile army. On the north of Epipolae, the high ground rising above the city, he built a fort, whilst the fleet lay further north at Thapsus. Thus entrenched he began to build a besieging wall from north to south. The Syracusans attempted to build two walls in turn to intercept the Athenians, but on each occasion suffered defeat and saw their work destroyed. But in the second engagement the brave general Lamachus fell, and the sole command thus devolved on Nicias, a man by nature timid and uncertain, and now rendered vacillating and infirm of purpose by a wearing disease. For the time, however, things looked black for Syracuse. The Athenian fleet sailed south and took up a position in the bay of the Anapus; in the city deep dejection reigned and many were for timely submission.

But new forces were beginning to work. Alcibiades received a warm welcome in the hostile camp, and devoted all his energy and ability to spurring on Sparta to vigorous action. The Spartan government was deeply influenced by his exposure of Athenian ambitions, and on his advice decided to resume the war. Gylippus, an able Spartan, was sent with a small fleet to assist in the defence of Syracuse. Nicias omitted to take precautions; Gylippus landed at Himera and made his way by land to Syracuse. His arrival infused a new spirit into the defence; the Syracusans felt that they were not doomed or deserted, and began to hope for final success. Gylippus soon took action. He captured Labdulum, the Athenian fort, and began to build a new cross-wall, this time to the north of the Athenian lines.

South of Syracuse Nicias occupied Plemmyrium and moved his fleet there; but on the north the cross-wall was pushed past the Athenian lines, after Nicias had given battle and had been defeated in a vain attempt to prevent it. Syracuse was, for the time, safe against blockade and could begin to think of attack; Nicias, in despondency, appealed to Athens for reinforcements. His appeal was heard, and Conon was despatched with 20 ships to Naupactus, on his way to Sicily. But Sparta now resumed the war in earnest. In 413 Agis led an army into Attica and, instead of confining himself to plundering the land, established the fortified post of Decelea in the north. From this time onwards, the enemy had a permanent post in Attica from which to harry the land, and Athens at once began to feel the effects in a general rise of prices. An attempt was made to increase the revenues by substituting for the tribute of the allies a 5% tax on imports throughout the empire. Argos, with her usual ineffectiveness, left her ally entirely in the lurch. Conon at Naupactus was engaged by a hostile fleet and could do no more than hold his own, and reinforcements from the Peloponnese got through to Syracuse. In the early summer of 413 Athens, realizing that the position was very serious, equipped a second great force of 73 ships and 5000 hoplites and gave the command to the tried general Demosthenes. He arrived at Syracuse to find Nicias in a sad plight. He had just lost Plemmyrium, in spite of a victory gained at sea; and the Syracusans had immediately afterwards offered a second battle at sea and gained a great victory. Demosthenes decided on instant action. He led a great night-attack on Epipolae, intending to destroy the Syracusan cross-wall and thus prepare the way for the complete investment of the city. The enterprise began well, but ended in complete failure. Demosthenes then realized that Syracuse could not be taken, and pressed for an immediate retreat. But Nicias refused to move; he

was weak and purposeless, he feared a bad reception at Athens, and he seems still to have cherished some hope of taking Syracuse. Reinforcements continued to come in to Syracuse, and at last, late in August, Nicias consented to the retreat. But an eclipse of the moon on August 27th alarmed his superstitious nature and he insisted on further delay. Gylippus now resolved to make his victory complete. The Athenians were defeated at sea, and the mouth of the Great Harbour was blocked with a line of boats. Demosthenes made one last great effort to secure at least a safe retreat. In a despairing conflict in the Great Harbour the Athenians were at last driven back to land, and the fleet was thus doomed. The ships must have been, in great part, old and rotten, the narrow space gave no scope to superior skill, and the Syracusans had introduced some new inventions especially suited to fighting in confined spaces. The path by sea was closed: the only course left was to retreat by land. But a false warning sent from Syracuse caused the generals to delay over-night, and, when Demosthenes and Nicias began to lead their dispirited forces southward the next morning, they found the ways already blocked. They struggled on for several days, under hopeless difficulties, until at last the great army was brought to surrender; first Demosthenes, then Nicias, had to yield up himself and his forces. Nicias and Demosthenes were at once put to death, the prisoners were confined in misery in the quarries. It was a tragic ending to a great enterprise, and Thucydides never wrote so movingly as when he painted for us in his seventh book the horrors of those few days of defeat and disaster.

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SECTION 15. ATHENS FIGHTS FOR LIFE, 413-408 B.C.

Athens had once again done for her enemies what they could not do for themselves. She had so weakened herself by a reckless expenditure of strength that the task of defeating her was made easy for them. And this time her plight was desperate. Her great fleet had been sacrificed in the harbour of Syracuse; her supply of men was sadly depleted, and, above all, every enemy in Greece began to stir, now that a chance occurred of attacking the hated enemy with impunity. The news of the defeat was received with almost incredulous horror at Athens. But no mercy could be expected from the foe, and the only thing to be done was to make what preparations could be made for resistance. A special council of ten "*πρόβουλοι*" was appointed to organize defence and every effort was made to equip a new fleet. Sparta prepared for an immediate victory. Agis was in middle Greece in the winter of 413-412 and recovered Heraclea. The Peloponnesians decided on putting out a fleet of 100 ships; while from Chios, Lesbos, and Euboea came propositions for revolt against Athens. And Persia too was prepared to play a hand in the game. Artaxerxes I had died in 425, and, after some troubles, Darius II Ochus succeeded him. The king now sent orders to his satraps, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, to raise tribute again from the coast cities of Asia. This involved war with Athens, and the satraps sought the Spartan alliance, offering what the Spartans most needed, pay for their troops. The ephors, following the advice of Alcibiades in preference to that of Agis, decided to send their fleet first to Chios, leaving the appeal of Lesbos and Euboea for the moment unheard. But Athens had managed to launch a new fleet and contrived for a time to keep the Peloponnesian ships blockaded off the coast of Argolis. In the summer of 412, however, Alcibiades got through with five ships and

sailed to Asia Minor. Even this tiny force was enough. Chios, Erythrae, Miletus and other states at once revolted from Athens, while Persia recovered most of the mainland. A convention was signed between Tissaphernes and the allies, by which the right of Persia to her old possessions was recognized. Athens had been forced to draw on her last reserve and had managed to muster a force of 45 ships in Ionia; Teos was recovered, Miletus was blockaded, and in Samos the democrats rose and overthrew the oligarchs, and thus preserved the island for Athens. But a new fleet arrived from the Peloponnese and Sicily, and the Athenians declined battle before Miletus; but the siege of Chios was commenced. In the winter of 412-411 Athenian reinforcements arrived; Miletus was again blockaded and Chios was very hard pressed. Alcibiades had lost his footing at Sparta; king Agis, embittered by a private injury, had long been his enemy, and now the government lost confidence in him. But he had found new friends: he had won the entire confidence of the Persian satrap, Tissaphernes, and instructed him in the artful policy of prolonging the war and thus exhausting both combatants, a policy bound to bring in profit to Persia. Meanwhile the Spartan admiral Astyochus was able to muster 112 ships at Cnidus and went into winter-quarters at Rhodes, which joined him. The great difficulty lay in actually obtaining the promised pay from Persia. Finally, a third convention (a second one had been ineffectual) limited Persian territorial claims to Asia and fixed exactly her responsibility for pay. But everything still depended on the paymaster, and Tissaphernes had no intention of giving Sparta an easy victory. Early in 411 Astyochus failed in an attempt to relieve Chios, but further north the Spartan Dercylidas brought about the revolt of Abydos and Lampsacus. During this same year the Boeotians took Oropus from Athens.

Athens had been shaken to her foundations by the Sicilian disaster, and the democracy, unquestioned in its brighter days, could no longer be assumed to be the one and only possible form of government. A general movement among the Athenian oligarchs began, in which, for the time being, moderates and extremists worked together. The immediate object of both sections was to suspend the absolute democracy and to substitute for it the "*πάτριος πολιτεία*"—whatever precisely that might be supposed to mean. In the army at Samos the same spirit was abroad, and Alcibiades saw in the new movement an opportunity for securing his own recall to Athens. He therefore opened up negotiations with the oligarchs at Samos; let them only overthrow the democracy, which Persia could not trust, and recall him, and he would effect an advantageous peace with Persia. One of the oligarchic leaders, Phrynichus, seriously doubted the honesty of Alcibiades and did his best to upset the negotiations. But the offer was too tempting to be refused. Alcibiades's terms were accepted, and Pisander was despatched to Athens to bring about the desired revolution. The Athenian people had no natural inclination to abandon a form of government that suited them well; but peace with Persia seemed a priceless boon, and they therefore brought themselves to appoint ten commissioners to treat with Alcibiades and the Persians (early 411). Thirty "*πρόβουλοι*" were appointed to lay proposals before the people. Their proposals were drastic enough: pay for state offices was to be abolished: the actual citizenship was to be limited to 5000 men, and, till the list was made up, a body of 400¹ was to direct the state. The oligarchic clubs had been preparing for this decisive moment and the democracy found no strength to resist. The old council of 500 was discharged and the 400

¹ Each tribe was to appoint ten men, and each of these men was to choose three colleagues.

were in power. Virtually Athens was in the hands of a small oligarchic faction; for the 400 had no genuine intention of resigning their powers; the list of 5000 citizens had merely served as a convenient mask for their intrigues. But the new government soon began to experience trouble. They had made a start of substituting oligarchy for democracy in some of the island states, hoping by this concession to secure their loyalty. The first results were disappointing; Thasos, now under an oligarchy, revolted. Alcibiades, of course, was quite unable to carry out his promise of bringing about peace with Persia, and an attempt to make terms with Agis failed. The reaction therefore soon began. The democratic section in the army, supported by the democrats of Samos, repressed the oligarchic movement on the island, swore loyalty to the democratic constitution and elected new generals, chief among them Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. Alcibiades had no objection to treating with the democrats if his interest pointed him that way; he was recalled from exile to Samos and elected general. The army was wildly anxious to sail straight for Athens and restore the democracy; Alcibiades wisely restrained them, pointing out that such a step would involve the immediate loss of all Asia Minor. In Athens, too, the reaction was beginning. The moderate oligarchs, headed by the able Theramenes, began to draw away from the extremists under Phrynichus and Antiphon. The extremists sought again, but without success, for peace at Sparta, and to guard against danger built the fort of Eetionea in the Peiraeus. At last the end came. A Spartan fleet appeared off the Peiraeus and then set sail for Euboea; the Athenian fleet pushed hastily after it and suffered a complete defeat; most of Euboea at once revolted (September, 411). This disaster deprived the government of its last hold on public support. The 400 fell, and Theramenes took the reins into his hands. The "5000" (the list actually ran to 9000) were appointed, and

a reconciliation was effected with Alcibiades and the army of Samos. The council of 500 was restored and a committee was appointed to revise the constitution. With some not very important exceptions the democracy was restored. A number of the oligarch extremists, Antiphon among them, were put to death; Theramenes gained through the downfall of his former allies and received as reward the contemptuous nickname of "Buskin," the boot that fits either foot.

On the Asiatic coast the Spartan admiral Astyochus, inadequately supported by Tissaphernes, was unable to stir, and discontent spread among his men. Late in 411 a new admiral, Mindarus, came from Sparta to replace him. Pharnabazus, satrap of Dascylium, promised active support if the war were transferred to the North, and Mindarus sailed for the Hellespont district, where Byzantium and Chalcedon were already in revolt against Athens. The Athenian fleet followed and gained a welcome victory at Cynossema near Sestos (October, 411). Cyzicus was recovered and a second victory was won at Abydos. Alcibiades visited Tissaphernes, but the satrap, anxious to display his loyalty to Sparta, imprisoned him. Alcibiades, however, escaped in January, 410. Mindarus retook Cyzicus, but the Athenian forces united and fell upon him there; a brilliant victory on land and sea broke up the hostile force and gave Athens her first real prospect of victory since the Sicilian disaster. Sparta, in bitter disappointment, offered fair terms of peace, but Cleophon, the leading demagogue of the time, secured their rejection. Now, if not earlier, the old constitution was fully restored; a campaign began against adherents of the 400, and the "*διωβελία*," a state-dole of two obols *per diem* for every citizen, was introduced. For the moment the war was at a standstill. Pharnabazus zealously worked to create a new fleet, but Sparta did nothing more than send Clearchus to Byzantium with a

few ships. But she was weary of the double-dealing of Tissaphernes and sent an embassy to Susa to protest against him. The great Syracusan general, Hermocrates, was deposed by his countrymen from his command and went into exile. At Corcyra party-strife broke out afresh, and Conon was sent from Athens to watch events. The democrats were victorious, but a reconciliation of parties soon followed and the Athenians were dismissed (410). In Greece itself Athens lost ground; Sparta recovered Pylos and Megara Nisaea. Thrasyllus was despatched with large forces to Ionia, but was defeated at Ephesus (summer, 410) and sailed on to the Hellespont. On the Thracian coast Athens gained ground and Thasos was recovered; while in the Hellespont Alcibiades gained another victory (409), this time at Chalcedon. Pharnabazus made a truce with him, and Byzantium fell into Athenian hands. Things looked more hopeful, and Athens could send an embassy with some confidence to Susa (end of 409). Early in 408 Alcibiades returned to Athens and received a brilliant welcome. He had done more than any other man to bring his country low; but he too had been the means of restoring her fortunes and he seemed to be marked out as her deliverer. He celebrated his recall by conducting the procession of the *mystae* under strong armed escort to Eleusis (October, 408).

SECTION 16. DECLINE AND FALL OF ATHENS, 408-404 B.C.

But a change now came over the war on the coast of Asia Minor. Persia decided in favour of the Spartan envoys and resolved to throw her full weight into the scale against Athens. The young prince Cyrus was sent down to the coast to carry out this policy; he had the will and the ability and was emphatically the right man for the work.

And Sparta at last found the right man to command, in the person of her new admiral Lysander. Able but unscrupulous, greedy of power but superior to all meaner indulgences, he was the very man required for the task. He transferred his fleet from Rhodes to Ephesus, met Cyrus and won his entire confidence. The pay of the sailors in Spartan employ was raised to four obols *per diem*, and this higher rate promoted desertions from the Athenian fleet. Late in 408 Alcibiades returned to Asia Minor and took up his station off Notium. Early in the next year his lieutenant, commanding in his absence, was drawn into a battle off Notium and defeated (407). Alcibiades lost the confidence of the Athenians at the first news of failure; he was deposed from command and went into exile in the Hellespont. Instead of one general with supreme powers, a board of ten was now appointed. Lysander saw success in prospect and was content to play a waiting game. Dreaming of immense personal power when Sparta triumphed, he set about forming small oligarchic factions, devoted to his person, in the cities of Asia Minor, and encouraged protest against the bad Spartan custom of changing the admiral year by year. But here he was unsuccessful; early in 406 Callicratidas came from Sparta to succeed him. Lysander had taken care that his successor's task should be no easy one. Cyrus in particular began by treating the new admiral with galling neglect. But Callicratidas, by his noble simplicity and honest zeal, overcame all difficulties. He mustered a fleet of 140 ships and moved northward to attack Lesbos. Conon followed him, but was shut up in the harbour of Mytilene and could not escape. In desperation he sent an urgent appeal to Athens for relief. The Athenians rose nobly to meet the occasion, and by unheard-of efforts raised a new fleet of 150 ships. A great battle was fought at Arginusae; Callicratidas fell in action, and a glorious victory rewarded the Athenians' pluck (June, 406). But, unfortunately, the

glory of the victory was clouded by tragedy. A number of Athenians on sinking vessels had had to be abandoned after the battle, owing to a sudden storm ; popular indignation, violent and unjust, demanded victims, and all the ten generals, except Conon, were put on trial. In utter defiance of all law, they were condemned to death in a body, and the six who returned to Athens underwent the death-penalty. It was a piece of tragic and criminal folly and largely destroyed the moral effects of the victory. Sparta did, however, offer peace once more ; but Athens was blind and again refused.

The last agony now drew on apace. The cities of Asia Minor petitioned at Sparta to have Lysander restored to the command, and, although the law forbade him to hold the admiral's office a second time, he was sent out as secretary to the admiral Aracus, with the real power in his hands. Early in 405 he had a fleet of 100 ships at his disposal at Ephesus. After re-establishing his clubs and prompting an oligarchic rising against the democrats at Miletus, he moved to the Hellespont and took Lampsacus. The Athenians followed him and took up a position at Aegospotami. Here the whole fleet was surprised and annihilated by Lysander. It was a tragic but contemptible ending to the great war, and there can be little doubt that the criminal negligence of the Athenian generals was, in part at least, due to treachery. Conon alone escaped with a few ships and took refuge with Evagoras, king of Salamis in Cyprus (autumn, 405).

The Athenian Empire now broke up, only Samos holding out, and from every quarter Lysander sent in the Athenians to Athens, in order to overcrowd the city. But even now Athens would not admit defeat ; she granted citizenship to the loyal Samians and prepared for a last resistance. Agis marched up to the walls, his colleague, Pausanias, followed with a second army and Lysander blockaded the harbour.

Relief was impossible and famine soon began to make itself felt. Early in 404 Theramenes was sent to treat with Lysander. He stayed with the Spartan for some months, until Athens was on the verge of collapse, and then at last returned with the Spartan terms of peace. An unconditional surrender was demanded, and Athens had no choice but to submit. The peace terms were, under the circumstances, not severe. Thebes and Corinth urgently demanded the destruction of the city, but Sparta, to her eternal credit, refused to admit this barbarous proposition. But it was all over with the days of Athenian greatness. The long walls were destroyed, all ships of war but twelve surrendered, all foreign possessions given up and all exiles restored. Athens was to continue to live, but only as a state without political personality, in complete dependence upon Sparta. Late in the summer of 404 Samos was conquered, and the oligarchy was restored there. Sparta stood supreme without a rival in Greece, and, as chief representative of Sparta to the outside world, Lysander held a position of well-nigh absolute power, such as had fallen to no Greek before him. How the state and the man used their immense opportunities we shall see in the sequel. It will be a sad tale of wasted chances and squandered success; the greatness of Athens is only properly understood when we see Sparta's failure to carry on her work.

CHAPTER IV

FROM THE FALL OF ATHENS TO THE DEATH OF PHILIP, 404-336 B.C.

SECTION I. THE SPARTAN SUPREMACY

SPARTAN supremacy involved numerous internal changes in the constitutions of her allies. In many cities she placed garrisons under governors, called harmosts, and regular tribute was levied, as it had been by Athens. For the worst abuses Lysander was responsible. He established in the cities not moderate oligarchies, but the so-called decarchies, small cabals of unscrupulous men, whose one merit was their devotion to him. These scoundrels naturally signalized their rule by massacre and confiscation (as, for example, in Thasos and Sestos) and even in their worst excesses received Lysander's support. Athens did not escape the common lot. Assisted by Lysander, Critias and Theramenes established a body of thirty as the ruling power in Athens, nominally appointed to draw up a new constitution, but in reality, as in the popular description, the thirty "tyrants" (June, 404). A reign of terror began in Athens; no man's life or property was safe, and the malcontents were helpless, for Callibius was sent with a Spartan garrison to ensure quiet (late 404). Athenian exiles wandered abroad in Greece, and Sparta attempted to close all doors to them. But Thebes and Corinth had very rapidly undergone a change of sentiment; Athens, now crushed, excited no

further hate; it was Sparta, who was claiming the entire gain of the war and leaving nothing for her allies, who was the real enemy to be feared. Both cities, therefore, in defiance of Sparta, extended a warm welcome to the Athenian refugees. Critias and his gang drew up a list of 3000 who alone were to enjoy exclusive political rights, whilst the rest of the citizens were disarmed. But Theramenes, a moderate man, once again as in 411 began to fall out with his extreme confederates. In vain he preached moderation and reason. Critias was too quick for him; he denounced Theramenes and hurried through his execution before any protest could be made. At about the same time Alcibiades was seized and put to death by agents of Sparta in Phrygia.

Sparta herself was violently shaken by the great change in her political fortunes. She found herself called upon to fill a position for which she was not prepared, and difficulty after difficulty arose. Lysander had acquired great masses of gold and silver treasure; but gold and silver were not permitted in Laconia. Over this question a great debate arose, which ended in a compromise; the possession of gold and silver was allowed to the state but forbidden to the individual—and naturally the individual soon overcame this prohibition. Scandals became common; the most notorious case was that of the great defender of Syracuse, Gylippus, who was convicted of peculation and banished. The other great trouble was the shortage of men. Sparta had not the numbers required to administer an empire, and this weakness drove her into courses of trickery and violence.

A conservative party at Sparta, headed by king Pausanias, strove to curtail the power of the ephors and restore the kingship to the original glory that it had enjoyed under the traditional constitution of Lycurgus. Lysander, on the other hand, was working, at first in secret,

for a radical revolution. For the moment the conservatives could not challenge him. His acts were ratified, and during the winter of 404-3 he held a triumphal procession throughout Greece, receiving unlimited flatteries and even divine honours. But his position was insecure, resting, as it did, simply on personal prestige, which can disappear as quickly as it arises. During this winter Thrasybulus, with a band of Athenian exiles, established himself in Phyle, and, shortly afterwards, in the Peiraeus itself. The thirty were defeated in an attack on him, and Critias and others fell in the action (early March, 403). The survivors of the thirty were deposed by the 3000 and took refuge in Eleusis, which they had occupied; for the moment, ten men were appointed as an executive. Lysander had no intention of allowing his work in Athens to be overthrown, and, in the summer of 403, he brought up an army and fleet against the Peiraeus. But Pausanias gained the victory at Sparta and received authority to intervene. He brought up an army—in which Thebes and Corinth declined to serve—and soon effected a reconciliation between the exiles and the Athenian state. Athens was free of its tyrants; only Eleusis was to remain independent, as a refuge for the defeated party (October, 403).

Pausanias' liberal policy was ratified in Sparta. Pharnabazus sent in complaints of Lysander's conduct and the great admiral was deposed from office, whilst his personal adherents were ruthlessly persecuted. Thorax and Dercylidas were submitted to punishment, and Clearchus was recalled from Byzantium and only escaped death by exile. The decarchies were overthrown and moderate oligarchies (*πάτριοι πολιτεῖαι*) took their place. In Sestos, Lysander had removed the natives to make room for a military colony of his own; here the old inhabitants were now restored. Lysander had to look on helpless while his work was being demolished. He employed a certain Cleon of

Halicarnassus to write a political brochure in his support, advocating an elective monarchy at Sparta—this document was discovered after his death—and attempted to secure the support of the oracles of Delphi, Dodona and Zeus Ammon. But the native conservatism of the Spartan state was too strong for him.

Sparta was mistress of all Greece and unquestioningly recognised as the supreme power. Her allies of the Peloponnesian League were entirely overshadowed by her; and the more important of them began to resent her supremacy. The other states of the Grecian world were her direct subjects; Sparta had promised freedom to the Greeks, but all she actually did was to substitute a harder yoke for the comparatively light rule of Athens.

Elis had been at open feud with Sparta since 421 and had repeatedly offended her. The time for punishment had now come. In 401 Sparta called on Elis to give up Triphylia and Pisatis. When Elis declined, Agis invaded the land from the Achaean side, but turned back on account of an earthquake. In 400 he invaded Elis again and plundered the country, but a rising of the Elean oligarchy in Sparta's interest miscarried. In 399 the Eleans submitted, surrendered the disputed territories and re-entered the Peloponnesian League. The Messenians were driven from Naupactus and Cephallenia, and Sparta re-occupied Heraclea Trachinia. In 401 Athens reunited Eleusis to the rest of Attica without opposition from Sparta. Sparta also turned her serious attention to Thessaly and the affairs of the North. In Macedon a really able monarch, Archelaus, had succeeded the shifty Perdiccas, and, under him, Macedon was growing rapidly in power. His influence extended southwards; he had already taken Larissa and his ambition embraced all Thessaly. Sparta declared herself against him, placed a garrison in Pharsalus and was preparing for further action, when other

complications distracted her attention. In 399 king Agis died and Lysander saw a chance of a great personal victory. He succeeded in pushing aside Agis's son, Leoty-chidas as illegitimate and raising Agesilaus, Agis's half-brother, to the throne, in full confidence that his candidate would be a pliable instrument in his hands. In 398 a dangerous conspiracy of the Helots in Sparta under a certain Cinadon was nipped in the bud; it was a symptom of the serious chronic malady of the Spartan state—the exclusion of the great bulk of the population of Laconia from civic rights.

In 404 Darius II of Persia died and his son Artaxerxes succeeded to the throne. But Cyrus, the younger brother of Artaxerxes, had no intention of recognizing him as king, and he had a powerful secret ally in the queen-mother, Parysatis. In the same year (404) Egypt again revolted. Cyrus contrived to secure his release from the court at Susa, whither he had been summoned, and returned to his satrapy (403). Sparta, true to her ally, began to surrender the coast cities to him, but Tissaphernes, loyal to Artaxerxes, held Miletus, and Cyrus besieged the city. Cyrus's plan was to collect a large force of Greek mercenaries—he had fully realized their superior fighting qualities—and by their aid to win the Persian throne. A number of well-known Greek captains, Clearchus, Menon, Proxenus, Socrates and others, enlisted troops for his service and Sparta gave him secret encouragement. By 401 his preparations were complete, and the "Ten Thousand" (as we call the force, after Xenophon's famous description) set out, nominally on a campaign against Pisidia, whilst Tissaphernes hurried up to the court with tidings of the approaching danger. Cyrus reached Syria unopposed, the native prince of Cilicia having failed to check his passage, and a Spartan fleet attended on him. Here he at length revealed to his troops the real object of the march. The

idea of so distant an enterprise alarmed the soldiers, but, by dint of heavy promises, Cyrus secured their adhesion. He marched unopposed along the Euphrates into the neighbourhood of Babylon, where the Persian army, in vastly superior force, encountered him. At Cunaxa the decisive battle was contested. The Greeks fought well and were victorious in their part of the battle, but Cyrus fell in action, and, with his death, his cause was lost. The Greeks were in a parlous plight, and things became worse when Tissaphernes decoyed their leaders to an interview and murdered them. But there was no talk of submission. New leaders, Xenophon, the Athenian historian, among them, were elected, and they started their march northward (December, 401). The Persians soon abandoned the pursuit, and, after many hardships and dangers, the survivors reached Trapezus on the Pontus in March, 400. Their troubles, however, were not yet over. Sparta, by supporting Cyrus, had compromised herself badly with Persia, and the reappearance of the mercenaries was an unwelcome reminder of a grave political misadventure. She therefore put every difficulty in the way of the returning troops. Xenophon cherished the plan of founding a great new colony on the Black Sea, and, on several promising occasions, pressed his project on the men. But they were sick for home and would not listen to him. By way of Heraclea and Calpe they at last reached Byzantium. Here they nearly came into violent conflict with Sparta; they entered the city without permission, and they were only with difficulty persuaded by Xenophon to listen to reason and submit to the Spartan commander. Driven from Byzantium, they took service in the winter of 400 with Seuthes, a native prince of Thrace. By the next year events had occurred which opened up to them a new service under the lead of Sparta.

SECTION 2. SPARTA AGAINST PERSIA

Early in 400 Tissaphernes had been sent down from the Persian court to the coast, and the Greek cities appealed to Sparta for protection. Before, Sparta had been willing to surrender them; but her relations with Persia were already troubled and she coveted the national prestige that attached to a patriotic war against the traditional enemy. She therefore listened to the appeal and sent Thibron with some 5000 men to Ephesus. Needing reinforcements, he took the troops of Cyrus into his employment. Thibron won some small successes in Aeolis, but his rule was harsh and aroused complaints. Dercylidas was therefore sent to replace him, and received instructions to move against Caria. But he, too, shirked his real and more difficult task; he made a truce with Tissaphernes and moved northward against the satrapy of Pharnabazus. He gained certain partial successes in 399 and 398, but nothing decisive could be achieved in that quarter. Persia could not be decisively beaten, unless the coasts of Ionia and Caria were wrested from her; and this was the more necessary as she was already thinking of raising a fleet on the Carian coast. The reason for the reluctance of the Spartan commanders to campaign in Caria was their great inferiority in cavalry; the Carian country was favourable to that arm, and the Persian superiority in it was decisive. Pharax was sent from Sparta with a fleet to co-operate with the army, but Dercylidas could effect nothing and made another truce with Tissaphernes. But Persia was planning a deadly counter-stroke. Pharnabazus entered into negotiations with the Athenian admiral Conon, who had found a refuge at the court of Evagoras of Cyprus, the able man who had made himself king in 411 and had since then been a steady friend of Greeks, and especially of Athens. Pharnabazus received the consent of the Persian court to his plans,

and Conon, as agent of Persia, began to collect a fleet in Cyprus. The plan was to deprive Sparta of her supremacy at sea and thus finally to frustrate her designs in Asia Minor. News of the Persian preparations reached Sparta in the summer of 397 and excited considerable alarm. An alliance was concluded with Achoris, the rebel king of Egypt¹, and king Agesilaus was appointed to the command in Asia Minor with increased forces. Thebes, Corinth and Athens all declined to assist in the expedition, and the Thebans took occasion to insult Agesilaus by violently interrupting him when sacrificing before departure at Aulis. Early in 396 Agesilaus appeared at Ephesus and at once concluded a three months' truce with Tissaphernes. Lysander, who accompanied the king, hoped to find him compliant and began to play the great man as in the old days. But Agesilaus was no weak or undecided character. He deliberately set himself to humiliate Lysander by rejecting all petitions presented through him, and finally, at Lysander's own desire, gave him a mission elsewhere. Early in 396 Conon appeared with a fleet at Caunus, but Pharax, with the Spartan fleet, kept him blockaded there till he was relieved early in 395. Agesilaus raised a corps of cavalry in the winter of 396-5 and spent this year (395) in a campaign in Lydia, which brought him a victory in the neighbourhood of Sardis.

Rhodes, meanwhile, expelled its oligarchs and welcomed Conon. But the Athenian admiral had to suffer from the delays usual in Persian warfare and himself went up to court to complain of Tissaphernes' dilatoriness. The court was won over to his plans. Tithraustes was sent down from Susa to put Tissaphernes to death, and, early in 394,

¹ Under Amyrtaeus II, Egypt had again risen in revolt against Persia (415). But in 409 Amyrtaeus was deposed by his mercenaries, and Nephretes became king. Achoris was proclaimed king by his troops in 404 and reigned till 391.

Conon could return to his fleet with every prospect of speedy action.

Tithraustes concluded a truce with Agesilaus, and the Spartan king spent the autumn of 395 in a campaign in the Hellespont district, where he found an ally in king Otys of Paphlagonia, and the spring of 394 on the coast of the Troad. But such small successes as he won there could not affect the main issue. The Spartans, in 395, realizing the importance of decided action, had put the command of the fleet in his hands, and he had entrusted it to his brother Pisander. But, meanwhile, events had been occurring in Greece, which utterly changed the prospects of Spartan policy.

SECTION 3. THE CORINTHIAN WAR

Discontent against Sparta's leadership had arisen very soon after the fall of Athens and had been steadily growing in intensity. The Boeotian League, in which there was a strong democratic party, generalled by Ismenias, led the opposition. The Boeotians were a strong fighting people and felt, with reason, that Sparta had paid them poorly for their great services in the war. Athens, too, was slowly recovering from her losses. On the fall of the thirty, a general amnesty had been proclaimed, and, to the credit of the restored democracy be it said, it was, on the whole, faithfully observed. The one bad sign was a crop of unscrupulous prosecutions, in which the orator Lysias played a particularly disgraceful part. The finances were in a desperate state; public burdens rested heavily on the wealthy and yearly income-taxes were levied. Good conservatives at Athens traced all the misfortunes of the state to the mischievous modern spirit, and this resentment found vent in the prosecution of Socrates, as a corrupter of the youth and an offender against religion. Socrates steadily declined all compromise

and was condemned to drink the hemlock. He sealed the lesson of his life by a noble martyrdom; but we can, at least, understand the motives that prompted the attack on him.

The opposition in Greece only needed the barest excuse to break out into open war. The occasion soon arose. Early in 395 the Locrians provoked a war with Phocis, and, when Sparta assisted Phocis, Boeotia came to their aid. Lysander appeared in Boeotia and took Orchomenus, but soon afterwards fell in battle near Haliartus. Pausanias, with the main army, arrived too late and was compelled to make a truce and retire (autumn, 395). For this failure he was afterwards banished. Meanwhile Athens had plucked up courage to risk everything on one desperate cast and had thrown in her lot with the Boeotians, and now Corinth and Argos joined the league. Other states, Euboea, Chalcidice, Leucas, Ambracia, and Thessaly followed; only a part of the Peloponnesian League stood true to Sparta, and, even there, disaffection was beginning to raise its head. The allies made an alliance with Persia, and a Persian agent, Timocrates, contributed largely to the expenses of the campaign. The situation was critical for Sparta, and in June, 394, a message was sent to Agesilaus bidding him return to defend his country. Before he could obey, the first act of the war had taken place. The Spartans met their enemies near Nemea and were left with the victory in a hard-fought battle. But the success yielded no immediate result, and the Spartan party in Corinth failed to master its opponents. Agesilaus reluctantly obeyed the call home and led his army by the land route from Asia to Boeotia. There a Spartan division joined him, and, in a great battle at Coronea, he gained a decisive victory. The Boeotian troops, however, distinguished themselves greatly by forcing their retreat from the stricken field, and gained additional

confidence from this nominal defeat. But, before the battle had been fought, news reached Agesilaus of a disaster which meant irretrievable loss for Sparta. His brother Pisander had given battle to Conon and Pharnabazus off Cnidus and had suffered a complete defeat. The break-up of the Spartan Empire was the immediate result. The victorious admirals sailed round the islands and coasts, expelling the Spartan harmosts and garrisons; only Abydos was still held by Dercylidas. They then sailed to Athens and rebuilt the long walls; Athens was now secure against a land attack and could again feel confidence in herself. Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros were again joined to Athens, and attempts were made, without success, to win Dionysius of Syracuse for the alliance. The Spartan Empire abroad was definitely lost; but in Greece itself the war continued. The fighting centred round Corinth and consisted chiefly of small engagements and skirmishes; no other great battle was fought. Corinth was, for the time, merged in the state of Argos; the oligarchy made a second attempt to betray the city to Sparta, but their efforts were again frustrated. On the whole, the war went in favour of Sparta. She gained a victory near Corinth and took the port of Lechaëum. But, in the divided state of Greece, the decision virtually lay with Persia, and, towards the end of 393, the Spartan Antalcidas was sent up to court to make terms; but the Persian government decided to let the war continue. In 391 a congress met at Sparta to debate on peace; Boeotia was not averse to the suggestion, but Argos was unwilling to yield up Corinth, and Athens gave a deciding vote in favour of war. In 391 Agesilaus operated with success near Corinth. But the able Athenian captain, Iphicrates, with his trained corps of light-armed troops, surprised and annihilated a Spartan division at Lechaëum, and this success gave the allies new heart. In 389 Iphicrates, distrusted by the Corinthians, was dismissed from Corinth.

The year of 388 was spent by Agesilaus in a campaign against Acarnania, undertaken at the instance of the Achaeans. But abroad events were taking place which disposed Persia to think of peace with Sparta. Evagoras of Salamis declined to acknowledge the overlordship of Persia, and in the war that followed (390 onwards) Athens sent help to her old ally. She was fast recovering her strength and was even hoping to regain her lost empire. In 387 Thrasybulus sailed with 40 ships to Asia Minor. He won great successes in Thrace and the Hellespont, and Lesbos, Clazomenae and other cities came under democratic rule and joined Athens again. But these successes were short-lived. The great admiral Conon had already died at the court of Evagoras, and in 388 Thrasybulus died too. There was an end to Athenian dreams of revived greatness, and Athens began to suffer nearer home from troublesome piratical raids from Aegina.

In the Hellespont one great success fell to her lot. Iphicrates cut off and destroyed another Spartan division under Anaxibius, proving once again that Spartans were not invincible. And, in Cyprus, Evagoras, assisted by the Athenian captain Chabrias, held his own. In 388 Antalcidas was sent up again to the Persian court to discuss terms of accommodation. This time he found the Persians willing to negotiate and gained all that he desired; Tiribazus was sent down to the coast to assist in restoring peace. Antalcidas himself returned and succeeded in blockading the Hellespont and cutting off the Athenian fleet in the Bosphorus. At the same time the able Spartan captain Teleutias harassed the Attic coasts from Aegina, and even ventured on a raid on the Peiraeus. To continue the war would have been perilous for Athens, and fair terms of peace were offered her. The other allies felt themselves unable to continue the war without her, and in 386 the "King's Peace"—so-called because it was expressed as

the good pleasure of the Persian king—was ratified at Sparta. Athens lost nothing, retaining Lembros, Imbros and Scyros. Argos had to submit to separation from Corinth, and the Boeotian League, despite the protests of Thebes, was broken up. The general principle adopted was that of autonomy, or independence, for all Greek cities, great and small. But, inasmuch as Sparta ranked as the guardian and executor of the peace, this autonomy meant not freedom, but simply disunion and incapacity to resist the encroachments of Sparta. The peace was, in fact, a great diplomatic triumph for that state. She had lost her sea-power—it had always been something alien in her hands—but she was in a position to carry through her supremacy on land more fully than ever before. Allied with Persia and the great tyrant of the West, Dionysius of Syracuse, she seemed strong enough to meet every emergency.

SECTION 4. SICILY AND CARTHAGE. DIONYSIUS

The mention of Dionysius reminds us of stirring events in the West that will, for a time, demand our notice. In 410, shortly after the triumph over Athens, a democratic revolution took place in Syracuse, and Hermocrates was deposed from his command. Syracuse took an active part in the naval war against Athens, but entirely neglected her home defence. And yet there was need for precautions here. Segesta, still pressed hard by Selinus, again looked abroad for help, and this time her appeal was made to Carthage (410). The Carthaginians placed a garrison in Segesta and repelled an attack from Selinus, and Syracuse promised aid to her ally. Thus, without any real desire for war, the two great powers, Carthage and Syracuse, were brought into collision. The Carthaginian general Hannibal landed in 409 with a large army near Lilybaeum, captured Selinus after a nine days' siege, and massacred

the inhabitants. The turn of Himera came next. Diocles, the general of Syracuse, came too late to save the city and all of the inhabitants who did not escape betimes perished in the sack. In place of the Greek city Carthage founded Therma. The first campaign had brought her great and unexpected triumphs. Hermocrates now returned to Sicily and distinguished himself by successful raids on the Carthaginian territory; in 407, however, he fell in an attempt to win his way into Syracuse. In the following year a second Carthaginian invading force landed in the south and attacked Agrigentum (May, 406). A relief fleet from Syracuse was annihilated by the Carthaginians and Agrigentum had to be abandoned to its fate. In December, 406, Himilco, who succeeded Hannibal on his decease, took and sacked the beautiful city. It was clear that the Greek civilization of Sicily stood in imminent danger of destruction. It was equally clear that only Syracuse could avert that disaster and that, with her existing government, she was unequal to the task. Fortunately a strong hand was ready to seize the reins of power. Dionysius, a promising young officer in the Syracusan army, backed by powerful and wealthy men, notably Philistus and Hipparinus, denounced the generals for their incompetence and secured the appointment of a new staff, himself among the number. He then accused his colleagues of treachery and was appointed sole general. His next step was to surround himself with a bodyguard of 1000 men. This accomplished, he threw off the mask, made himself master of Syracuse and stood forth openly as military dictator (406-5). However little sympathy we may feel, as a general rule, for such usurpers, we must confess that in this case a military despotism was justified. Only the centralization of power in one hand could enable Syracuse to bring her full resources into play against the national foe, and, in spite of all his hesitations and shortcomings,

which have probably been exaggerated by unfavourable writers, Dionysius indisputably accomplished his great work and repelled the attack of Carthage at a moment when success seemed almost impossible. His first efforts were, however, failures. In 405 Himilco attacked Gela, and Dionysius, after a great but unsuccessful attack on the enemy's camp, abandoned both Gela and Camarina to the enemy. Indignation was bitter in Syracuse, and Dionysius lost control of the city for the moment; but he speedily recovered his position. At the end of 405 he concluded a peace with Carthage on the basis of the *status quo*. The whole of the west and south of the island thus remained in the hands of Carthage, whilst Leontini and Messana were recognized as independent. Dionysius employed the years of peace in ruthlessly establishing his power in and without Syracuse. From 404 to 400 he subdued Herbessus, defeated Syracusan exiles in Aetna, reduced the Sicel tribes to submission, took Catana, Naxos and Leontini, and, after war with Messana and Rhegium, secured the adhesion of the former city. Rhegium continued hostile, but Locri sought his alliance. In 404 there was another rising against Dionysius in Syracuse, and he was besieged in his island fortress of Ortygia. His position seemed almost hopeless, but his trusty Campanian mercenaries extricated him from an awkward plight. Dionysius was not a tyrant of the vulgar stamp, that is, he was not wantonly cruel or lascivious. But he was determined to be undisputed master and was drastic in his measures to secure that end. The old constitution continued to exist in name, but above the laws stood the tyrant himself and his word alone was all-powerful. Many slaves were emancipated and the Syracusans were disarmed and overawed by an elaborate system of espionage. But, if Dionysius deprived Syracuse of freedom, he gave her security and power. The high ground of Epipolae was

brought within the fortifications; and a great army and fleet, ready to meet any foe, were raised. By 398 Dionysius had made Syracuse the chief military power in Greece and was ready to resume the war against the national foe. In 397 he called on Carthage to surrender all the Greek cities in her possession; when, as was natural, she refused, he declared war. Anxious to found a dynasty, he celebrated his marriage to Aristomache, daughter of Hipparinus, and to Doris, a lady of Locri.

Carthage was quite unprepared for this attack, and, at the first call, the Greeks of Sicily rose against the usurpers. Dionysius marched unopposed to the west, and, after a terrific siege, captured the stronghold of Motya. In the following year Dionysius turned against Segesta. But Himilco landed a strong force at Panormus and soon regained Eryx and Motya. Dionysius declined battle, and Himilco speedily won the whole of the north coast, including Messana, and, on the site of Motya, founded the new city of Lilybaeum. The Syracusan fleet was defeated off Catana, and Dionysius had to fall back and stand a siege in Syracuse. A movement to depose Dionysius was repressed by Pharacidas, the admiral whom Sparta had sent to the support of her ally. Himilco had triumphed greatly, but at Syracuse his success met with a decisive check. Pestilence broke out in the camp, Himilco committed suicide, and Dionysius completely defeated his enemies by land and sea, thus plucking victory out of imminent defeat. From 396 to 393 Carthage was occupied with a Libyan revolt, and Dionysius had a free hand in Sicily. He settled mercenaries in Leontini, restored Messana and founded Tyndaris, and continued his conquests over the Sicels. The strong post of Tauromenium, however, defied all his attacks (winter, 394). But again fortune deserted him. Messana and Tyndaris revolted, and in 393 Carthage sent a new army of invasion under Mago. After indecisive

fighting peace was concluded in 392, Carthage surrendering all but her old possessions in the west. Tyndaris and Agrigentum, which had also revolted, submitted to Dionysius.

Dionysius now turned his attention to the affairs of southern Italy. Here the Lucanians were pressing hard on the Greek cities; Posidonia, Pyxus and Laus had fallen before them (c. 405 to 400), and a league, including Croton, Caulonia, Thurii and Elea, had been founded to resist them. There was clearly great scope for the exercise of a power like that of Dionysius. Locri was devoted to his cause, whilst Rhegium threw in her lot with the Italiote League. On Rhegium, therefore, Dionysius directed his first attack. The league sent help to the threatened city and Dionysius replied by forming an alliance with the Lucanians. In 389 the Lucanians gained a great victory over Thurii at Laus; Leptines, the brother of Dionysius, offered his good services to the Greeks in arranging a peace, but for this action Dionysius deposed him from his command. Dionysius gained a great victory over the forces of the league on the river Elleporus, and the Greeks thereupon gave up the struggle. Caulonia and Hipponium surrendered to him and Rhegium made peace. But Dionysius, who had private grounds for bitterness against the city, provoked a fresh war in 387 and took and destroyed it. The whole of the south-west of Italy was now in Dionysius's hands, and he planned the building of a wall across the peninsula from Scylletium to Hipponium in its defence. Dionysius was famous from one end of the Greek world to the other, and in 388 sent a magnificent deputation to Olympia to make a display of his greatness before the eyes of all Greece. But he was as much the object of hatred as of admiration; the Athenian orator, Lysias, denounced him in a set oration as an enemy to Greek liberties, and the crowds took vengeance by pillaging his tents. Dionysius's

activity was still great and in 387 he sent a fleet to assist Sparta. His eyes were now turned to the Adriatic and here he founded colonies at Lissus in Illyria, at Pharos, and at Issa. Further, he occupied Ancona and Adria and plundered Pyrgi, the harbour of Caere. In 383 he was again involved in war with the Carthaginian general Mago. He gained a great victory at Cabala, but, immediately afterwards, he was defeated at Crommium, so that neither side could boast a decisive success. In 379 he took Croton but failed against Thurii, while Carthage took Hipponium. Probably in 376 he concluded a lasting peace with Carthage. He surrendered Selinus and the territory of Himera, and received in exchange a free hand in Italy, where he maintained friendly relations with Tarentum, Metapontum and Thurii. The rest of his reign was undisturbed by foreign wars. We shall see how he assisted Sparta again, and how, when Athens came into alliance with Sparta, he received high honours from that state and had the satisfaction of having a tragedy honoured with a prize. He died in 367 and left the succession undisputed to his son, the younger Dionysius. He was a great man, vigorous, enterprising and many-sided, a general of no mean ability, a fine administrator, a man of good general culture, and even an aspirant to poetic fame. But, in spite of all his great qualities, he fell short of genius. The curse of incompleteness rested over all his work, and, within a few years of his death, his empire was destroyed and Syracuse was again as weak as he had found her.

SECTION 5. SPARTA AS TYRANT

We return to the history of Greece after the King's Peace of 386. Sparta was resolved to use that instrument to serve her private ends and soon gave proof of this resolve. Mantinea had offended her in various ways during

the years of war. Sparta now attacked the city, took it after a stubborn resistance and broke it up into the five villages out of which it had originally arisen. Phlius, too, felt the heavy hand of the master. At the instance of Sparta, a number of citizens of the Spartan party were received back. On their return disputes arose about rights of property, and the exiles appealed to Sparta. For this they were fined; but Sparta intervened in their favour. Agesilaus took the field against Phlius in 381 and early in 379 forced it to surrender. A commission was appointed to regulate the internal affairs of the city—that is to say, the city practically lost its autonomy and came entirely under Spartan control. In most of the cities of Boeotia small oligarchic factions (*δυναστεῖαι*) favourable to Sparta held power. In Thebes, however, the parties were evenly balanced, and there was a deep feeling of resentment against Sparta. To understand the new developments in the north of Greece we must go back a little in our narrative. Archelaus of Macedon had died in 399 and after some years of anarchy Amyntas III had succeeded to the throne, which he held, with interruptions, down to 370. Hard pressed by the Illyrians, Amyntas sought help from the league of Greek cities, which was rising into prominence under the presidency of Olynthus, and, in return for their assistance, ceded certain territories to them. The danger over, Amyntas demanded these territories back, and, when the league refused, appealed to Sparta. He was supported in his appeal by the cities of Acanthus and Apollonia, which were unwilling to exchange their full individual autonomy for the citizenship of the league. Sparta decided to interfere and sent Eudamidas with a force against Olynthus (382). In 381 Teleutias was in command but fell in a defeat, and the king Agesipolis, who followed him, died of fever in 380. The war was carried to a successful conclusion by Polybiadas in 379;

the Chalcidians were not strong enough, in the long run, to resist the solid military power of Sparta. The league was dissolved and the cities composing it were compelled to enter the Spartan alliance. The Spartan League, now extending beyond the Peloponnese, was organized in districts, and the principle of commutation of military service for money was adopted. This northern expedition had brought with it important changes further south. Sparta, in sending so large a force to the north, could not but be uneasy about the attitude of Thebes, and, when the Theban oligarch Leontiadas offered to betray the citadel, the Cadmea, the Spartan general Phoebeidas eagerly embraced the offer. The betrayal was successfully carried out; a Spartan garrison was placed in the Cadmea, the great democratic leader, Ismenias, was put to death and Thebes became a vassal of Sparta. The little city of Plataea was restored, under Spartan protection. In Thessaly the oligarchs were in alliance with Sparta; but Jason, the able tyrant of Pherae, was working to win for himself an independent power. Up to now Sparta had been completely successful in her selfish and unscrupulous policy. She had divided her enemies and was conquering them one by one. But Nemesis soon overtook her. A number of Theban exiles who had received hospitality at Athens, led by Pelopidas and Melon, formed a conspiracy to recover Thebes. Assisted by friends in the city a small band obtained admission to Thebes in December, 379, murdered the leading oligarchs and called upon the citizens to assert their liberty. A general rising against Sparta followed, and the Spartan garrison, owing to the cowardice of its commander, surrendered the Cadmea. Cleombrotus, the Spartan king, arrived too late to avert the loss; he retired, leaving Sphodrias with a detachment in Thespieae. Athens had lent troops, perhaps unofficially, to assist the conspirators; she now repented of her rashness and consented to

sacrifice the two generals responsible to Sparta's resentment. Thebes, too, was willing to make reasonable terms. But Sphodrias was an ambitious man and wished to repeat the success of Phoebeidas. He marched by night to surprise the Peiraeus but was overtaken by daylight on the way. The attempt was an utter failure, and, worse still, an overt one. Sphodrias was put on trial at Sparta but, through the influence of Agesilaus, was scandalously acquitted. This was more than Athens could endure. Had Sphodrias been condemned, she might still have been willing to submit; his acquittal left her no real choice. She formed an alliance with Thebes against Sparta and prepared for an energetic campaign.

SECTION 6. REVOLT AGAINST SPARTA. THEBES AND ATHENS IN ALLIANCE

Agesilaus took the field against Boeotia, but the Athenian general Chabrias checkmated him by clever defensive tactics; and, shortly afterwards, Phoebeidas fell in battle near Thespieae. Sparta's attempt to crush her enemies at a blow had signally failed, and Athens was not content simply to stand on the defensive. She was already in alliance with Chios, Byzantium and other states, and the general distrust and dislike of Sparta offered her good prospects of further advance. Accordingly, in 377, a second Athenian League was formed, with the avowed purpose of thwarting the perverse ambitions of Sparta and maintaining the King's Peace in its plain and honest interpretation. A number of island cities joined the league and Thebes herself became a member. Athens carefully renounced all claims to any undue predominance in the confederacy. She was forbidden to acquire land in the allied states or to interfere in their home affairs, and, instead of the obnoxious "tribute" (*phoros*), "contributions"

(*συντάξεις*) were to be paid to the general fund. The allies were represented in a permanent council (*συνέδριον*), sitting at Athens. The Athenians also adopted a new system of taxation to increase the fighting resources of the state. Meanwhile the war in Boeotia continued. In 377 Agesilaus again failed to force a battle against the allies. In the following year he was seriously ill and his colleague Cleombrotus took the field, but was checked at the passes of Cithaeron. Thebes steadily gained ground, and, by 374, had recovered all the Boeotian cities, except Plataea and Orchomenus, and founded a new single state under her own leadership. Pelopidas won a great victory over the Spartans at Tegyra in 375, and in 374 Plataea was recovered. About the same time Athens took Oropus. Meanwhile Jason of Pherae had leisure to extend his power unhindered. Polydamas, the leading statesman of Pharsalus, appealed to Sparta to check his progress ; but Sparta was averse to a new and dangerous enterprise, and Pharsalus had no choice but to join Jason (374). Jason proceeded to raise a strong army and secure his election as "duke" (*ταγός*) of all Thessaly. Sparta could not wound Athens, except by a victory at sea ; and as land operations brought no success she resolved to try this new means of attack. In 376 the Spartan admiral Pollis, with a Peloponnesian fleet, blockaded the Saronic gulf. Chabrias at once put out to attack him and gained a decisive victory at Naxos. Sparta's attempt to recover sea-power had failed ignominiously, and Athens used her victory to extend her power. Amyntas III joined Athens in alliance and a number of the Cyclades entered the league. Timotheus, too, led an expedition round the coasts of the Peloponnese. The democracy in Corcyra rose and joined him, and he defeated a Spartan fleet at Alyzia. Alcetas of Molossia and probably Jason of Pherae himself entered the confederacy. But, in spite of these successes, Athens was desirous of

peace; she was in great financial straits, she had nothing to fear from Sparta, and she was suspicious of the growth of Theban power. Sparta, too, was willing to make terms, and peace was concluded in 374 on the same basis as in 386. But this peace was short-lived. A dispute at once arose over the island of Zacynthus, war was resumed, and the Spartans, relying on a promise of help from Dionysius, sent Alcidas against Corcyra. A second force of 60 ships under Mnasippus followed. Timotheus received instructions to proceed to the relief of the island, but he was destitute of money and was kept inactive at Calauria. Corcyra was closely besieged and seemed in imminent danger of capture. In the autumn of 373 Timotheus was deposed from command, and, late in the year, put on his trial. Influential friends spoke for him and he was acquitted, but was not, however, reappointed to the command. Callistratus and Iphicrates took his place and, early in 372, set sail for the west. Iphicrates was an able general and made all possible speed to the island. But, even before his arrival, the danger was at an end. Mnasippus had grown negligent and had incurred a decisive defeat on the island. The Spartan fleet broke up and the fleet sent by Dionysius was captured by the Athenians on their arrival. Sparta and Athens now finally decided to make up their quarrel. Sparta needed a free hand to deal with her chief enemy Thebes; Athens deeply resented the seizure of Plataea by Thebes (373), and was uneasy at the changed attitude of Jason, who had renounced her alliance. A peace congress met at Athens in 371 and peace was concluded. The claim of Athens to Amphipolis and the Thracian Chersonese was recognized. Thebes shared in the negotiations, but claimed the right to swear to the peace as representative of the united Boeotian state. Agesilaus stoutly resisted the claim, and Thebes was excluded from the peace. No one in Greece doubted that

the time of reckoning had come, and even the Theban patriots themselves must have shrunk from the danger they had deliberately incurred. But Thebes was fortunate in the possession of able generals and statesmen. Pelopidas we have already met as one of the deliverers of Thebes in 379 and as a successful general in the years of war following. But his close friend Epaminondas, who gradually rose into prominence in the years from 379 to 371, was even greater than he. He was a man of mild nature and had declined to share in the assassination of the oligarchs. But, when Thebes had once been delivered, he came forward to help and soon rose to the first rank by sheer dint of character and ability. He was a careful student of tactics, and had discovered a means of using the excellent Theban infantry which was to stand him in good stead when the hour of decision arrived.

Events in the East demand a passing notice. Evagoras of Cyprus continued his successful resistance to Persia for some ten years and at one time actually captured Tyre. Finally, in 381, the Persians made a great attack on the island, and Evagoras was driven to seek peace; he was compelled to submit, but, even in submission, safeguarded his honour. In 374 his long reign came to an end, and, with him, Cyprus ceased to be a force in politics. Egypt was still in revolt against Persia, and a great expedition (385 to 383) failed to reduce her to submission. From 378 onwards, the Persians renewed the attack but, in spite of the valuable assistance of the Athenian captain Iphicrates, failed to make any headway. In Caria the native prince Hecatomnus, ruling as a Persian vassal (391 to 377), established a considerable independent power, while the able satrap of Cappadocia, Datames, rose to similar prominence.

SECTION 7. THE THEBAN SUPREMACY

Sparta was at last free to move against Thebes, and no one out of Boeotia looked for anything but an easy victory for her arms. Cleombrotus was already in Phocis with a Spartan army and led his troops direct against the enemy, meaning to make a speedy end. The armies met at Leuctra, and, to the universal amazement, the Thebans broke through the enemy and threw them back routed on to their camp. Epaminondas was a great tactician and had conceived the plan of strengthening and deepening his left wing, and trusting to it to give him the victory, while his centre and right wing hung back out of action. This new formation, assisted by the excellence of the Boeotian cavalry, decided the battle. Cleombrotus fell on the field, and the Spartans retired under an armistice to join Archidamus, who had led a second army to the Isthmus. Jason of Pherae, on receiving news of the battle, hurried up to the field, but on the conclusion of the armistice retired. On his way home he took Heraclea Trachinia and extended his suzerainty to the south. He cherished great schemes and intended, in 370, to make an imposing appearance at the Pythian festival. Probably his ambition extended as far as the conception of a hegemony over all Greece; but, at this zenith of his fortunes, he was murdered. His successor Alexander, though energetic and unscrupulous, had not the ability required to carry through these great plans. Now that Jason was dead, Thebes could reap the fruits of her victory. The Locrians, Phocians and Malians, together with Euboea and Acarnania, at once acknowledged her supremacy. In the Peloponnese the blow to Spartan prestige led to terrible class wars and risings of the demus against the oligarchs. In Corinth, Sicyon and Phlius these outbreaks were suppressed; but in other cities, notably Argos, the demus won the day

and celebrated its victory by atrocious massacres (370). Athens was bitterly disappointed at the result of Leuctra, which defeated all her plans. But, even so, she attempted to draw what profit could be drawn from the changed conditions. In 371 she called a congress at Athens, and succeeded in extending her sea league to include most of the Peloponnese; Elis, however, stood aloof. Athens was clearly bidding for the hegemony which Sparta had lost. But Thebes was not satisfied with the success already gained. Epaminondas's plans went further; he meant, once and for all, to break the power of Sparta and place Thebes where Sparta had stood. The political movements in Peloponnesus assisted him. The Mantineans took the opportunity of rebuilding their city, and Tegea, a home of oligarchy, fell into the hands of the democrats. Both states sought the Theban alliance, and Agesilaus effected nothing by a demonstration in Arcadia. In December 370 Epaminondas led his army into the Peloponnese. Uniting with his Arcadian allies he invaded Laconia in four columns, and, in spite of a gallant resistance, broke in and ravaged the land far and wide; only the stubborn defence of Agesilaus saved Sparta herself from capture. But, before Epaminondas retired, he dealt Sparta a deadly blow. He restored the old Messenian state and built the new city of Messene on the hill-side of Ithome. The new state held its own, and Sparta struggled in vain to recover its lost territory. Athens, dismayed at the Theban successes, now joined Sparta on terms of absolute equality, and Iphicrates led out a force against Epaminondas, but made no serious effort to block his retreat (369). In the summer of 369 Epaminondas again led out an army. He found the line of the Isthmus blockaded, but broke through, joined his allies, captured Sicyon and Pellene, and did not retire until the autumn. In this year, the Mantineans and Tegeates combined, under Theban encouragement, to found

a new federal state of Arcadia. A new city, Megalopolis, was built to form the centre of the new state, and a league council of 10,000 (the *μυρία*) with an executive committee (*δημουργοί*) and a league army (*ἐπάρκται*) was instituted. Thus to the north as well as to the west Sparta was hemmed in by a new and solid power; and the northern districts of Laconia itself remained, after the invasion of Laconia, in Arcadian hands. The new Arcadian state, however, was unwilling to be simply an instrument in the hands of Thebes and, under its able leader Lycomedes, began to play an independent rôle in politics. In 368 the Arcadians took the field on their own account, and pressed Phlius hard. But Archidamus of Sparta gained an easy victory (the "Tearless Battle") over them which somewhat depressed their confidence and revived the drooping hopes of Sparta. Returning home in 369 Epaminondas and Pelopidas were temporarily deposed from command; their enemies accused them of having wasted opportunities. Complications in the north of Greece began to claim Theban interest. Alexander II of Macedon, invited by Thessalian oligarchs, took Larissa and Crannon; the rival party appealed to Thebes, and Pelopidas appeared in their support in Thessaly. Theban relations with Macedon underwent a change, and Pelopidas supported Alexander II against a pretender, Ptolemaeus of Alorus. But in 368 this Ptolemaeus murdered the king and made terms with Thebes, giving her hostages, among them Philip, afterwards king of Macedon. On his return to Thessaly, Pelopidas attempted to take Pharsalus, but, failing in the attempt, was taken prisoner by Alexander of Pherae. Thebes sent a force against the tyrant, but the leadership was bad and the army fell into serious difficulties. Epaminondas, who was serving in the ranks, was called to take command and extricated the army. His reputation thus redeemed, he was re-elected general in 367, and by clever operations compelled Alexander to surrender Pelopidas.

Persia now thought fit to take a hand in the game, and sent a representative, Philiscus, to hold a peace congress at Delphi; but after much talk nothing definite was effected. Dionysius had already sent a fleet to assist Sparta in 369, and Athens, as Sparta's ally, paid him her highest honours and formed a defensive alliance with him. In the same years, Greek embassies from Thebes, Athens, Arcadia and other states went up to the Persian court at Susa. Pelopidas, who represented Thebes, gained a signal diplomatic victory and returned, bringing the terms of a "King's Peace," in which all the wishes of Thebes were satisfied. A congress was called at Thebes to discuss this new document. But many states were dissatisfied with it and, when Corinth had once given the lead, state after state refused to accept it (367). In this same year Epaminondas, for a third time, led an army into the Peloponnese and won over Achaea. But the Boeotian government, against Epaminondas's advice, overthrew the oligarchies in Achaea; and the defeated party rallied, recovered its position, and threw its weight on to the Spartan side. In Sicyon a certain Euphron had risen by popular support to be tyrant. In 366 he quarrelled with the Argives and had to flee, failing in his flight to betray the city into Spartan hands. Similarly in Eretria a certain Themison became tyrant; he took Oropus from Athens and delivered it to Thebes, and Athens could not enlist any help from her allies towards its recovery. She therefore determined to act for herself, and, to that intent made an alliance with Arcadia. She also formed the plan of seizing Corinth; but the Corinthians got wind of the project in time and dismissed the Athenian garrison. In 366 Corinth and the smaller allies of Sparta, fearing for their safety, concluded peace with Thebes, and this peace was generally accepted. But Sparta refused to recognize the independence of Messene and stood alone in her opposition.

With the help of troops sent by Dionysius II she recovered the lost Sellasia. Athens, meanwhile, was free to extend her influence at sea. Her admiral Timotheus gained for her Byzantium and part of the Thracian Chersonese, forced Perdiccas II, who had succeeded to the throne of Macedon, to make an alliance with her, and captured Pydna, Methone, Torone, and Potidaea. Amphipolis and Olynthus, however, resisted all her attacks. In Asia, a revolt of satraps against the central government broke out under Ariobarzanes and Datames, and both Sparta and Athens co-operated with them against the Persian government, sending out Agesilaus and Timotheus to their support. Thebes continued her movements in the north. In 364 Pelopidas fell in a successful action against Alexander of Pherae; but in 363 the Thebans defeated the tyrant, confined his influence to his own city, and took Magnesia and Phthiotis. Orchomenus, a centre of oligarchic sentiment in Boeotia, was destroyed. In 364 Epaminondas made a bold attempt to challenge the supremacy of Athens at sea. He raised a fleet and sailed to the coast of Asia Minor, where Chios, Rhodes, Cos and Byzantium joined him. But this was the only move of Thebes in this direction, and Athens soon recovered Chios and Naxos. The speedy successes of Epaminondas, however, revealed the unpopularity of Athens abroad. The second sea league had begun to follow in the track of the first; the members began to feel suspicious of Athens as an enslaving power, and the more important states were only awaiting an opportunity to break loose. But for the moment Timotheus had brought considerable additions to the empire, and he received a triumphant reception on his return in 362.

The great feature of the politics of the period of the Theban supremacy is their extraordinary complication. The interests of states were strangely tangled and there was a perpetual shuffling of the political card-pack, which

reminds us of the years following the Peace of Nicias. Fresh troubles arose in Peloponnesus which gradually worked up to a decision, but such a decision as really decided little. In 364 Euphron returned to Sicyon. He repaired to Thebes to give an account of himself, but was murdered there by his enemies; Thebes approved of the murder and took possession of Sicyon for herself. In the same year Elis attacked Lasium, a town over which she claimed supremacy. The Arcadians took part against Elis, defeated her troops, and then, turning back, defeated Archidamus of Sparta, who had invaded Arcadia. They then marched back into Elis and, with their Athenian allies, enabled the Pisatans, the old holders of the festival, to celebrate the Olympic games. An attack of the Eleans was repulsed. A party in the Arcadian League was disposed to turn the sacred treasures to its own uses; but Mantinea raised a protest, and the league army, joining in it, had to be disbanded. This involved a complete split in the Arcadian League. The democrats of Tegea, assisted by Thebans, seized their aristocratic opponents, but then, losing their nerve, released them again. Feeling the need of help, they called in Epaminondas to make a settlement in their favour. On the side of Thebes stood Tegea and Megalopolis; on the other side stood Sparta, Athens, Mantinea, Elis and Achaëa. In 362 Epaminondas led a strong force of Boeotians and allies from middle Greece into the Peloponnese and found the Spartans and their allies awaiting him near Tegea. His strategy was bold and masterly and only failed of success through sheer ill-luck. His first move was to march past the enemy and strike straight at Sparta. Agesilaus, however, hearing by accident of his plan, hurried back just in time to save the city. Epaminondas then launched his second stroke. Turning on his tracks he marched hot-foot to Mantinea, intending to capture the

city before the allies could relieve it. Once again luck was against him. A body of Athenian cavalry arrived in the nick of time and, by its gallant resistance, saved Mantinea from capture. A battle was now inevitable, as both sides were anxious for a decision. It was fought on the 5th of June in the plain between Mantinea and Tegea. Epaminondas employed the same tactics as at Leuctra, and, since his enemies had not learnt how to meet them, with equal success. But, in the moment of victory, he himself received a mortal wound. His death deprived his troops of all zest for fighting, and the victory was left unexploited. Thebes had no statesman competent to fill his place, and a general peace was concluded, which left things in the confusion that had existed before the battle. But Sparta still held out, in a fine though foolish refusal to acknowledge the loss of her old power. To protect themselves against Thebes, a defensive alliance was formed between Athens, Mantinea, Elis and Achaea.

The old king Agesilaus of Sparta had lived too long for his happiness. He had seen his country dragged from a pinnacle of glory to the very edge of ruin, but, obstinate to the last, he still refused to admit defeat. In 361, to fill the depleted Spartan exchequer, he undertook mercenary service in Egypt. In that country Nectanebus I had ruled from 385 to 363, and, on his death, his son Tachos had succeeded him. Called in to assist Tachos against Persia, Agesilaus joined in an invasion of Syria, but transferred his allegiance to an usurper, Nectanebus II, and secured his triumph. On his way home Agesilaus died, but his body was embalmed and carried to its rest at Sparta.

In 361 Thebes had to interfere in Arcadia to prevent the impending dissolution of Megalopolis. The battle of Mantinea had given no clear decision; but new forces were about to appear in the Grecian world, which would reduce the small private feuds of the Peloponnese to utter insignificance.

SECTION 8. THE CULTURE OF THE AGE OF
REACTION

The period which we have been discussing was, in most respects, a time of reaction and depression. Modernism was indeed triumphant but was still feared and disliked by many who had been unable to withstand its influences. In religion, the reaction manifested itself in a revival of formal piety; the old religion was nearly dead, but the conservative spirit continued uneasily to haunt its grave. In politics, the sense for big combinations and schemes was gradually lost, and the Greek world sank back into a state of absolute disintegration. Every city had its party strife and its body of discontented and restless exiles. This class of dispossessed citizens was a dangerous factor, always making towards revolution. The social changes already at work in the preceding period continued to operate. Country life continued to decline before the city, and capitalism, with its system of slave-labour, continued to develop. The political warfare in the states became more and more a crass material struggle between rich and poor. The continued wars had given rise to a new class, that of the mercenary and the mercenary captain, which henceforth plays an ever increasing part in Greek life. We must not, however, exaggerate the extent of the general decline. Art, it is true, was past its prime in the sphere of the state, and fell back more into private life. Architecture, in particular, the art that owes most to public influences, had fewer achievements of magnitude to show. But sculpture and painting, in a rather new sphere, attained perhaps their highest formal perfection, making up in grace and harmony what they lost in grandeur. Poetry, as an active force, declined. Most sources of serious poetry were running dry; the Middle Comedy, for example, is but a sorry substitute for the rude vigour of

Aristophanes in his earlier days. Great tragedies were no longer written; but Euripides came into his own at last and enjoyed an enormous influence. Prose was the natural vehicle of thought in the age. The sophists continued to publish the show pieces that displayed their mental agility. The political speech, together with the speech of the private advocate, began to appear in written form; and the political brochure was developed as an independent form by the great stylist Isocrates. Philosophy was represented by those schools which owed their birth to Socrates—the schools of Aristippus, Antisthenes, Phaedo, and Plato. The diversity in their teachings is a signal witness to the many-sidedness of the genius of their inspirer; but we shall hardly err in continuing to regard Plato as the disciple on whom, in truth, the mantle of the master descended. Apart from these schools, there was a great revival of Pythagoreanism in Italy and Sicily; while Democritus of Abdera, a voluminous writer, expounded the Atomistic philosophy, which he had, in part at least, learnt from his master Leucippus. The greatest age of Greek thought was past; but the Greek mind was still vigorous and active and was destined to contribute for centuries to come to the stock of human knowledge.

SECTION 9. DECLINE OF ATHENS. PHILIP OF MACEDON

The battle of Mantinea left the Greek world without a leader; no state could claim any true preponderance of power. Athens was steadily on the decline. She had never entirely recovered from the disasters of the Peloponnesian war, and her finances were in chronic disorder. A change, too, had come over her citizens; even if they were not the corrupt mob that some writers would represent them to be, the democracy had unfolded all its latent vices,

and the average citizen was fonder of comfort and less ambitious for glory than his forefathers had been. In foreign politics Athens pursued a miserable career; she had neither the self-restraint to abstain from foreign adventures nor the energy to carry them through, and involved herself in various petty wars, with Macedonia, with Alexander of Pherae and with the Thracian kings. In 361 the fleet of Alexander of Pherae defeated the Athenians off Peparethus and raided the Peiraeus, but the tyrant died in 359, and, after his death, the tyranny soon expired. In 357, however, Athens recovered the Thracian Chersonese, which had fallen into the hands of Cotys of Thrace, and thwarted a Theban attack on Euboea and recovered most of the island. In 360 Perdiccas of Macedon died, and the succession of his son Amyntas III was disputed by several pretenders. Philip, the child's uncle, felt himself called upon to assume control; he took up the government for his nephew, beat off the Illyrians, who took occasion to invade Macedon, disposed of the pretenders one by one, and then set aside his ward and proclaimed himself king. Athens had supported one of the pretenders, by name Argaeus. Philip bought her off, by offering her Amphipolis in exchange for Pydna; but, when she took the bait, he declined to carry out his share of the bargain. In 354 he gained Amphipolis for himself and strengthened his position by an alliance with the Chalcidian League, which had again grown up round the important city of Olynthus.

The revolt of the Persian satraps spread and prospered for some years, till it extended over the whole of the west of the empire. It finally only collapsed through treachery. Orontes of Armenia turned traitor, Datames was murdered, and the revolt came to an end (about 359). Egypt, however, continued to hold out.

In 357 came the dissolution that had been long

threatening the Athenian Sea League. Supported by Mausolus, prince of Caria, Rhodes, Cos and Chios rebelled against Athens. The Athenian fleet was defeated at Embata near Chios, and, in 356, Athens was compelled to recognize the independence of the rebels. We find the older and more reputable statesmen of Athens, Iphicrates and Timotheus, falling out of favour, and *condottieri*, such as Chares, taking their place. There was an end to all real Athenian power. Euboea returned to her allegiance to Thebes: Lesbos revolted in 350, and such a success as the storming of Sestus in 353 was rendered disgraceful by the brutality with which it was exploited.

SECTION 10. SICILY AFTER THE DEATH OF DIONYSIUS I

Meanwhile, the west of the Greek world had been suffering from evils similar to those that had harried Greece itself. In 368 Carthage again attacked Dionysius, and the war was still raging with doubtful issue when Dionysius II, who succeeded his father without opposition, at once concluded peace on the basis of the *status quo*. Dionysius the younger was a well-meaning but weak-willed prince, easily subjected to the influence of stronger minds. The chief man at his court was Dion, son of Hipparinus. He was a serious and philosophic character, who for years had been a close friend of the philosopher Plato and cherished his favourite political theories. At his suggestion, Dionysius invited Plato to visit his court at Syracuse, and the philosopher, hoping to put his theories into practice, obeyed the call. Plato's plan was to start by educating the young prince, and then to set him to introduce the ideal constitution. But Dionysius soon wearied of the restraints set on him; at the same time he grew suspicious of Dion and sent him into banishment. Plato stayed for some time longer at court and was finally sent



Mausolus

away in all friendship. In 361 Plato returned to Syracuse but was again dismissed in 360. Meanwhile Dionysius had confiscated Dion's property and given away his wife, Arete, in marriage to another man. Though unwilling to submit to personal discipline, he was still devoted to Plato's theories and avowed himself a lover of philosophy and liberal politics. But Dion, an exile and the victim of bitter personal wrongs, was not disposed to suffer in silence. In 357 he landed at Heraclea Minoa, entered Syracuse unopposed, and, with his brother Megacles, was elected general; Dionysius, having lost the city, still held the island of Ortygia. Dion was a man of noble character and high ideals; but, to realize his liberal plans, he determined to win absolute power, and this brought him unpopularity. He was driven from Syracuse to Leontini, and a certain Heraclides was elected to be head of a board of 25 generals. The new government was lamentably weak, and the mercenaries of Dionysius overran the city until Dion returned and delivered Syracuse, and was reappointed general. In 354 the island fortress of Ortygia surrendered to him. But he was unable to follow his natural generous instincts. Heraclides refused to be reconciled, and Dion felt himself obliged to put him to death. A plot was now formed against Dion by Callippus, a pupil of Plato, and he was murdered in 353. Callippus became tyrant, only to fall in 352; Hipparinus, son of Dionysius I and half-brother of Dionysius II, followed him, and was succeeded by his brother Nysaeus. But Syracuse could find no rest or settlement, and in 346 Dionysius returned and reoccupied the city. Locri revolted against him, the Bruttians fell upon the Greek cities, and the empire of Dionysius I collapsed in ruins. Plato had rightly forecasted that Syracuse was driving straight to destruction, unless she could alter her course; unfortunately the great theorist had been unable to avert the disaster by realizing his ideals in action.

SECTION II. THE SACRED WAR. THEBES AND PHOCIS. GROWTH OF PHILIP

Thebes, although she had lost her hegemony after the death of Epaminondas, was still the chief power in central Greece. She had an ancient feud with the Phocians, and used her influence in the Delphic Amphictyony to get fines imposed on a number of wealthy Phocians. The Phocians refused to submit to this treatment. Led by Philomelus and Onomarchus they took up arms and captured Delphi; Sparta, willing by any means to weaken Thebes, entered into alliance with them; Athens, too, joined them, and the hostile Locrians were defeated. A long and wasteful war now began between Thebes and Phocis, which lasted down to 346 and kept the chief military powers of Greece unprofitably occupied, while Philip continued to strengthen his power in the north. The Thebans were in themselves the stronger power; but the Phocians held the temple treasures of Delphi, and, as they had no scruples about drawing on them for their own uses, could command the services of a strong mercenary force which quite counteracted the natural Theban superiority. The Phocians defeated the Locrians and Thessalians, but were beaten by the Thebans at Neon. Philomelus died and his power fell to Onomarchus and Phayllus. These two men made themselves absolute masters in Phocis and established a reign of terror there. But they were able generals and fought with success against the Thessalians. When the latter called in Philip of Macedon to their aid, Onomarchus defeated him in two great battles and compelled him to retire, and followed up these successes with victories in Boeotia.

We must now turn our eyes northward to observe the growth of the great power which was so soon to dominate the whole Greek world. The question has been frequently

discussed of late, as it was even in ancient times, whether the Macedonians were a Greek people. There can be little doubt that they were, although there was no doubt a strong admixture of Thracian and Paeonian blood. The decisive point is that the Macedonians spoke a Greek dialect and that it was an independent dialect—not one borrowed from the Greek cities of the coast. Macedon was a wooded country, with no large cities and a population living in primitive fashion on the land. The people were a sound and vigorous stock and had all the makings of a fine military force. The old heroic monarchy still survived; the king could trust his people's loyalty, he was absolute ruler, and need acknowledge no check save that of tradition. Next to him came the body of nobles; there was no middle class, to bridge the gap between them and the peasants. Archelaus had been the first to introduce modern culture into Macedon. After his death, the country was torn by civil strife and it was not until the strong hand of Philip grasped the reins, that the arrested development could continue. We have already seen how Philip assumed the throne, disposed of his early difficulties and outwitted Athens. His first attempt at interference in the affairs of Greece was, as we saw above, unsuccessful. In 352, however, he again took the field against Phocis. Onomarchus fell in battle against him and Pherae surrendered. It seemed probable that he would push even further south, but Athens and Sparta sent a corps to assist Phayllus and the Phocians, and Philip could not get through the pass of Thermopylae. Sparta could spare little thought for affairs abroad, for she and her Peloponnesian allies were engaged in a long and wearisome struggle with Megalopolis. At Athens the able finance minister Eubulus was in power from 354 to 346, and by his wise and cautious administration he restored order into the Athenian finances. His policy was one of caution; Athens, to his mind, was not strong enough

to venture on foreign expeditions and must play a quiet game. She made, however, an alliance with Orontes, satrap of Ionia and Aeolis, then in revolt against Persia (349 to 348) and recovered Mytilene. Another ally of hers was king Cersobleptes of Thrace. Philip, meaning to secure the whole Thracian coast, made war on him, but was compelled by illness to retire. For some years he had been the ally of the Olynthian League. But that power stood in the way of his future schemes, and a breach was bound to come as soon as Philip saw his chance. In 349 he declared war on Olynthus; the city appealed to Athens, and the Athenians, seeing the danger, sent a relief force. But the help sent was inadequate, and, to complicate matters, Eretria revolted (348). Chalcis and Oreus followed the lead, and, although the Athenian general Phocion gained a victory at Tamynae, the island, with the exception of Carystus, was lost. Meanwhile Philip had a free hand against Olynthus. The league fought bravely, but Philip was too strong and in 348 Olynthus fell. Philip was resolved that no strong power should ever arise again in Chalcidice to trouble him. He broke up the league and destroyed, we hear, a great number of Chalcidian cities. A general desire for rest now prevailed, and in 346 Athens concluded a peace with Philip, from which Phocis was excluded. Later in the same year a new embassy was sent to the Macedonian court to settle further details. Philip either was, or pretended to be, anxious to arrive at a close understanding with Athens, and Aeschines, who represented the Athenian peace party, was anxious to close with him. Demosthenes, however, who was also on the embassy, did his best to block the scheme. The embassy came home empty-handed, and Demosthenes, on his return, denounced his fellow ambassadors but failed to secure their conviction. This man, the greatest orator of ancient times, had for some years been active in Athens as a political

speaker. He started as an opposition leader ; he was not in harmony with the pacific views of the leading statesmen and could not forget the great days when Athens had been the chief power in Greece. He saw, earlier than most people, the extraordinary ability and ambition of Philip, and decided that it was the part of Athens to oppose and check his growth. His policy has come in for much severe criticism of late. Scholars have pointed out that Athens was no longer the great power that she had once been, that Philip was always anxious for her friendship and willing to treat her with consideration, and that it was simply the obstinacy of Demosthenes that rendered a friendly understanding impossible. We must admit that, considering the state of Athens as she then was, a policy of deliberate moderation was perhaps the wisest course. But we can hardly blame the patriot for taking rather too high a view of his nation's destiny ; and it must not be forgotten that Philip's friendship for Athens was not disinterested and could not be relied on, if ever he found himself able to dispense with her help. The evil was, that of the two policies, the peaceful and the warlike, neither was resolutely adopted and prosecuted, until it was too late. For this, however, we can hardly blame Demosthenes. Phocis had been excluded from the peace, and Phalaecus, on whom the command had devolved, saw no choice but to submit to Philip (346). Athens sent no aid, and Thebes, by sending an army to co-operate with him, shared in his triumph. Phocis was severely punished. Her votes in the Amphictyonic Council were transferred to Philip and she was sentenced to pay back, in annual instalments, the sacred treasures which she had misappropriated to her use. Philip appeared with great pomp at the Pythian festival, and Athens, after refusing at first to send a legation, was compelled to climb down. So far, Philip had gained a complete diplomatic and military success. His policy, depending solely on his

own will, was too able for the divided counsels of the Athenians.

SECTION 12. BREACH BETWEEN ATHENS AND PHILIP. THE FINAL STRUGGLE

We have now to study the last struggles of the Greeks against the hegemony of Philip and the final realization of Greek unity under his command. The ideal of the political oneness of the Greek world was one that had been steadily growing for years. The Greeks had long felt their common brotherhood, in contrast to the surrounding barbarians, and the able political writer Isocrates never wearied of preaching the doctrine to his hearers. Greece was wasting her powers in suicidal wars. Why should she not unite all her forces and direct them towards a national war against the traditional enemy, Persia? Persia's military inferiority had long been recognized. The empire had now lost its former vigour and cohesion and could hardly be expected to withstand a vigorous attack. With the conquest of Persia, new vistas, unlimited in promise, opened up for the Greek race. Agesilaus had dreamt of undertaking this war, with Sparta as national leader of the Greeks. Jason of Pherae, we are told, had had similar schemes in view. The realization of the ideal was reserved for Philip, the king of that outlying part of the Greek world which many Greeks had always considered as at least semi-barbarous. We cannot regret his success; but we can find some excuses for the narrow-minded patriots who could not adjust their ideas to the new conditions that had so suddenly arisen. Philip now pushed on his plans fast. He was chosen "archon" for life of the Thessalian League and began to develop his fleet. The enemies of Sparta in the Peloponnese also allied themselves with him. At Athens, the conflict of parties waxed ever hotter. In 346 or 345

Aeschines made a successful attack on Timarchus, a friend of Demosthenes. In 343 Philocrates, a friend of Aeschines, was driven into exile, and in 343 Demosthenes himself attacked Aeschines for his share in the embassy of 346 and narrowly failed of success. In 343 or 342 Philip expelled Arybbas, son-in-law of the late king Neoptolemus of Epirus, and set up the king's son Alexander in his place, and made an alliance with Aetolia. In Euboea, too, he gained a following. The fear of him, however, was spreading in Greece. Corinth and Megara made alliances with Sparta, and so too did Argos, Megalopolis and Messene—but these latter states still kept their earlier alliance with Philip. Philip turned next against Thrace; he dethroned king Cersobleptes and made the whole land a Macedonian province. Byzantium was his next goal. Demosthenes was anxious to precipitate a conflict, and, when the Athenian captain Diopeithes attacked Cardia, an ally of Philip, he persuaded the people to ignore Philip's protests and openly declared his war-policy in the great Third Philippic (341). Byzantium and Abydus joined Athens. Athens sent an embassy to the Persian court, and recovered Oreus and Eretria from Philip's power. Demosthenes was, at last, victorious in her councils and succeeded in silencing all opposition. In the summer of 340 Philip was repulsed at Perinthus, and an Athenian fleet sailed to assist Byzantium against him. Philip acknowledged the repulse and turned aside to fight the tribes northward on the Danube. Demosthenes was appointed "*ἐπιστάτης τοῦ ναυτικοῦ*" at Athens; he carried important naval reforms and succeeded in procuring the devotion of the Theoric fund—to which all state surpluses were paid and which contributed to the celebrations of the public festivals—to the military chest. War had not yet broken out between Philip and Athens but it was inevitable, and it seems that Philip sought to hasten it on and, at the same

time, to embroil the two powers which, if united, might cause him serious trouble—Athens and Thebes. The Amphissian Locrians were his agents. They proposed at the Amphictyonic Council to inflict a fine on Athens for having set up a certain obnoxious dedication. Aeschines, who was representing Athens, turned the charge by a very neat trick. He charged the Locrians, in their turn, with having cultivated sacred ground. The council was carried away by his eloquence and declared a Holy War against Locris. Here was yet another opportunity for Athens to throw aside her opposition and co-operate with Philip. But Demosthenes was committed to the opposite policy. He persuaded the Athenians to take no part in the attack on Locris, and Thebes, too, held back. In 339 therefore the Amphictyony called in Philip to be its general. Philip marched in haste to Elatea and, hoping still to disunite his opponents, made the most tempting offers to the Thebans. But here Demosthenes won the crowning triumph of his career. He represented to Thebes the dangerous power of Philip and secured her alliance for Athens. Philip had no choice but to fight it out with the allies. At first, he met with failure; but, rallying in his usual way, he defeated the Locrians at Amphissa, executed judgement on them, and prepared to settle with Athens and Thebes. The decisive battle was fought in August, 338, at Chaeronea in Boeotia. The Thebans, in particular, fought with heroic resolution, but Philip and his son Alexander, who now appears for the first time in history, with a veteran army at their backs, gained a decisive victory. Thebes had no choice but to submit, and paid dearly for her opposition. The Boeotian League was dissolved and a garrison was placed in Thebes itself. Athens, thanks to her sea-power, which was still intact, secured milder terms. She had to surrender the Thracian Chersonese and enter the Greek league, which Philip now formed with a view to a campaign against



Demosthenes

Persia ; but she retained her land possessions and received back her prisoners. A short campaign broke the resistance of Sparta. A "*κοινὸν συνέδριον τῶν Ἑλλήνων*" was instituted at Corinth and elected Philip general against Persia. Philip had triumphed over all obstacles ; the first part of his great work was triumphantly completed.

SECTION 13. TIMOLEON IN SICILY

At Syracuse we saw Dionysius restored to power in 346. He did not reign unquestioned for long. Hicetas, at the head of the Syracusan exiles in Leontini, appealed to Corinth for help against the tyrant, and Timoleon, a man of character and ability, was sent out with a small force. In earlier life Timoleon had assisted at the murder of his own brother, who had attempted to make himself tyrant of Corinth, and had since then lived a retired life ; the task now entrusted to him was to decide, by his success or failure, whether the act had been noble or base. Carthage prepared to take a hand against Timoleon, and Hicetas, after capturing Syracuse and confining Dionysius to the island, turned and supported the foreign foe. Timoleon, however, defeated Hicetas ; Dionysius surrendered Ortygia to him and retired into private life at Corinth. Hicetas still held the city ; but he quarrelled with Carthage, and his allies left him in the lurch. He was forced to flee, and Timoleon occupied Syracuse ; the first part of his task was achieved. Hicetas now made terms with Timoleon ; he was recognized by him as tyrant of Leontini and took part with him in the great national war that ensued. The Greek cities were so weak and disunited that Carthage hoped to be able to sweep the Hellenic element entirely out of Sicily. But here again Timoleon was the man for the task. He completely defeated the Carthaginians on the river Crimisus (340 or 339) and used his success to the full.

He compelled Carthage to sue for peace, expelled the tyrants from the cities, and established moderate and reasonable constitutions ; a Greek league, under the presidency of Syracuse, was formed to guard against Carthaginian aggression. His work accomplished, Timoleon laid down his power and settled as a private citizen, universally honoured and respected, at Syracuse, where he lived to a great age. He is, perhaps, the most attractive of all Greek statesmen, a man whose work was one of blessing and healing and was not marred by any admixture of base personal ambition. He could not give Sicily a settled peace, but he could and did give it rest and quiet for a long term of years ; and he left behind him a noble and gracious memory.

The Greeks of Italy were being sorely pressed by the hardy tribes of the Lucanians and Bruttians, and, in despair, Tarentum called in king Archidamus of Sparta to command her armies (343). When he died in battle in 338, Alexander of Epirus was called in to continue his work. He won several great victories and gained the mastery of all southern Italy ; but his allies the Tarentines grew timorous and broke with him, and he fell in battle against the Lucanians in 331 or 330. Tarentum profited by his fall and reduced the Messapians to subjection ; the pressure of the barbarian tribes was already beginning to slacken.

CHAPTER V

FROM ALEXANDER THE GREAT TO THE APPEARANCE OF ROME IN THE EAST

SECTION I. MACEDON AND PERSIA. ACCESSION OF ALEXANDER

EGYPT had long defied the Persian power, but in 358 Artaxerxes Ochus, a prince of more than the ordinary vigour, ascended the throne, and some years later (c. 345) made a resolute attack and conquered the rebel province. In 338, however, Ochus was assassinated, and Darius Codomannus, who succeeded him after an interval of anarchy in 335, was too mild and weak a character for the work that awaited him. Persia had grown timid and hesitant, and failed to intervene in the affairs of Greece while interference might have profited her. In 337 the Hellenic Council, meeting at Corinth, resolved on war with Persia, and, early in 336, two of Philip's generals, Parmenio and Attalus, led 10,000 men into Asia Minor. But Philip was not destined to enter the Promised Land. His family life was a troublous one; Olympias, the mother of the crown-prince Alexander, was bitterly jealous of a younger rival, and, though a reconciliation was effected and sealed by the marriage of Alexander of Epirus, brother of Olympias, to a daughter of Philip, named Cleopatra, the feud was never wholly healed. In 336 Philip fell a victim to the attack of a private enemy, and there were not wanting those who—however unjustly—yet charged Alexander and Olympias with

responsibility for the crime. Alexander, however, was at once acknowledged as king in Macedon. But the Greeks knew little of the quality of the young prince, and dreamed of deliverance now that the terrible Philip was dead. Alexander soon dashed such hopes to the ground. He marched straight down through Thessaly, and opposition grew silent before him; he was at once elected general of the Greeks against Persia. A series of murders ensured his position at home; Attalus, the general, who was father of Olympias's rival, Cleopatra, was put to death. In 335 Alexander moved northward to settle with the Triballi and Illyrians. Persian envoys were about in Greece preaching revolt, and, in Alexander's absence, old hopes revived. Thebes actually broke out in revolt, but once again Alexander struck with decisive speed; he hurried southward, stormed Thebes and razed it to the ground, and compelled Athens to surrender all Theban refugees and to banish a number of obnoxious citizens.

SECTION 2. THE CONQUEST OF ASIA

In Asia Minor the Macedonians had at first been warmly welcomed and had made good progress. But, after the murder of Attalus, they lost ground, and Memnon, the able Persian commander, drove them back on the Hellespont. Early in 334 Alexander went himself to the war, taking with him 30,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry. Some of his generals voted for a waiting policy, but Alexander himself was self-confident and impatient. At the river Granicus, on the north slope of Mt Ida, he defeated the Persians, and this victory opened up to him the whole of Ionia and Caria. Ephesus, Sardis and Dascylium surrendered and Miletus was taken by storm; in the cities that came under his power, Alexander set

up democracies. The Persian fleet was still undefeated, and Memnon mustered an army to co-operate with it at Halicarnassus. But Alexander made no delay; he attacked and captured the city and subdued all Caria, and Lycia and Pisidia followed with their submission. Early in 333 Alexander, with his whole army, passed the Cilician gates and occupied Cilicia. For the time he could do nothing at sea, and Memnon controlled the Aegean. But this capable captain died and no worthy successor appeared. King Darius had by this time mustered his forces and appeared in north Syria. By a clever move he allowed Alexander to march past him and then took up a strong position in the rear of the Greek force. Alexander turned on his enemy and gained a complete victory at Issus. In the battle the Persians failed to make use of their great numerical superiority, and Alexander's tactics were far superior to theirs. The plan of battle was for the phalanx to hold the enemy's centre in play, while the magnificent Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry decided the issue. Darius now offered Alexander the whole of Asia Minor and Syria, if he would make peace. But Alexander would not be content with half-successes; he was determined to follow up Darius into the heart of his empire and conquer the East as he had conquered the West. But there was still work to be done before the initial successes could be accounted secure. The Greek fleet gained the mastery of the Aegean, and the Persian force broke up. Alexander himself turned to subdue Phoenicia. The great city of Tyre, alone, closed its gates to him and was only taken, after a long and desperate siege, in July 332. Moving on southwards, Alexander captured Gaza and advanced into Egypt. Persian rule had never been popular in that country, and Alexander was welcomed as a deliverer. He founded there the first and greatest of his cities, Alexandria, which to this day preserves its founder's name. In Phrygia,

meanwhile, the able general Antigonus defeated a Persian army and put an end to all resistance (332). Early in 331 Alexander marched inland through Mesopotamia to meet the new great army which Darius had mustered. The armies met at Arbela, near the site of Nineveh, and victory again crowned the smaller, but more mobile, army (September, 331). The victory was not too easily won, and, at one time, Alexander's centre and left wing were very hard pressed. All organized resistance now collapsed. The Persian army broke up, and the king himself fled eastward. Alexander moved on in triumph and entered, as conqueror, the great cities of the Persian East, Babylon, Susa and Persepolis. This last city was pillaged by his troops. After wintering in Persia, Alexander advanced in the spring of 330 into Media and took Ecbatana, while Darius fled before him into Bactria. Thus, in a few years, as the result of some three battles, the Persian Empire had collapsed before the first determined attack made upon it. In military training and equipment the Persian levies were no match for the Greeks; and the army that Alexander led was probably the first armed force that the world had yet seen. Alexander himself was a very great general. His chief fault was an excess of impetuosity which led him to expose his person to danger in an unwarrantable manner. It is probable, as some modern scholars suggest, that Parmenio was a sounder tactician and we need not deny his great share in Alexander's victories. The fact remains that Alexander possessed that element of dash and reasoned venturesomeness which distinguishes genius from talent; that he could trust himself and his men and could afford to play for more than safety.

Alexander had left Antipater to watch Greece during his absence. In 331, while Antipater was engaged in war with a Persian force in Thrace, Sparta took the opportunity of rebelling. Antipater hurried to the spot

and crushed the revolt in a battle at Megalopolis, after which Sparta submitted. The Greeks could not yet grasp the fact that the world had changed and that their small local feuds and ambitions were ceasing to be matters of importance in the world.


Alexander, as he conquered the Persian Empire, had preserved its organization in satrapies but had adopted the principle of appointing Macedonians as his satraps. After Arbela, he began to try another policy, setting up Persian satraps with Macedonian military commanders at their side. Great fortresses, such as Sardis, Memphis and Babylon, had their own commanders. The tribute remained much as before. Vast sums of treasure fell into Alexander's hands and were freely squandered; his chief financial minister, Harpalus, who fixed his seat in Babylon, contrived, as we shall see later, to misappropriate large amounts.

In the summer of 330 Alexander quitted Ecbatana, leaving Parmenio in command in Media, and hurried north-west on the line through Rhagae in pursuit of Darius. Bessus, the satrap of Bactria, who stood at the head of the last Persian resistance, deposed Darius and, hard pressed by Alexander, put him to death, and himself made his escape; the enemy, whom Alexander had sought in vain living, fell at last into his hands in death. The path of conquest now stood open, and Alexander rapidly subdued the regions of the southern Caspian and after them Aria, Drangiane and Arachosia. Signs of trouble between Alexander and his Macedonians began to appear. Alexander, having succeeded to the throne of the Great King, began to assume Oriental court pomp and ceremonial, and the Macedonians bitterly resented these alien ways. A conspiracy was formed against him by some of his officers, and, whether justly or not, Philotas, son of Parmenio, was accused of complicity when the plot was discovered. He

was condemned to death by the assembly of soldiers, and, immediately afterwards, Parmenio was executed on Alexander's orders. We cannot entirely acquit Alexander of a certain jealousy of his great general, which perhaps made him too ready to welcome suspicion; but it is possible that the severity was justified by the plea of self-defence. Early in 329 Alexander marched into Bactria; Bessus could make no stand against him and took to flight, but was taken, delivered up and put to death. Crossing the Oxus, Alexander pushed on to the Jaxartes, and was engaged in quelling the resistance of the natives until early in 327. He continued to forward his policy of adopting Oriental customs, and took the significant step of marrying Roxana, the daughter of a Bactrian noble. He also tried, but without success, to introduce the Persian custom of doing homage (*προσκύνησις*). A second conspiracy was discovered and ruthlessly suppressed. Alexander's character was not quite proof against the corrupting influence of too great success; he became more and more prone to fits of temper, and, in a drunken passion, killed Clitus, one of his closest friends. In the summer of 327 Alexander crossed the Paropamisus range, subdued the native tribes and pushed on across the Indus. There he found in the king of Taxila an ally against Porus, a native monarch who reigned over a considerable territory. Alexander gained a fine victory over Porus on the Hydaspes and compelled him to become his vassal. Not yet was Alexander weary of conquest; he longed to push further into the mysterious East and learn the truth about the unknown Indian peoples. But his soldiers were weary of campaigning and sighed for peace and home. Alexander dared not persist in face of their impatience and reluctantly prepared to return. Three Indian satrapies were formed, and a fleet was built on the Indus which sailed down to the sea and coasted along

the Persian Gulf. Part of the army was despatched westward through Arachosia and Carmania; with the rest Alexander marched into the dreary desert land of Gedrosia. After terrible losses through want and drought he finally arrived in Carmania in 325, whence he returned to Susa in the winter of 325-4. He found that his presence was badly needed. Many of his Persian governors had abused their trust and had to be replaced by Macedonians. Some of his Greek ministers, too, had been unfaithful. In particular, Harpalus, the treasurer, had been enriching himself unlawfully; on the news of Alexander's return, he fled with a large treasure from Babylon and made his way to Asia Minor, and so on to Greece. Alexander pursued his policy of uniting East and West under his rule and began to enrol Persians in the army. This unpopular step led to a dangerous mutiny, and Alexander, in the end, practically gave way, and enrolled the Persians in separate regiments. Following the example of their king great numbers of Macedonian officers took native wives. Many veterans were settled in the great military colonies, which Alexander planted at suitable places along his line of march; but 10,000 of them received their discharge and were despatched, richly rewarded, back to Greece. Alexander had won his world-empire—the task of organizing it still remained. As chief assistant he appointed a chiliarch—a sort of imperial vizier; the post was first held by Alexander's friend Hephaestion, but, after his death, it stood empty. Of great importance, too, was the "*ἀρχιγραμματεὺς*" or chief secretary, an able Greek named Eumenes. The enormous expenses of the government, for the army, court and other purposes, were amply covered by the great Persian treasures. Alexander had quickly absorbed Oriental ideas and made the definite attempt to attach divine honours to his person. The idea was familiar in the East, and he was naturally successful; even at Athens

he was accepted as the god Dionysus. This was a step of great historical importance ; it represents a definite invasion of the West by eastern ideas, and the idea of the divinity of a human being, once introduced, lived on in history and reappeared later in the form of the deification of the Roman emperors. In 323 Alexander died at Babylon, on the eve of a great expedition against Arabia. His early death deprives us of the chance of passing a fair judgement on his statesmanship. Some modern scholars see in him simply a supreme type of Fortune's favourite—the man who has greatness thrust upon him—and deny him any exceptional ability either as general or as statesman. On his generalship we may reasonably accept the general verdict of antiquity, which placed him in the very first rank of ancient commanders. Of his statesmanship it is harder to judge. We can see in him a clearly-conceived policy that aimed at blending East and West in one harmonious whole. That the policy failed we know. Whether it might have succeeded, had he lived another twenty years, we cannot say. We can only suspend judgement, while freely acknowledging that at least Alexander was a man capable of forming plans on the heroic scale. Much of his work began to decay almost immediately after he died. His further eastern conquests were not effectively held for long ; it was a comparatively easy matter for a Macedonian army to conquer undisciplined tribes ; it was a very different task to impose on them a lasting Greek civilization. But, even in regions where the Greeks soon lost their political supremacy, Greek influence survived, and to Alexander belongs the undoubted honour of having opened up Asia to Greek civilization. Of the struggle for the rule in the empire and of the dissensions in which that great framework broke down, we shall have soon to speak. We must first return to Greece, to see what had been happening there while Alexander was conquering Asia.



Alexander the Great

SECTION 3. ATHENS AND AETOLIA

Antipater continued to rule for Alexander in Macedon. In 323 he sent his governor in Thrace to attack the barbarian tribes, but the Macedonians suffered a terrible defeat (325) and Thrace, under a native prince Seuthes, revolted. In Greece the only two powers of any account were Athens and Aetolia. The Aetolian League was beginning, for the first time, to play an important rôle in politics. Philip had given it Naupactus and in 329 it conquered Oeniadae. The Aetolians were a rough and half-barbarous military people, whom their enemies stigmatized as little better than pirates and robbers; but, in the hard times that were coming, they were better fitted to survive than milder and more humane powers. Athens enjoyed a time of unambitious prosperity. From 338 to 326 the able statesman Lysurgus controlled the finances in admirable style. The chief statesmen were Demades, Demosthenes and the blunt and honest Phocion. Athens followed a policy of peace, but still refused to co-operate heartily with Alexander and professed neutrality in the war with Persia. Demosthenes, despite the failure of his policy, retained his influence, and in 330, at the great trial of strength with his enemy Aeschines, which gave rise to the two great speeches of the rivals on the "Crown," he carried the day, and Aeschines went into banishment. At the Olympian festival of 324 a decree of Alexander was read aloud, in which he called upon all Greek states to receive back their exiles. Athens and Aetolia alone made difficulties. At about the same time Harpalus appeared in Greece and was admitted, but without his troops, into Athens. He soon left the city, rejoined his troops at Cape Taenarum and went to Crete, where he met his death. But part of his treasure had been left at Athens, and it was discovered that 350 talents were not forthcoming. An inquiry was made, and Demades,

Demosthenes and others were convicted of having taken bribes and were sent into banishment. But the news of Alexander's death produced a sudden reaction. Athens decided to fight for freedom; Aetolia, Phocis and Locris joined her, and Leosthenes, a mercenary captain at Taenarum, placed 10,000 men at her disposal. The war began well; the Macedonians were defeated in Boeotia and again at Thermopylae, and Antipater was compelled to throw himself into the fortress of Lamia. But Leonnatus brought up reinforcements from Asia, and, after an indecisive battle, Antipater was free to retire to Macedon. Fresh reinforcements arrived, and in August, 322, the Greek allies were defeated at Crannon. Resistance then broke down. Athens was compelled to admit a Macedonian garrison, pay an indemnity, receive back exiles and limit her citizenship on a property qualification. Demades, Phocion and Demetrius of Phalerum came into power, as statesmen approved of by the conquerors. Demosthenes, who had been recalled from exile, was put to death, thus dying, as he would have chosen to die, a martyr to his life-long faith. Aetolia alone remained unsubdued; Antipater was about to take the field against her, when news from Asia distracted his attention.

SECTION 4. STRUGGLES FOR POWER AMONG ALEXANDER'S GENERALS

In Asia, the generals of the dead Alexander were left with a difficult problem to face. Who was to fill the vacant throne? Alexander had left no heir, but his wife Roxana was expected in a few months to give birth to a child. A provisional government was, therefore, instituted to rule until the birth of the son, if son it should be. Perdikkas was chiliarch, with supreme command of the army, and other officers obtained various provinces. But the troops wanted a king without delay, and Philip Arrhidaeus, the weak-minded

half-brother of Alexander, was therefore proclaimed. Roxana soon gave birth to a son and the infant was proclaimed king beside Philip Arrhidaeus. Perdikkas continued to be chiliarch and protector of the kingdom, and Seleucus, beside him, held a high military position. Ptolemy obtained Egypt, Lysimachus Thrace, Leonnatus Hellespontine Phrygia, Antigonus Phrygia, Eumenes Cappadocia and the neighbouring provinces, and Peithon Media. Antipater continued to hold Macedonia, but received Craterus as an associate in his power. But trouble soon arose, for jealousies among the generals were rife, and the women of the royal family complicated matters by insisting on playing a part. Olympias offered her daughter Cleopatra in marriage to Perdikkas, and Eurydice, a grand-daughter of Philip, married Philip Arrhidaeus. The trouble began when Perdikkas, in consequence of a private feud, drove Antigonus from Phrygia. Antigonus fled to Antipater, who, with Craterus, welcomed him, and Ptolemy and Lysimachus joined the league against Perdikkas. Perdikkas intended to marry Cleopatra and escort Alexander's body to Macedon and bury it at Aegae. But his intended bride refused him; and Philip Arrhidaeus carried off the royal corpse to Egypt, where Ptolemy gave it burial at Memphis. Ptolemy was one of the ablest of Alexander's many able marshals; he had deliberately chosen Egypt for his share because of its great natural advantages, and already in 322 his general, Ophellus, had subdued Cyrene. Perdikkas first turned against Ptolemy (early in 321). But the attempt ended in failure; Perdikkas was defeated in battle and was murdered by his own troops. Meanwhile Eumenes, acting for Perdikkas, successfully defended himself against the attacks of Antipater, Craterus and Neoptolemus, satrap of Armenia. The *status quo* had been upset and a new organization of the empire was required. Ptolemy, with his wonted caution, declined the chief place,

and Antipater became regent. Antigonus was appointed commander-in-chief and Cassander chiliarch (320). Seleucus, of whom we shall hear more later, took possession of Babylonia. Eumenes, the friend of Perdiccas, was left without support. Brave and skilful as he was, the odds were too heavy for him, and Antigonus defeated him and besieged him in Nora in Cappadocia. Antipater restored the authority of Macedon in Greece, repelling the Aetolians from Thessaly and compelling Athens to put Demades to death. In 319 Antipater died and left the regency to Polysperchon. The new regent was too weak for his post and quarrelled with Antigonus, to whose side Cassander, son of Antipater, deserted. Polysperchon, therefore, sought support in the Greek democracies and cultivated the friendship of the old queen Olympias, and of Eumenes. ~~In Athens, he restored the democracy, and the aged Phocion fell a victim to the reaction (318); but, soon afterwards, Cassander occupied the city and appointed the philosopher Demetrius of Phalerum his representative at the head of a decidedly oligarchic régime.~~ Cassander then went to Macedon, drove out Polysperchon and became imperial regent. Eumenes, meanwhile, had raised a large army and marched into Phoenicia, but things looked bad for his cause when Ptolemy and Lysimachus joined the league against him. Polysperchon and Olympias returned from Epirus to Macedon and captured and put to death Philip Arrhidæus and Eurydice. But Cassander returned from the Peloponnese, subdued his enemies in Macedon, and put Olympias to death (316). Eumenes maintained a gallant resistance to his enemies during 317 in Susiana and Parætacene. But finally he was defeated and was surrendered by his own troops to Antigonus in Persia (316). Antigonus conceived the plan of securing all the fruits of victory for himself. Peithon and Seleucus had been his allies; but he put the former to death, the latter had to

flee, and Babylon fell into his hands. Antigonus went into winter-quarters in Cilicia (316); for the moment he was supreme in Asia. But the mere fact of his success at once raised up enemies against him, and Ptolemy, Lysimachus and Cassander combined to oppose him. Civil war broke out and Antigonus was repulsed in an attack on Egypt. From 316 to 312 the war raged with varying issue. Polysperchon joined Antigonus, only to desert before long to Cassander. In 312 Ptolemy gained a great victory in Syria, only to be repulsed again by Antigonus. In the same year Seleucus established himself in Babylon, and from this date his successors reckoned their era. In Greece, meanwhile, success swayed to and fro between the parties. Finally, in 312, a fresh understanding was arrived at. Till the young Alexander came of age, Ptolemy was to hold Egypt, Antigonus Asia, Lysimachus Thrace, Cassander Macedon; Greece was left nominally independent. Seleucus held the eastern provinces, but it seems doubtful whether he was actually included in the peace. The war of the marshals thus ended in the virtual dissolution of the empire; the idea of an imperial unity, to be restored at a future date, was carefully kept up, but probably no one believed that it would ever be realized.

The kings—for such they now virtually were—directed themselves to strengthening their hold on their respective possessions. By about 308 we find Ptolemy holding Egypt, Cyrene, Cyprus, Corinth and some islands. Ophellas in Cyrene had revolted against him, but in 309 Ptolemy recovered the land. In 309 he had supported Polemaeus a nephew of Antigonus, who rebelled against his uncle in Cilicia; but in 308, he let Polemaeus fall, made peace with Antigonus and, sailing to Greece, conquered Corinth, Sicyon and Megara. But he soon met with resistance and made peace with Cassander. Cassander put Roxana and her young son Alexander to death in 310. In 309 Polysperchon

supported Heracles, an illegitimate son of Alexander, against Cassander, but soon made terms with him and put his pretender to death. Lysimachus spent these years in consolidating his empire in Thrace; only Byzantium maintained her independence against him. Seleucus made an expedition into the Far East, where Sandracottus had founded a new empire in India; but events in the West demanded his presence and he retired, surrendering the Indian province and receiving in his turn 500 elephants (304). Antigonus was as restless and ambitious as ever.¹ In 307 he resolved on a bold stroke against Cassander. His son Demetrius, surnamed Poliorcetes¹, appeared suddenly in Peiraeus (June, 307), expelled the Macedonian garrison and restored the democracy. Cassander's *protégé*, Demetrius of Phalerum, who had ruled with wisdom for ten years, fell, and the Athenians welcomed Demetrius as a liberator and heaped honours on him and his father. Cassander suffered yet another rebuff; the Epirotes rose against his friend Alcetas, and made the young prince Pyrrhus king. Antigonus's successes once more earned him the hostility of Ptolemy, who counted it his task to maintain a balance of power. Demetrius sailed for Cyprus and defeated Ptolemy's fleet in a great battle, and Salamis too fell into his hands. But in 306 Antigonus was repulsed in a grand attack on Egypt. At about this time Antigonus, Ptolemy, Lysimachus and Cassander all assumed the title of king. Rhodes refused to renounce her friendship with Egypt, and Demetrius undertook an attack on the city. In a siege, conducted with great skill and resolution on both sides, the Rhodians made good their defence (c. 306-304). Finally they made a nominal submission, but still refused to break off friendly relations with Egypt. In Greece, Athens, allied with Aetolia, beat off an attack of Cassander (306). But Polysperchon recovered the Peloponnesus, and early in 304 Cassander was in a

¹ From his great siege of Rhodes, see below on this page.

position to attempt the siege of Athens. Late in the same year Demetrius returned to Greece, and Cassander retired before him behind Thermopylae. In 303 Demetrius won all the Peloponnese, except Messene and perhaps Elis, and the Greeks, meeting again in council at Corinth, appointed Demetrius their general. Antigonus was resolved to wrest all Greece from Cassander; but his dangerous growth in strength united the other rivals, Ptolemy, Lysimachus, Seleucus and Cassander in a new league against him. Lysimachus invaded Asia, and most of the north-west fell into his hands. Ptolemy attacked Syria, Seleucus joined the allies for a campaign in Phrygia, and Demetrius, who was opposing Cassander in Thessaly, was recalled to assist his father. In a great battle at Ipsus in Phrygia Magna the old Antigonus fell, and the war was decided.

SECTION 5. SELEUCUS, LYSIMACHUS AND DEMETRIUS

Seleucus obtained the lion's share of the spoils—Syria and Asia Minor as far north as Phrygia—while Lysimachus received the rest of Antigonus's possessions. In Greece the Athenians and their allies repulsed Cassander at Elatea. Demetrius, with his strong fleet, was still a force to be reckoned with, and Seleucus, fearing the jealousy of his former allies, made terms with him and took his daughter Stratonice in marriage. In Greece, however, Demetrius lost ground; for Athens, and then Boeotia and Phocis, made peace with Ptolemy and Lysimachus. Demetrius's alliance with Seleucus was short-lived; by 299 he had broken off this connexion and formed a new one with Ptolemy, marrying his daughter Ptolemais; Pyrrhus of Epirus went to Egypt as a hostage for Demetrius. In 297 Cassander died, and his eldest son Philip did not long survive him; the kingdom then fell to his sons, Antipater and Alexander, under the guardianship of their mother Thessalonica.

Demetrius, returning to Greece in 295, attacked Athens, where a certain Lachares had made himself tyrant, and took the city in 294. But Seleucus and Ptolemy had by now made peace again, and Ptolemy sent Pyrrhus back to Epirus, where he soon made himself king. In 294 Demetrius expelled the family of Cassander and was received as king in Macedon; he also formed an alliance, which lasted only a few years, with Pyrrhus. Demetrius was engaged in wars in Greece from 293 to 291. In 290 Pyrrhus broke with him and attacked Macedon, but was repulsed and made peace (289). In 288 a new league was formed against Demetrius by Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus and Pyrrhus. The two last-named kings attacked Macedon; Demetrius's army deserted him and he was compelled to flee. Pyrrhus and Lysimachus divided the spoils, and Demetrius had nothing left him beyond his possessions in Greece. In 288 Athens, under Olympiodorus, revolted against him, and when in 287 Demetrius attacked the city, Pyrrhus raised the siege. Demetrius then went to Asia, was driven from Lydia by Lysimachus, and, turning against Seleucus, fell into his power. He finally died in captivity at Apamea, bringing to a close a career distinguished at once by immense energy and dash and striking political incompetence. Demetrius's son Antigonus had, meanwhile, striven to keep his father's hold on Greece. Finally he made peace with Pyrrhus. About 285 or 284 Lysimachus broke with Pyrrhus and drove him from Macedon; he was himself recognized as king in that country and in Thessaly. There were now only three powerful sovereigns left—Lysimachus, Seleucus and Ptolemy. Ptolemy had abandoned his wife Eurydice for Berenice, and abdicated in 285 in favour of her son, Ptolemy II. He died in 283. Eurydice and her son, Ptolemy Ceraunus, fled first to Lysimachus and then to Seleucus. The two great potentates, Lysimachus and Seleucus, now quarrelled, and

Seleucus defeated and killed his rival in a battle in Hellespontine Phrygia (281). A league was formed against the conqueror by Byzantium and other cities and Mithradates of Cappadocia on Pontus, and Seleucus's troops were defeated by the latter. In 281 Seleucus marched to take possession of Lysimachus's European possessions. But at Lysimachia his *protégé*, Ptolemy Ceraunus, murdered him, and made terms with his own half-brother, Ptolemy II of Egypt. For the time he was entirely successful; he defeated Antigonus at sea and compelled him to recognize his position, and, to dispose of a dangerous rival, he did all he could to encourage Pyrrhus in his western adventure¹. Ptolemy II quarrelled with his wife Arsinoe, and she left him and fled to Samothrace.

SECTION 6. THE NEW AGE OF GREEK LIFE

We have now reached the end of the violent period of transition from the empire of Alexander to a new state-system of powerful monarchies. The interplay of so many conflicting interests and the instability of political relationships make the history of the period infinitely difficult to grasp. We have attempted above to summarize as clearly as possible the actual political events. It will help to make the picture clearer if we now devote a little attention to a general consideration of the new aspect of the Greek world.

Let us first glance at the chief actors in the political drama. The age was one in which the individual, rather than the state, plays the leading part. Among all the successors of Alexander there was perhaps none of outstanding ability; but there was certainly an abundant supply of vigorous and energetic personalities. Antipater, who died in 319 at the age of 80, was an able, if prosaic, character, a Macedonian of the old school. Antigonus, who

¹ See below, History of Rome, pp. 269, 270.

died in 301 aged 84, was a better organizer than general. He played a great part in the world for years and only fell because he could not content himself with anything short of supremacy. His son Demetrius, whose relations with his father were throughout marked by charming loyalty and devotion, might stand for a type of his age—a rash and restless adventurer, generous but undisciplined, and chased on from project to project by a tireless ambition. Ptolemy, who died in 283 at the age of 83, was a brave, vigorous and, above all, shrewd man. He knew better than most of his peers how to suit his aims to practical requirements and succeeded in holding and consolidating the kingdom he had chosen. Lysimachus, who died in 281 aged 80, was a good general and administrator. He was notorious as a miser, and, at least in his later years, was narrow-minded, suspicious and base. Seleucus, who died in the same year at the age of 72, was a good general and governor, and, though he died in the moment of his triumph, left behind him an established empire. Eumenes, who died in 316 aged 45, wins our sympathy by his devotion to the cause of the unity of the empire; but he was not a Macedonian, and this drawback condemned him to failure. Cassander was a hard and obstinate character. Ptolemy Ceraunus was one of the worst scoundrels of an age rich in the type. His own father, knowing his character all too well, deliberately passed him over in favour of his younger half-brother. A marked feature of the time was the large part played by women in politics; we need only mention Olympias, Cynane, Eurydice and Arsinoe. It was a time of ruthless egoism, of lurid crimes of treachery and murder, of marriage alliances made in haste and broken as hastily, and of tragic family feuds. For the time, the only political standard was the self-interest of the individual.

Let us now pass from the individual to the state. The East had been opened up to the Greeks, and the new rulers

showed a true sense of their responsibility by sowing their possessions with new Greek cities. Antigonus and Seleucus were particularly prominent in this respect. These cities formed a link of union for the new empires, lying, as it were, like islands in a sea of barbarism. The rulers of Pergamum and the kings of Bithynia (Zipoetas, 327-279, and his son Nicomedes) pursued a similar policy.

Macedon, in spite of all the exhaustion caused by constant war, was still a powerful, though not a wealthy, kingdom. Her influence was strong in Thrace and Greece, and her devotion to monarchical government was complete. Thrace, after the death of Lysimachus, ceased to be an independent kingdom. Epirus, united under one king, could rival Macedon in strength. Thessaly, though autonomous, was practically subordinate to Macedonian home politics. After about 307 Athens lost something of her commercial prosperity, and Corinth succeeded her as the first trading city of Greece. Other important cities at this time were Chalcis, Demetrias in Thessaly and another Demetrias, built by Demetrius near Sicyon. Aetolia was strong in the Amphictyonic Council and held Thermopylae. Acarnania and Thebes inclined to Macedon; and Macedonian influence was also strong in Corinth, Sicyon, Messene, Elis, Argos and Arcadia, while Sparta held aloof. But central Greece was no longer the centre of the Greek world. Prosperity shifted towards the east, and Asia Minor, with its cities of Ephesus, Smyrna and Pergamum, was probably the most prosperous part of the world.

The Seleucids claimed to rule over the Asiatic portion of Alexander's empire. But the far eastern provinces were soon lost, and Bactria and other nearer provinces were only insecurely held; Seleucus, in transferring his capital from Babylon to Antioch, recognized the fact that Syria was the true centre of his empire. The Seleucids claimed western Asia Minor but were never entirely able to make that

claim good. The cities of the Asia Minor coast were, in theory, autonomous, but naturally fell from time to time under the dominating influence of one or other of the great powers. Antioch and Seleucia on the Tigris were two of the great cities of the world. The Greek cities of Pontus were on the decline, and suffered more and more from the encroachment of their neighbours. Egypt possessed great natural advantages. It was easily defensible, naturally wealthy, and owned an industrious and docile people. The Ptolemies made few changes in civil government and politics. A mercenary army sustained their power, which they sought to popularize by showing consideration for Egyptian sentiment and, in particular, for the priestly caste. Egypt was a great commercial and trading power and its resources were exploited to the full by the Ptolemies, who ran their empire as a great landed estate. Abroad, Egypt held Cyrene, Cyprus, and, at times, positions in Phoenicia, the Cyclades, Cilicia and Lycia. Alexandria soon grew to be the first city of the world. Egypt, as a commercial power, pursued in the main a policy of peace. But her fleet was the strongest in the western Mediterranean and her wealth made her a force to be reckoned with. In the West, Carthage was far the largest and most important city. Sicily declined, though Syracuse still retained something of her old prosperity; in Italy, Tarentum alone of the Greek cities was really flourishing.

The monarchy was a form of constitution unfamiliar to the Greek mind and associated by it mainly with barbarous or backward peoples. It had come into force again, because the city state had proved unable to solve the political problems of a new age. The kings adopted various measures to give a sanction to their rule. On the one hand, they sought to claim, where possible, descent in one form or another from Alexander the Great. On the other, they claimed for themselves divine honours; in Egypt, Ptolemy I

and Berenice were worshipped after death as "*θεοὶ σωτῆρες*," and Ptolemy II and his dead wife Arsinoe were worshipped as "*θεοὶ ἀδελφοί*." From the time of Antiochus II onwards divine honours were regularly claimed by the Seleucids. In Macedon and Epirus no trace of this thoroughly Oriental custom appears. Eastern pomp invaded court ceremonial. The kings claimed, as a rule, the right to regulate the succession at their pleasure ; but in Epirus and Pergamum the people had more power. In Macedon and the East the king was an absolute ruler, but had at his side a "*συνέδριον*" to consult, and various high officials—prime minister, state secretary, admiral and others—to assist him in government. The Seleucids maintained the old Persian system of satrapies, with a strategus or satrap at the head of each. In Egypt the unit of administration was the nome, under a strategus or nomarch. Foreign possessions were governed by strategi. Macedon formed a single administrative district. On the whole, the Greek cities, under the monarchies, enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy ; the non-Greek population was destitute of political rights. Its condition was probably none too happy ; taxation was heavy, and the bureaucracy was oppressive.

A few general tendencies of the age may be briefly noted. Local patriotism was on the decline and the cosmopolitan spirit was born. Women were better educated and played a freer part in society than heretofore. Philosophy began to change its nature. It ceased to be a free inquiry into nature and came more and more to take the place of dying religion as a rule of life. The great representatives of this tendency are the Stoic and Epicurean schools, which both attempted, in their different ways, to teach the individual where to look for happiness. Athens was still the centre of philosophy in Greece. It was here that these two great schools grew up, and here that the successors of Plato and Aristotle exercised their activity.

Science entered on a golden age. The new great monarchies, especially the Ptolemaic, fostered it, and Alexandria soon became its chief home. Geography, astronomy, mathematics, history, and literary criticism were all taken in hand and advanced by specialists. The chief literary phenomena were the New Comedy of manners at Athens and the mimes, elegies, epigrams, epics and bucolic poetry of Alexandria and its circle. Art found rich and intelligent patronage at the royal courts, and Pergamum, in particular, was distinguished for its art school.

SECTION 7. THE WEST: AGATHOCLES AND CARTHAGE

We have now to turn our eyes to the fortunes of the Greeks in the West. Carthage was ceasing to be an active danger; but a new enemy was arising in Italy. The rough tribes of the south had long been a thorn in the side of the Grecian cities; and further north a more dangerous enemy was arising in Rome, which was just beginning to establish its supremacy in central and southern Italy. Timoleon gave the Greeks of Sicily peace for a space; but, after his death, troubles soon arose. At Syracuse the council of 600 usurped the government, but was overthrown by the democracy. The oligarchs again returned, but were expelled again in 317 by Agathocles, son of Carcinus of Rhegium, who had spent an adventurous youth and had served as an officer in the Syracusan army. He drove his enemies out of Syracuse and was appointed commander-in-chief with unlimited powers, that is, virtually tyrant. Agathocles's first step was an attack on Messana. At first he was repulsed, and the prince Acrotatus came from Sparta to lead the resistance against him. But in 313 Acrotatus made peace and retired, and Messana surrendered to Agathocles. Carthage had by this time become uneasy about the new potentate and was contemplating interference; but

Agathocles forestalled the attack by invading the Carthaginian province in the west of Sicily. He was repulsed in an attack on Agrigentum and defeated in battle by the Carthaginians (312), and his whole position seemed in peril; but here he planned a desperate counter-stroke. He returned to Syracuse, successfully shipped an army across to Africa, and burnt his ships, in order to commit himself finally to the adventure (August, 310). This unexpected attack promised well. The Carthaginians suffered a defeat in the field, and recalled their army from Sicily, where Agrigentum was left to continue the war alone, after Hamilcar had fallen in an attack on Syracuse (309). Agathocles enlisted the support of Ophellas, then in power at Cyrene, against Carthage. Ophellas brought up 10,000 men; but his treacherous ally murdered him and took over his army. Agathocles took Hippo and Utica and then sailed back to Sicily, leaving his son Archagathus in command in Africa (307). Archagathus, in his father's absence, suffered two great defeats, and Agathocles, returning to Africa in 306, could make no further headway. He therefore deserted his troops and fled to Sicily. Failing to make terms with the Syracusan exiles, he made peace with Carthage, restoring to her his conquests in Sicily; he then gained a decisive victory over his enemies in Sicily and was able to make a peace with them, by which he was recognized as king in Syracuse (305). The rest of his career can be narrated in a few words. He played a large part in the politics of southern Italy, repulsed an attack of Cassander on Corcyra and took the island (298). He formed passing connexions with Pyrrhus (295) and Demetrius Poliorcetes (289). In 289 he was murdered by his grandson Archagathus. The verdict of historians on his career varies widely. Some regard him as nothing more than a clever and unscrupulous adventurer, whose career was mainly mischievous; others lay stress on his great qualities as

crowd of pretenders were contesting for the empty place. But a settlement soon came; Antigonus made peace with Antiochus (277) and married his sister Phila; near Lysimachia he cut to pieces a large Gallic force and, fresh from the prestige of this victory, won the throne of Macedon. Paeonia held out in revolt, but Athens and Sparta made peace. The survivors of the Gauls passed eastward to the Propontis and Bosphorus (c. 278-7); invited by Nicomedes of Bithynia, they crossed to Asia and gave him the victory over his brother Zipoetas. Finally they settled down, in three great tribes—the Trocmi, Tolistoboi and Tectosages—in the country of the Upper Sangarius and Halys, which henceforth was named Galatia after them. They long continued to be a disturbing influence in politics, supplying mercenaries in abundance to the highest bidder; their settlement tended to promote the political division of Asia Minor and thus furnished some protection to the Greek cities of the coast.

The period that follows is one for which we possess no single trustworthy ancient authority, and we must be content to remain in ignorance of many interesting details. Macedon under its new king Antigonus Gonatas, a man of sterling character and ability, regained its old position. Pyrrhus, on his return to Greece, attacked him and at first gained considerable successes, even driving Antigonus out of Macedon; but, when he turned south into Greece and appeared in the Peloponnese with 25,000 men, Sparta stood faithful to Antigonus and repelled his attack. Antigonus then appeared in Corinth to defend his allies, and Pyrrhus fell in a street fight in Argos (272). His son Alexander succeeded him as king in Epirus. Antigonus was left free to re-establish his power in Greece; he placed garrisons in Corinth, Peiraeus and Chalcis and supported tyrants, devoted to his cause, in a number of cities.

In Egypt Ptolemy II Philadelphus was king from 285 to

246. He put away his wife Arsinoe and married his sister of the same name, adopting Ptolemy, her son by Lysimachus; she died in 270. Magas, step-son of Ptolemy I, who was governor of Cyrene, revolted in 274, with the encouragement of Antiochus I of Syria. At first he could not be subdued and even ventured to attack Egypt. But Ptolemy invaded Syria and took Damascus, and, by a peace made in 272, he retained his conquests. Cyrene was left nominally independent; but in the end (c. 250) Ptolemy's son, Ptolemy Euergetes, married Magas's daughter, Berenice, and Cyrene was reunited to Egypt. In Syria, Antiochus I Soter reigned from 281 to 261. He was defeated in his war with Bithynia (280), but soon afterwards defeated the Gauls. How he fared in his war with Egypt we have seen above.

The Egyptian fleet was the chief sea-power in the East, and Ptolemy attempted to secure an influence to counter-balance that of Macedon in Greece. Athens and Sparta entered into alliance with him in 266, and from about 266 to 258, the so-called Chremonidean war¹ raged between Athens, Sparta, Elis, Achaea and other states encouraged by Egypt on the one hand, and Macedon and her following on the other. Of the history of the war we have only the barest outlines. Antigonus besieged Athens, and the city, unsupported by its allies, had to surrender and admit a Macedonian garrison (about 263). Sparta at first delayed; but in 264 her king Areus, attempting to march to the relief of Athens, was defeated and killed near Corinth. At sea, too, the Macedonian fleet defeated the Egyptian near Cos. The result of the war was the complete triumph of Antigonus in Greece and the decline of the influence of Ptolemy, who seems to have shown a most culpable lethargy. It is inspiring to see that the chief states of Greece could still suffer and dare something for their liberty.

In Asia Minor a certain Philetaerus had made himself

¹ Named after Chremonides, the chief political leader of Athens.

master of Pergamum. He died in 263 or 262, and his nephew and successor, Eumenes I, broke off his dependence on Antiochus I and defeated him near Sardis. The kingdom of Pergamum was, for more than a century, a force in politics; its influence depended mainly on its wealth, which gave it the power to enlist mercenaries. In 261 Antiochus I of Syria died and was succeeded by his second son, Antiochus II Soter (261-246). In alliance with Antigonus Gonatas, Rhodes and Ptolemy's adopted son¹, Ptolemy, he waged war against Egypt, and had the better of the exchanges. Alexander of Epirus attacked Antigonus without success, and on his death Epirus came under Macedonian influence; and Sparta, too, rose in vain against Macedon. Finally a breach between Syria and Macedon led to a peace between Syria and Egypt, after a war in which Egypt seems steadily to have lost ground. In 250 Nicomedes of Bithynia died. His son Zipoetas sought Macedonian support, while Antiochus II espoused the cause of a rival, Ziaelas, who finally gained the throne. In the Further East the Seleucid kingdom steadily lost ground. A certain Diodotus made himself independent in Bactria, and won Areia and Margiana. Andragoras in Parthia, too, became practically independent; and, nearer home in Cappadocia, Ariarathes founded a new kingdom (c. 270). On the death of Antiochus II Seleucus II succeeded him and reigned from 246 to 226.

SECTION 9. THE KINGS AND THE LEAGUES, C. 246 TO 201 B.C.

In Greece a new form of political union, the "*κοινόν*," or confederation of independent states, now comes into prominence. Such federations had been known from early times, as, for example, in Achaea, Thessaly and Boeotia; but they had all been weak and loosely organized. The need

¹ He died at Ephesus during the war.

of providing some counterpoise to the solid power of the monarchies caused the new "*κοινά*" to adopt a fresh and more coherent organization. The chief of these federations were the Aetolian, with which we have already met on several occasions, and the Achaean, which begins to appear in prominence from about 255. In general, the cities composing the federation retained complete autonomy, with constitution and magistrates of their own. But the decisions of foreign policy and of peace and war were vested in a league council, to which the members sent delegates. By the side of this council there was a league assembly which, in the field, was replaced by the army. The executive and the command in war were assigned to a committee of magistrates¹, which in course of time gave place to a single head. The new constitution enabled the city-state still to play a dignified part in foreign politics; but it suffered from grave inherent weaknesses—lack of funds, and the want of a machinery for executing decisions of the league inside its own bounds. The growth of the Achaean League can be traced in its general outlines. About 280 Patrae, Dyme, Tritaea and Pharae regained their independence and refounded the league. Aegium, Bura and Cerynea joined after 276, but it was the accession of Sicyon in 251 that first gave the league importance. In 251 Aratus, a citizen of Sicyon, expelled the tyrant Nicocles and brought his city into the league. Aristodemus, an able tyrant in Megalopolis, was murdered; the Arcadian League revived and entered into close relations with the Achaean. Sparta opposed the new alliance; her king, Agis, defeated the Arcadians and Achaeans, the Arcadian League was dissolved, and a certain Lydiades made himself tyrant in Megalopolis.

In central Greece, Aetolia fought with Boeotia for the

¹ In Aetolia we find a strategus, a hipparch, a tamias and a grammateus; in Achaea a strategus with ten demiurgi as colleagues, a hipparch and a nauarch.

possession of Phocis. Aratus came too late with his aid and the Boeotians were defeated, while Phocis and the eastern Locris joined Aetolia. Antigonus of Macedon had seen his influence in Greece waning, and in 256 he had withdrawn his garrison from Athens. He recovered Corinth, but in 243 Aratus surprised the city and brought it into the Achaean League, and Epidaurus, Megara and Troezen also joined him. Aratus himself was the leading spirit in the league and held the office of strategus every second year. He was a capable statesman but no general, and frequently lost in the field what he had won in the council-chamber. Antigonus sought support in Aetolia, while Aratus cultivated the friendship of Egypt. At Sparta an interesting attempt at political reform was made by Agesilaus and his young nephew Agis, supported by an ephor, Lycurgus. Their plans of reform were mainly social and included such measures as a remission of debts and a redistribution of land (243). The number of Spartiates had sunk to 700; Agis hoped to re-establish a state of 4000 Spartiates and 15,000 Perioeci. But the reform party was speedily vanquished. The ephors of 242 were hostile, and Agis failed to win military laurels against the Aetolians, who invaded the Peloponnese. The result was the death of Agis and the flight of the other leaders of reform (241). The Aetolians, co-operating with Spartan exiles, failed to capture Sparta. Aratus, meanwhile, tried without success to bring Argos and Athens into the Achaean League. In 239 Antigonus Gonatas died and was succeeded by Demetrius. Aratus renewed his attempts on Argos, without success, in 237 and 235. But a great success fell to Achaea; Lydiades of Megalopolis laid down his tyranny and joined the league¹, as did Tegea and Mantinea, only to fall away soon to Aetolia. The two leagues, the Aetolian and Achaean, usually at enmity, united to defend themselves against Demetrius. In 229

¹ He became strategus in 233.

Demetrius fell in battle against the Dardani, and Antigonus Doson became king, as guardian for the young heir, Philip; he made peace with Aetolia and defeated the Illyrians. Argos at last joined Achaea, Athens expelled a Macedonian garrison, and Macedonian rule was entirely broken in Greece; only Euboea and a part of Thessaly remained in the possession of Antigonus.

Ptolemy III Euergetes became king in Egypt in 247 and Seleucus II in Syria in 246. War broke out between these monarchs in 246-5, and Ptolemy III, invading Syria in 245, won great successes in Syria and Cilicia. But he was called back to Egypt by internal troubles, and Seleucus, in alliance with the kings of Pontus and Cappadocia, restored the west of the Seleucid Empire (244). In 242 Seleucus was defeated in southern Syria, and his mother Laodice forced him to associate his young brother Antiochus with himself in the kingship. In 242 Egypt made peace, giving up all conquests except a few places held by her garrisons. A little later Seleucus was again at war, this time with his brother Antiochus, who was supported by Egypt and Cappadocia. Antiochus was strong in Asia Minor, and Seleucus, attacking him, was defeated at Ancyra. Peace was concluded in 237, Antiochus being recognized by Seleucus as king west of Taurus. During this period a certain Arsaces had founded the Parthian Empire; Seleucus took the field against him and gained great successes; but Bactria and Parthia combined, and Seleucus was forced to retreat, especially as home troubles called him. In Asia Minor, Antiochus came into conflict with Attalus of Pergamum¹ and suffered three great defeats (229-8); and in 237 he met his death in Thrace. Seleucus died in 226, and a certain Alexander became king, under the name of Seleucus III Ceraunus. After an unsuccessful attack on Pergamum he was murdered, and Antiochus III the

¹ He had succeeded Eumenes in 241.

Great succeeded him (223). The new king showed great activity. He fought with Egypt in south Syria in 221; then, turning on Molon, who had revolted in Media and defeated his generals, he put down the rebel and restored his empire as far east as Parthia. In Asia Minor, however, Achaeus, cousin of Seleucus III, proclaimed himself king. In Egypt, Ptolemy IV Philopator came to the throne in 221-220. In 219 war broke out again with Syria; at first success inclined to Antiochus, who took Seleucia in Pieria and won a great victory north of Sidon; but in 217 Ptolemy gained the great battle of Raphia, and Antiochus made peace, renouncing his claim to Coele-Syria.

In 235 Cleomenes, a bold and able man, became king in Sparta. He was resolved on two things—to reform the Spartan constitution, by substituting the royal authority for that of the ephors, and to restore Spartan prestige abroad. In 228 war broke out between Sparta and the Achaean League. The Achaeans were defeated near Megalopolis, but Aratus, rallying in a remarkable way, replied by capturing Mantinea. A second defeat of the Achaeans followed, in which Lydiades fell, and the influence of Aratus, who was accused of having deserted his comrade, was for the time shaken. In 226 Cleomenes carried out his *coup d'état*. Returning from Arcadia to Sparta with a mercenary army, he murdered the ephors, abolished that magistracy and the senate, and declared a cancelling of debt and a redistribution of land. At the same time he reformed the military system, introducing the long Macedonian lance and admitting the Perioeci to service as heavy-armed troops. In the same year Cleomenes recovered Mantinea and defeated the Achaeans near Dyme. A proposal was made to settle the dispute between Sparta and the Achaean League by electing Cleomenes its general. But this was not what Aratus wanted. A chance delay gave him his opportunity and he called on Antigonus

Doson to intervene. Thereupon Cleomenes broke off negotiations, captured Argos and Corinth, and gained a promise of Egyptian aid. Antigonus soon appeared in Peloponnesus with over 20,000 men and Aratus was re-elected general of the Achaean League. Cleomenes steadily lost ground; Corinth was surrendered to Antigonus, who also took Mantinea and Tegea, while Egypt sent no support to Cleomenes and in 221 made peace with Macedon. Cleomenes, left to his own resources, was thrown back on Laconia and finally suffered a complete defeat at Sellasia (221). He escaped to Egypt, where he committed suicide a few years later. Antigonus occupied Sparta, reversed all the reforms of Cleomenes, and placed a Macedonian garrison in the city. Antigonus was at this moment called back to Macedon by an Illyrian invasion; he defeated his enemies, but died soon afterwards (221 or 220) and was succeeded by Philip. In Greece, a new war speedily broke out. Aetolia, long notorious as a pirate power, had been of late particularly reckless in her encroachments and had plundered Messene. The Achaean League took up arms against the Aetolians and defeated them near Caphyae. Philip was called in by the Achaeans and fought with skill and energy in the Peloponnesus (219-218) and in Aetolia (218-217). In 217 a peace between the belligerents was negotiated by Egypt, Rhodes and Chios on the basis of the *status quo*. Philip was dreaming of playing a wider part in world politics; in 219 he had given refuge to Demetrius of Pharos, who had been driven out by Rome, and in 217 he definitely allied himself with Hannibal. But a Roman fleet in the Adriatic sufficed to hold him in check. In 213 Philip poisoned Aratus, and Philopoemen (born 253) followed as leader of the league. In 211 Rome made an alliance with the enemies of Philip in Greece—Aetolia, Elis and Sparta¹, and war broke out in 209 between these states

¹ Sparta had joined Aetolia (220) and a certain Lycurgus had become king.



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GREECE, c. 200 B.C.

and Macedon and Achaea. In 205, after indecisive operations, the Aetolians made peace without consulting Rome, and subsequently Philip himself made terms with Rome. At Sparta, the tyrant Machanidas had taken possession, and was succeeded, on his death in 207, by Nabis, another ruffian of a similar stamp. In Syria, Antiochus succeeded in defeating Achaeus and putting him to death; and, in an expedition to the Far East (210-208), he gained what were officially styled great victories, which, however, had no abiding results.

SECTION 10. RETROSPECT

We have now reached the point at which Rome begins to enter into the politics of the eastern Mediterranean; and henceforth the history of the civilized world runs more and more into a single channel. The complication of politics caused by the conflict of interests of several great kingdoms and many minor powers is speedily simplified. Rome becomes the centre of the scene and the question is simply that of the relations of other states to her. But before we leave the period it will repay us to take a very brief general view of the political condition of the East.

In Greece, Sparta, after the fall of Cleomenes, was miserably weak. Athens was devoted to peace and cultivated the friendship of the peace-powers, Egypt, Pergamum and Rhodes. The Aetolian League was still the chief power in middle Greece and had a following in the Peloponnese. The Achaean League was past its prime. It no longer held the same territory that it had once done and it had sacrificed its complete independence in return for Macedonian support. Macedon was relatively strong; but, in this age, she was a curse to Greece—strong enough to be a continual menace, but not strong enough to unite Greece under her hegemony. The Greek cities of the coasts of

Thrace and Asia Minor were mainly autonomous, but naturally felt the influence of the great neighbouring kingdoms. Rhodes was a great commercial city and, possessing a small but efficient fleet, stood for peace and checked piracy. The kingdom of Pergamum was an influential but peace-loving power, though constantly at war with the Galatians and the Seleucids. Bithynia, despite the fact that its rulers were anything but great men, was a bulwark of Greek civilization. The Seleucids probably retained some hold on Phrygia, south Lydia and Caria; but their claims to the whole of Asia Minor could never be made good. Cappadocia played a minor part in politics under its line of kings; whilst, to the north, Pontus under Mithradates I, Ariobarzanes and Mithradates II grew steadily in power. The Seleucid Empire, losing steadily in Asia Minor and the Further East, was on the decline, though it still held Syria and Persia in a firm grip. The Parthians, destined to play so large a part in later history, ruled in Parthia as an aristocracy in a conquered land. Egypt was steadily on the down grade, thanks to the progressive degeneration of its princes. The first Ptolemy was in the first rank both as statesman and general; Ptolemy II was, at least, an able diplomat, and Ptolemy III was a keen soldier. But the fourth Ptolemy was neither statesman nor soldier, and was addicted to unworthy favourites. On the whole, Macedon and Syria ranked as the active and warlike powers; against them were grouped the peace-powers, Egypt, Pergamum, Rhodes, Athens and Aetolia¹. It was clear that if Rome chose to intervene as a friend of the victims of aggression she could count on finding considerable support.

¹ She liked plundering rather than war.

CHAPTER VI

ROME AND THE WEST DOWN TO C. 200 B.C.

SECTION I. NORTH AFRICA, SPAIN, GAUL AND GERMANY

THE ancient history of Europe centres almost exclusively round Greece and Rome. Many nations passed on down the centuries without leaving a record of their fortunes behind them ; while others only entered the realm of history when they came into contact with those two great historical powers. Hence it is that the historian finds little to relate of the independent history of these peoples and comes to regard them only as minor actors in the great dramas of Greek and Roman life. But we cannot dispense with some brief reference to these by-ways of history, even if, in some cases, we can do little beyond avowing our ignorance ; and, to avoid interruptions of the main thread of our narrative, we will place here, at the head of the history of the West, the little that must be said about the nations of north Africa, Spain, Gaul and Germany.

In north Africa, we have already learnt to know the Libyans, as the western neighbours of the Egyptians. They seem to have been a fair-haired, light-skinned race, of a fine physical type, and are generally supposed to have come from Europe. Further west, we meet a very different race, distinguished by its ruddy skin, which is supposed to have pushed its way to the north-west from Abyssinia and Ethiopia. To this stock the ancient Numidians and

Mauretanians probably belonged ; and this same race, now known as the "Berber," is predominant in the same region to the present day. North Africa never developed a strong native power in ancient times and the history of its tribes forms nothing but an adjunct to that of Egypt, Carthage and Rome.

The earliest inhabitants of Spain and Portugal of whom we have any knowledge were the Iberians, a race characterized in the main by short skulls and dark hair, akin to the Sicani, the earliest inhabitants of Sicily. At an early date, not to be fixed with any exactitude, the peninsula was overrun by Celtic invaders from the North. They settled mainly in the interior of north-eastern Spain and, in some cases, coalesced with the earlier inhabitants ; such seems to have been the origin, for example, of the Celtiberians. But the south and north-west were never conquered by the Celts and remained in the possession of Iberian tribes, such as the Lusitanians, Asturians and Cantabrians. The Spanish tribes were high-spirited and warlike and offered a stout resistance for over two centuries to the Roman conqueror ; under the empire Spain became completely romanized and, in 98 B.C., gave Rome its first provincial emperor in the person of Trajan.

The chief home of the Celts in historic times was in Gaul ; but it is probable that in early ages they were settled to the north and east of the Rhine and were only pushed back over the river by the advance of the Germans. The earlier population of Gaul—we can trace Iberians in the south-west and Ligurians in the Rhone valley—was then ousted by the Celts. The population of Britain was mainly Celtic ; the British tribes maintained close relations with their Gallic kinsmen, and the conquest of Gaul, by bringing the Romans into contact with Britain, led on to the conquest of that island. The Celts of Britain were never united under a single native rule ; the Romans found

a number of independent tribes, Regni, Icenii, Silures, Ordovices, Brigantes and the rest, which submitted one by one to her rule. Ireland and Scotland were never conquered by the Romans, and we know little of the tribes inhabiting them; it is now generally supposed that the Picts of Scotland were not Celts, but belonged to a race that was not even Indo-European. To the east of southern Gaul we find other Celtic tribes, the Helvetians, the Raetians and the Noricans. In Italy the Celts first appeared about 600 B.C., but did not advance far into the Po valley until nearly two hundred years later. The Celts were a powerful and warlike race and played no inconsiderable part in history; but their total lack of political cohesion limited them to a subordinate rôle. The Gauls, once conquered by Rome, assimilated her civilization with extraordinary ease, and, in the later empire, Gaul came to be almost more Roman in sentiment than Italy herself.

The Teutons, or Germans, show close connexion with the Celts, who preceded them, and the Slavo-Lithuanians, who followed them in their movement towards the West. Pushing on to the shores of the Baltic, the Teutonic nations divided into two great sections. One branch, the south or west Teutons, pushed the Celts across the Rhine and settled in their place; to this branch belong the Frisii, Chauci, Chatti, Suevi and Cherusci, with whom Rome began to come into contact in the first century B.C. The other section of the race, the north Teutons, occupied Denmark and the Scandinavian peninsula, and thence threw off a new offshoot, the east Teutons, who settled north of the Danube towards the Black Sea. To this branch of the race belong the nations of the Herulians, Goths, Vandals and Burgundians, which play so large a part in the tale of the declining empire. The forward movement of the western Teutons against the Celts, which must have begun very early, continued steadily until the first century B.C. The

north of Gaul was invaded by Teutons, and out of their union with the Celts sprang the mixed tribes of Belgica. Then, a little before the end of the second century B.C., came the incursion of the Cimbrians and their allies into Gaul and Spain; what might have been the fortunes of the invaders, had they had only the Celts to deal with, we cannot tell; as it was, they came into collision with the consolidated power of Rome and, after a series of tremendous victories, finally succumbed to superior generalship and discipline. But the advance of the Teutons still continued; when Caesar took up his command in Gaul, he found Ariovistus and his Suevians firmly settled among the disunited Gallic tribes and steadily resolved to hold their ground. It was the critical moment, and it was fortunate for Rome that she had a great man to meet it. Caesar absolutely refused to countenance the German settlements in Gaul and, in a very short time, had decided the question at issue once and for all; Gaul was to become a province of the empire, not a country of the Germans. But further the Romans did not go. Augustus, for a time, cherished the policy of advancing the frontier of the empire to the Elbe, and the work of Nero Drusus and Tiberius had already prepared the ground for the erection of the new province, when the defeat of Varus caused Augustus to renounce the whole project and finally accept the Rhine as his frontier. The victory of Arminius had, it is true, far-reaching consequences; but we must not forget that the abandonment of Germany was an act of voluntary renunciation on the part of Augustus and his successor, and that Rome undoubtedly could have consummated the conquest of Germany—only the price to be paid seemed too high to be justified by any probable gain.

And now, after these few pages of preface, we can proceed to the history of Rome, into which the histories of all these nations finally flow, like rivers into one central sea.

SECTION 2. ROME AND ITALY TO C. 500 B.C.

Time was when Roman history started with the foundation of the city by Romulus in the year 754 B.C. But modern criticism has worked havoc with the traditional narrative ; and to-day we can offer no detailed account of the events that lie before about 500 B.C., and must restrict ourselves to a brief sketch of the general conditions of the Roman people in those early days. The little that we know about the other nations of Italy will find its natural place as an appendage to the tale of Rome.


About the earliest population of Italy there is much that is still unknown ; but a few facts can rank as reasonably certain. In the south dwelt the Itali and Oenotres, probably close kinsmen of the Sicani of Sicily. North of them lay a great Indo-European nation, divided into two branches, the Oscan, including the Umbrians, Sabines and Samnites, and the Latin, including the Latins, and among them the Romans, the Aequians, Volscians and Hernicans. The Latins were spread along the east coast ; in the mountains of the interior lived a number of Sabellian tribes, and north of them came the Umbrians. Of the Etruscans, who were strong in the north and north-west, two accounts are given ; one makes them come from Raetia in the North, the other traces them to Asia Minor. At present we cannot decide which of the two to accept. In the north-west dwelt the Ligurians, in the north-east the Venetians. The Gauls did not appear in the Po valley till a comparatively late date. The earliest civilization traceable in Italy is that of the pile villages of the Po valley, roughly similar to that of one of the earlier cities on the site of Troy. The Romans were a part of the Latin race, probably with an admixture of Sabine and Etruscan blood. The city of Rome lay in a favourable position, commanding the Tiber and owning a large extent of agricultural land. The

earliest settlement (*Roma quadrata*) was on the Palatine hill. Next, the Esquiline was included and we then have the so-called "Septimontium." The next enlargement consisted in the inclusion of a Sabine settlement on the Quirinal. Finally the Aventine was brought within the walls, and we now have what is known as "Servian Rome," so-called after the king, Servius Tullius. This city was divided into four local tribes—the Suburana, Esquilina, Collina and Palatina. Ostia, at the mouth of the Tiber, was probably already occupied.

The unit of society was the family under the supreme power of the *pater familias*. In his "hand" were all its members, and he possessed, within this sphere, the power of life and death. Next came the *gens* (clan), composed of a number of families, with property, religious rites and clients of its own. The whole community was grouped for political purposes in curies, each composed of clans. There were three tribes, distinct from the four local ones mentioned above, the Luceres, Ramnenses and Titienses, but of their exact nature we know little. The main point to be observed is that the individual does not appear as yet—we have simply to deal with groups of varying sizes.

Among the Sabellian peoples, the tribe was the political unit. In Latium, from early times, a league of small cities is found, enjoying *commercium* and *connubium* with one another, centred round Alba Longa. In Etruria stood a confederacy of twelve cities. Originally kings had held the rule, but were succeeded by strong aristocracies (the Etruscan *lucumones*), ruling over half-enslaved dependents.

Primitive Roman religion, before it was transformed by foreign influence, was a somewhat formless and colourless system. The Roman believed in a number of divine powers (*numina*), associated with the various activities of life, and the chief function of religion was to teach the correct ceremonial by which their favour might be won or their wrath



Roma quadrata

averted. There were no statues of the gods and no temples. The *auspices* watched for divine signs and the augurs interpreted them. The relation of man to his gods was conceived of under legal forms ; by performing the proper ceremonies man established a definite claim to the desired blessings. Many of the gods of the later Roman religion were imported from abroad ; but among the genuine Italian deities we may reckon Jupiter, Mars, Semo Sancus, Vesta, Ops, Ceres, Liber, Venus, Fortuna, Vulcan, Juno, Neptune, and Dispater. In Etruria we find Tin the sky-god, Juno and Minerva, and also a cult of the *Lares*. Here lay the original home of augury and soothsaying and a number of savage and terrible superstitions.

That the Romans were at first ruled by kings is certain ; but all details of their rule, the wars of Romulus and of Tullus Hostilius and the peaceful labours of Numa Pompilius and Servius Tullius, are little more than myth, and the historian today will be content to give a bare outline of the form of the regal constitution. At the head of the state stood the king, elected by the people to hold supreme command, but controlled by the intangible force of tradition. Beside him stood the senate, his council, nominated by him and unable to do more than offer him advice. The people, the ultimate source of power, voted on a limited range of questions in their curies, but probably were restricted to giving an answer for or against the proposal submitted. The community fell into two great groups, the Patricians and the Plebs. In all probability the Patricians were the old community, while the Plebs gradually grew up out of slaves, aliens and clients of the state. A national distinction is possible, but not certain. The Patricians were strong and the king might naturally favour the weaker Plebeians, to secure their support for himself. At some time before the end of the sixth century B.C. the so-called Servian Reform, attributed to the king Servius Tullius, introduced

an important change. The people were now divided into five classes, graded according to wealth, and each class was divided into Centuries, each Century containing *seniores* and *juniores*. The meeting of the nation in its Centuries, the *Comitia Centuriata*, was held in the Campus Martius, and could only be convoked by the holder of the *imperium*, or military command. This is the assembly that we find in use at the beginning of the Republic.

Of the fall of the kings at Rome tradition has much to tell, history but little. It was certainly connected with troubles with Etruria. That country reached its zenith at an early date and was the first in northern Italy to welcome Greek influence. From about 600 onwards, the Etruscans pushed south along the east coast of Italy. Campania fell into their hands, and the Tarquins at Rome were almost certainly an Etruscan dynasty. At some date not long before 500 a political rising, which was probably national in character, led to their expulsion, and the Roman Republic was established. We have only space to chronicle the bare fact; the legend of Sextus and Lucretia must be left with many other romantic stories to the poets. The Etruscans, under Lars Porsena of Clusium, attacked the infant republic and actually conquered Rome; the legend of "brave Horatius" attempts in vain to disguise the fact. But the Etruscan yoke was soon thrown off again, and the Etruscan power gradually began to decline, until it ceased to be a serious menace to Rome. At some date in the sixth century Rome, we hear, destroyed Alba Longa and claimed the vacant leadership of the Latin League.

SECTION 3. THE ROMAN REPUBLIC,
FROM C. 500 TO 376 B.C.

The kingly power fell into the hands of the Patricians ; the Plebeians appear at first as a discontented and disqualified class, resenting their forced submission to the *imperium* of the magistrates, to the stern laws of debt and to exclusion from a share in the public land, and fighting to free themselves by refusing military services in times of foreign war. The regal *imperium* was given to two officers, elected annually, at first named *praetors*, later *consuls*, equal in power. The *imperium* was, in theory, unlimited, but the right of appeal from it to the Centuries (*provocatio*) was early asserted and won. In times of great danger a dictator could be appointed, who, during the term of his office, held supreme power in his hands. Religion, like politics, was as yet a monopoly of the Patricians, and the *pontifices*, with the *pontifex maximus* at their head, held a great influence. The first great victory of the Plebeians consisted in the appointment of *tribuni plebis* in 494—at first two, later ten in number. Their persons were sacred and their chief duty was to protect the poorer citizens against the magistrates or, in technical language, to render their *auxilium* by *intercessio* or veto. They had the right to fine or arrest a magistrate who opposed them ; but their power was limited to Rome and they had not the *imperium*. An important right was that of summoning the Plebs to meet and presiding over its debates. The senate continued as an advisory body, nominated by the consuls, though life-tenure of rank soon became normal. Its chief importance lay in the fact that its *auctoritas* or sanction was required for all elections and laws. The Curiate Assembly practically disappears ; in its place we find the *Comitia Centuriata*, which elected all magistrates holding *imperium* and passed laws. The *Concilia plebis tributa* originated in 471 B.C. It elected

the tribunes and could pass *plebiscita* binding on the Plebs, but not on the whole state. It voted not by heads, but by tribes; and here we should say that early in the Republic the four old city tribes disappear and twenty-one new local tribes take their place. Debate was confined to informal public meetings. The regular assemblies simply decided for or against a proposal.

The chief grievance of the Plebeians was the lack of a written code of laws, to define the rights and duties of the citizen. An increasingly active agitation led to the suspension of the ordinary constitution in 451 and the appointment of decemvirs to draw up a code. The history of these magistrates and their ambitious head, Appius Claudius, is too obscure for us to discuss in detail. What we know for certain is that the Plebs seceded from the city during a war with the Sabines and Aequians, that consuls and tribunes were restored in 449, that the famous Twelve Tables, drawn up by the decemvirs, became the first Roman code of law and that discontent was alleviated by the Valerio-Horatian Laws of 449. The main provisions of these laws were these; the resolutions of the Plebs were to be binding on the whole people—probably after ratification by the Centuries. The inviolability of the tribunes was reasserted, and the aediles, subordinates of the tribunes, were to keep the orders of the senate in the Temple of Ceres. The Twelve Tables dealt mainly with civil law; criminal law hardly existed as yet.

When we turn to the foreign affairs of the young republic, we find a story of almost continuous wars. About 508, as we have seen above, the Etruscans attacked and conquered Rome. What led them to retire we cannot say. A few years later Rome was engaged in a great war with the Latin League, which culminated in the victory of Lake Regillus. In 493 a treaty gave form to the relations between Rome and Latium, and in 486 the little nation of

the Hernicans formed an alliance with Rome on similar terms. Rome's chief enemies at this time were her near neighbours, the Aequians, Volscians and Sabines, with whom she waged incessant wars, which perhaps often were little more than border raids. We hear of victories over the Aequians in 425 and 410, and over the Volscians in 479 and 439. The powerful Etruscan city of Veii was another steady foe. She contested with Rome the possession of Fidenae and, about 472, almost the entire clan of the Fabii is said to have fallen in war with her. To strengthen itself the Latin League founded a number of colonies, Velitrae, Norba and others, which themselves joined the league. This summary, in which no mention has occurred of the great heroic figures of the myths, Horatius, Cincinnatus, Coriolanus, must seem sadly meagre and cold. But to make bricks requires straw, and history demands a better tradition than we can find as yet.

The internal history of Rome in this period was marked by fierce strife and quick political growth. The number of magistrates was increased by the appointment of quaestors (447) and of censors (c. 443). The chief endeavour of the Plebeians now was to obtain admission to the consulship. This claim could not be defeated, but the Patricians covered their defeat by securing the annual appointment, in place of consuls, of six military tribunes with consular powers; to these posts Plebeians might be elected. Owing to the frequent wars the dictatorship was constantly in use. During this period a new political body, the *Comitia Tributa*, arose, in which all citizens assembled and voted by tribes. This body elected the quaestors, and tribunes could bring offenders before it. The influence of the senate, to which Plebeians were now admitted, was on the increase, gradually extending itself to the fields of war, finance and foreign policy. As a permanent body in the state, it began to gain an ascendancy over the yearly changing magistrates. In 445 the Canuleian

Law legalized marriages between Patricians and Plebeians—an important step towards the equalization of the orders.

The main feature of the politics of this period is the slow but sure attack of the Plebeians on the political monopoly of the Patricians. But another line of cleavage began early to show itself—that between rich and poor. While the rich Plebeian fought for privileges, his poorer comrade fought for more elementary necessities—for relief from the savage laws of debt and for a fair share in the enjoyment of the public land. For the time the two sections of the Plebs fought side by side; but long after the purely political grievance was settled, the deep distress of the poor continued to find voice and was destined, in far later times, to shake the Republic to its foundations. The two sections of the Plebs, in close alliance, carried their cause to victory in the year 367. Year after year the Patricians had resisted the reforms proposed by the tribunes; but the demand was repeated by the same men, year after year re-elected, until at last the reforms had to go through. The main provisions of these Licinio-Sextian Rogations were these: consuls were again to be appointed, and one must be a Plebeian; all money paid in interest was to be deducted from the capital amount of debts; a strict limit was placed on the amount of public land that any individual might hold; lastly, a praetor and two curule aediles were to be elected annually from the Patricians—a change best understood as a concession extorted by the latter party. With these laws we close the first chapter of the internal history of Rome. The old aristocracy has been definitely ousted from power and a new one, composed of holders of the chief magistracies, takes its place; at the same time, a new opposition, resting on the poor and unprivileged classes, begins to arise against it. The kingship, as a political form, was dead; on several occasions influential citizens were accused of attempting to restore it, and paid

for the attempt with their lives¹; the institution had become hateful and the name of "king" had a sound that offended the Roman ear.

These years of keen internal strife were anything but years of peace abroad. Etruria on the north was declining, and, in the years 406 to 396, Rome broke the resistance of Veii and settled her account with her arch-enemy. Other conquests too were made; Anxur was captured in 398 and Velitrae in 396. The Volscians, after a decisive defeat about 430, gave no more serious trouble, and the Aequians and Sabines were ceasing to be a pressing danger. But a new enemy suddenly appeared on the scene. At some date near 400, the Gauls entered northern Italy, overran Etruria and marched on Rome; a great victory on the river Allia gave the city into their hands to burn or pillage; the Romans retired and only the Capitol held out². But, like all Gallic raids, this one soon ran out its course. Probably under the inducement of substantial bribes, the plunderers withdrew and Rome recovered strength with a speed that surprised and dismayed her enemies. The Gauls retired to northern Italy and a number of tribes, Cenomani, Senones, Boii, Lingones and others, found permanent homes in the Po valley. Rome, free from danger, pushed rapidly forward. The Volscians and Etruscans were defeated, victories being gained over Falerii in 387 and Volsinii in 383, and in 385 Rome took the bold step of closing the Latin League, that is, of admitting no further members. The discontent caused by this measure is attested by the revolts of Praeneste and Tusculum, which were, however, speedily repressed. Etruria, hard hit by the Gallic invasion, never recovered strength. But, in the south, the vigorous hill-tribes of the


¹ Spurius Cassius in 479, Spurius Maelius in 432 and Marcus Manlius in 377.

² Traditional date 390 B.C. But Edward Meyer would place the capture of Rome nearly ten years later.

Samnites were unfolding a remarkable strength and energy. Descending on Campania they took Capua (c. 438) and soon possessed the whole land; coalescing with the old inhabitants they formed the new nation of the Campanians. Further south, kindred tribes pushed into Lucania and began, from c. 440, to harass the cities of Magna Graecia; Posidonia, Pyxus, Laus and other cities fell before them. As yet the relations of the Samnites with Rome were friendly, but their growing strength was ominous for the future. It was well for Rome that her able general Camillus had given her an improved military organization in the war with Veii; a struggle with Samnium for the hegemony of Italy was already clearly foreshadowed.

SECTION 4. THE CONQUEST OF ITALY

Rome had already proved that she possessed ability and vitality far superior to that of any other Italian city. In the next period of her history we find her fighting and conquering her chief rivals the Samnites and asserting herself as the chief power in Italy. It was a time of steady though rapid development and, naturally enough, the internal life of Rome, though active, was in the main peaceful. The consulship was still occasionally held by two Patricians, but this abuse was checked in 342, when it was settled that both places might be held by Plebeians. Dictators were still frequently appointed, mainly for the conduct of serious wars, but also, on occasion, for the performance of unimportant acts of ceremonial. The new magistrate appointed in 367, the praetor, was a sort of assistant-consul and could act as deputy of the consuls in all their functions, military as well as civil; but the duties that fell mainly to him were judicial. The office was at first claimed by the Patricians, but, as early as 337, a Plebeian held it. The tribunes now sat in the senate



and began to lose their character of popular champions and to act as willing servants of that body. The first Plebeian censor was elected in 357. Owing to his control of the rolls of the citizenship, the senate and the knights, the censor could exert important political power, and, in 312 and the following years, Appius Claudius, as censor, accomplished something little short of a revolution. He enrolled the sons of freedmen in the senate and gave places to the mob of Rome in all the tribes, instead of in the four city ones only. This was a radical measure, involving much the same results as an extension of the franchise, and was simply annulled by the next censors. Subsequent censors, however, came back again and again to Claudius's policy. The curule aediles were soon assimilated to the Plebeian; their duties consisted in the charge of the city police, public games and the like. The quaestors, at first appointed simply as assistants of the consuls, had now become financial officials; one of them was always attached to a general's staff. Politics were now open to the Plebeian; religion could not long remain barred to him. In 300, by the *Lex Ogulnia*, the number of pontiffs and augurs was increased and the new places were assigned to Plebeians. The senate continued to draw fresh power to itself by an undisputed usurpation of functions; it proved itself competent to rule the state and thereby established a certain moral title to power. Of popular assemblies there were at this time three—the meeting by centuries (*Comitia Centuriata*), which elected consuls, praetors and censors, the meeting by tribes (*Comitia Tributa*), electing curule aediles and quaestors, and the *Concilium plebis*, or meeting of the Plebeians only, which elected tribunes and Plebeian aediles. The principle that resolutions of the Plebs (*plebiscita*) should be binding on the whole community had already been laid down in 449; but we find it repeated in a Publilian Law of 339 and a Hortensian Law of 287. On this last occasion the law only

passed after the Plebs had seceded from the city. It is probable that these successive laws removed successive bars in the way of the *plebiscita* becoming law.

The Plebeians had won all along the line; patrician rank continued to count as a certain personal distinction, political importance it had none. But the discontent of the poor was not so easily allayed. Repeated attempts to restrict usury by legislation show us the distress of the debtor and the determination to remedy it. But this was a mere alleviation of symptoms, while the root evil was left untouched. More effective and salutary were the large distributions of public land in small holdings, which gave the small man an opportunity of lifting himself out of the slough of debt. Life in Rome was still simple. The streets were narrow, the houses low and of baked bricks. Trade was active but was not yet conducted on a large scale. Rome was still the town of simple folk, great in nothing but its sense of citizenship—the Rome on which historians, such as Livy, looked back with regretful wonder.

Rome had succeeded in the hardest of political tasks; a bitter internal feud had been settled without bloodshed, and the state had gained new strength by the admission of new citizens to privilege. The union of the orders immensely strengthened the community, and this access of power was soon displayed abroad. In 363 the Hernicans, hitherto loyal allies, revolted and a five years' war ended in a fresh treaty, to the advantage of Rome. The Gauls were still occasionally dangerous; there was severe fighting in the years 361 to 358, but the city itself was never again seriously menaced by them. A few years later Rome was at war with Etruria; but the Etruscan power was on the wane, and it was now conquest, and not self-defence, that led Rome to take up arms. The first collision with the Samnites had its scene in Campania. The details are too involved and obscure to be dealt with shortly. All we know for certain is

that Rome interfered in Campanian affairs and was at war with the Samnites in the years 343 to 341 ; the result seems to have been a treaty of peace on equal terms. Rome must have been only too willing to accept an honourable settlement, for in 340 the whole Latin League rose up in revolt. By 339, after fierce fighting, Rome had crushed the rebels ; she dissolved the League, and the members were forced to form alliances—more or less favourable, according to circumstances—singly with Rome. Nor was Rome content to rest on this success. The Volscians were reduced to subjection, and Privernum, which revolted, was speedily subdued. Further south, Rome pushed her influence into Campania and that country began to fall away from the Samnites and join her. In 327 the important city of Neapolis transferred her allegiance to Rome, and the Samnites refused to accept the rebuff. It is clear that both parties were confident in their own strength and did not shirk the contest, which was to decide definitely who was to be political master of the centre and south of Italy. Valour and military skill were not all on the Roman side ; what decided in Rome's favour was her close political unity and her political sagacity, against the disunion and confusion on the other side. The war opened with Roman successes and an alliance was formed by Rome with the Apulians. But in 321 a Roman army was cut off and driven to capitulate at the Caudine Forks by the Samnite Gavius Pontius. The senate refused to acknowledge the ignominious treaty to which their defeated generals had consented, and the war went on ; but for the moment Rome's power and prestige had suffered a heavy blow. The Samnites, however, did not have things all their own way, and about 320 a truce was arranged ; but war broke out again, and Rome commenced a slow but steady advance. Fregellae, which had been taken by the Samnites, was recovered, and an anti-Roman conspiracy at Capua was put down.

Samnium was lost, unless she could find allies, and, when she at last found them, it was too late. In 311 Etruria was at war with Rome, but the great victories of the Vadimonian Lake (310) and Perugia (309) soon ended that danger. Rome now campaigned in Samnium itself, and the capital Bovianum was taken. The Marsians, Paelignians and Hernicans joined in the struggle but all had to own defeat and submit to Rome. Finally, in 304, the Samnites made peace. The fact that they had not to submit to any severe or humiliating terms shows more clearly than anything else could have done the terrible character of the struggle, which left the victors almost as exhausted as the vanquished. Rome was content to wait for the fruits of victory to fall into her lap; but to secure disputed territories she founded Latin colonies at Sora, Alba Fucens, Carsoli and Narnia. Rome, in these great days, never waged war haphazard; lands once won in battle were immediately secured for the future by strong military colonies. But the sturdy Samnites were not yet crushed. About 295 they allied themselves with the Umbrians, Etruscans and Gauls and threw themselves again on Rome. The crisis was sharp but soon at an end. The decisive battle of Sentinum (294) broke the strength of the coalition, and Samnium renewed her former treaty with Rome. In the same year the Sabines submitted and became *cives sine suffragio*. In 285 Rome defeated the Gallic tribes of the Boii and Senones and founded the colony of Sena.

SECTION 5. ROME AND PYRRHUS. THE ITALIAN ALLIES

Sicily and the south of Italy now began to attract Roman attention. At Syracuse, after the death of Agathocles, a certain Hicetas murdered the tyrant's grandson Archagathus and became tyrant himself (289). The Syracusan mercenaries, however, deserted, captured Messina and established

themselves there as the Mamertini or children of the war-god. Hicetas of Syracuse had wars to wage with Messana and Agrigentum; he defeated Phintias of Agrigentum, but was murdered in 279 by Thoenon. Syracuse, in its weak state, was in imminent danger of falling a victim to Carthage. In southern Italy the Lucanians were pressing Thurii hard, and Rome intervened to protect that city, together with Rhegium and Locri, which also felt themselves insecure. This was only the beginning of more important developments. In 282 a Roman fleet showed itself off Tarentum. A treaty forbade the Romans access to these waters, and Tarentum had fair grounds for complaint. But the hot-headed city would not wait to obtain justice peaceably; the Tarentines fell upon the Roman ships and plundered them and then proceeded to take and sack Thurii. Rome, of course, demanded satisfaction for these insults; but Tarentum declined to give it. This meant war, and Tarentum, too weak to withstand Rome single-handed, called on Pyrrhus, the warlike king of Epirus, for aid. Pyrrhus was restless and ambitious and readily accepted the invitation. He crossed to Italy with a large army, took full command of the situation and in 280 won a hard victory over the Romans at Heraclea on the Siris. The Samnites and Lucanians hereupon joined him, and a Campanian legion deserted from Rome and seized Rhegium. Diplomacy was to complete what victory in battle had begun. Pyrrhus's envoy Cineas appeared in Rome, with offers of a fair peace, and for a moment the senate wavered; but old Appius Claudius steeled them to resistance, and the war went on. The year 279 brought Pyrrhus a second victory at Ausculum, but it was so dearly purchased that Pyrrhus himself declared that he could not afford another like it. Good fortune now gave the Romans a breathing-space. The Carthaginians, with whom Rome had an alliance, were pressing the Greeks of Sicily,

and Pyrrhus was called in to repel them. The volatile prince could not refuse this offer; he crossed to Sicily and gained some brilliant successes, as was his wont, defeating the Mamertini and attacking Lilybaeum. Then a reaction set in, the Greeks grew tired of a protector who asked for too much in the way of obedience and endurance, and in 276 Pyrrhus abandoned his Sicilian adventure and returned to Tarentum. Two defeats had failed to bring Rome to her knees; nothing but another victory, and a decisive one could save Tarentum from ultimate defeat. But this third triumph was not to be won. The Romans defeated Pyrrhus in a hot action at Beneventum (275), and soon after the battle he left Italy, never to return. A few years later his lieutenant Milo withdrew the Epirote garrison and gave up Tarentum to Rome (271). In 270 Rome recovered Rhegium from the rebel Campanians; Roman influence was from henceforth predominant in the south of Italy and even the Hannibalic war only shook it for a time. To the north, too, Rome displayed her power. Volsinii in Etruria was destroyed (265-4), and Picenum was conquered. Italy was rapidly coming to recognize a mistress in the city of the Tiber; and the conflict of Rome with Pyrrhus and an alliance that she formed with Ptolemy II of Egypt could not but suggest larger fields for her activity in the near future.

Superior tactics, equal, but hardly superior, courage, and a subtle policy, which adopted for its motto the precept "Divide and rule," had enabled Rome to triumph over her rivals. She was now beyond question the chief power in the peninsula, and all the communities south of the Gauls were connected with her by some sort of tie. Let us look for a minute at the different kinds of relations that existed between Rome and the other Italian states. In the first place we find citizen colonies, possessing full Roman citizenship. In these the Roman settlers formed a sort of political

aristocracy, while the original inhabitants probably held a lower grade of citizenship. Next come the communities which possessed the restricted franchise, the *civitas sine suffragio*. They enjoyed the private rights of citizens, but not the public; that is, they could not vote and were not eligible for office at Rome. This status was usually conferred on defeated states, but there was a growing tendency to promote such half-citizens to full rights and, by about 150 B.C., the *civitas sine suffragio* ceased to exist. Apart from these two classes of Roman citizens, we find the allied states, on the one hand the Latin, on the other the rest of the allies. The rights of the Latins, the *jus Latinum*, had been defined after the suppression of the great Latin revolt; they were not unfavourable, and, among other things, the citizens of a Latin state might, subject to certain restrictions, migrate to Rome and acquire citizenship there. The rest of the allied states, the *civitates foederatae*, stood in more or less equal relations to Rome, according to the special *foedus* which defined them. Some cities, Praeneste, Tibur and Neapolis, for instance, enjoyed something like political equality. Others were little more than subjects in anything but name. The Latin allies had their own laws, enjoyed *commercium* and *connubium* with Rome, and were independent; but they were bound to supply contingents of troops according to certain recognized schedules or *formulae*.

SECTION 6. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR AND SUCCEEDING EVENTS UNTIL C. 220 B.C.

Rome had established her power on a firm basis in Italy but she could not yet allow herself to rest. There was another power in the western Mediterranean which was unwilling to brook so dangerous a rival. We have already learnt to know Carthage as the inveterate enemy of Greek

civilization in the West. For centuries Greeks and Phoenicians had striven for mastery and, at last, the decay of Greek political power in Sicily seemed to promise a decisive victory to the Phoenicians. The new Italian power could not be suffered to challenge the claim of Carthage to the spoils. Pyrrhus is said to have observed, on leaving Sicily, that it would furnish a fine battle ground for Rome and Carthage; and the remark, whether genuine or not, shows an acute perception of the case. Within fifteen years of his departure the struggle had begun. We have already had occasion to speak of the constitution of Carthage, and need only recapitulate briefly here. It will be well to remember that Carthage was a great commercial state, ruled by a close aristocracy, whose power found no rival except occasionally in powerful families, which based their position on the army; that a large piece of coast in Africa, the west of Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica and coast places in Spain all belonged to her empire; that in it were included native Phoenicians, in Carthage, Utica and other cities Liby-Phoenicians, a mixed population in Africa, and subjects in other parts of her dominions. Carthage was, in a sense, a peaceful power; she lived for wealth and commerce, not for conquest; but she possessed a large and, sometimes, powerful fleet, and was always ready to fight when her material interests were seriously threatened. Hitherto her relations with Rome had been friendly and had been defined by a number of treaties. But with the clash of interests war was quick to come. In 269, Hiero, general of Syracuse, made himself king and at once set about attacking the Mamertini of Messana. In desperation they looked round for help, and, while one party called in Carthage, another preferred Rome. Carthage was the first to receive the call and placed a garrison in the city. But the Romans also acted with vigour. They threw an army into Messana, drove out the Carthaginian garrison and

defeated Hiero (264). The war between Rome and Carthage that followed was waged mainly in and about Sicily. Hiero of Syracuse soon saw where the prospects of victory lay and formed an alliance with Rome (263), which lasted unbroken down to his death. Agrigentum was taken, and, to meet the Carthaginians on their own element, Rome built a fleet. The victory of the consul Duilius at Mylae was the first decisive blow of the war. The next years are distinguished only by an indecisive naval action off Tyn-daris (257). But in 256 Rome adopted a new policy, which held out some prospect of a speedy and successful campaign. She decided to take up the plan of Agathocles and attack Carthage at her own doors. The Roman fleet cleared the way by a victory off Ecnomus, and Regulus landed with an army at Clypea in Africa. Carthage was taken by surprise and, for a time, Regulus controlled the situation. But a clever Greek officer, named Xanthippus, secured the command at Carthage and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Romans. Regulus was taken prisoner and died in captivity; the tale of his noble self-sacrifice, in urging his countrymen, when sent on an embassy to Rome, not to purchase his release by an unworthy peace, may not be historical—but if so, that is the worse for history. The aggressive policy had failed, and Sicily again became the scene of operations. Panormus was captured by Rome, and in 251 Metellus gained a great victory under the walls of the town. But the Roman fleet suffered by shipwreck, and nothing could be done to bring Carthage to her knees. After the defeat of the rash Claudius Pulcher at Drepana in 249, the prospects of victory seemed even more remote. But Carthage, on her part, showed no activity, and, although, in 247, the able Hamilcar Barca was sent to command in Sicily, the forces at his disposal were not large enough to enable him to do more than carry on a successful guerilla warfare. But, within these limits, he displayed a

marvellous talent and resourcefulness. He occupied the hill of Heircte in the west, gave the Romans no peace, and defied all their attempts to entrap him. At last, in 242, Rome roused herself for one desperate effort. A good fleet, equipped mainly by private patriotism, was placed under the command of C. Lutatius Catulus. He completely defeated the hostile fleet off the Aegates Insulae, and Carthage, weary of a war which offered her no hope of gain, was ready for peace. She agreed to evacuate Sicily, to leave Syracuse unmolested, to restore all prisoners without ransom, and to pay an indemnity of 2200 talents in twenty years (241). The north and west of Sicily now came under direct Roman rule and formed the first of the provinces; customs duties were levied and a tax of 10% was raised on all the produce of the land. The first governors were either nominated by the praetor or elected expressly by the assembly. Rome emerged from the long struggle victorious, but she could hardly congratulate herself on her war policy. She had not been distracted by trouble in Italy—on the contrary she had consolidated her position by the foundation of new colonies—and yet she had taken twenty years to defeat an enemy who simply waited to be beaten. Had Hamilcar Barca been properly supported from home, he might already have given Rome serious trouble. As it was, there must have been a strong opposition to the Barca family in Carthage which rendered a vigorous conduct of the war impossible.

The power of Carthage was, however, still unbroken, for the loss of Sicily, though serious, was only the loss of a limb. But, immediately after the peace, a revolt of the mercenaries broke out in Africa, which threatened to make an end of the state. Stung by the withholding of their pay, the troops revolted and many of the natives joined them. Only the military genius of Hamilcar saved Carthage from ruin. By 238 he had crushed the revolt in

the "Truceless War"; but Carthage was weak and helpless, and had to submit to the loss of Sardinia and Corsica and the payment of another 1200 talents, as the price of peace with Rome. The two islands were constituted a Roman province. Had Rome struck hard at once, Carthage could scarcely have resisted the blow. But Rome had other work on her hands, and Hamilcar was allowed time in which to win a fairer province than Sicily and to train a finer army than any that Carthage had yet had. In 238 he went to Spain and there, by war and diplomacy, established a strong Carthaginian province in the south-west of the peninsula. On his death in 228, Hasdrubal succeeded him and, dying in 221, left Hamilcar's son, Hannibal, to carry on his father's work. New Carthage had been founded on the west coast, and Rome had done nothing, beyond concluding an alliance with the town of Saguntum and fixing the river Ebro as the boundary between the two spheres of influence. The statesmen of Rome had not realized the danger that was slowly arising in the West.

But the years of peace with Carthage had not been entirely wasted. From 238 to 230 a steady warfare had been waged against the Ligurians of the north-west of Italy, and in 230 to 228 the pirate power of queen Teuta of Scodra was humbled. The Illyrians had attacked Corcyra and defeated a relief force sent by the Achaeans; Rome raised the siege of Corcyra and compelled Teuta to sue for peace. Rome thus became known in Greece and found friends in Achaea, Corinth and Athens. More serious was the trouble with the Gallic tribes of north Italy. The Insubres and Boii, alarmed by Roman aggressions, invaded Etruria, but were decisively defeated at Telamon (226). In 224 the Boii submitted, and in 223-2 C. Flaminius, after some not inconsiderable reverses, reduced the Insubres to subjection. Placentia and Cremona on the Po were founded to retain a hold upon the newly acquired territory.

In 219 Demetrius of Pharos, an adventurer who had proved troublesome in the Adriatic, was driven out by Roman arms. All the problems of Roman policy had so far been met and solved. But Hannibal was now ready to embark on his life-career of hostility to Rome, and the settlement of the League war in Greece left Philip of Macedon free to reach him a hand; the growth of Roman power could not be agreeable to him, and it was his plain interest to lend hearty support to her enemies. Fortunately for Rome, Philip possessed neither the generalship nor the statesmanship required for this great task.

SECTION 7. THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

The deeper cause of the Second Punic War was the need of a definite settlement between Rome and Carthage. The immediate cause lay in the activity of Hannibal in Spain. Hannibal had inherited from his father Hamilcar a genius for warfare, a marvellous power of handling men and a passionate hatred of Rome. He had now at his command in Spain a strong and devoted army and he resolved to strike a decisive blow. Early in 219 he laid siege to Saguntum, the ally of Rome, and, disregarding Roman protests, took the city. The peace party at Carthage, led by Hanno, attempted in vain to disavow their general's action; Hannibal's friends triumphed and war with Rome was the result. Hannibal had formed the daring plan of invading Italy by land. Early in 218 he placed a strong garrison in Africa, entrusted the command in Spain to his brother Hasdrubal, and set out for Italy with some 60,000 men. The march to the Alps gave him little trouble, though he had to force the passage of the Rhone. But the crossing of the Alps cost him terrible losses in life, and, when he descended into Italy in the winter of 218-7, he had less than half of his original army

left. Hannibal's speedy action had frustrated the Roman plan for an invasion of Africa; but the general Cn. Scipio proceeded to his original destination in Spain and fought with success north of the Ebro. It was absolutely necessary for Rome to prevent Hannibal from receiving reinforcements from Spain, and Scipio's action, though apparently rash, was really a piece of well-considered strategy. The first campaign in Italy went all in Hannibal's favour. After a successful skirmish on the Ticinus, he gained a great victory on the Trebia. The Gauls flocked to his standard, and he was able to rest his weary army in Liguria. Early in 217, Hannibal marched through the marshes of the coast into Etruria. The Roman general who opposed him was C. Flaminius, a brave but rash and unskilful commander, Hannibal soon succeeded in enticing his opponent into a trap. Flaminius was cut off with his whole army in a hopeless position on the shore of Lake Trasimene and fell with the greater part of his force. Rome realized how close the danger lay, and appointed the old and experienced Q. Fabius Maximus dictator. Hannibal pushed on through Umbria and Picenum into Apulia, devastating the land as he went. But the allies refused to receive him, and Fabius, who had decided on that policy of delay which earned him the nickname of *Cunctator*, refused to offer battle, and contented himself with dogging Hannibal's footsteps. Hannibal moved on to Campania and narrowly escaped from a trap set for him by the dictator. But the waiting policy required patience, and many Romans demanded immediate results. Minucius, Fabius's master of the horse, who boldly promised decisive victories, was raised to an equality of command. But the rash officer was soon entrapped by Hannibal and only saved by the timely aid of Fabius; recognizing his error, he resigned and resumed his old subordinate position. The consuls for 216 were the aristocrat L. Aemilius Paullus and the opposition man Varro. Rome

had recovered from the panic caused by the disaster at Trasimene and there was loud clamour for a victory. A great army under the two consuls was despatched, and at Cannæ in Apulia Hannibal brought his opponents to battle. Seldom has there been a more brilliant tactical display or a more complete victory than that of Hannibal on this occasion. The Roman army was practically annihilated, and it has been suggested that Hannibal might have taken Rome itself had he marched forward at once. But this is hardly likely. The senate rose superior to defeat, refused to ransom the captives, would hear no word of peace, and proceeded to strain every nerve to make good the defence. If Italy held true, Rome might still hope for final victory. But, even so, the results of Cannæ were not inconsiderable. Late in 216 Capua revolted and early in 215 Hannibal took Nuceria, Acerræ and Casilinum, though he was repulsed at Nola. Locri, Croton and most of Bruttium also joined him. But the main support of Rome, the strong cities of central Italy, still held to their allegiance. From Spain came more hopeful news. P. Scipio had been sent in 218 to join his brother; the two Roman generals had fought with success, and for the time being Hasdrubal could not think of a march to Italy. And from Carthage came no reinforcements to Hannibal. This lack of support from home—which can only be accounted for by an indifference amounting almost to treachery on the part of the authorities—deprived Hannibal of his only real chance of success. Rome had only to hold on, and his army was bound in time to melt away. To guard against any danger from Philip of Macedon, who had formed an alliance with Hannibal, a Roman fleet of 50 ships was sent to the Adriatic. Sicily, too, became involved in the war. When the old king Hiero died in 220, his grandson and successor Hieronymus at once declared for Carthage. He was soon assassinated and Syracuse fell into the hands of Carthaginian captains. The

year 214 saw 21 legions in the field on the side of Rome. Hannibal could not force a battle and moved to and fro between Campania and Apulia; and the Romans even gained a victory at Beneventum. Meanwhile the consul Marcellus went to Sicily and, after a desperate siege, took Syracuse. The loss of Agrigentum, which was taken by the enemy, counted for little against this success. In 213 Hannibal won battles near Capua and at Herdonea in Apulia. More important still, Tarentum revolted from Rome—though the Romans still held the citadel and controlled the harbour—and Heraclea and Metapontum followed. South Italy was almost all in Hannibal's hands. But Rome could afford to move slowly, and, in 212, began the siege of the rebellious Capua. Hannibal did all he could to save the city, first by a general attack on the besiegers, then by a sudden dash on Rome—but all in vain. Capua fell and was terribly punished for her treason. Rome intended that her fate should be an object lesson of what rebels might expect. But this success was discounted by disaster in Spain. The brothers Scipio both fell in battle, and Hasdrubal seemed to have his hands free at last. Rome was compelled to act at once, and the young P. Scipio was sent to take the command (211). He soon began to assert himself and, probably in 210, surprised and captured the capital, New Carthage, by a brilliant raid. In Italy the fighting centred round Bruttium and Apulia. It was ominous for Rome that twelve of the colonies, pleading their utter exhaustion, now refused to supply troops. But the example did not spread, and the Romans waited in silence; the culprits could be dealt with later. In this year, the Aetolian League, as ally of Rome, attacked Philip, and this inconvenient little war took up the king's whole attention. In 210 Agrigentum fell and Sicily was again in the hands of Rome. In 209 the aged Fabius subdued Tarentum after a stubborn siege; once again Rome had proved that

Hannibal could not shield rebels from punishment, and the fact was bound to have a steady influence on waverers.

Rome was slowly gaining the upper hand, without the risk of any great battle ; against the cautious strategy now pursued Hannibal was helpless, unless reinforcements came. And at last they arrived. In 208 Hasdrubal succeeded in making his way past Scipio and set out on the road to Italy. Scipio claimed a victory over him, but that counted as nothing ; his duty was to detain Hasdrubal in Spain, and that he had failed to do. In 207 the war reached its crisis. One consul, Livius Salinator, marched north to meet Hasdrubal ; the other, Nero, was told off to detain Hannibal in the south. Despatches from Hasdrubal to his brother fell into Nero's hands. The consul hurriedly marched with a picked corps northward, and assisted his colleague to inflict complete defeat on Hasdrubal on the Metaurus. From this blow Carthage never rallied. Mago, it is true, landed in 206 in Liguria, but he had no chance of forcing his way through. In 205 Scipio, after further triumphs in Spain, returned to Rome and was elected consul, with Sicily as his province. In the same year a general peace was concluded in Greece. Scipio was all for an attack on Africa, but the older generation of statesmen were timid of so bold a project, and the senate, while not forbidding the expedition, assigned quite insufficient forces. But volunteers flocked in to serve under the brilliant and popular young general, and in 204 Scipio effected a landing in Africa. The Numidian chief Syphax, in earlier years a friend of Rome, had now joined Carthage ; but this move was balanced by the defection of a rival Numidian, Massinissa, to the Roman side. The war took an ominous turn for Carthage, and Hannibal, still undefeated in Italy, was compelled to return to the defence of his native city. Scipio, who had been continued in his command, finally gained a decisive victory at Zama (202), and Hannibal himself saw

that peace must now be made. Carthage had to pay an indemnity of 10,000 talents, in yearly amounts of 200 talents, to surrender all her fleet except 10 triremes, to restore all prisoners without ransom, and to renounce all free action outside Africa. She retained only her African territory and her constitution. Massinissa, Rome's energetically, was rewarded with an increase of territory, and the boundary was, probably designedly, left vague, in order that it might cause continual disputes with Carthage. Scipio celebrated a splendid triumph and received the well-earned name of "Africanus." He was the idol of the people; but the nobles looked askance on the all too eminent hero.

Carthage once humbled, Rome had no serious rival left in the western Mediterranean. Much still remained to be done before Spain or even northern Italy could be considered as conquered, but these wars, though troublesome, were seldom serious. The next fifty years saw her drawn into an eastern policy, which finally secured for her the succession to all but the further eastern portions of Alexander's inheritance. Before proceeding to this new age, we must take a short view of internal affairs at Rome during the Punic wars. In 241 a reform of the *Comitia Centuriata* took place, designed, we may suppose, to increase its political efficiency; but it is too complicated and uncertain to be described in detail here. In 227 two new praetors were appointed and received as their function the government of the two provinces of Sicily and Sardinia with Corsica. The conduct of the wars fell mainly to the senate. That body acquitted itself well and, by right of merit, gained the practical direction of the entire policy of the state. The Assembly of the Tribes was gradually displacing that of the Centuries as a legislative body; but it was too clumsy, too much fettered by awkward procedure and religious scrupulousness, to be an effective body. The dictatorship did not

answer the new requirements and fell out of use. On the other hand the stress of war compelled the senate to resort to the expedient of extending a magistrate's command beyond the term of his actual office—an important change, for in it lay the germ of the later pro-magistracies as independent offices. The tribunes were mainly loyal servants of the senate, but an opposition party existed, and occasionally carried, as in the case of Flaminius and of Varro, the election of its candidates to the consulship. The army was sound and strong, but the leading left much to be desired. The allies had, on the whole, displayed a laudable loyalty. Towards the end of the war, the twelve colonies which had refused to supply troops were heavily punished; their contingents were doubled and they were subjected to a direct property-tax of 10%. Even the loyal allies gained nothing by their loyalty. As Rome grew in power, her citizenship increased in value, and the status of her allies correspondingly deteriorated.

CHAPTER VII

THE GREAT AGE OF ROMAN EXPANSION, 202-79 B.C.

SECTION I. ROME AND THE EAST, FROM 202 TO 168 B.C.

UP to now, we have traced the history of the east and west of the ancient world on more or less separate lines. But, although convenience may require such separation, we should try throughout to realize the unity of the whole story and to resist the temptation to imagine the histories of Greece and Rome as belonging to different worlds. And since, from about 200 onwards, Rome becomes more and more the political centre of the whole Mediterranean, it now becomes allowable, nay rather obligatory, for the historian to gather up the various strands and weave them into a single thread of narrative.

Philip of Macedon had openly espoused the cause of Carthage against Rome, and, for this offence, the victorious power might be expected sooner or later to call him to account. For the moment, however, she needed rest, and it was only exceptional circumstances that led her to force on a decision at once. In 205 Ptolemy IV of Egypt had died, and a series of ministers fought for the guardianship of the new king Ptolemy V, a minor. Philip and Antiochus of Syria saw here a chance of profit, and made an agreement by which Antiochus was to seize southern Syria, while Philip "compensated" himself with territory on the coast of Thrace and Asia Minor. Philip started to make conquests in Asia Minor, and a league, headed by Pergamum, Rhodes and

Athens, was formed to check him. At this point Rome stepped in and, joining these allies, warned Philip to abandon his conquests. Philip paid little heed to the warning and in 200 turned to Thrace to plunder. Rome then declared war and sent an army into Illyria. The people were weary of war, and the senate had some difficulty in overcoming this natural reluctance; but the moment was a critical one and could not be neglected. For two years Philip maintained a successful defence, and the Roman commanders made no headway. But in 198 the able T. Quinctius Flaminius received the command, and the tide began to turn. The Achaean League, hitherto neutral, joined Rome; in 197 Flaminius defeated Philip in a pitched battle at Cynoscephalae in Thessaly, and the king at once made peace, surrendering his claims to territory in Thrace, Greece and Asia Minor and paying an indemnity of 1000 talents. With the help of ten commissioners sent out from Rome, Flaminius arranged the affairs of Greece. Peace with Philip on the above-mentioned conditions was ratified. The freedom of Greece was solemnly proclaimed by Flaminius at the Isthmian games of 196, and the Roman garrisons in Corinth, Demetrias and Chalcis were withdrawn. Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, had given trouble to Flaminius, but a short campaign brought him to reason; he surrendered Argos and other towns and his fleet, and abandoned his right to independent action (194). Philip himself sought alliance with Rome. The Aetolians, who had offended Rome in 205, were punished by receiving no share in the spoils of the war. Rome had accomplished her purpose. She had humbled Philip and had established what looked like conditions of prosperity in Greece. For the present, her interference was heartily welcomed, as that of a powerful and unselfish arbiter.

While Philip was engaged in Asia Minor, Antiochus had been making the best of his side of the bargain. He

defeated the Egyptians and took Jerusalem. In 197 a peace was arranged with Egypt, by which the young Ptolemy married Antiochus's daughter Cleopatra, and received back the south of Syria; in return, Antiochus was to be allowed a free hand in Asia Minor and Thrace. Rome protested when he proceeded to avail himself of this permission, but Antiochus trusted to his own strength and Rome's difficulties and refused to obey. The great Hannibal had been driven into exile from Carthage by pressure exerted from Rome (199) and took refuge at the court of the Great King. But Antiochus had not the wisdom to appreciate the value of his great client and wasted his genius on unimportant commands.

In 193 Antiochus rejected a last Roman embassy, and war was now only a matter of time. The actual occasion arose in Greece. A few communities in the south of Laconia, the so-called *Eleuthero-Lacones* had received their independence from Rome. Nabis attacked them, and the Achaeans took up their cause. War was now afoot, and the Aetolians, anxious to pay off their grudge against Rome, invited Antiochus to bring an army to Greece; he would find everything as he wished it. Antiochus accepted the invitation and landed at Demetrias in 192. The Aetolians, called in by Nabis, treacherously murdered him and seized Sparta; but the Spartan people rose, expelled the invaders, and joined the Achaean League. In the war that ensued, the league and Philip took the side of Rome; against them stood Antiochus, the Aetolians and some smaller powers. The campaign of 191 was disastrous for Antiochus in Greece. He was dislodged from Thermopylae, and retired to Ephesus, leaving his allies in the lurch. Aetolia now sought peace, but, as nothing less than unconditional submission was likely to be accepted, decided to await events. Meanwhile the Roman fleet sought out the enemy and defeated them near Chios, and in 190 the

consuls L. Cornelius Scipio and C. Laelius carried the war into Asia; the great Africanus was serving as a legate. The decisive battle was fought at Magnesia on the Sipylus in 191. The victory was easy and cost Rome little, and Antiochus wisely decided on immediate submission and obtained easy terms. He surrendered all claims to territory north of the Taurus, agreed to limit his fleet and paid an indemnity of 15,000 talents. Hannibal, too, was claimed as a victim. He escaped to the court of Prusias of Bithynia; but, even there, Roman vengeance would not spare him, and, a few years later, to escape betrayal, he was driven to suicide. The turn of Aetolia now came. M. Fulvius Nobilior took Ambracia, and the Aetolians submitted, paying an indemnity and entering into alliance with Rome. In Asia, Cn. Manlius Vulso, anxious to pluck some laurels for himself, attacked the Galatians and carried off a vast amount of booty. In 188 the settlement of Asia Minor took place; Rhodes and Pergamum had been loyal allies and both were rewarded with additions of territory. Philip received no such reward, and this slight turned his thoughts again towards war. It was only natural that Roman generals, acting with full powers so far from home control, should take measures that were not agreeable to the senate, and that the senate should resent their action. Thus both Nobilior and Vulso had difficulty in obtaining their triumphs, and L. Cornelius Scipio and Publius Scipio himself were put on their trial for misuse of public monies. The hero of Zama could not brook the slight and withdrew from public life into Campania, where he died a few years later.

Philip had hoped for a reward for his loyal support of Rome against Antiochus, but he had been cruelly disappointed. He turned silently to preparations for revenge; for the time being his son Demetrius went to Rome as a hostage for his father's loyalty. When the young prince returned in 181, he found a dangerous rival in Perseus,

an illegitimate son of Philip. This latter poisoned his father's mind against Demetrius and persuaded him to consent to his murder (c. 180). In 179 Philip died, and Perseus succeeded to the throne, for which he had schemed and sinned. He was a man of some energy and ability, and possessed a certain tenacity of purpose; but he was petty-minded, mean and too ready to despair under difficulties. In spite of this there were opportunities at hand, and before the end came he made himself a serious danger to Rome. Into the details of Greek history we need not enter. The main point is that the Achæan League was constantly having trouble with its members, particularly with Sparta, and the arbitration of Rome was naturally sought. Whether innocently or of design, that arbitration was never decisive, and the influence of Rome began to be felt as an evil. Rome, then, was gradually losing her first popularity, and Perseus cunningly sought to profit by her loss. He did all he could to win over the Achæan League and cultivated the friendship of Syria, Bithynia and Rhodes. As yet he had effected little. Antiochus IV of Syria, who had succeeded to the throne in 173, renewed the alliance with Rome; but Perseus was gaining ground, and Eumenes of Pergamum went in person to Rome to expose his designs (c. 173). Perseus had been busily arming, and everybody knew against whom his preparations were directed. Rome, therefore, without further delay, declared war (172). The first two years of the war (171-170) were decidedly favourable to Perseus, and only his weakness in diplomacy prevented his success from appearing even more decided. L. Marcius Philippus, consul for 169, succeeded in entering Macedon, but only after Perseus, by fatal indecision, had allowed him to escape out of a desperate position. In 168 L. Aemilius Paullus, a really competent general, received the command. And it was time for Rome to show her strength. Gentius of Illyria had at last been bribed to join Perseus, and both

Pergamum and Rhodes had shown signs of wavering. Rhodes had had the audacity to offer to arbitrate, and Eumenes had negotiated with Perseus, with a view to securing him a peace. But Paullus soon put an end to such waverings. The battle of Pydna (168) finally defeated the hopes of Perseus ; the king surrendered and ended his days in captivity at Alba Fucens. Gentius, too, was defeated and submitted. Macedon was disarmed ; the monarchy was abolished, and the country was divided into four districts, independent and definitely separated from one another. The Achaean League had aroused the suspicions of Rome, and 1000 of its leading members were deported as hostages to Italy. Eumenes escaped lightly : Rome would have been willing to favour his brother Attalus at his expense, but Attalus was loyal and Eumenes escaped with a warning. Rhodes had to pay more heavily for her show of independence ; she was kept in terror of a declaration of war and finally lost her territory on the mainland. The island of Delos was opened as a free port and drew off much of the trade of Rhodes. Paullus returned to Rome and triumphed in brilliant fashion. So great were the spoils of war that the *tributum*, or war-tax, on Roman citizens could be abolished for the future. A few words will suffice for the other eastern powers. Prusias of Bithynia had disguised under neutrality a marked hostility to Rome, but he escaped punishment by complete self-abasement. Ariarathes of Cappadocia had been an ally of Rome. In the north of Asia Minor, Pharnaces I of Pontus (c.190-169) had laid the foundations of the Pontic power and had taken Sinope (183). He was opposed to Rome, but came to no open conflict with her. Antiochus IV of Syria profited by Rome's entanglements to make war on Egypt. He was successful in Syria and had actually set foot in Egypt, when a Roman embassy appeared and peremptorily ordered him to retire. Antiochus blustered,

wavered and retired. More and more it was coming to be recognized that the commands of Rome, even as far away as Egypt, must be heard and obeyed.

SECTION 2. ROME AND THE WEST, TO C. 168 B.C.

While Rome was thus establishing a strong influence in the East, Italy and the West were anything but quiet. And we must remember, when we condemn Rome for the slackness with which she sometimes, as in 170 and 169, waged war, that she had many calls on her energies. In the years 201 to 197 there was serious trouble in north Italy and heavy fighting against the Boii and the Insubres. Placentia itself was sacked, but was restored in 198. The new province of Spain was at first assigned to proconsuls, but from 197 onwards to praetors. There were two commands, one in the north, the other in the south-east. The Spanish tribes were warlike and untamed, and in 197 disasters befell the Roman arms in both provinces. But in 195 M. Porcius Cato commanded with success in the north and made a distinct advance in the pacification of the country. War, however, continued with little respite, and in 181 the Celtiberians rose in force. In 180 Tib. Sempronius Gracchus, by adopting a new policy of friendly conciliation, did much to secure peace. The service in Spain was unpopular, and commanders were only too ready to abuse their power. In 171 facilities were given to the provincials to protect themselves against oppression, and some abuses were thus abolished. Sardinia was the scene of fighting in 181 and 178, but in 177-6 Gracchus pacified the province and brought so many Sardinians to the Roman slave-market that the term *Sardi venales* passed into a proverb. In the north-west of Italy there was persistent and wearisome warfare against the stubborn Ligurians, and Rome advanced but slowly. The Boii had again to be fought in 192-1, and the colonies

of Bononia, Mutina and Parma were founded to establish peace in their neighbourhood. In 177 a little war against the Istrians in north-east Italy was carried to a successful end. In Africa, Massinissa lived at perpetual feud with Carthage. Rome was only too pleased that her old rivals should be thus distracted and refused to make a satisfactory settlement of the vexed question of the boundary line; Massinissa was proving to be just what Rome had meant him to be, a perpetual thorn in the side of the Phoenician city.

SECTION 3. ROME AND THE EAST, TO C. 130 B.C.

In the East for many years there was a general peace, during which the influence of Rome came to be recognized as a powerful and permanent factor in politics. But then fresh trouble arose. In 150 a number of the deported Achaeans were allowed to return to their homes, and their arrival seems to have led at once to fresh disturbances. In 149 a series of petty disputes led to a war between the Achaean League and Sparta, which was destined to have important results. In this same year the Macedonians rose under a certain pretender Andriscus, but Q. Caecilius Metellus soon suppressed the rising. The constitution of 167 had proved a failure, and the country now became a province (148). Meanwhile, the unrest in Greece came to a head. Rome supported the cause of Sparta, and the league was led on by its hotspurs into a war, which involved a direct breach with Rome. The struggle was soon over. L. Mummius gained two decisive victories and, to make an example once for all, sacked Corinth. Commercial jealousy may have contributed to this, perhaps necessary, act of barbarism. All existing leagues in Greece were dissolved, and tribute was imposed on those states which had been hostile to Rome. But many communities remained free, and it is probably more correct for the present to speak of Greece as a Roman

protectorate than as a province. Such interference as was necessary was undertaken by the governor of Macedon.

For the East in general a few words will suffice. Attalus II reigned in Pergamum from 159 to 138. His successor, Attalus III, on his death, bequeathed his kingdom to Rome. Ariarathes V of Cappadocia (163 to 130) was a capable sovereign, and, like the two Attali, friendly to Rome. Pontus was steadily growing under its able monarch, Mithradates II (169 to 121). Prusias II of Bithynia was murdered in 149, and his successor Nicomedes, a shifty rogue, reigned in peace from 149 to 95. In the Further East, a line of Grecian sovereigns ruled in Bactria, until Scythian invaders conquered the country (about 140). The once great Seleucid Empire was rapidly on the decline, and the history of the competitors for the throne is not sufficiently important to justify us in following it through all its intricacies. Antiochus V died in 162 and Demetrius II, a nominee of Rome, succeeded him. In 150 Demetrius was driven out by a pretender named Alexander Balas, but returned to reign, with interruptions, down to 125. A second pretender, Tryphon, held power from 142 to 139. In 139 Demetrius was defeated and captured by the Parthians; his brother Antiochus VII overthrew Tryphon and reigned from 138 to 129. In the latter year Antiochus fell in battle against the Parthian Phraates, who then liberated Demetrius and restored him to his kingdom. The whole of the eastern provinces had been lost, and Parthia, under Mithradates I (174 to 136) and Phraates (136 to 127), had grown to be a considerable power. To this period belongs the great national struggle of the Jews under the Maccabees against the attempt of the Seleucid kings to impose Hellenic civilization on them. Success shifted from one party to the other, but the national movement, led in turn by Mattathias and Judas, Jonathan and Simon Maccabaeus, finally triumphed. John Hyrcanus, the successor of Simon, ruled Judaea as prince from 136 to

107; under him Judaea flourished, formed an alliance with Rome and subdued Edom, Sichem and Samaria. His successors were Judas Aristobulus and Judas's son Jannaeus Alexander (104 to 78). Like the Seleucid Empire, Egypt was sinking into political insignificance. Ptolemy V died in 180 and Ptolemy VI, a minor, succeeded him. From 170 to 163 his brother Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II Physcon shared his throne, but quarrelled with him, and was set to rule first Cyrene, and then Cyprus. Physcon ("Fat Paunch") returned to Egypt as sole ruler on his brother's death in 146 and reigned in peace and ignominy till 119. But this age of political decline in the eastern kingdoms was one of keen and not unproductive intellectual life. Pergamum was a centre of literature and art and is deservedly famous for its school of sculpture. Rhodes, too, was a wealthy and enterprising, though peaceful, state and ranked as a centre of intellectual life. Athens, though past her prime, was still a University city and exercised her old attraction on men of ability. Alexandria remained the chief home of scholarship and science; but, in Egypt as a whole, Hellenism was declining before a national Egyptian revival.

Into these currents of intellectual influence the comparatively barbarous Rome was now drawn. The effect was great and immediate. Roman literature grew fast, in entire dependence on Greek models, and even such an un-Roman pursuit as philosophy began to allure the chosen few. It was in vain that a good old conservative like Cato set his face against the new Greek ways. The opposition was prospectless; Cato himself could not escape the influence of the new and detested forces. A characteristic figure of the time is the historian Polybius. Starting political life in the Achaean League, he was among the Achaeans deported to Italy. In Rome he won the friendship of the younger Scipio and his circle, and, in these surroundings,

he conceived the great idea which he worked out in his history—the idea of Rome as the strong power, fashioned by fate to give peace and settled government to the civilized world.

SECTION 4. AFRICA, SPAIN AND SICILY, C. 168–130 B.C.

The West was the scene of great and stirring events. Carthage, though politically impotent, was still a great commercial city, and Romans of the stamp of Cato could not endure her continued success. The final quarrel arose out of the old weary frontier quarrels with Numidia. In 152 Carthage, unable to gain a decision at Rome, decided to settle her dispute with Massinissa by arms. Rome snatched at the pretext for war. In vain did Carthage humble herself and make all signs of submission: the more she gave the more was demanded of her. At last the citizens saw that there was no hope for them. But it was to be a case of *non moriemur inulte*. With the courage of desperation the Carthaginians raised a new defence and actually held out against overwhelming force from 150 to 146. But a capable general, Scipio Aemilianus, had the conduct of the war and, with almost unlimited power at his disposal, gave them no chance of escape. The city fell and was razed to the ground. The confiscated territory formed the new province of Africa, but Punic characteristics, notably the Punic tongue, long testified to the ancient rule. It was, no doubt, a good thing for the world, that Rome and not Carthage emerged victorious from the life and death struggle; but the grand careers of Hamilcar and Hannibal and the final heroic resistance of Carthage against hopeless odds will ever make the Carthaginian one of the great "lost causes" of history. Old Massinissa had died before the settlement in 149, and his kingdom was divided between his three sons, Micipsa, Gulussa and Mastanabal. We shall hear more of Numidia in a later section.

Spain continued to be a source of perpetual vexation to the Romans. In 153 a great revolt broke out among the Celtiberians and, a few years later, the Lusitanians in the south-west found a leader in the shepherd Viriathus and started war. For nine years did this second rebellion rage, and a number of Roman governors earned in it an ignominious title to fame. Finally the patriot leader was murdered, and the revolt collapsed. In the north the great revolt was soon suppressed. But quiet was not restored, and in 143 the little city of Numantia took up arms against Rome. The subsequent war and siege is one of the blackest disgraces on the Roman arms. Successive governors failed to reduce the stubborn little city. One of them, C. Hostilius Mancinus, suffered a disgraceful defeat and, to save his army, made an equally disgraceful treaty (137). It hardly mitigated the disgrace that the senate refused to ratify it and surrendered the general to the enemy. At length, in 134, Scipio, the conqueror of Carthage, was sent to take command. He first restored discipline in the utterly demoralized army and then began the siege in earnest. In 133 ended a struggle in which all the honours remained with the conquered.

Other wars there were, but none of any importance—a Ligurian war in 166, a Dalmatian campaign in 156, a war with the Gauls round Massalia in 154 and with the Illyrians in 143. In spite of all blunders, Rome was steadily establishing settled conditions of quiet in the western Mediterranean. Yet one other trouble clouded the horizon—serious in itself and of evil omen for the future. Sicily, as a province, had become the scene of a great system of agriculture by slave labour. The immense number of the slaves, discontented and justly discontented with their hard lot, soon began to show itself as a serious danger. In 135 they rose in revolt under a certain Eunus, who took the style of king Antiochus; for three years the island was the scene

of war and riot, but in 132 P. Rupilius suppressed the revolt, and the *Lex Rupilia* reorganized the conditions of the island. The war was an unpleasant symptom of a social malady, steadily eating like a hidden canker and always liable to show itself in horrible outbreaks such as this.

SECTION 5. HOME POLITICS OF ROME, C. 200-130 B.C.

These years of rapid development abroad were not uneventful at home, and that deep change in the Roman constitution began to take place which finally led to the downfall of the Republic. The senate was now the recognized but unofficial leader of the state. But the constant wars, often necessitating the prolongation of a single command over a number of years, encouraged new and disquieting ambitions in the nobles. We find, therefore, a marked disposition on the part of the senate to impose new limitations on the magisterial powers. A definite stage is marked by the *Lex Villia Annalis* of 180. A certain order of tenure of office had long been recognized in practice; this law gave it definite legal validity. The chief state offices were now to follow one another in the order:—quaestorship, praetorship, consulship. The aedileship, when held, usually followed the quaestorship. Ten years' military service (from 18 to 28) opened the young noble's career. At 28 he could be elected quaestor, at 31 aedile, at 34 praetor, and at 37 consul. In 151 re-election to the consulship, which had before been allowed after an interval of ten years, was absolutely prohibited. The tribunate was still an unenterprising servant of the senate. Re-election to it had come to be reckoned illegal—at what time we do not know. The censorship played a very important rôle in politics. The two burning questions that each pair of censors had to face were these—(1) Shall Latins be

enrolled under the prescribed conditions as citizens? (2) Shall freedmen be enrolled in all, or only in the city tribes? The progressive party was inclined to be liberal on the second of these points, but agreed with its more conservative opponents in being absolutely rigid on the former. Roman citizenship was steadily rising in value, and, while differences of status between citizens were gradually disappearing, the gulf between citizen and ally grew wider every year. In 189 all Latin communities were compelled to undergo a Roman census, and, about the same date, 12,000 Latin immigrants were expelled from Rome. In 186 the Bacchanalian worship, with its immoral and unsettling tendencies, drew down the vengeance of the senate, and a vigorous inquisition was prosecuted, not in Rome only, but throughout Italy. Of a few important censorships some details may be given. Cato and his supporter Flaccus in 184 showed strong conservative tendencies in attacking luxury and in rigorously revising the rolls of the senate and the knights. In 179 M. Aemilius Lepidus and Fulvius Nobilior, while liberal in their treatment of freedmen, ordered Latin immigrants of recent standing to return from Rome to their homes. Things had come to such a pass that men were actually found who preferred the status of freedman to that of Latin. In 169 C. Claudius Pulcher and Tib. Sempronius Gracchus, two strong reformers, came into collision with the capitalists and with the tribunes, who supported them; but, defended by the senate, the censors carried the day.

The time was one of busy legislation in various fields. The Porcian laws, not known in any detail, protected the Roman citizen against corporal chastisement. A number of laws were directed against political bribery, and the ballot was introduced in turn for elections, popular trials and ordinary votes in the assembly. Increasing luxury called forth energetic but futile repressive legislation. Many

Romans looked with alarm on the progressive emancipation of women, and the *Lex Vocontia* of 169 limited their power to acquire wealth by inheritance. The provinces, too, required legislation. At a very early date, Roman rule began to be oppressive in a variety of ways. Apart from irregular extortions on the part of the governor—and these were frequent—there was the systematic plundering of the provincials by Roman men of business, who looked to the governor for protection and support, and took care to punish him later, if he failed them. Complaints at Rome were frequent, and, in 149, the *Lex Calpurnia de repetundis* appointed a special court of *judices*, chosen by the *praetor peregrinus* from the senate, to try cases of extortion. This law may have been some check on official abuse, but the unofficial exploitation continued. And what made the evil hopeless was the fact that the taxes were not directly collected by state officials, but were sold to companies of private speculators (*publicani*), who paid down a lump sum to the state and then recovered it, and as much more as possible, from the provincials. It was a terrible evil—and an incurable one.

Native Roman religion was on the decline. Two laws—the *Leges Aelia* and *Fufia*—introduced, it is true, order into the religious regulations governing the holding of assemblies. But religion was no longer a vital force in politics, and genuine old religious scruples were now used and abused for purely secular and political purposes. Greek philosophy, and, in particular, Greek scepticism, found their way into Rome; while, at the same time, such an emotional foreign cult as that of the Mother of the Gods was adopted as national. Literature, too, contributed its share to the dissolution of the rough, but tough, old Roman character. Slavery was a corrupt and corrupting influence. There was much oppression, and the sufferings of the slaves on the big landed estates (*latifundia*) must have been

horrible beyond words. In Rome, a city mob began to form, and the cry was heard for cheap corn and many games. Rome had won an empire, but there was a heavy price to pay—a price that must be chiefly paid out of what had been best and soundest in the old Italian state.

SECTION 6. THE AGE OF THE GRACCHI, 133–90 B.C.

For a long time our main interest has centred on Rome's foreign development, which has been so rapid and engrossing that internal affairs have played a relatively unimportant part. All this is now altered. The seeds of old trouble begin at last to spring up, and discussions that have been postponed by foreign conquest at last demand solution. The first question that introduced violent discord into politics was that of the land. Conquests in Italy had brought vast stretches of territory into the possession of the state. This land was treated in various ways; some was assigned to colonies, some to individual farmers; another part was let out on lease by the censor; the remaining part—very considerable in amount—was left open to *possessio* or occupation—that is, any citizen might use it for agriculture or pasturage, in return for a merely nominal rent. This land still remained state property (*ager publicus*) but, in practice, it came to be treated entirely as private and, as such, was sold, bequeathed and mortgaged. As usually happens, the wealthy classes practically monopolized the use of it, and, with so much land withdrawn from use, the small farmer class suffered desperately from "land hunger." The foundation of colonies helped to allay the evil, and it was no doubt due to this that the outcry was delayed till so late as this. But only a radical treatment of the question could possibly save the small landholder, and any intelligent and sympathetic Roman, travelling through Italy about the year

140, must have been struck by the ominous concentration of land in a few hands. It was, in fact, the actual sight of the evil in operation that led the young Tiberius Gracchus, son of the famous consul and censor, and of Cornelia, daughter of Scipio Africanus, to undertake to find a political remedy. In 134 he was elected tribune and at once let it be known that he intended to devote himself to the land question. Nor did he lack influential supporters; such distinguished men as P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus, Appius Claudius and P. Mucius Scaevola were ready with their advice and support. The enthusiasm among the poorer classes was immense. They welcomed Gracchus as a deliverer and were ready to flock to Rome to vote for his proposals. But equally vehement was the opposition. This was an attack on that which the wealthy always hold most sacred—on their money-bags—and their opposition was naturally of the bitterest. Nor was it entirely without justification. The abuse went very far back, and any attempt to remedy it was certain to inflict heavy losses on many who were personally innocent. The proposals brought forward by Gracchus in 133 were, however, not extreme. The limitations to occupation of the *ager publicus*, fixed by the Licinian Rogations of 367, were re-enacted; but, as a concession to the actual facts, each holder was to be allowed to retain as private property 500 jugera, with an extra 250 for each son. The remainder was to be resumed by the state and distributed among poor citizens. To ensure the permanence of the reform, the sale of this land was prohibited for the future. The wealthy classes strained every nerve to defeat the measure and found a tribune, M. Octavius, to interpose his veto. But Gracchus refused to be checked. He proposed to Octavius that one of them should resign office and, when Octavius declined this irregular proposition, illegally put the measure to the vote and carried it by a large majority. Octavius

was deposed from office and replaced by a nominee of Tiberius. Three land commissioners were appointed—Tiberius, his younger brother Gaius, and his friend Appius Claudius, and the work began. At this moment the news reached Rome that Attalus III of Pergamum had bequeathed his kingdom to the Roman people. Gracchus at once announced his intention of proposing the appropriation of the royal treasures to enable the new landowners to stock their farms. But his year of office was drawing to an end, and he had to stand for re-election to the tribunate. This was illegal, but he had gone too far to draw back. His opponents, however, were desperate men, and, a riot arising, the senate and their followers murdered Gracchus. A commission was appointed to try Tiberius's adherents, and the frightened rich wreaked a heavy vengeance. But the senate dared not abolish Gracchus's work at a blow. His place on the commission was filled by his friend Licinius Crassus, and, for the time, the distribution of land continued. When Scipio Aemilianus returned victorious from Numantia in 132, men waited with eager interest to hear his verdict. It ran—

“ὥς ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος, ὃ τις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι ;”

The schemes of Gracchus were too bold and perilous for the moderate man. Thus ended the first attempt to save the Italian farmer. That Gracchus was honest, disinterested and actuated by noble motives is certain ; it is no less certain that he lost his coolness in the heat of the conflict and allowed himself to be rushed into unconstitutional action. But it is easy to condemn—far harder to suggest what line of action he should have chosen. It was certainly intolerable that a reform, ardently demanded by a large majority of the voters, should be thwarted by the veto of a single tribune ; yet that was the law of the constitution. The time, in fact, had come when only two


courses were open—generous concessions on the part of the privileged classes, or revolution. The new mongrel aristocracy lacked the magnanimity and wisdom which had led the Patricians to give way to the Plebs without wrecking the state; the opposition was too strong to be overruled, and revolution naturally followed. Gracchus died a martyr to his political creed; his death atoned for his mistakes, and the guilt of innocent blood rested on the victors. He died for the terrible crime of having assailed the sacred rights of property, and the venomous hatred of the rich for such a criminal act still colours our accounts of him. Anyone who has studied the psychology of wealthy classes and has observed that property is only sacred to them when it is their own will estimate such abuse at its true worth. There were a few genuine patriots, who saw in Gracchus a menace to the constitution; there were many purblind egoists, who saw in him a danger to their personal interests and naturally called it patriotism to remove him.

For the time the victory of the senate was complete. In 130 two of the land commissioners, Crassus and Claudius, died, and M. Fulvius Flaccus and C. Papirius Carbo took their places. But a way was found to suspend their action, by taking away from them their judicial powers and transferring these to one of the consuls; when the consul soon afterwards went abroad things came to a standstill. Abroad, the chief event was a rebellion in Asia under a pretender Aristonicus. The rising was suppressed in 130, and in 129 the consul M'. Aquilius regulated the new province of Asia. Lycaonia and Cilicia Aspera were not included, but were given to Cappadocia, and Magna Phrygia was bestowed on Mithradates I of Pontus, only to be withdrawn shortly afterwards. In the succeeding years, there were small wars in Illyria (129), Corsica (126-4) and in Gaul, to the north of Massalia (126-3). At home there was the hush that precedes a storm. In 131 Carbo, now leader of

the popular party, proposed that re-election to the tribunate should be allowed. The senate saw the danger of the proposal and took care to defeat it. In 129 Scipio Aemilianus met his death under suspicious circumstances ; he was almost certainly murdered, but we do not know by whom. He was the moderate man, hated by extremists on both sides ; the senate did not trust him, and the opposition could not forgive him his abandonment of the cause of Tiberius Gracchus. The question of the allies and their status began to be a burning one. A proposal was brought forward that the citizenship should be given to them ; the senate disapproved of this radical—but really politic—suggestion and retorted by an expulsion of aliens from Rome. In 125 Flaccus as consul renewed the proposal, but was forced to abandon it. The danger of raising hopes only to dash them was soon seen in the revolt of Fregellae (125). It was easily crushed, but, for all who had eyes to see—though such were few at the time in Rome—it was a dangerous omen for the future. In the summer of 124 Gaius Gracchus returned from Corsica, and was elected tribune. He was known to be moved by the bitterest indignation over his brother's murder, and the opposition at once hailed him as their heaven-sent leader.

SECTION 7. THE CAREER OF C. GRACCHUS

Gaius Gracchus was one of the most remarkable men produced by the Roman Republic. Less simply noble-hearted than his elder brother he possessed an acuteness of political insight far surpassing his. His activity was, in the main, simply destructive. But it is not fair to assume that he was altogether lacking in constructive ability ; in happier times he might have been a great creative force. But he lived in days when an old constitution was faced with new problems for which it was unadapted. Adaptation



The Roman Forum

was difficult, with the best of will on all sides. With the selfish and unintelligent policy of the *optimates*, as the senatorial party now came to be called, it was impossible, and revolution was the essential step before new conditions could be introduced. Nor must we forget the bitter personal animosity that animated Gaius from the first. Revenge for his brother was one of the first objects that he pursued, and, though we may regret this as a weakness in his character, it was surely a pardonable and very human failing. The result was that Gaius's work was mainly revolutionary, and that, perhaps almost unconsciously, he worked directly for the overthrow of the Republic and the foundation of a military monarchy.

Concerning the exact sequence of Gaius's political acts we have only very imperfect information, and the order in which we narrate them must be understood to be purely tentative. Gaius began with an act of political vengeance. Popilius, who had been head of the commission that tried Tiberius's adherents, was summoned to trial and went into exile to escape certain condemnation. Gaius then brought in a law arranging for the distribution of corn at half the market price to the city mob, another mitigating the hardships of military service, and a third, providing that the taxes of Asia should be sold to *publicani*. At the same time the land commission was set again in working order, probably by the restoration of its powers of jurisdiction. These acts probably belong to the year 123. They show great political ingenuity, but no main guiding principle beyond the desire to win support from any and every side. In 123 Gaius was re-elected tribune against the law. Now, probably late in 123, he carried a law transferring the seats on the juries from the senate to the knights, and thus founded the political importance of the equestrian order. To this class belonged, as a whole, the *publicani* who raised the taxes, and the control of the juries gave them a

powerful hold on the senatorial governors. Any governor who attempted to repress their extortions was now liable to be tried and sentenced for extortion by these blood-suckers! To win popular support, Gaius also proposed new colonies at Capua and Tarentum. So far the senate had been unable to oppose Gaius's cleverly-calculated proposals. The means of opposition that they now devised were almost more desperate than complete passivity. They set up a tribune of their own party, a certain M. Livius Drusus, to outbid Gracchus for popular support. Twelve colonies were to be founded, rent for all land allotments was to be remitted and Latin soldiers were to be exempt from the punishment of scourging; all three proposals were quite insincere and aimed simply at winning votes. Meanwhile Gracchus continued his restless activity. A new colony was to be sent to Carthage, and a *Lex Sempronia de provinciis consularibus* required the senate to assign the provinces, to be given to the consuls, before their election—a severe blow to the influence of the senate over the magistrates. But, more important still, Gracchus, finding his previous supporters failing him, made a direct bid for the support of the allies; he proposed the conferment of the franchise on all Latins. All this time Gaius was restlessly active, carrying out the details of his many proposals. He was absent from Rome for seventy days, supervising the foundation of the colony at Carthage, and his enemies seem to have made good use of his absence. On his return he failed to carry his franchise bill, and, worse still, he failed to gain re-election to the tribunate for 122. His constitutional position was lost, and only force could save him from the vengeance of his enemies. That he did not deliberately start an armed revolution speaks well for his self-command. Early in 121, however, the senate passed the *senatus consultum ultimum*, calling on the consuls to look to it that the state suffered no harm, equivalent to

a proclamation of a state of martial law. Gracchus was murdered in a street affray and his friends were massacred in numbers with him. The senate could boast itself victor. But Gracchus's work lived after him, and the shades of the murdered brothers were soon to be appeased by blood offerings in plenty.

SECTION 8. ROME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 121-90 B.C.

The second revolutionary had been removed, and it only remained to abolish as much as possible of his work. For the moment his party was helpless. In 121 permission was given to sell the allotments of land and, in 118, the distribution ceased. In 119 Carbo, a leading democrat, was impeached for high treason and committed suicide, whilst an attack on Opimius, who had led the assault on Gaius Gracchus, had failed in the previous year. In these years began the public career of a man who was destined afterwards to become famous; C. Marius was tribune in 119, praetor in 115 and, although showing no marked political ability, attracted attention by his resolution and ambition to succeed. A few wars of no great importance occupied Rome abroad. In 122 and the following years the Romans, in alliance with the Aedui, defeated the Arverni and the Allobroges in Gaul. The *Via Domitia* was carried from Forum Julii, past Aquae Sextiae, to Spain; in 118 the colony of Narbo was founded and, about the same time, the south-west of Gaul became a province under the name of Gallia Narbonensis. There were campaigns against Dalmatia in 119, and against various Alpine tribes in 118, 115 and 114.

But the scene of the only war of importance was laid in Africa. Micipsa, the last to survive of the three sons of Massinissa, died in 118, leaving his kingdom to be shared between his sons, Hiempsal and Adherbal, and his nephew, Jugurtha, an illegitimate son of Mastanabal.

Jugurtha was an able and unscrupulous young prince, a good soldier, trained in the Roman army and well acquainted from personal knowledge with the unamiable little weaknesses of the greedy Roman nobles. His plan was to push aside his rivals, seize Numidia for himself and buy a *post factum* pardon at Rome. With this programme in mind, he murdered Hiempsal and drove Adherbal to flight. Adherbal appealed to Rome as the suzerain of Numidia, but Jugurtha's bribes were effective, and a Roman commission assigned the west of Numidia to him and left only the east to his rival. Jugurtha at once provoked a war and besieged Adherbal in Cirta. A Roman embassy was sent to protest; Jugurtha beguiled it with fair words and proceeded to capture Cirta and murder the prince. But here he had gone too far. There was a furious outbreak of indignation at Rome against Jugurtha and, in 111, the consul L. Calpurnius Bestia was despatched to fight him. Money again passed from Jugurtha's coffers into Roman pockets and bought him a favourable peace. But this bribery was too notorious to be disguised, and Jugurtha was called to Rome to give account. He obeyed the call, but soon found it expedient to flee—not before he had murdered his cousin Massiva, who was putting in a claim for the throne. War was now certain, and the consul Sp. Postumius Albinus, took the field; but his brother Aulus was defeated, while commanding in his absence. In Rome a commission was appointed to investigate the scandalous bribes of the past years, and inflicted severe penalties on the culprits (109). In the same year, the consul Q. Caecilius Metellus, a capable officer, proceeded to the war. He soon began to make headway, and gained a hard-won victory on the River Muthul. But his advance was slow, and C. Marius, his lieutenant, saw a chance of earning laurels for himself. In 108 he returned to Rome, was elected consul and entrusted with the command against

Jugurtha. Marius, with the young L. Cornelius Sulla under him, took the field in 107. Metellus found some consolation for his unjust recall in a triumph and the surname of Numidicus. Jugurtha had secured an alliance with king Bocchus of Mauretania and by no means abandoned hope. But, in 107, Marius gained a victory near Cirta and took the stronghold of Capsa. The decisive success that ended the war was due to the skill and energy of Sulla, who, on a mission to Bocchus, persuaded the king to abandon Jugurtha's cause. As a result, Jugurtha was entrapped and delivered to Rome, and the war was at an end. The west of Numidia was given to Bocchus, the east to Gauda, a son of Mastanabal. The war offered several interesting lessons to the student of politics ; it had shown up the corruption of the Roman nobility, it had revealed the military genius of Marius and it had given a hint of his future conflict with his younger rival Sulla. The army, too, is strangely changed in composition ; instead of a genuine citizen army we begin to find a host of paupers and allies ; the first steps towards a professional standing army were being taken.

More dangerous than the Jugurthine war was a sudden storm that broke upon Italy from the North and, for a moment, seemed to threaten Rome with destruction. As early as 113 a horde of Cimbri and Teutones, migrating with their wives and children from Germany, appeared in the north-east Alps and defeated a Roman army at Noreia. Some Gallic tribes joined them, and in 109 the whole mass appeared on the borders of Gallia Narbonensis, demanding land. The demand was refused, but the Roman general, M. Junius Silanus, suffered a heavy defeat. In 107 yet another Roman general fell in battle against them, and, to crown all, in 105 two Roman armies, failing to co-operate with one another, were practically annihilated near Arausio on the Rhone. Rome at last became alive to the immensity of the danger, and Marius was elected consul for 104.

Fortunately for Rome, the barbarians turned south to Spain, and Marius had time to carry through reforms that greatly increased the fighting power of the Roman army. The poorer citizens were employed, not only as light-armed troops, but also as heavy infantry, and men were enrolled, not for a single campaign, but for a full term of sixteen years' service. The allies served as cavalry and light-armed troops. Before the end of 104 Marius was on the watch for the enemy in Gaul. Consul again in 103, he saw the horde return from Spain. The Teutones pushed forward against Italy on the west, while the Cimbri marched round to break in from the north-east. The consuls for 102 were Marius for the fourth time and Q. Lutatius Catulus. Marius cut to pieces the Teutones at Aquae Sextiae in Gaul, and joined Catulus in 101 to oppose the invading Cimbri in north Italy. The decisive victory of Vercellae put an end to the peril, and the fame of deliverer fell to Marius. He had held the consulship in four consecutive years, and was elected for the sixth time for the year 100. In the face of overwhelming danger constitutional prohibitions were readily overlooked.

In other parts of the Roman world, too, there were serious disturbances. Sicily, in particular, was the scene of a second ruinous servile war. In 104 the slaves rose under two leaders—Salvius, self-styled Tryphon, and Athenio—and the latter soon became Tryphon's loyal lieutenant. At first the slaves gained several victories over the Romans, and it was not till 101 that the consul M'. Aquilius defeated Athenio, who commanded after Tryphon's death. Soon afterwards Athenio died, and by 99 the last embers of the revolt had been stamped out. In Spain, the Lusitanians and the Celtiberians both troubled the Roman governors; and Macedon suffered invasions from the north in 92 and 88. In the eastern Mediterranean the pirates, with their centre in Cilicia, were becoming a serious nuisance. The great

sea-powers of the East had declined, and Rome neglected her obvious duty of providing an efficient sea-police. In 103 the praetor M. Antonius was sent against them, and a province of Cilicia was probably formed ; the main evil, however, was only partially checked. Cyrene, where Ptolemy Apion reigned from 117 to 90, was bequeathed by him at his death to Rome but was not immediately organized as a province. In the north of Asia Minor a man was rising to power, who was destined seriously to challenge Rome's dominion in the East. Mithradates Eupator, a man of great physical and mental vigour, but of semi-barbarous character, made himself king of Pontus about the year 114. Nominally he had succeeded to the throne in 121, but there was internal trouble in the country and for some years he had led a life of peril and adventure. The Greek cities of the Pontus were hard pressed by the barbarians of the interior, and they looked to the vigorous young prince for protection. He undertook the task and discharged it with entire success. He became king in Bosphorus and ruled over a genuine kingdom of the Black Sea. His ambitions went further still. In 105 he agreed with Nicomedes of Bithynia to partition Paphlagonia and also intrigued for a hold on Cappadocia. In 96 the senate declared these two countries independent, and the royal plotters withdrew. But in 93 Tigranes, son-in-law of Mithradates, who had founded a new great power in Armenia, acting on his instigation, conquered Cappadocia. Sulla, as proprætor in Cilicia in 92, restored the native prince Ariobarzanes ; but it was clearly felt on both sides that a final settlement had yet to be made. Mithradates's schemes of self-aggrandizement led him into direct opposition to Rome, and on the Roman side there was no disposition to shirk the challenge.

SECTION 9. INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ROME, 120-90 B.C.

At Rome itself, the opposition party, now styled the *populares*, helpless after the murder of Gaius Gracchus, was beginning to raise its head, and had found new leaders in L. Appuleius Saturninus and C. Servilius Glaucia. In 103 Saturninus, as tribune, had passed a law giving back to the knights the seats on the juries, which had for a time been reclaimed for the senate. In the year 100 a deliberate attack on the constitutionalists was planned. Saturninus was tribune, Glaucia praetor and Marius, now consul for the sixth time, allowed himself to be won for their policy. Marius was a self-made man and had little sympathy for the nobles, who looked a little too superciliously on the gauche, but able, officer. But he was no revolutionary—in fact he was hardly a politician at all, in the sense of having a definite political policy—and his adhesion to the democratic cause brought ruin on his associates and discredit on himself. The proposals of Saturninus followed the old democratic tradition. New territory, acquired in north Italy, was to be distributed to individual citizens; the price of corn for distribution was to be reduced to a merely nominal figure; colonies were to be founded outside Italy, and Marius was empowered, within limits, to confer citizenship on deserving soldiers. To the land-law all senators were required to swear obedience, and Q. Caecilius Metellus chose rather to go into exile than submit to a hated measure. But the coalition was a purely artificial one, and Marius soon lost touch with his colleagues. For the year 99 Saturninus was again candidate for the tribunate, Glaucia for the consulship. The senate again resorted to violent repression and passed the *senatus consultum ultimum*, and Marius, as consul, perhaps half unwillingly, drew the sword against men who had but a few months before been his close allies. The leaders of the opposition were

massacred, and, in 98, Metellus returned from exile. Marius had wasted in political intrigue the fame which he had won on the battlefield, and left Rome for the East.

A notorious political scandal gives us a glimpse into the shameful conditions prevailing in the provinces. P. Rutilius Rufus, as legate of the proconsul Scaevola in Asia, had distinguished himself by an honest and plucky refusal to assist the *publicani* in their oppressions. In 92 he was prosecuted at Rome for extortion and found guilty by the equestrian jury! He withdrew to Smyrna, in the province which he had plundered, and was welcomed by his victims with the highest honours!

The question of the allies and their relation to Rome had long exercised men's minds. The allies felt bitterly that they were obtaining no fair reward for their loyal service; they were losing rather than gaining in position; they had no sufficient protection against oppression by Roman magistrates, and Roman citizenship was steadily denied them, just when it began to appear a desirable possession. The statesmen of Rome showed a lack of generosity and insight that can hardly be explained and never justified. They neglected an insistent demand for plain justice and seemed to have no conception of the peril to which this course exposed the state. In 95 the consuls passed a law *de civibus regendis*, to inquire into the claims of individuals to citizenship. Excitement was intense throughout Italy, and the events of the next few years led to a bloody outbreak. In December 92 the young M. Livius Drusus, a liberal-minded member of the senatorial party, came forward with bold political proposals. These were (1) that new colonies should be founded in Italy and Sicily, (2) that the senate should be supplemented by 300 new members, drawn from the knights, and that from this enlarged body the jurymen should be selected, (3) that the distributions of free corn should be increased. Drusus,

though no democrat, seems to have realized that reform alone could stave off revolution, and to have made an honest attempt to find a reasonable solution for the burning questions of politics. But a strong opposition soon showed itself among the knights and even in the senate, and the consul L. Marcius Philippus placed himself at its head. Drusus, meanwhile, took a step, which lost him much of the sympathy which he still enjoyed. He opened negotiations with the allies, and, after he had failed to secure re-election for the tribunate in 90, definitely threw in his lot with them and pledged himself to obtain for them the Roman franchise. He had succeeded in passing a single law combining in one several of his distinct proposals, when he suddenly met with his death—probably by murder. The news of his end was the signal to the allies to raise the standard of revolt. If Rome would not have them as her citizens, they would prove that they could do without her.

SECTION 10. THE SOCIAL WAR. MARIUS, CINNA AND SULLA

The war that ensued, the so-called "Social War," is only known to us in its general outlines, and we must be content to dispense with details of the campaigns. And yet it was a struggle of the first magnitude, a struggle for life and death, which, had the result been different, would have seriously affected the future destinies of the world. And in the first year a very little would have turned the scale against Rome. The main strength of the rebels lay in the centre and south of Italy, where the Marsi, Paeligni, Vestini, Marrucini, Samnites, Lucani and others took arms. Corfinium was recognized as the allied capital, and a senate of 500, 2 consuls and 12 praetors were appointed. The allies clearly intended to destroy Rome and put in her

place a new Italic state. The main objects of Roman strategy were (1) to prevent further revolts in Umbria and Etruria, (2) to shield Rome herself from attack, (3) to hold Campania, (4) to promote desertions from the enemy. The first year of the war (90) was, on the whole, unfavourable to Rome. In the south, where the allied general C. Papius Mutilus faced L. Julius Caesar and Sulla, Aesernia, Venusia and much of Campania were taken by the rebels. In the north the Romans fared better. P. Rutilius Lupus, the consul, was defeated, but Marius gained a victory, and the siege of Asculum was commenced. In 89 the fortune of Rome began to assert itself. The consuls Cn. Pompeius Strabo and L. Porcius Cato were both commanding in the north, while Sulla was general in the south. Marius, for unknown reasons, disappears from the war. Pompeius was very successful both in diplomacy and fighting; Asculum fell, and the revolt died down in all the surrounding parts. Sulla was equally successful in Campania and Samnium and took the Samnite capital, Bovianum. But the need of conciliation was at last recognized. In 89 the *Lex Calpurnia* empowered generals to confer the citizenship on individuals, the *Lex Plautia Papiria* conferred franchise, under certain conditions and restrictions, on all Italy, and the *Lex Pompeia* gave the franchise to Cispadane Gaul. These measures completed what Roman victories had begun. The strength of the allies declined, and the war died away into a series of small but desperate struggles on the part of the few irreconcilables. How the new citizens were enrolled we do not know; their enrolment was a matter for arrangement by the censors and various devices were probably tried. At any rate this important work was not carried out with due efficiency and celerity.

For the year 88 Sulla was elected consul, with the prospect of the command in the war against Mithradates, which was now imminent. But Marius was back in Rome

and entered into an alliance with the tribune P. Sulpicius Rufus against the rival who had, we may imagine, helped to oust him from his command in the Social war. Rufus came forward with a series of new proposals. Exiles were to be recalled, new citizens and freedmen were to be enrolled in all thirty-five tribes, and the command in the East was to be given to Marius. But Sulla had no intention of losing his just rights through this sort of political trickery. He convinced his army at Nola of the justice of his claims and marched straight on Rome. Rufus was murdered, and Marius narrowly escaped into exile. The proposals, which Rufus had carried, were repealed, and the tribunes were coerced by a regulation that the consent of the senate should first be obtained, before they could bring any measures before the tribes. Three hundred new senators were enrolled, and certain changes were made in the *Comitia Centuriata* and *Comitia Tributa*, calculated to increase the influence of the wealthy. Sulla himself then set out for the East, where a serious war awaited him. Of the consuls for 87, one, Cn. Octavius, was an optimate, the other, L. Cornelius Cinna, a democrat. Sulla must have foreseen the possibility of a reaction during his absence, but the war urgently demanded his presence, and he had learnt that the commander of the legions could speak the deciding word in Rome. From the Italians there was little more to be feared. Pompeadius Silo, who had been the heart and soul of the revolt, was dead, and, with his death, all serious fighting ceased.

After Sulla's departure to Greece, Cinna revealed his hand. He proposed that all men exiled by Sulla should be recalled and that new citizens and freedmen should be enrolled in all thirty-five tribes—a renewal, in fact, of the bill of Rufus. Party strife ran high at Rome, and Cinna was driven to flight; but the army at Capua welcomed him, and Marius, whose wanderings had taken him to

Africa, returned and landed in Etruria. Cn. Pompeius, who was in command of an army in the north, temporized at first; when finally he declared for the senate, it was too late. Rome surrendered to Cinna and Marius, and the two conquerors celebrated their restoration by a series of brutal massacres. Marius, always a morose and lonely nature, had been embittered by undeserved neglect and returned with wild beast fury to gratify his one remaining passion, vengeance. He was elected consul with Cinna for 86—the prophecy that he should seven times hold Rome's highest office was thus fulfilled—but died at the very beginning of the year. Political power in Rome remained with Cinna, and a colleague, Carbo, now begins to come to the front. Sulla had been declared a public enemy, and Flaccus, with Fimbria as legate, was sent out to displace him. Of the fate of these two men we shall hear later. Rome was virtually in a state of chaos and anarchy; the official government was felt to be nothing but a usurpation, and even its supporters must have realized that there could be no security until a settlement had been made with Sulla.

SECTION II. SULLA AND THE EAST

But, for the moment, Sulla's attention was fully taken up with foreign affairs. We have seen above how Mithradates of Pontus had drifted into opposition to Rome; the Social war in Italy offered him a chance too good to be missed. In 94 Nicomedes III succeeded Nicomedes II in Bithynia; Mithradates supported the rival claims of his brother Socrates, and at the same time drove Ariobarzanes from Cappadocia. The latter king and Nicomedes III appealed to Rome for protection; M'. Aquilius was sent to protest, and Mithradates seemed inclined to give way. But, when Nicomedes deliberately provoked him by invading Paphlagonia, Mithradates resolved on war (89). The forces

put in the field against him by Rome, consisting mainly of Asiatics, were routed in several actions; he seized Bithynia and Asia and re-occupied Cappadocia. The envoy, M'. Aquilius, was put to death, and, probably in order to commit the natives to his cause, Mithradates ordered a general massacre of Italians in Asia Minor. His fleet controlled the Aegean, Delos was taken and only Rhodes held out against him. His successes had not even yet reached their zenith. Athens, under the political guidance of Aristion, welcomed a garrison from him, and his general Archelaus landed in 88 in Greece and made himself master of most of the land. This was the position of affairs in 87, when Sulla at last landed in Greece. He at once proceeded to a siege of Athens and the Peiraeus, while his lieutenant Lucullus set about raising a fleet. In March 86 Athens fell, and Sulla soon afterwards gained a great victory at Chaeronea. Mithradates had made himself hated in Asia by his ferocity, and, on the first news of Roman successes, Ephesus and other cities revolted from him. About this time the Marian leader Flaccus, with his lieutenant Fimbria, landed in Greece, but, avoiding Sulla, marched by land to the north of Asia Minor. Early in 85 Sulla gained a second great victory at Orchomenus, and all was over with the hopes of the great king in Greece. In Asia, Fimbria murdered his chief Flaccus and, assuming the command, defeated Mithradates and shut him up in Pergamum. Lucullus gained a decisive victory at sea off Tenedos, and Mithradates, through his general Archelaus, consented to discuss terms of peace with Sulla. He was to surrender his fleet and all prisoners of war, to evacuate the province of Asia, Bithynia and Paphlagonia, Galatia and Cappadocia, and to pay an indemnity of 2000 talents. After some delay peace was concluded on these terms, though, for the time, it was not ratified at Rome. Sulla could now deal with the rival Roman leader. He moved his army to

Asia Minor, and Fimbria, deserted by his men, committed suicide (84). Asia had to pay dearly for its revolt, by supplying a sum of 20,000 talents, and this blow, following on the miseries of the Mithradatic occupation, must well-nigh have exhausted the unhappy province. Sulla spent the winter in Greece; early in 83 he landed at Brundisium with 40,000 devoted men. His clear judgment and iron will had triumphed over all difficulties. He had refused to be disturbed in his purpose, until the prestige of Rome was restored in the East; that task done, he had leisure to deal with the so-called government which had been engaged in hampering and condemning him. The armies at the disposal of the enemy in Italy far outnumbered his; but Sulla's troops were veterans and were devotedly attached to his person, and he calculated, with perfect correctness, that they would suffice for his purpose.

Syria and Egypt were now condemned to play purely secondary parts in politics. In Syria we find constant disputes over the throne, between Antiochus VIII Grypus and Antiochus IX Cyzicenus, and later between Antiochus X and Seleucus VI, but no real importance attaches to these petty complications. In Egypt the wretched Physcon had died in 117 and his widow Cleopatra ruled in his place until 89, when she was murdered by her son Alexander; the murderer died in 88, and his brother Lathyrus succeeded him. Egypt, like Syria, politically speaking, had had its day.

After Sulla's decisive victory at Orchomenus in 85, the Marian party saw clearly that they would have to fight for their lives. They at once began to raise troops. Cinna was murdered in 84 in a riot at Ancona, and Carbo succeeded to the command and held the consulship without a colleague. Sulla, on landing in Italy, was at once joined by Metellus and Cn. Pompey, and defeated the consul Norbanus at Canusium; the army of the other consul,

L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, deserted to him without a battle at Teanum (83). Diplomacy was as strong a weapon in Sulla's hand as was the sword, and he contrived to gain the support of large numbers of the new citizens. For 82 Carbo and C. Marius, son of the old general, were consuls. Marius was defeated at Signia, and Sulla marched on and occupied Rome without a fight. The opposition still carried on the war in the north, but Metellus and Pompey were successful in Umbria and Picenum, and, although Sulla failed to gain a decisive success at Clusium, Carbo and Norbanus were disastrously routed in Cisalpine Gaul. Carbo deserted his troops and fled to Africa, and his army was defeated and surrendered. The war was virtually over, but there was still one terrible and dramatic scene to come. The last of the Italians to continue the hopeless struggle, the Samnites, roused themselves for a final effort of despairing revenge. Sulla returned only just in time to defeat the assailants at the battle of the Colline Gate and save Rome from the horrors of a sack (November, 82). Sulla's victory was complete and everybody waited on his words.

SECTION 12. SULLA'S REFORMS

The victor was a strange mixture of opposites, energetic but pleasure-loving, easy-going but relentless on occasion, enlightened and able but fond of low company and addicted to superstition. What made him great was his imperturbability and his iron will; seldom has any man shown a greater power of driving straight towards an object, undeterred by any minor obstacles. By birth and conviction he was a staunch optimist, and his intention was to restore and strengthen the old constitution by removing the chief menaces to its peace. But before reform came vengeance. The Marian party had set an evil example of

massacre and pillage, and Sulla was not the man, for all his easy nature, to forgive an injury. A reign of terror was established at Rome; large numbers of leading Romans were proscribed and their property confiscated. Of the horrors of this time we hear many gruesome accounts. Political hatred was the noblest of the motives that prompted the tools of Sulla; the real motive was more often mere greed or private spite. But there was nowhere help for those whom Sulla refused to pity. The senate confirmed all his past acts and conferred on him unlimited power for the future. He was appointed dictator, with no time limit assigned to his office; virtually he was the uncrowned tyrant of Rome. All went well with him; Q. Sertorius, one of the ablest of the defeated party, was driven from his refuge in Spain; the young Cn. Pompey won Sicily and Africa for him; Sulla celebrated his triumph over Mithradates in January 81, and the *Ludi Victoriae* October 81, commemorated the "crowning mercy" of the Colline Gate. Sulla had some reason when he adopted the cognomen of *Felix*, "the Fortunate." He then passed a series of laws, amending the constitution. We are struck at once by the consistent plan that runs through his whole scheme and by his apparent inability to see how futile it all was. A paper constitution could not save the aristocracy, if they could not save themselves; and Sulla apparently did not realize the full extent of their incompetence or the full strength of the forces of reform and progress. Still he made the attempt. In the first place, the power of the tribunate was completely broken. The tribune was deprived of his power of arrest and was confined to intervention in defence of an injured citizen—his original function. The consent of the senate must be obtained before any proposal could be brought before the tribes; and, further, to prevent men of ability from becoming candidates, the tribunate was declared a bar to the holding of curule office. A second

law regulated anew the *cursus honorum*, or succession of offices. The old order—quaestor, aedile, praetor, consul—was retained, but the tribunate, of course, disappeared from the list. The minimum ages for the four magistracies were fixed at 30, 36, 39 and 42 respectively. No office could be held a second time until after the expiry of ten years. Here we may mention Sulla's other regulations about the magistracies. The number of praetors was raised to eight, the number of quaestors to twenty, and the holding of the quaestorship now conferred a seat in the senate. The censorship was, in practice, as good as abolished, and its duties, so far as they required fulfilling, were discharged by the consuls in the years 80 and 75. Finally, Sulla made a complete division between the magistracy and pro-magistracy—that is, between civil and military office. There were at this time ten provinces, including the new one of Cisalpine Gaul—a number exactly equal to that of the consuls and praetors (two and eight). Each consul and praetor now proceeded, in the regular course, after his year's civil office in Rome, to a military command in a province; the senate decided which provinces should be assigned to proconsuls, which to propraetors. The senate was strengthened by the enrolment of 300 new members, and the seats on juries were restored to the senate. The old method of filling up the sacred colleges, that of co-option, was restored. The doles of cheap corn were abolished. Large numbers of slaves were emancipated and became freedmen of Sulla. The Italian communities that had been prominent on the Marian side were punished, and large assignments of land were made to Sulla's veterans. Sulla also introduced some reforms in legal procedure, which had a longer life than his purely political measures. He established a number of special standing courts (*quaestiones*), on the analogy of the *quaestio repetundarum*, founded in 149—*peculatus*, *maiestatis*, *de ambitu*, *inter*

sicarios, de falsis, iniuriarum—presided over by the praetors, with senators as jurymen. Probably in 77 yet another court, the *quaestio de vi*, was added. Sulla's reform marks a distinct advance in procedure and was the most permanent part of his work. One of the most remarkable acts of Sulla's remarkable career came after his legislation; to the general surprise, he laid down his dictatorship and retired into private life in Campania. There he died in 78; he was honoured with a public funeral, and his body was burned in the Campus Martius.

He left a state apparently peaceful, yet destined within a few years to be the scene of convulsions as violent as any that preceded them. He was not a great constructive statesman; he may have had the ability—his measures certainly display skill and insight—but he lacked the necessary sympathy and power of realizing the strength of the opposition. Abroad there was tolerably complete peace. Murena, whom Sulla had left in Asia as legate, provoked a fresh war with Mithradates and suffered defeat, but Sulla soon renewed the peace (83). Murena, however, celebrated a triumph—for what victory one can hardly guess. Young Pompey, too, demanded and practically extorted from Sulla a triumph over Numidia. This able young officer never lacked a good opinion of himself, and, in these days of his youth, displayed far more energy than in his later days of fame. Only in one province were the hopes of the Marians still alive. Q. Sertorius returned to Further Spain and succeeded in stirring up a Lusitanian revolt. Metellus was sent against him in 86, but the rebel was still unsubdued when Sulla died.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC

SECTION I. THE SERTORIAN WAR, ETC. 79-71 B.C.

HARDLY was Sulla dead, when fresh trouble began to arise in Rome. The two consuls of the year 78, Lepidus and Catulus, were constantly quarrelling, and Lepidus began to talk of reversing certain of Sulla's acts and, especially, of restoring the corn doles. As proconsul of Narbonese Gaul in 77, he made an attempt to bring about a revolution by force of arms, but Catulus, assisted by Pompey, defeated him, and he fled to Sardinia and there died. Little is known of his real plans, but his attempt shows clearly how much discontent must have existed in Rome and Italy. The remains of his army were led by his legate Perpenna to join Sertorius in Spain. In 77 Pompey left Rome to share in the Spanish war, and, in his absence, the political agitation continued. There was a steady demand for the restoration of the tribunate with its full powers and a first step towards restoration was made in 74, when ex-tribunes were again made eligible for curule office. The decisive moment arrived when Pompey and Crassus joined forces, and, as consuls in 70, practically annulled the Sullan reforms. But, before entering into details, we must go back a little and cast an eye on foreign affairs during the years 79 to 70. There were several small wars. In 79 P. Servilius Vatia was despatched against the pirates and gained some success in the years 78 to 75 ; but M. Octavius, an ex-praetor,

who succeeded him (74), was a blunderer and made no progress. M. Lucullus, the consul of 73, earned a triumph by victories in Macedonia in the years 72-71. The chief trouble, however, was in Spain, where the Marian Q. Sertorius had established a complete ascendancy over the minds of the natives and defied all the attempts of Metellus to oust him. In 77 Pompey secured a share in the command from a not too willing senate, and, after a time, the two generals began to make headway. The power of Sertorius was at its height in 76, when he was successful in the field and actually formed alliances with Mithradates and the pirates. But from 74 onwards he lost ground, and disaffection arose in his camp. In 72 he was murdered by Perpenna; and, as the murderer proved incapable of taking his place, the revolt was speedily subdued. Pompey and Metellus returned to Rome to triumph. In 81 Sulla had placed Ptolemy XII on the throne of Egypt, but the king was soon murdered. It was stated that he had bequeathed his kingdom to Rome; be that as it may, the inheritance was not taken up, and the last degenerate successors of the Lagid continued to rule for a few decades more. Cyrene became a province in 74 and received a *quaestor pro praetore* as its governor. War broke out again with Mithradates in 73, and we shall have to follow its course in a later section.

In 73 south Italy and Rome itself were threatened by a serious revolt of slaves and gladiators under a certain Spartacus. For nearly two years the whole of the south was in chaos, and the slaves actually gained victories in the open field. But in 71 M. Licinius Crassus, as praetor, penned up the rebels in Bruttium, and Spartacus fell in an attempt to escape through Apulia. Pompey, returning from Spain, gained a little cheap renown by cutting up a band of rebels in the north. Pompey and Crassus were bitter rivals, but they were both men of mark—Pompey

as a soldier, Crassus as a plutocrat—and the party of reform succeeded in bringing about a reconciliation between them. They were elected consuls together for 70 and at once brought in some important measures. The tribunate was restored in the full extent of its powers, and the seats on juries, so long fought over, were divided between senators, knights and *tribuni aerarii*: these last were probably a property-class, ranking a little below the knights. The senatorial juries had not proved worthy of their trust, and provincial government had been notoriously bad. The condemnation of Verres, the infamous governor of Sicily, was a great personal triumph for the prosecutor, M. Tullius Cicero, and a serious blow to the senatorial party. Cicero was a “new man,” that is, he came of an Italian family that had not yet held curule office and he started, as was natural, in the opposition ranks. He was a brilliant orator and a many-sided and able man. We shall hear much of him later, when events had led him to alter his political attitude.

SECTION 2. MITHRADATES AND LUCULLUS. POMPEY IN THE EAST

We can now take up the account of the war with Mithradates, which we have kept for this place, because it links on rather to the following than to the preceding period. We have seen that peace had been seriously threatened in 83, but that Sulla had interfered to reaffirm it¹. Events, however, steadily led to a fresh breach between Mithradates and Rome. Between the years 84–73 Tigranes of Armenia conquered Syria and Cappadocia and founded his new capital of Tigranocerta. This new power in the East, likely to be friendly to Mithradates, was bound to attract the attention of Rome, when her hands were free elsewhere. Mithradates himself felt that he could not find a satisfactory

¹ See p. 321.

modus vivendi with the intrusive western state and in 76 he offered a deliberate challenge to Rome by forming an alliance with Sertorius. But the actual occasion of war only arose two years later. In 74 Nicomedes of Bithynia died and, as was becoming the fashion, bequeathed his kingdom to Rome. Mithradates set up a rival candidate, and this time Rome took up the glove. M. Aurelius Cotta was sent to take command in Bithynia and L. Lucullus received the province of Cilicia, with instructions to intervene in the north, if need called. Cotta soon gave Lucullus his chance. He was defeated at Chalcedon and besieged by Mithradates in Cyzicus. Lucullus hurried to the rescue, raised the siege and inflicted a heavy defeat on the enemy's retreating forces. Mithradates's fleet was next defeated, Heraclea was taken by Cotta, and Lucullus pursued the flying king. In 71 Lucullus entered Pontus, triumphed at Cabira, and compelled Mithradates to seek refuge at the court of Tigranes. Tigranes was not disposed at first to give his father-in-law any active assistance; but the demand of Lucullus for the surrender of Mithradates in 70 hurt the great king's pride and drove him to war in 69. Lucullus invaded Armenia, marched unhindered through the land, and, after a brilliant but hazardous campaign, captured Tigranocerta itself. The kingdom of Syria was restored to a Seleucid prince. Lucullus was dreaming of further advance, of an attack, for example, on the Armenian capital, Artaxata; but he had triumphed too quickly and had partly lost hold of his army. Worse still, he had bitterly offended the capitalists of Asia by his wise and intelligent policy of reform in the province, and their whole influence was employed against him at Rome. Lucullus spent the winter of 68-67 in Gordyene; early in 67 Mithradates returned to Pontus and defeated a Roman detachment. Lucullus hurried back, only to find that a successor, M'. Acilius Glabrio, had been

appointed. He returned to Rome a disappointed man, full of the not unjustified feeling that his military genius had not been allowed fair scope for its display. In spite of his brilliant victories, he left the situation much as he had found it. Tigranes had recovered Cappadocia, Mithradates Pontus. But, although Mithradates was back in his kingdom, his power had sustained a serious shock, and Pompey found an easy victory awaiting him when he appeared in 66 to complete the task begun by Lucullus. The events that led up to this mission of Pompey to the East will now demand our attention.

After their consulship of 70 Pompey and Crassus retired for the time into private life. Their reconciliation was only temporary and they were soon at feud again; but they were, in their several ways, the leading men of the day at Rome, and Pompey, in particular, seemed only to be waiting for an opportunity of adding to his record of service and success. The task to be assigned him was not far to seek. The pirates, far from being crushed, were becoming more dangerous year by year. Trading on their impunity, they aspired to rank as a sovereign state and, as such, allied themselves with Sertorius. In 68 Metellus was sent to one of the pirate strongholds, Crete, and fought there with success in the years 68-66. But wider action was required to crush the evil, and in 67 the tribune Gabinius brought in a bill, bestowing on Pompey the command against the pirates, with an authority, superior to that of ordinary governors, extending over all seas and for 50 miles inland. At the same time Glabrio was sent to succeed Lucullus in Asia and Bithynia. Pompey discharged a troublesome task in the most brilliant fashion. Within 90 days he had defeated the pirates off Cape Coracesium, brought the war to a successful conclusion and cleared the sea. It mattered little, though it was characteristic of the man, that he had contrived to quarrel with Metellus on

a point of authority in Crete. It was but natural that fresh opportunities should be sought for employing so successful a commander. In 66 the tribune Manilius proposed that the command against Mithradates should be given to Pompey. He was to hold Cilicia, Bithynia and probably Asia as well. A section of the aristocracy, headed by Catulus and the orator Hortensius, opposed the bill. But all in vain; Cicero and Caesar were in favour of it, and it was triumphantly carried. Pompey, we see, was in a curious position. He was not committed to either party, *optimates* or *populares*; but the former grudged him the pre-eminence which he claimed as his due, and the *populares* played for his support by thrusting on him the commands which their rivals denied him. Pompey, himself, seems curiously passive, pushed this way and that by external forces. His sympathies, indeed, were always conservative; but his personal ambition was inconsistent with the true conservative attitude, and the need that he felt to gratify that ambition condemned him to an ambiguous political rôle. We will follow, at once, the course of his actions in the East and will then return to see what events had taken place in Rome during his absence.

Pompey found a comparatively easy task awaiting him; at any rate, he had no difficulty in defeating Mithradates and expelling him from Pontus (65). Mithradates fled to his kingdom in the Crimea and there laid fresh plans for renewing the war. But his son Pharnaces rebelled against him, and, in 63, the old king was driven to die by his own hand. Throughout a long life he had played a prominent and not inglorious part and had shaken the Roman hold on the East in a way that no one could have imagined possible. He was a splendid physical specimen of humanity and a good soldier; but he was always half a barbarian and lacked the refined diplomatic skill which alone could have given him success against Rome. Pompey now


devoted himself to the task of giving a new settlement to the East. In 65 he had undertaken a campaign against the Albani and Iberi, to secure the north-eastern frontier; to the south-east the Euphrates was recognised as the boundary between Rome and Parthia. The key-note of Pompey's policy was to encourage the small city-state and principality and to make them the basis of Roman dominion. We may classify his settlement thus :

A. Provinces. Antiochus XIII was deposed and Syria was made a province. Cilicia was extended to the east, and the west of Pontus and the coast of Paphlagonia were added to Bithynia.

B. Client kingdoms. Native dynasties were recognized in the interior of Paphlagonia and in Commagene, and Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia and Deiotarus of Galatia ruled as vassals of Rome. In Judaea armed intervention was necessary. Jannaeus Alexander (104-78) had the support of the Sadducees, the party that inclined towards Hellenism, against the orthodox religious sect of Pharisees. His enemies expelled him in 88, but he returned in 87. On his death in 78 the Pharisees regained power, for Hyrcanus II and the influential queen-mother Salome were devoted to them. Aristobulus, a brother of Hyrcanus II, drove him out and took Jerusalem, but Pompey decided for the other part, captured the city and restored Hyrcanus as high-priest. Politically, Judaea ranked as an appendage of the province of Syria.

C. Allied kings. Such were Tigranes in Armenia and Pharnaces in Bosphorus.

Lycia retained its freedom and Egypt and Cyrene were left untouched. On the whole, Pompey's work was sensible and thorough, and he returned to Rome early in 61 with a greatly enhanced reputation. His coming was being awaited with the utmost excitement. Rome was in a state




Pompey the Great

bordering on anarchy, and men felt that Pompey had only to stretch out his hand to obtain supreme power.

SECTION 3. FACTIONS AT ROME, 70-61 B.C.

Politics in Rome had been steadily going from bad to worse. Corruption and violence became more and more prevalent, and little rule, except club rule, was any longer recognized. Among the leading personalities of politics were M. Tullius Cicero, C. Julius Caesar and M. Porcius Cato. Of the first of these men we have already had occasion to speak. He was rapidly winning fame as the first orator of the day. He had been curule aedile in 69, shortly afterwards praetor, and his hopes already rose to the consulship. C. Julius Caesar, a young man of high aristocratic birth, had distinguished himself at the very start of his career by defying Sulla's order to divorce his wife, a daughter of Cinna. He was chiefly known as a brilliant and dissolute young man of fashion. But, from this time on, he turned his serious attention to politics and soon began to make his mark as a fearless leader of the opposition. He was quaestor in 69 and curule aedile in 65. Cato was a man of a very different stamp. Limited in intelligence and uncompromising to the point of absurdity in his principles he yet held a position of influence by sheer force of character and honest devotion to duty. In his own narrow way he was a genuine patriot, and we cannot but admire his courage and devotion, however much we may deplore his hopeless lack of tack and adaptability. He distinguished himself by his devoted service as quaestor in the year 65. Into all the complications of the politics of this period we have no space to enter and can only endeavour to pick out the salient points. Corruption was now a permanent factor to be reckoned with. In 66, P. Autronius Paetus and P. Cornelius Sulla were elected

consuls for 65 ; but they had only succeeded by scandalous bribery, and they were unseated. Thus disappointed, they entered into a plot to murder the new consuls. We do not know its details, but it was certainly wide in its scope ; probably Caesar, Crassus and L. Catiline, in a subordinate degree, were all implicated. Catiline was a young nobleman of low character but considerable ability, who had been praetor in 68 and governor of Africa in 67. On his return to Rome he was prosecuted by P. Clodius, and, though his trial did not come on until 65, was prevented from standing for the consulship in 66. When the case was tried, Catiline, though notoriously guilty, gained an acquittal by wholesale bribery. For the consulship of 63 there were three candidates, Cicero, C. Antonius and Catiline. Cicero had started as an opposition speaker, but his natural tendencies were towards the other side, and the *optimates*, in the lack of a more congenial candidate, adopted his cause as their own. The result was the election of Cicero and Antonius. Antonius had run in company with Catiline, but Cicero gained his support by allowing him to have Macedon as his proconsular province. Cicero had started life as the champion of the knights ; in his new capacity of optimatus, he devoted himself to realising the ideal of the *concordia ordinum*, the political co-operation of senate and knights. The opposition soon raised difficulties in his way. The tribune Rullus brought in a land bill (December 64), to appoint a commission of ten to distribute lands in Italy to poor citizens. The money required for purchase was to be provided by sale of public property ; probably the revenues of Egypt were, in the first instance, thought of. Cicero distinguished himself by an able and successful opposition. The next move was an attack on C. Rabirius, who was supposed to have been the slayer of Saturninus. The attack, of course, was really directed against the senate and was a deliberate challenge of its right to pass the



Cicero

senatus consultum ultimum, proclaiming martial law. But Rabirius was acquitted, and again the opposition had failed. This was all bad for the opposition leaders. Caesar, in particular, felt his position desperate; he secured election to the high office of Pontifex Maximus (64), though the esteemed Catulus was a rival candidate; but, had he failed, he felt that Rome would have been too hot to hold him. In July 63 Catiline was again an unsuccessful candidate for the consulship. Up to this time he had acted with the *populares* and had not gone beyond their ordinary political programme; but now he grew desperate, cut loose from his old associates and sought support in the wildest and most hopeless elements of society. It is from this point that the true Catilinarian conspiracy starts—no genuine plan of political reform, or even political revolution, but an anarchic plot, perilous to society, but blind to everything but immediate success. The conspiracy, however, was dangerous enough in so demoralized a society as that of Rome; and a certain C. Manlius was ready with a body of troops in Etruria to join in, as soon as it came to blows. To Cicero fell the task of defending the state—his colleague was hopelessly inefficient—and he performed it with high credit. His spies kept him informed of the plans of the conspirators, and the senate, alarmed by Cicero's warning, declared a state of martial law. Manlius rose in Etruria in October 63. On the 7th of November a plot to murder Cicero miscarried, and, on the next day, the consul denounced Catiline in the senate and drove him out to join the rebels. But there were still conspirators at large in Rome, and, for the moment, Cicero could not touch them. Luck gave him his chance. An embassy from the Allobroges was tampered with in Rome by the Catilinarians, but betrayed the intrigue to Cicero. Cicero had now secured damning evidence against the enemy, and, on the 5th of December, after a fierce debate, in which

Caesar pleaded boldly for milder measures, the senate, nerved to decision by Cato, authorized the execution of the conspirators. The sentence was at once carried out. Catiline was beaten in a desperate action at Pistoria and fell on the field. Cicero could claim, with some justice, that he had saved the state ; but, in saving it, he had put Roman citizens to death without trial, and for this illegality, whether justified or no, he had to pay dearly later. Both Crassus and Caesar were accused, probably without reason, of complicity in the plot ; they were, we may imagine, actually innocent, but might not have been indisposed to draw what profit they could from its success, had it succeeded.

The time of Pompey's return from the East was now at hand, and at Rome all eyes were turned towards him. In 62 Q. Metellus Nepos, an agent of Pompey's, as tribune, proposed that he should be recalled to restore public order. Again, in the same year, Caesar, as praetor, proposed that the rebuilding of the Capitoline temple, begun by Catulus, should be completed by Pompey. The senate defeated both proposals ; over the second, things came to a dangerous crisis, but Caesar won favour by a timely withdrawal of his proposal. Pompey was a source of serious embarrassment to the government. He might, on occasion, be useful to them, but his outstanding power was a menace to the constitution, and he was constantly being played off against them by the opposition. Cicero earned fresh oratorical fame by his successful defence of P. Cornelius Sulla, who was prosecuted on a charge of violence, and of Archias, a *protégé* of Lucullus, whose claim to citizenship was contested. Late in 62 there was a grave political scandal. The young Clodius, engaged, it was said, in an intrigue with Caesar's wife, obtained admission to the celebration of the rites of the Bona Dea, rites strictly limited to women. Caesar divorced his wife,

but refused to admit her guilt: Caesar's wife, he declared, must be above suspicion. Clodius was tried in January 61 and acquitted. His guilt, as far as the sacrilege went, was matter of notoriety; but the courts of law were, at the time, anything but courts of justice.

SECTION 4. THE "FIRST TRIUMVIRATE"

In December 62 Pompey landed in Italy and disbanded his army. The senate apparently read this action as a confession of weakness and irritated him by refusing his demand to have all his acts confirmed in a body. This was a fatal blunder. Caesar had been praetor in 62; in 61 he went as propraetor to Further Spain, and partly re-established his financial position; in June 60 he returned to Rome and found Pompey disappointed and vexed with the senate. Caesar abandoned his claim to a triumph in order to become a candidate for the consulship, formed a political alliance with Pompey and Crassus—the two were once more united by a common interest—and was elected consul for 59 with the optimate M. Calpurnius Bibulus as his colleague. The political league between the three statesmen was purely unofficial, and, though popularly called a triumvirate, did not, like the second triumvirate, represent a legal institution. But the popular instinct was correct. The compact implied that Pompey, Caesar and Crassus were to be the three rulers of Rome; the presidency, no doubt, seemed to belong to Pompey, and it suited Caesar to grow up at first under the shadow of his name.

It was said in jest of Caesar's year of consulship, that it was the consulship of Caius Caesar and Julius Caesar. Certainly Caesar went his own way and took absolutely no notice of the legal impediments which his obstinate colleague endeavoured to put in his way. Early in 59 a land bill was

carried appointing twenty commissioners to purchase land with the sums brought by Pompey from the East. Pompey and Crassus had seats on the commission, but Cicero declined the offer of one. A second bill assigned lands in Campania for allotment, probably mainly for Pompey's veterans. Ptolemy Auletes was recognized as king of Egypt, and Pompey's acts were confirmed *en bloc*. The senate had assigned insignificant provinces to the consuls of 59, meaning thus to check Caesar in his further ambitions. This did not suit him, and a remedy had to be found. The tribune P. Vatinius therefore proposed that the command in Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, with three legions, should be assigned to Caesar for three years. The senate gave in, and actually added Transalpine Gaul and another legion. The triumvirs had all their plans ready, and, to cement the alliance, Pompey married Caesar's daughter Julia. The army of Caesar was at their command, and it only remained to arrange matters at Rome. Lucullus was frightened out of opposition, but Cicero refused repeated offers and declined to join the triumvirs. They then resolved to remove him; his bitter enemy, P. Clodius, was allowed to become a Plebeian and so to stand for the tribunate of 58. As tribune, Clodius brought in a proposal directed against anyone who had put citizens to death without trial. Cicero could not fail to see that the blow was aimed at him; he had no friend powerful enough to protect him and only escaped condemnation by going into voluntary exile. Cato was another irreconcilable who was certain to give constant trouble. He was, therefore, sent as commissioner to Cyprus to take possession of the royal treasures for Rome; for Ptolemy, the last king, had died and had bequeathed his kingdom to the Roman people. Cyprus was added to the province of Cilicia, and Cato discharged his unwelcome duty with praiseworthy conscientiousness and brought back 7000

talents. But the object of the triumvirs was served. He did not return until the year 56.

SECTION 5. CAESAR IN GAUL. AFFAIRS AT ROME,
59-56 B.C.

Caesar had first shown some ability as general in his governorship of Further Spain. But he felt that he had greater powers yet undeveloped, and his new command gave him full scope for their exercise. For there was trouble in Gaul that imperatively called for Roman intervention. The Aedui, allies of Rome, were being pressed hard by their neighbours, the Arverni and Sequani, and a horde of invading Germans under Ariovistus. Nor was this all. The Helvetii, feeling confined in their settlements, were preparing for a national migration in quest of fresh lands and in 58 were already on the move westward. Caesar had no intention of allowing them to carry through their plan. He repulsed them at the Rhone, and they turned northward into Aeduan territory. Caesar had time to bring up his full forces from the south and the Alps, and gained a decisive victory at Bibracte; the survivors of the Helvetii had no choice but to return to their former home. Caesar was now ready to take a hand in the affairs of the Gauls. The country was divided into a number of tribes, warlike but unorganized; towns were few, and the unit was the country-district. The power of the priestly caste, the Druids, was great. Political influence was monopolized by the nobles; the mass of the people had no real share in political decisions. This absence of political organization rendered it possible for an able man like Caesar to achieve vast results with relatively tiny resources. Caesar had first to settle with Ariovistus. During the Helvetian trouble he had treated him as a friend; now he peremptorily demanded the withdrawal of all Germans across the Rhine.

One great victory of Caesar sufficed to ensure the success of his demands, and Ariovistus and his host disappeared forthwith from Gaul. In 57 Caesar advanced into the north. The warlike tribes of Belgica, the northern district of Gaul, formed an alliance against him, and the Remi were the only important tribe to declare in his favour. Nevertheless Caesar triumphed, and, after a desperate fight, gained a decisive victory over the most obstinate of his enemies, the Nervii. The Aduatuci were next defeated, and the Veneti and the coast tribes of Armorica submitted. Two years' fighting had carried the Roman standards almost to the limits of Gaul. But the conquest was far from complete. In the winter of 56 the Veneti imprisoned the Roman envoys, and Caesar had to prepare for a campaign of vengeance. Thorough as ever, he made careful preparations and had a large and useful fleet built. But, before he could proceed with his conquests, Caesar had to re-arrange his affairs at home, and we must pause a moment to follow the course of history in Rome during his absence.

Pompey had been left behind with the task of maintaining such conditions as the triumvirs desired. But the task was no easy one, and Pompey lacked the finesse and tact which Caesar possessed in so large a measure. The young tribune P. Clodius had served the cause of the triumvirs, as well as his own private enmity, by procuring Cicero's banishment. But Pompey could not hold him in leash, and Clodius, at the head of armed gangs of ruffians, became a standing danger to the peace of society. The best that Clodius's enemies could do was to set another captain of irregulars, T. Annius Milo, to oppose him. Government in Rome, in fact, had come to be a matter of riots. One result of the quarrel of Clodius with the triumvirs was the recall of Cicero from exile in August 57. Cicero's friends plucked up courage and pressed for his reinstatement, and the orator, on his return, received a warm welcome in

Italy and Rome. In 56 the corn supply showed signs of failing; the *cura annonae* was entrusted to Pompey for five years, and, to carry out his duties, he received pro-consular powers throughout the empire. In 57 Ptolemy Auletes was expelled from Egypt and sought restoration at Rome; he was well received, and the task of restoring him—coveted in vain by Pompey—was entrusted to Lentulus Spinther, proconsul of Cilicia. The consuls and praetors elected for 56 were aristocrats, and the position of the triumvirs seemed to be weakening. But Caesar had kept in touch with all political movements and he now deemed the time come to take action. In the April of 56 Pompey and Crassus, attended by crowds of leading Romans, travelled north to Luca to attend a conference with Caesar. The triumvirate was practically re-established. Cicero, receiving a hint of fresh dangers if he made himself objectionable, followed Pompey into alliance with Caesar, and his brother Quintus Cicero joined Caesar's staff as legate. Pompey and Crassus were marked out as consuls for 55, and Caesar's command was extended for another five years.

SECTION 6. THE CONQUEST OF GAUL, 56-50 B.C.

Some sort of order was now ensured at Rome for a few years at least, and Caesar could return to his immediate military tasks. The campaign of 56 was directed against the rebellious Veneti. The new Roman fleet gained a great victory, and the rebels submitted; and, soon afterwards, the tribes of north Armorica yielded to Caesar's *legatus* Sabinus. In the same year, another legate, Crassus, advanced the Roman arms into Aquitania in the south-west. Caesar himself wound up a successful year with a troublesome and only partially successful expedition against the Morini and Menapii. In 55 Caesar had to oppose an

attempt of German tribes to cross the Rhine and himself crossed the river, to make a display of Roman power in Germany. To the same year belongs his first expedition to Britain. It was little more than a military reconnaissance, and such successes as he gained in the south-east were trivial and transitory. In the next year (54) Caesar undertook a larger expedition. Starting from the Portus Itius he crossed the straits of Dover with a large fleet and landed with five legions and 2000 cavalry in Kent. The native chieftain, Cassivellaunus, submitted, and an annual tribute was imposed ; but, once again, Caesar had no leisure to make anything like a formal conquest even of the territory he had invaded. Trouble in Gaul demanded his serious attention. Signs of disaffection had already appeared in 54. Dumnorix, an Aeduan patriot, had been put to death, and the Treviri, too, had shown traces of restiveness. Caesar wintered (54-53) at Samarobriua, while detachments of his troops, under *legati*, lay in winter-quarters at various points in the north. Early in 53 a widespread rising against Rome took place. Sabinus and his force were cut to pieces by the Eburones, and Caesar only succeeded, by straining every nerve, in arriving in time to save Q. Cicero from a like fate at the hands of the Nervii. Labienus, who was stationed among the Treviri, succeeded in defeating the rebels. But, with so much discontent abroad, Caesar felt that his forces were inadequate ; he therefore brought up two fresh legions from Cisalpine Gaul, and received a third from Pompey, who now held the rank of proconsul in Spain, though still in Rome. In 53 Caesar subdued the Menapii, while Labienus defeated the Treviri ; the troublesome Eburones were practically wiped off the map. The Senones and Carnutes also called for correction, and a second demonstration was undertaken in Germany, to warn off possible intruders in Gaul. In the winter of 53-52 Caesar himself was in Cisalpine Gaul, engaged, as ever, in

raising fresh troops. Two legions lay in the territory of the Treviri, two in that of the Lingones, six in that of the Senones. At this moment, when Caesar was separated by hundreds of miles from his armies, the Gauls roused themselves to a last desperate struggle for freedom. In the north the Carnutes revolted and, more important still, the powerful Arverni followed their example. And this time the national cause found a leader in the young noble Vercingetorix. The movement spread on all sides and soon all central Gaul was in a blaze. Caesar surprised enemies and friends alike by a piece of brilliant daring. With a small band of cavalry he dashed through the heart of the enemy's country and safely arrived at Agedincum, in the land of the Senones, where he soon mustered four legions. Caesar began the campaign by an attack on the Carnutes and took the towns of Vellaunodunum and Cenabum. Vercingetorix turned to meet him in the land of the Bituriges, but could not save the town of Avaricum from capture. The Gallic chief now resolved on a new policy—the destruction of all stores and towns and the conquest of the Romans by starvation. The policy was a cunning one and, had it been carefully carried out, might well have been successful. Caesar attempted to capture Gergovia, but met with a repulse and had to fall back on Agedincum. Vercingetorix lay between him and home and could begin to threaten Gallia Narbonensis; but, fortunately for Rome, the powerful tribe of the Allobroges declined to join the rebels. When the Gauls proceeded to take the initiative they were repulsed, and Vercingetorix fell back on the town of Alesia. Caesar followed up his success and began the siege with ten legions. But now the Gauls made one supreme effort: a huge army of relief was mustered, and, for the moment, it seemed that Caesar might be crushed between the lines of the foe. But the attack from outside was beaten off and Alesia had to capitulate. Vercingetorix surrendered

to the victor, the revolt was crushed and the conquest of Gaul was at length assured. The winter of 52-51 saw a few local risings, and in 51 the Bellovaci in the north-west rebelled. The remnant of the Eburones, too, was troublesome; and, in Aquitania, Caesar deemed it necessary to take and sack Uxellodunum to overawe the natives. The chief remaining task was the organization of Gaul. Here Caesar had only time to make a beginning, but he imposed tribute on the tribes and made them liable for military service. In the spring of 50 Caesar set out for Cisalpine Gaul, but returned a little later to hold a grand review of his troops in the land of the Treviri. He had used his years of government to some purpose. He had given to Rome and Roman civilization a grand new province, destined to attain to high prosperity and to be a bulwark of Roman culture under the Empire. For himself he had won a splendid military reputation and an army devoted to his interests. Trouble was brewing for him at home, but, with such troops at his back, he could face the future with equanimity.

SECTION 7. AFFAIRS AT ROME, 56-49 B.C.

In Rome events had slowly worked up to a crisis. Pompey and Crassus, the consuls of 55, received the two Spains and Syria, respectively, as their provinces, each for five years, and Caesar's Gallic command was extended for a like period. Pompey remained in Italy and governed his provinces through his legates, L. Afranius and M. Petreius; but Crassus was eager for military fame and left for Syria late in 55. In the summer of 54 he invaded Mesopotamia, but did little beyond exciting the enmity of king Abgarus of Osrhoene. In 53 he advanced in pursuit of the Parthians into the desert. Abgarus, nominally his ally, betrayed him, and, at Carrhae, the Roman legions,

fighting under unfamiliar and unfavourable conditions, sustained a crushing defeat. Crassus fell in the battle, and Roman prisoners and Roman ensigns fell, in large numbers, into the hands of the enemy. Crassus's quaestor, C. Cassius Longinus, successfully hindered a Parthian invasion of Syria, and the succeeding governor, Bibulus, used diplomacy with success. In 51 peace was concluded; but Roman prestige had suffered a serious blow, and an expedition of revenge against Parthia was for years a pet scheme of Roman generals. At Rome, one of the consuls of 54, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, was a decided optimate and Cato was praetor. The triumvirs were far from being omnipotent; Cicero, it is true, was on their side, and evinced his loyalty—not too willingly—by undertaking the defence of such agents of theirs as Vatinius and Gabinius. The latter, as governor of Syria in 55, had, without authorization, restored Ptolemy Auletes to Egypt and was brought to trial for insubordination. The consular elections for 53 broke down through scandalous corruption, and the year 53 opened without consuls. Not till July 53 were Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messalla elected. In this same year Julia died, and her death meant the snapping of one of the bonds that held Pompey and Caesar together. Pompey began to incline towards the *optimates*, and the death of Crassus, removing the last connecting link and bringing the two survivors into direct rivalry, accelerated his movement. The senate passed a resolution that, in future, consuls and praetors should proceed to their provinces, not immediately after holding office, but after an interval of five years. This measure told subsequently against Caesar, but Pompey, innocently or not, raised no objection. The year 52 again opened without consuls. It was only natural that, in the absence of regular government, club-law should flourish. Clodius and Milo, with their armed gangs, again fought for mastery, and, in one of

these *mêlées*, Clodius was killed. The senate passed its *senatus consultum ultimum*, and, soon afterwards, Pompey was appointed sole consul, with instructions to nominate a colleague after two months. From the 4th to the 8th of April Milo stood his trial for the murder of Clodius. Cicero undertook the defence ; but Pompey's troops stood on guard round the court, and the orator lost his nerve and delivered a feeble speech, far inferior to the great oration which he had planned and which he afterwards published. Milo was condemned and went into exile at Massalia. The resolution of the senate about the provinces was now made law. Caesar had received permission to become a candidate in 49 for the consulship of 48 without appearing in person. The senate could, in theory, send out his successor on the expiry of his Gallic command on March 1, 49 ; but the normal practice was that the pro-consul should continue in his province till the end of the year, and, if this normal practice were followed, Caesar could step direct from his province to the consulship, and his enemies could not assail him. It was over this point that the final dispute between Caesar and the senate arose. Meanwhile, Pompey's proconsulate was extended for another five years. The consuls of 51 were M. Claudius Marcellus and Ser. Sulpicius Rufus, the former a decided enemy of Caesar ; Cato himself was an unsuccessful candidate. The question of Caesar's successor and the date at which he should be sent out came up on several occasions for discussion in the senate, but no decision was arrived at. Cicero spent this year in Cilicia as governor, and attempted, with partial success, to show how a decent man ought to administer a province. The consuls for 50 were C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Aemilius Paullus, the first a decided opponent, the second an adherent of Caesar. The tribunes were mainly Caesarians ; one of the most important of them, Curio, started as a violent enemy of Caesar, but was bought

over by him and proved a very valuable assistant. For example, he blocked all proposals about sending a successor to Caesar. But events moved quickly up to the crisis. Caesar, at Pompey's request, sent back the legion that he had borrowed and one of his own with it; they were nominally designed for a Parthian war, but were, for the present, kept under arms at Capua. In August, C. Claudius Marcellus, a cousin of the consul of 50, and L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus were elected consuls for 49, whilst Mark Antony makes his first appearance on the scene as tribune. Both consuls were hostile to Caesar and devoted their whole energies to getting a successor sent to him on March 1, 49. As we have remarked above, this was the one thing that Caesar could not tolerate. He must step direct from his Gallic command to the consulship; if he had to return to Rome, even for a few months, as a private citizen, his enemies would have time to impeach and overwhelm him. Short of submission on the vital point, Caesar stretched concession to the uttermost. He offered, we hear, to resign his command, if Pompey would do the same, and a proposal to this effect was actually carried in the senate on December 1. Marcellus was for having Caesar declared a public enemy, but the senate shrank from the decisive step. Marcellus then called on Pompey to attack Caesar, and Curio, pretending that his life was in danger, fled to Caesar's camp. On January 1, 49, Caesar's final propositions were heard and discussed; he would give up all his command except Cisalpine Gaul and two legions on March 1, or the whole of it, without any reservation, if Pompey would do the same. If not—his letter ended with an unmistakeable threat. In the final debate of January 7, the senate decided to reject the offer. Cicero in vain pleaded for an accommodation; the extremists carried the day, and the *senatus consultum ultimum* was passed. The die was cast. Caesar was not the man to draw back when

the critical moment came; and any hesitation he may have felt at the last moment was purely emotional and transitory.

SECTION 8. THE GREAT CIVIL WAR, 49-45 B.C.

The senate had chosen civil war but was not ready to wage it, and Caesar gave his enemies no time to repair their past neglect. He summoned up his army from Transalpine Gaul, while he himself, with only some 5000 men, crossed the Rubicon and invaded Italy. His march was one triumphal procession. Umbria and Picenum fell to him without fighting, and the senatorial commander, Domitius, was captured in endeavouring to organize resistance at Corfinium. Pompey saw that Italy could not be held; he called in his troops to Brundisium, and Caesar, for all his haste, was not in time to hinder his embarkation for Greece. Rome was abandoned by the senatorial party and fell without a struggle to the victor. Caesar appropriated the state financial reserve, received the dictatorship, appointed M. Aemilius Lepidus city prefect to maintain order in Rome, despatched Curio to Sicily and Africa, and Valerius to Sardinia, and prepared himself to deal with the legates of Pompey in Spain. It was essential for him to become master of the West before he proceeded to the decisive struggle in Greece. Massalia declared herself neutral, but Caesar refused to recognize her neutrality and besieged the city. The campaign in Spain was short and sharp. Caesar, in his haste, became involved in serious troubles, but the opposing generals, Afranius and Petreius, missed their chance, and, finally, a brilliant stroke of strategy by Caesar compelled the surrender of the opposing armies at Ilerda without serious fighting. After this blow, Further Spain also submitted, and Cassius was left with four legions to hold the provinces. In September Massalia fell.

Against these brilliant successes the senatorial party had little gain to set. Labienus, one of Caesar's best legates, had indeed changed his colours at the outset ; but a solitary desertion had no particular importance. Curio, however, after securing Sicily, was defeated and killed in Africa in battle against the Pompeians, assisted by the Mauretanian prince Juba, and, for the moment, this loss could not be retrieved. More serious was the mutiny of Caesar's ninth legion at Placentia ; but it was speedily suppressed, and the danger was averted. Returning to Rome Caesar laid down the dictatorship and became consul for 48 with P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus as colleague. He restored political rights to a number of citizens and gave some relief, by legislation, to debtors. Roman citizenship was extended to all Cisalpine Gaul. Caesar was now ready to fight out his quarrel with Pompey. With an overwhelming superiority at sea the Pompeians should have been able to hinder Caesar's crossing to Greece ; but, through inattention or error, they failed to do so, and, early in January 48, Caesar landed in Epirus with seven legions. Pompey hurried up his troops to Dyrrhachium to oppose his advance, and, until reinforcements arrived, Caesar was in a precarious position. But, in April, Antony brought over four fresh legions and joined the main army. Caesar now took the offensive and actually endeavoured, with a smaller army, to blockade Pompey in Dyrrhachium. He suffered a severe repulse, which, with more energy on the enemy's side, might have been fatal, and drew off inland. Pompey now marched into Thessaly to join a detached corps under Scipio. Caesar followed him, and on the 9th of August the decisive battle was fought at Pharsalia. The superior military qualities of Caesar's troops gave him a complete victory ; the enemy broke up and Pompey fled. Had Pompey been willing to play a waiting game he might have avoided the catastrophe and possibly have ended by winning the campaign. But he was not in sole

and individual command, as was his rival, and he was constantly embarrassed by the officious advice of incompetent politicians who would be soldiers. The senate, as a whole, expected an easy triumph. Thus Pompey was led, against his better judgement, to fight, and Caesar found the way made easy for him. Pompey fled to Egypt but was murdered on landing by the Egyptian government. The Pompeians, for the most part, took refuge in Africa; their fleet continued to dispute with the Caesarians the possession of the Adriatic. All Greece submitted to Caesar, and the conqueror moved through Asia to Alexandria with two legions. Ptolemy Auletes had died in 51, and there had been disputes over the succession. Caesar sought to solve them by dividing the rule between Cleopatra and Ptolemy, the late king's children, but the Egyptians resisted the interference and rose against the intruder. Caesar had rashly ventured into hostile country with insufficient forces, and, from October 48 to March 47, he was besieged in Alexandria and came within an ace of falling into the enemies' hands. At last a certain Mithradates of Pergamum brought up a relieving force from Asia Minor; but the young and fascinating queen Cleopatra had cast her spell on Caesar, and he lingered by her side for three months more. Then stern necessity called him from her. The young prince Pharnaces of Bosphorus had recovered his father's kingdom of Pontus, occupied Cappadocia, and defeated the governor of Asia. Caesar hastened against him and defeated him in the battle of Zela, famous for its celebration in the *veni, vidi, vici* despatch to the senate. In September Caesar landed at Tarentum. There had been trouble in Italy in his absence, and the notorious young M. Caelius had broached anarchical propositions. But he and his confederate Milo, of ill fame as the slayer of Clodius, fell in a rising in south Italy, and quiet was restored. In the Adriatic, Caesar's lieutenant, Vatinius, at

last succeeded in defeating the hostile fleet. Cassius, who, as we have seen, had been left in command in Spain, lost all hold by his infamous government, and, when he was proceeding, on Caesar's order, to attack Juba in Africa, a revolt tied his hands. In September 47 C. Trebonius took over the command and Cassius disappears from the scene. At Rome, exaggerated honours were heaped upon the master of the world. Caesar dealt summarily with matters of pressing importance and then prepared to settle with the Pompeians in Africa. A second serious mutiny interrupted his plans, and the troops, weary of fighting, marched on Rome to enforce their demands for immediate reward. Caesar met them boldly in the Campus Martius and by his personal authority and courage overawed them into submission. In December 47 Caesar sailed for Africa. The Pompeians, commanded by a Scipio, held the province in great strength, and Juba was a useful ally. The campaign was protracted and troublesome. But P. Sittius, a Roman adventurer, who had founded a small bandit principality in western Mauretania, distracted Juba by a flank attack, and at last Caesar gained a decisive victory at Thapsus. Cato committed suicide at Utica, and Petreius and Juba died by one another's hands (April 46), while the survivors fled to their last refuge in Further Spain. P. Sittius was rewarded with a small principality around Cirta. In July 46 Caesar returned to Rome as the undoubted conqueror in the war. He had made mistakes, but had retrieved them all. And, for a certain bewildering and unorthodox brilliance, his political and military conduct in these years has rarely, if ever, been equalled.

Honours were heaped thick on the victor; he was appointed dictator for ten years and sole censor; and he again held the consulship. In August he celebrated four consecutive triumphs—Gallic, Egyptian, Pontic and African. Roman sentiment forbade a triumph for victory in civil

war, but men could hardly forget that the African triumph was celebrated over Cato, as much as over Juba. Caesar did not lose his head in the flush of success, but at once set to work on a series of reforms that he had long had in mind. But, before we speak of these, we will ring the curtain down on the last act of the civil war. The last of the Pompeians had rallied in Spain under the command of Pompey's sons Gnaeus and Sextus, Afranius and others. A savage campaign in Further Spain ended in Caesar's final triumph at Munda, March 17, 45. From this time on, there was no organized resistance to his power.

SECTION 9. CAESAR'S REFORMS

The last stage of Caesar's life—that in which, having won political supremacy by arms, he proceeded to put into realization his ideas of reform—might well have been the most brilliant of all, had it not been cut short. As it is, we find his work, in nearly every direction, left uncompleted. Even what he actually accomplished was, however, grand. The army received a large donative and assignments of lands, and the populace too came in for a share of the bounty. A great *Lex Julia Municipalis*, of which we should like to know more than we do, regulated the internal affairs of *municipia* throughout the empire. The calendar, which had fallen out of harmony with the true solar year, was reformed on a sound scientific basis, and sixty-seven days were intercalated in the year 46 to put matters right. Roman citizenship was bestowed generously on provincials. The senate was filled up with new members—of a very mixed kind, if we may trust the hostile accounts—and Caesar showed plainly his intention of proceeding rapidly with the raising of the provinces to an equality with Rome. The number of praetors was raised to fourteen, that of quaestors to 40. The evil of the corn

doles was mitigated, though not removed, the number of recipients of corn doles being cut down from 320,000 to 150,000. Many other fine schemes were planned but never came to realization—the draining of the Pomptine Marshes and the Fucine Lake, and the improvement of the harbour at Ostia. Abroad, a general peace reigned. Burebistas, the active king of the Getae, had rapidly raised his kingdom to a menacing strength, but he died before the danger became acute. One great foreign enterprise, however, awaited Caesar, and he was preparing for it at the time of his death. The defeat of Carrhae was still unavenged, and the Parthians had given support to a certain Bassus, an opponent of Caesar, in Syria. Caesar resolved to restore the Roman honour by a war of aggression. But before he could set out for the East, death overtook him at Rome. Throughout the civil wars he had shown the greatest possible degree of mercy and consideration for the conquered. He had endeavoured to win over his enemies and to legitimize his usurpation by wise and conciliatory government. But there were many who could not forgive the destroyer of the republic. And Caesar had, in some points, rashly challenged public sentiment. Cleopatra lived with him for a time in Rome—and an eastern princess seemed no fit consort for a Roman emperor. In 44 Caesar was appointed dictator for life. The title of king was constantly pressed upon him; he steadily refused it, but there were not wanting suggestions that he might have prevented even the offer. The month of Quintilis was renamed July and a temple was assigned to Caesar's worship. All these things contributed to foster discontent, and, early in 44, this discontent found vent in a conspiracy. The chief movers in it were C. Cassius, M. Brutus, Decimus Brutus, C. Trebonius Cimber and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, nearly all of them friends of Caesar, who had accepted favours at his hands. On the

Ides of March they murdered Caesar in the forum ; he had had warnings of a plot but refused to take any unusual precautions. He had always desired a speedy and unexpected death, and the gods granted him his wish. His was no perfect character. He was not free from the vices of his age, he was, as Shakespeare's Brutus insists, "ambitious," and he had shed blood freely to reach his ambition. He destroyed Roman "liberty" and created the military despotism. But few greater men have ever trodden this earth. A masterly statesman, a brilliant, though unorthodox, general, a master of simple style in writing, a fiery speaker, he accomplished a work such as few others have even touched. Perhaps he was too hasty, too anxious to accomplish in a generation the work of centuries. For all that, he was one of the few men who have the gift of original genius and set their stamp on the world for generations. He was free from petty malice and base cruelty. He never shed blood for the sake of gratifying a low revenge. He has nothing of the saint in his composition, but he remains one of the finest types of paganism ; the portrait of him in the British Museum gives a wonderful impression of the enlightened and refined intelligence of the man. With all his faults, he was a man of a grand make. His murderers claimed to have sacrificed their friend to the sacred cause of liberty ; their conduct after his death proved them as incapable as they were unscrupulous. They had, in fact, no clear alternative before them. It was perhaps pardonable for an aristocrat of the time to resent the fall of the rule of his class ; there is no excuse for an intelligent spectator of today to be misled by the catchword of "liberty" into forgetting that, though political liberty had become at the time impossible, liberty, in the sense of a share in ordinary human rights, was far safer under the rule of the emperors than it had ever been under the declining rule of the senate.



Julius Caesar

SECTION 10. FROM THE DEATH OF CAESAR TO THE TRIUMPH OF THE TRIUMVIRS, 44-41 B.C.

The tyrant was dead, but no man knew what form of government was to take his place. The conspirators fondly imagined that they could restore the old republic; but it was dead, and a period of complications and wars, with which we must deal very summarily, led straight back to the only solution—the military monarchy. The conspirators had thought of murdering Mark Antony with Caesar. In the end they spared him, and, soon after the murder, effected a formal reconciliation with him. A general amnesty was agreed upon, but Caesar's acts were confirmed by the senate; his will was to be read publicly and he was to receive a public funeral. Antony, on the occasion of the reading of the will, so worked on the popular emotions that the murderers were compelled to leave the city; he then obtained possession of Caesar's papers and looked forward to succeeding to his power. C. Octavius, grand-nephew of Caesar, had been adopted by him as son and appointed chief heir; in April he returned from Apollonia and claimed his inheritance, which Antony declined to yield up. The young heir paid the legacies out of his own moneys and began to raise troops in Italy. The history of this time is extraordinarily complicated, and a brief account, such as ours, must find a short cut through its mazes. The position was roughly this: Mark Antony and Octavian¹ were united in their determination to avenge Caesar's murder when occasion offered, but were kept apart, for the time, by the dispute over Caesar's inheritance. The senate was, for the moment, on fair terms with Antony, but it had no intention of throwing over Brutus and Cassius, and, as it gradually drifted into a quarrel with the former, was willing to employ them against

¹ C. Octavius, after his adoption, becomes C. Julius Caesar Octavianus.

him. During September Cicero, who had returned to lead the constitutionalists in politics, criticized the conduct of Antony, and the latter retorted with a fierce attack. He had received from the assembly in June the command of the Gauls, but D. Brutus was in Cisalpine Gaul, to which province Caesar had appointed him, and Antony marched northwards to Ariminum, meaning to oust his rival. Brutus and Cassius sailed for the East at the end of September. Brutus took possession of Macedon (early in 43), and Cassius won Syria ; the senate recognized the former usurpation, but not the latter. The breach between the senate and Antony was now complete ; for the moment Octavian was willing to join the senate against his rival and was commissioned as *propraetor* in January 43 to take action with the consuls, Hirtius and Pansa, against Antony. Cicero was the soul of the movement and, in his second Philippic, delivered a crushing denunciation against the whole of Antony's political career. Antony had been pressing D. Brutus hard in Mutina ; but the consuls now came up, and, in two battles near Mutina, Antony suffered defeat. His cause appeared lost. But both consuls fell in the fighting, and the senate made the fatal mistake of thinking lightly of Octavian. They lent no recognition to his services, and, thereupon, he refused to prosecute the war, and began negotiations with Antony. The senate called on M. Brutus to bring up troops from Macedon to help D. Brutus to triumph. But no troops came ; Lepidus, who was governor in Hither Spain and Gallia Narbonensis, joined Antony, and Octavian demanded the restitution of Antony to his rights, and the consulship for himself. Meeting with refusal, he marched on Rome and occupied the city ; he was formally adopted as son of Caesar and received the consulship (August 43), whilst the murderers of Caesar and S. Pompey with them were declared public enemies. In the north Antony and Lepidus had carried the war to a

successful end. D. Brutus, deserted by his troops, was killed, and Octavian now entered into formal alliance with the victors. He laid down the consulship, and the three partners were formally appointed *tresviri rei publicae constituendae*. Unlike the first triumvirate, the second was legally grounded and received, by law, the fullest political powers. For 42 Lepidus was to be consul, while Antony and Octavian undertook the war against Brutus and Cassius. Lepidus was to hold Spain and Narbonese Gaul, Antony the two other Gauls, Octavian Africa, Sardinia and Sicily. The triumvirs decided to begin by making a thorough settlement with their enemies. A terrible proscription was instituted, and, among many eminent men, Cicero fell a victim. "Nothing in his life so much became him as the leaving of it"; and his martyr's death set the seal of genuineness on a career too full of vacillation. Brutus and Cassius meanwhile met at Sardis and marched together to Philippi. In the West the triumvirs gained Africa, but S. Pompey contrived to seize Sicily, which he was to hold for many years. Antony and Octavian took the field against the tyrannicides in Macedon, and, after hard and doubtful fighting, gained two victories near Philippi. Cassius committed suicide after the first, and Brutus after the second. The victors returned to Rome, and, in 41, a new division of the Roman world was arranged; Lepidus, who had not shared in the victory was restricted to Africa, Antony took the East, while Italy and the West fell to Octavian. Italy, in theory, was to be held by the three in common; but Octavian was on the spot and his influence soon became paramount. His first task was to provide lands for some 170,000 veterans and, to satisfy their claims, he was driven to resort to a merciless expropriation of former owners, which dealt a final blow to the decaying class of small Italian farmers. The poets Vergil and Propertius were among the sufferers. The dream of a restored republic, which had beguiled the murderers, had

dissolved into nothingness. The only question still to be settled was, to which of the rival claimants, for the moment in alliance, the rule of the world was to fall.

SECTION II. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE EMPIRE,
41—31 B.C.

The troubles arising in connexion with the settlement of the veterans gave birth to a vast amount of discontent in Italy, and Octavian was soon seriously embarrassed. Worse still, Antony's wife, Fulvia, and his brother, L. Antonius, consul in 41, out of hostility to the young Caesar, took up the cause of the malcontents. Finally civil war broke out. L. Antonius seized Rome, but was soon driven out; and the military skill of Octavian's legate, M'. Agrippa, soon compelled him to take refuge in Perugia. Here the rebels were besieged and, early in February, 40, were forced to capitulate. Octavian had triumphed, but only after a fierce and merciless fight; his colleague Mark Antony would not have been sorry to see him succumb. Meanwhile Antony himself had been engaged in raising money and regulating affairs in Asia Minor and Syria. Herod the Great was appointed tetrarch of Judaea, and Cleopatra, charged with disloyalty, was summoned to Tarsus to stand her trial. But the brilliant adventuress entirely captivated the impressionable Roman, and this was the beginning of an amour that was destined to wreck a brilliant political career. Early in the year 40 a Parthian invasion was repelled from Syria. But Antony's presence was urgently required in the West, and the war with Parthia had to wait its turn. We have seen that Antony's friends at Rome had been in actual collision with Octavian. Mark Antony himself had gone so far as to form a political connexion with Sextus Pompey and, when he appeared with a fleet before Brundisium, he was

refused admittance. An open breach seemed inevitable, but the armies on both sides wanted peace and the dispute was amicably arranged. A new treaty, the Treaty of Brundisium, was drawn up by Maecenas and Pollio, the agents of Octavian and Antony. Antony married Octavian's sister, Octavia, and agreed to abandon Pompey, in case the latter refused to come to terms with Octavian. The boundary between the two spheres of influence was fixed by a line, north and south, passing through Scodra (October, 40). The relief in Italy at the avoidance of war was immense. But Sextus Pompey remained to be dealt with; he could not be dislodged from Sicily and for peace he demanded a high price. For the moment, it was resolved to pay it. A new treaty at Misenum was signed, by which Pompey was recognized by the triumvirs as a constitutional power and received the command at sea and the control of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, and Achaea. He also demanded and obtained pardon for his adherents. The treaty was dictated by necessity and was not likely to be respected when that necessity was removed. Late in 40 Antony sent his legate P. Ventidius Bassus to Syria. Bassus was an able soldier and defeated the Parthians in a couple of battles, and then again even more decisively in 39 and 38. In 38 Antony himself appeared and appointed C. Sosius governor of Syria. Herod the Great had been expelled by the Parthians; but Antony took Jerusalem, then held by the anti-Roman party, and restored Herod. In the West, the understanding between Sextus Pompey and Octavian did not last long. Menodorus, an admiral of Sextus, deserted and betrayed Sardinia to the enemy, and Octavian was encouraged to refuse to surrender the deserter and to declare war. A battle off Cyme was indecisive, but in a second fight off Messana Octavian suffered a complete defeat (38). This set-back led to a new agreement between the triumvirs, the Treaty of Tarentum (December, 38).

The triumvirate was extended for a new term of five years. Antony promised to send a fleet to the West, and Lepidus arranged to co-operate with Octavian by land and sea against Sicily; but Octavian had to pay for Antony's assistance by sending four of his legions to the East. Agrippa was entrusted with the charge of the naval war, and, by the spring of 36, he had mustered a new and well-equipped fleet. Victories at Mylae and Naulochus decided the issue against Sextus Pompey; he fled to the East, where he died in 35. The remnants of his party were besieged in Messana but were at last driven to surrender. Lepidus had played a somewhat equivocal part in the contest and was suspected of intrigues with Sextus. Messana now surrendered to him, and Octavian's position was critical. But he took the bold course; he challenged the authority of Lepidus with his own troops, and the soldiers deserted to him and left Lepidus at his mercy. Octavian spared his life but interned him in Circeii. The rejoicing in Rome was great, and Octavian was hailed as a deliverer. He had now outlived his youthful heat and began to display great qualities of government, spending his whole energies on restoring peace and settled conditions in the West. In 35 and 34 Dalmatia was subdued, in 34 the Salassi of the western Alps submitted, and, about the same time, Bogud, a troublesome prince in Mauretania, was deposed. Men began to look on Octavian as the destined restorer of the Roman world.

Antony spent these fateful years in wild enterprise and idle indulgence in the East. He wasted the year 37 with Cleopatra in Syria and did not take the field against Parthia till the spring of 36. The Parthian king Orodes had abdicated in favour of Phraates IV, and, as the new king was cruel and unpopular, Antony hoped to gain much by encouraging a certain Monaeses as his rival. The campaign of 36 was, however, a failure. Antony invaded Atropatene,

but lost a detachment and failed to capture Praaspa. Finally, he had to make a difficult and well-nigh disastrous retreat into Syria. Early in 34 he attacked Artavasdes of Armenia Major, who had deserted him in 36, and deposed him, and made an alliance with Artavasdes of Atropatene. But, in serious truth, the result of all this fighting was absolutely nil. From about 37 onwards, Antony had begun to degenerate from a Roman general into an eastern sultan and fell more and more under the fatal influence of Cleopatra. He neglected his wife Octavia and finally, in 32, divorced her. He restored Egypt to its full territorial extent, giving Cleopatra part of Syria, Cilicia, Cyprus and probably Crete, and assigning principalities to her children. Rome ceased to recognize him as a true Roman, and, though he tried to win favour by offering to lay down his powers, it was already too late. At last Octavian obtained a copy of his will and had it read in public. Rome was excited by the fear that Antony intended to make Alexandria his capital; his adherents at Rome deserted him, and, in 32, he was deposed from his powers and war was declared against him. Antony had still fair prospects of victory, had he only displayed reasonable energy. But he wasted his chances, and soon Agrippa and Octavian appeared off the coast of Epirus with a large fleet. Against his better judgement Antony was persuaded to seek the decision at sea. At Actium the fleets met, and a fierce engagement took place; before the battle was decided Cleopatra took to flight, Antony followed her and the day was lost (31). In the spring of 30 Octavian followed the fugitives to Egypt. Antony, finding resistance hopeless, killed himself, and Cleopatra, failing to add Octavian to her list of lovers, followed his example. The kingdom of Egypt thus came to an end. Octavian appointed an equestrian *praefectus Aegypti* to rule for him as viceroy, and C. Cornelius Gallus was the first to hold the important

post. In August, 29, Octavian returned to Rome to triumph amid general enthusiasm. The danger from the East that had threatened Roman nationality was removed, and all eyes turned to Octavian as the arbiter of the future destinies of the state.

CHAPTER IX


THE ROMAN EMPIRE FROM AUGUSTUS TO DIOCLETIAN

SECTION I. AUGUSTUS AND THE PRINCIPATE

THE Republic was, beyond all doubt, dead, and a new form of government had to take its place. Julius Caesar had made no disguise of the fact and had disdained any sham or pretence. While he lived, he held all power centred in his hand and paid scant respect to old constitutional bodies, such as the senate. Octavian was a man of a different stamp. Lacking the genius of Julius, he possessed a marvellous political tact; he saw the danger of arousing violent opposition by too abrupt and frank reform and, therefore, while recognizing the essential need—centralization of government in one hand—he showed the utmost respect for constitutional forms. His honest intention seems to have been to carry over into the empire as much as possible of the old republic; thus he assigned to the senate a definite and important share in the government, and founded what Mommsen has neatly termed a “dyarchy”—or conjoint rule of two powers, emperor and senate. This division of power soon ceased to count for much in practice, as the senate showed itself unable or unwilling to bear its part, and subsequent emperors moved steadily towards absolute government. But, there can be little doubt that the compromise instituted by Octavian, though only half effective and transitory, smoothed the way over the change of constitution.

Octavian, then, or Augustus as we may now call him—he received the title in 27 B.C., and it is by it that we know him best—was distinguished by a cool sanity of view and an immense talent for politics. His youthful passions soon burnt themselves out; in later life he kept himself well in check, allowed no room for private resentments and learned to play the part of benevolent and dispassionate ruler. He was certain of himself within his natural limits; beyond those limits his caution would not let him go. He preferred to hold what was sure rather than to risk the certain in the hope of greater contingent gain. In fact, he was a man of exceptional talent, untroubled by that uneasy and unpractical thing, genius. He was fortunate in his friends, two of whom stand out above the rest. M'. Vipsanius Agrippa, a man of humble birth, rose to distinction in Augustus's service as a thoroughly capable soldier; Augustus himself was no general and Agrippa waged all his more important wars for him. C. Cilnius Maecenas was of quite a different stamp. Of noble Etruscan birth, he chose to remain a Roman knight and never entered the senate; he had a great talent for diplomacy and was constantly employed in the capacity of diplomatist by Augustus, and, on several occasions, was entrusted with the administration of Rome and Italy. Apart from his political activity he was lazy and luxurious; as a genuine patron of literature he has a place in literary history.

On the 13th of January, 27 B.C., Octavian laid down his extraordinary powers. On the 16th he received the title of Augustus, by which he was afterwards known. No one at Rome had any doubt that Augustus was to be the ruler of the Roman world; the only question was, under what precise forms his position would be legitimized. The new authority, now conferred by the senate on Augustus, had two main sides, (1) the military and foreign, (2) the civil.



Augustus

(1) Augustus received again the proconsular *imperium*, unlimited in time or place, which he had held since 40 B.C. In virtue of this power, he was supreme commander of all the armies and fleets of the state and the supreme authority in all the provinces. Augustus, however, did not directly undertake the government of all the provinces. He made two classes of them: the provinces more recently acquired, where large military forces were still needed, came under his immediate control; the older and more peaceful provinces, where, for the most part, only local militia were stationed, were assigned to the senate. The imperial provinces were governed by *legati pro praetore*, the senatorial by governors serving *pro consule*; for both classes of posts either consulship or praetorship was a qualification. A third class of provinces, mainly unimportant (Egypt under its *praefectus* is the one exception), were placed under the government of imperial agents, procurators, of the equestrian class. Imperial financial officers, also called procurators, served in the imperial provinces as general finance agents, and in the senatorial to collect moneys due to the emperor. All these imperial deputies received fixed salaries and were kept under a tolerably strict control. Augustus also had the right to direct foreign policy and regulate the general conditions of the empire. The administration of Rome and Italy remained with the senate; but in course of time, Augustus, to secure a higher degree of efficiency, took over the charge of various important services, e.g. of the public roads (*cura viarum*) in 20 B.C., and later of the corn-supply and firemen of Rome. The legions were mainly stationed on the frontiers; auxiliaries and local militia completed the defence. The chief command of the legion fell to the *legatus legionis*, who must be a senator. At Augustus's death, the number of legions was twenty-five—a dangerously small army for so wide an empire. There were

small fleets on such rivers as the Rhine, Danube and Euphrates, and two Italian fleets, at Ravenna and Misenum, under *praefecti classis*. Augustus restored good military discipline and re-organized the general system, fixing anew the length of service and the rate of pay. The praetorian guard, the most favoured branch of the service, was stationed under Augustus in and about Rome; it consisted of 9000 men in nine cohorts and was open only to Italians, who had a shorter term of service and higher pay than the legionaries. It was commanded by two *praefecti praetorio*, knights in rank. The only other troops in Rome were the *cohortes urbanae*, charged with police-duties, and the *cohortes vigilum*, a corps of firemen of the freedmen class, organized as soldiers. Veterans, on retirement, were well cared for, and such of them as were foreigners received Roman citizenship. To provide the necessary funds, Augustus founded in 6 A.D. a special *aerarium militare*, with special revenues assigned to its support.

(2) We now turn to Rome and the civil government. Augustus at first intended to make the consulship the basis of his authority and held that office without break from 27–23 B.C. In the latter year, however, he gave up this idea, and received instead the *tribunicia potestas*, unlimited in time or place, for life. It was granted by a formal vote of the *Comitia*, following on a resolution of the senate, and conferred inviolability and an absolute power of veto. The power of the tribune had always had something absolute and vague about it that had rendered it dangerous to the republic; that very quality made it a suitable basis for the power of the emperor. Finance was divided between emperor and senate. The old treasury, the *aerarium Saturni*, continued under senatorial control; its chief assets were the revenues of the senatorial provinces, its chief charges the expenses of those provinces and the costs of administration in Rome and Italy. The revenues of the

imperial provinces and certain dues from the senatorial were assigned to the emperor, and out of these grew the new imperial treasury, the *fiscus*, which, however, was probably not established under that name until the time of Claudius. The chief charges on the *fiscus* were the expenses of the imperial provinces, the pay of officials, and the maintenance of the armies and fleets. To secure a sure foundation for taxation, Augustus carried out a survey in, at any rate, many of the provinces, and later emperors substituted direct for indirect collection of taxes. This was a great step in advance and contributed largely to the welfare of the provincials. As regards the coinage, it was arranged that the emperor should strike gold and silver, while the senate retained the right of striking copper. The emperor had no definite legislative powers, but his *edicta*, *constitutiones* and *acta* very early began to carry legal force. The senate, we have seen, retained control over a number of the provinces and also over Rome and Italy. Augustus did his utmost to maintain its reputation and made a point of frequently consulting it on important matters. He himself ranked as its leading member, the *princeps senatus*. A census of 1,000,000 HS. was a qualification and the roll was annually revised. Admission to the senate, as before, lay through the quaestorship or any higher office. The consulship and praetorship retained much of their former dignity, but the lower offices ceased to be much esteemed. The emperor had a certain control over the election to these posts; he could nominate and also recommend a certain number of candidates, who were then, as a matter of course, elected. As time went on, the comparative inefficiency of the senate led Augustus to encroach at several points on its field of action. In 6 A.D. he undertook the charge of the fire-brigade of Rome (*cura vigilum*) and soon afterwards that of the corn-supply (*cura annonae*). For both these departments prefects of equestrian rank were

appointed. The *Comitia* ceased to play any real part in politics and, so far as they still survived, were nothing but a form. We find two new courts for the trial of criminal offences: (1) the senate, under the presidency of the consuls, (2) the emperor and his council. Even outside this second court the emperor had an extensive civil jurisdiction. The senate, through the practical abolition of the *Comitia*, actually added to its own constitutional powers.

Religion, like all other departments of state-life, was closely associated with Augustus, who became *pontifex maximus* in B.C. 12 and a member of all the chief religious colleges. The censorship was not, at first, part of the imperial powers, although Augustus himself, at intervals, discharged certain of its functions. The title of *pater patriae*, accepted by Augustus in 2 B.C., was purely honorary and had no special political significance. Strangely enough, there was no exact description for the new office created by Augustus; our word "emperor," derived from the Latin *imperator*, only describes its military side. Perhaps the best designation is that of *princeps*, which simply denotes the leading citizen in the state and, in its very vagueness, well represents the character of the original imperial office.

SECTION 2. FAMILY POLICY OF AUGUSTUS

Such was the constitution framed by Augustus to answer to the new needs of the Roman state. We have now to see what attempts were made to question his authority and what plans he formed for the succession. In the year 30 B.C. the son of the triumvir Lepidus failed in a conspiracy. A little later C. Cornelius Gallus gave cause for suspicion by his conduct in Egypt and was put to death. A more serious conspiracy was that of Fannius Caepio and A. Terentius Varro Murena in 23, but, like its

predecessors, it proved abortive. The only other conspiracy, that of Cn. Cornelius Cinna in 4 A.D., was easily suppressed.

The principate was not an hereditary office, but Augustus showed the clear intention of marking out his successor before he died. When he married his consort Livia, he adopted her sons Tiberius and Nero Drusus and also his own nephew Marcellus, to whom he gave his daughter Julia—his daughter by an earlier wife—in marriage. Agrippa, Augustus's right hand man, felt the advancement of Marcellus as a personal slight and retired to the East. Marcellus, however, died young, and in 21 Agrippa returned and married the widowed Julia; two sons born of this marriage, Gaius and Lucius, were adopted by Augustus. A series of heavy family losses now fell on the emperor. In 12 B.C. Agrippa died, in 11 Octavia, Augustus's sister, and in 9 his favourite step-son, Nero Drusus. Maecenas, too, died in 8 B.C. Julia, a second time left a widow, married Tiberius, but the marriage was unhappy and in 6 B.C. Tiberius retired to Rhodes. He fell into disfavour and, for some years, was practically a banished man. The hopes of Augustus now rested on his adopted sons, Gaius and Lucius. Both were marked out for the consulship, and, in 1 B.C., Gaius was sent on an important political mission to the East. He died, however, in 3 A.D. and, as Lucius had already died at Massalia in 1 A.D., Augustus was left without an heir. And dishonour, as well as death, had fallen on the emperor's house. His darling daughter Julia had plunged into a course of wild license at Rome, and at last news of her misconduct reached her father's ears. He never forgave her. Her lovers were heavily punished and she herself was banished. In 1 A.D. Tiberius had been allowed to return to Rome. He was a man of morose and unapproachable temperament but of great and tried ability, and in 3 A.D. Augustus adopted him as his heir, though at the same time he adopted Agrippa Postumus, the youngest

child of Agrippa and Julia. This young man, however, was unpromising and troublesome and was at last banished. Tiberius, himself, was instructed to adopt his nephew Germanicus, the son of Nero Drusus. From now onwards, Tiberius stood beside Augustus as a sharer in his duties and with the clear hope of the succession; when Augustus died at Nola in August, 14 A.D., he at once succeeded to the vacant throne.

SECTION 3. FOREIGN WARS OF AUGUSTUS


The reign of Augustus was, in the main, a time of peace and recuperation. The emperor himself was no general and had no keen personal motive for war; he preferred to gain his object by diplomacy wherever possible. Thus the war of revenge which Antony had vainly attempted against Parthia was never fought, but in 20 B.C. Augustus secured the restoration of the standards captured at Carrhae. There was, from time to time, trouble in Armenia, a state over which Rome claimed a certain right of suzerainty. In 22 B.C. Augustus sent out a certain Tigranes to contest the throne with the king, Artaxias, and Tiberius established him in the kingdom. But, in spite of this, Parthia continued friendly, and in 9 B.C. the Parthian king Phraates sent his sons to be educated at Rome. In 6 B.C. Tigranes of Armenia died, and a state of anarchy ensued. Gaius Caesar received the task of restoring order, but died after he had become engaged in war with the Parthian party in Armenia, and the country remained unsettled. Late in his reign Augustus, at the Parthians' request, sent out a certain Vonones to occupy the throne.

A few other events in the East deserve a brief mention. In 25 B.C. C. Aelius Gallus undertook a difficult expedition into Arabia Felix, and in 22 or 23 B.C. C. Petronius, prefect of Egypt, gained victories over the Ethiopians in the

south. Amyntas, king of Galatia, died in 25 B.C., and his kingdom became a province. In speaking of Judaea, we must pick up the thread of our earlier narrative. Caesar had left Hyrcanus, Pompey's nominee, in possession of the high-priesthood, but had appointed a certain Antipater to act as his procurator in Judaea. Antipater's sons, Herod and Phazael, were appointed tetrarchs of Judaea by Antony; but the Parthians restored the old princely house and carried Phazael into captivity. On the Parthian retirement, Antony reversed their arrangements and made Herod king. Herod chose the losing side in the war of Actium, but soon made his peace with the victor and ruled on until his death. He was an ardent lover of all things Greek and, as such, was bitterly hated by all devout Jews. In spite of terrible faults, he was a man of great powers, and the lurid tragedy of his family history has cast a certain undeserved gloom over his name. On his death in 4 B.C. his son Archelaus succeeded him in Judaea, but, proving an incapable ruler, was deposed in 6 A.D.; Judaea became a province, under the rule of procurators. Philip, another son of Herod the Great, received Caesarea Paneas and reigned till 34 A.D., and a third son of Herod, Antipas, ruled in the Galilaean Tiberias till 39. On the death of these princes, their principalities were taken over by Rome.

In the west of the empire there was more serious trouble. The north-west of Spain had never yet been properly subdued, and the credit of its conquest belongs to Augustus. The wars that broke the national resistance lasted, with intervals, from 29–20 B.C. In place of the old provinces of Hither and Further Spain, three new ones were formed—Tarraconensis in the north and north-east, with the districts of Asturia and Gallaecia in the north-west, Baetica in the south-east and Lusitania in the west and south-west. In north Africa a native prince, Juba,

was married to Cleopatra, daughter of Antony and the Egyptian queen, and received Numidia to rule; when Numidia was united to the province of Africa in 25 B.C., he obtained Mauretania in exchange. Africa was the only senatorial province in which a legion still stood under the command of the senatorial governor. Gaul had been conquered by Julius Caesar, but its settlement had never been completed. From 27-16 B.C. Augustus devoted great attention to this province and, for some years, was there in person. Down to 16 B.C. it was the scene of large exceptional commands, but in that year three provinces were formed—excluding the old province of Narbonensis—Gallia Lugdunensis, Belgica and Aquitania. To Belgica were attached the two frontier districts on the Rhine, named, somewhat arrogantly, Upper and Lower Germany. In 16 B.C. the northern frontier of Italy was secured by the conquest of Raetia and Noricum. On the Rhine frontier there was continual unrest, and, for a time, Augustus certainly favoured the plan of conquering the nearer districts of Germany and advancing the frontier to the Elbe. In 12 B.C. Nero Drusus subdued the Batavi and Frisii and, in the following year, attacked the powerful Cherusci and fortified a post at Aliso. Similar expeditions in 10 and 9 B.C. seemed to promise speedy success, but these hopes were frustrated by the sudden death of Drusus in the latter year. Tiberius took over his brother's work, but his retirement to Rhodes in 6 B.C. brought the advance to an end. In 4 A.D. Tiberius at length resumed the interrupted task, and Roman civilization penetrated deep into Germany. To the south, Maroboduus had founded a powerful kingdom among the Marcomanni, and Tiberius was planning an expedition against him. But just at this moment a terrible revolt broke out and spread over the whole of Pannonia and Dalmatia. Such a war at the very gates of Italy caused the profoundest alarm at Rome, and Tiberius,



THE ROMAN EMPIRE, 1st century A.D.

leaving Maroboduus undisturbed, hastened to quell the rebels (5 A.D.). After three years' heavy fighting the revolt in Pannonia was crushed (8 A.D.), and Dalmatia submitted in the following year. But, meanwhile, a disaster had overtaken the Roman arms in Germany, which put an end to all hopes of conquest. In 6 A.D. the incapable Roman governor, P. Quinctilius Varus, who had succeeded Tiberius, was surprised by the Cherusci under Arminius in the *Saltus Teutoburgensis*, and two Roman legions were cut to pieces. Tiberius checked the advance of the Germans; but Germany was lost and he could not take up again the task of conquest. On the Danube frontier the Roman arms were more successful. Moesia was subdued by Crassus in 29 B.C., and, in 16 B.C., a revolt of the powerful tribe of the Bessi was quelled in Thrace.

SECTION 4. HOME POLICY OF AUGUSTUS

The foreign policy of Augustus can hardly be called unsuccessful, but it was intensely conservative and had few brilliant successes to show. His government showed to far greater advantage at home. The emperor built on a grand scale himself and encouraged his friends in the like ambition. The new senate-house, the Forum of Augustus, the amphitheatre of Statilius Taurus, the theatre and baths of Agrippa are a few of the many fine buildings, with which Rome was embellished. Augustus, as we have seen above, took over the control of the Roman fire-brigade and the corn-supply and certainly did much toward making Rome a safer and a more comfortable city to live in. The public roads and the aqueducts were also carefully cared for. And Augustus was not content with material improvement; he felt that he was called to revive the good old Roman character as well. He encouraged matrimony and discouraged vice by the *Lex Papia Poppaea de maritandis ordinibus* and

the *Lex Julia de adulteriis*; he inspired the poets to assist him in the national revival—the *Aeneid* is Vergil's great contribution to his idea; above all he fostered the genuine old Roman religion, and, in 17 B.C., celebrated with great ceremony the secular games. How far his efforts met with success we cannot say; clear evidence of, at least, partial, failure is unfortunately easy to find.

SECTION 5. TIBERIUS (14-37 A.D.)

Tiberius, who succeeded his adoptive father in his high office, was readily recognized as emperor in Rome. He was an able and experienced man, but proud, suspicious and reserved, embittered by a hard and unkind life. Agrippa Postumus, a possible rival, was at once put to death, whether by Tiberius's express order or no is uncertain. But, although Rome took the change of rulers quietly, the armies chose the occasion to make their voices heard. Both on the Rhine and Danube the legions mutinied, demanding higher pay and easier terms of service. The position was serious; for, although no special bitterness was felt against the emperor himself, the mutineers were naturally driven into direct conflict with him. The Danube troops had no leader and were soon reduced to submission through a judicious mixture of promises and threats by Drusus, son of Tiberius, and Aelius Sejanus, the praetorian prefect. On the Rhine matters were more serious. Since 12 A.D. Germanicus had held the military command there, and the troops of Lower Germany now attempted to set him up as a rival to Tiberius. But Germanicus refused the perilous greatness thrust upon him and finally, by dint of threats and promises, suppressed the revolt. In the very next year Tiberius felt himself sufficiently secure to withdraw the extorted concessions.

Germanicus was filled with the idea of carrying out

his father's work and completing the conquest of Germany. In the years 14-16, he led his troops into Germany, in 15 he visited the *Saltus Teutoburgensis* and buried the remains of the Roman dead, and in 16 won a hard fight at *Idistaviso* over the *Cherusci*. But his troops lost heavily on the retreat, and the German tribes were still restive. Tiberius, it seems, had never approved of Germanicus's policy; he saw nothing to be gained by further expense of men and money, and in 16 he recalled Germanicus. The prince was honoured with a triumph and a second consulship (17 A.D.). Tiberius's German policy was justified in its results; a complete conquest of the country seemed likely to cost too dear, and anything short of conquest was useless and dangerous. The moment the Romans withdrew, party strife broke out in Germany. *Maroboduus*, king of the *Marcomanni*, came into conflict with the *Cherusci* and, being worsted, had to throw himself on Tiberius's mercy and ended his days at *Ravenna*. *Arminius* himself died in civil war in 21. The unity imposed on the Germans for the moment by the need of opposition to Rome was destroyed, and the quarrels of the tribes prevented any single one from becoming dangerous.

In the East circumstances had arisen which called for Roman intervention. *Vonones*, who had been sent out by Augustus, had been driven out of Parthia by *Artabanus III* and was in the custody of the governor of Syria. Tiberius now despatched Germanicus to hold a high command in the East and to regulate affairs there; but, to check his ambition, he at the same time appointed *Cn. Calpurnius Piso*, a personal enemy of Germanicus, to the governorship of Syria. This arrangement worked badly. Germanicus made a satisfactory settlement with Parthia; he set *Vonones* aside and, in return, *Artabanus* allowed the Roman nominee to rule in Armenia. But Germanicus displeased Tiberius by paying a visit to Egypt—a thing strictly

forbidden to all leading Romans—and became involved in a deadly feud with Piso. The enmity between the men was intensified by the hatred between their wives, Agrippina and Plancina, and things came to an open breach. In 19 A.D. Germanicus died suddenly at Antioch and the suspicion of poisoning fell upon Piso. Piso had retired to Cos; he now returned to Syria, but was driven out by the friends of Germanicus and was finally forced to return to Rome. Agrippina brought back the ashes of Germanicus and appeared before Tiberius, demanding revenge. Piso was tried before the senate and, finding that feeling was strong against him, committed suicide; Plancina escaped by the influence of Tiberius's mother, Livia. Germanicus had been the darling of the Roman people and the mourning over his death was deep and sincere. Tiberius has incurred heavy censure for his treatment of the young prince. Probably, though none too generous towards him, he was clear of any more serious responsibility. The relation between the two men was no easy one, and it was by no means all the fault of Tiberius that the issue was so disastrous. Later in the reign there was again trouble in the East. On the death of the Roman nominee in Armenia, Artabanus III of Parthia appointed his son Arsaces to the throne. Tiberius at first took no account of this action, but at last, in 35 A.D., sent L. Vitellius on a special mission. Vitellius restored the Roman authority, Arsaces was killed and a certain Tiridates was made king. Artabanus expelled Tiridates but finally, in 36, fearing trouble from Rome, renounced all claim to Armenia.

In Africa a certain Tacfarinas, a prince of the Musulamii, raised a serious revolt (about 20 B.C.), and it was not till 24 that he was finally conquered. In Thrace there was trouble with a native king, Rhascuporis, and in 21 and 25–26 risings against Rome had to be put down. A revolt in Gaul under Florus and Sacrovir was easily suppressed (21 A.D.).

Tiberius was never popular and he had the misfortune to outlive his better reputation. Slander has busied herself with his name, and the great historian Tacitus has lent his authority to brand him as a monster of cruelty and vice. On the evidence available we cannot fairly pass sentence on his private life. What we do know is that he was a conscientious and able administrator, and that under him the provinces enjoyed good and careful government. He maintained strict discipline in the army and he kept a close watch on the conduct of provincial governors. Under his rule the praetorian guard, hitherto stationed in detachments in and near Rome, was collected in a single camp inside the city. His financial administration was brilliant and he left a well-filled treasury. The *Comitia*, already practically effete, now ceased to have any political importance at all. He also instituted the important office of *praefectus urbis*—a post reserved for the most distinguished of the senators. The worst feature of his rule at Rome is one for which he was only partially responsible. Discontent was rife, and one actual conspiracy, that of M. Drusus Libo, was discovered and put down. Such plotting gave employment to a class of informers (*delatores*), who now become a constant and unpleasant feature of Roman life. Tiberius certainly encouraged them, but he might reasonably plead that it was only in self-defence.

The family life of Tiberius was terrible and tragic. His mother Livia was ambitious and arrogant, and, for this cause, during the last years of her life was completely estranged from her son. Of the fate of Germanicus we have already spoken. After his death Drusus, the son of Tiberius, was marked out as heir. But now Tiberius's evil genius appears on the scene in the person of Sejanus, the praetorian prefect. A man of great ability and terrific force of character, he succeeded in winning the entire confidence of the emperor. But Drusus hated him and the quarrel became acute ;

Livilla, sister of Germanicus and wife of Drusus, allowed herself to be entangled in an intrigue with Sejanus, and Drusus died suddenly—as it was discovered later, by poison. Tiberius then marked out Nero and Drusus, the sons of Germanicus, as his successors—the twin sons of Drusus were still mere infants. But Sejanus would brook no rival and began to plot the overthrow of the whole house of Germanicus. In 26 Tiberius left Rome for Capreae—never to enter the city gates again. Sejanus, in his master's absence, was more powerful than ever; Agrippina was high-spirited and incautious, and she and her sons, by their reckless talking, played into his hands. Tiberius was persuaded that they were disloyal and first struck at their friends, then placed them themselves under guard. In 29 Agrippina and Nero were banished and Drusus was imprisoned in Rome. The tragedy now moved quickly to its climax. Sejanus, impatient of the second place in the state, plotted to remove Tiberius. The danger to the aged emperor was acute; but he received timely warning and struck suddenly and unexpectedly. Tiberius sent a despatch, denouncing Sejanus to the senate; Sejanus was executed (31), and for several years victim after victim fell, on the mere charge of having been his friend. Betrayed by the man he had trusted so implicitly, Tiberius lost all self-control. He had forfeited all joy in life and only lived to the woe of others. In 33 Agrippina and Drusus were put to death—Nero had already suffered the penalty in 31. Tiberius's choice fell now on C. Caesar, younger brother of Nero and Drusus, who had escaped the ruin of his family by a feigned indifference, which pleased the emperor's morbid fancy; but Tiberius's own grandson, Tiberius Gemellus¹ was marked out as joint heir. In 37 Tiberius died at Capreae; it was rumoured that his end had been hastened by Gaius, in league with the praetorian prefect Macro.

¹ Son of Drusus: his twin brother had died in infancy.

SECTION 6. CALIGULA AND CLAUDIUS (37-54 A.D.)

The new emperor was recognized without dispute and was welcomed with wild jubilation. He was the son of the popular favourite, Germanicus, he had spent his childhood in the camp, where he had acquired his nickname of "Caligula," and men hoped great things of him. At first he seemed likely to answer all expectations and began his reign with a series of popular measures, heaping honours on members of his family and showing a liberal turn in politics. But he was a poor and base character. He soon squandered Tiberius's accumulated wealth and, in want of money, was driven to resort to hard taxes and exactions. As he gradually came to feel his power, he lost all sense of reason and became little more than a dangerous megalomaniac. At the end of 37 his co-heir, Tiberius Gemellus, was put to death, and Macro, the praetorian prefect, his own former supporter, also fell. Gaius aspired to divine honours, claimed the title of *dominus*, and acted the madman on the throne. His wild humours are scarcely fit matter for history and may be passed over with a bare mention. Anxious to win military glory, he undertook in 39-40 a farcical and useless expedition to Germany, which reads like a very parody of warfare. In 40 a conspiracy, headed by Gaetulicus, the governor of Upper Germany, was suppressed, and two sisters of Gaius, Julia and Agrippina, were banished on the suspicion of complicity. But such a madman could not be endured for long and, in January 41, Gaius fell a victim to a military conspiracy at Rome.

A few minor changes in the provinces call for mention. Ptolemy, son of Juba, king of Mauretania, was summoned to Rome and put to death; in Thrace the native prince Rhoemetalces was officially recognized as king; in Africa, the command of the *legio III Augusta* was taken

from the governor and given to ^{an} imperial legate, who also received the government of Numidia. As far as Gaius had a definite policy in regard to the provinces, it was a liberal one; he bestowed citizenship and even the rank of knight and senator with great freedom.

The conspirators who murdered Gaius had had no definite successor in view. The tale goes that, after the murder, a praetorian soldier, wandering through the palace, observed some one hiding behind a curtain, dragged him out and found him to be the emperor's uncle, Claudius, the brother of Germanicus. The troops at once hailed him as emperor and carried him off to the camp. It certainly seems that the choice was made suddenly and without much reflection; Claudius had for years been the butt of the court; clumsy and slow, he was often counted half-witted and, though really of respectable intelligence, he had something ludicrous about him even in his most worthy pursuits. But the general good sense that marked his government shows that he had been cruelly underrated. While the army was making Claudius emperor, the senate met and discussed the restoration of liberty. The debate was still in progress when the news of the army's decision arrived; this decisive news put an end to talking and Claudius was accepted as emperor. But the succession was not left entirely unquestioned; for M. Furius Camillus Scribonianus started a revolt in Dalmatia, which looked dangerous until his own troops deserted him. In 46 a second conspiracy, that of Asinius Gallus, was suppressed.

From the military point of view the reign of Claudius was not unimportant. In 43 it was decided to complete the task, begun by Julius Caesar and since then untouched, of the conquest of Britain. The emperor himself appeared in Britain, and a firm footing was obtained in the south and south-east. A. Plautius was the first legate of the island (43-47); his successor, P. Ostorius Scapula (48-51) pushed

forward against the Iceni and Trinobantes in the east and in 49 defeated the Silures in the south of Wales. In 50 Camalodunum was founded as a colony, and in 51 the leader of the national resistance, Caratacus, was taken captive. The governor from 52-54 was Q. Didius Gallus, who devoted his attention to internal development. On the Rhine frontier there was a general peace. But in 47 Cn. Domitius Corbulo fought against the Chauci, in 47-48 the Frisii submitted to Rome, and in 50 inroads of the Chatti into Gaul were repelled. Mauretania, since the death of Ptolemy, had been without a ruler; but in 41 C. Suetonius Paulinus was sent to take command and by 45 quiet was restored, and two new provinces, Mauretania Caesariensis and Tingitana, were formed and placed under procurators. Parthia was distracted by civil war, and from 41-48 two rivals, Gotarzes and Vardanes, fought for the crown. In 48, on the death of his rival, Gotarzes held the throne, but a revolt broke out against him and the rebels asked for a certain Meherdates to be sent by Rome to rule them. The governor of Syria, C. Cassius, placed Meherdates on the throne, but the prince could not retain his seat, and, after Gotarzes had died in 51, Vologeses I became king (52). Armenia too gave trouble. Mithradates, king of Iberia, occupied the land, but he became involved in war with his own nephew Radamistus, fell into his hands and was put to death (51); and, for the time, Rome did not interfere. In Judaea Claudius appointed his friend, the Jewish prince Herod Agrippa, king, but, on the death of Herod, placed the province once more under a procurator. Conditions in the land were bad and continually growing worse, and were moving steadily towards a great catastrophe. Lycia lost its freedom and was added to Pamphylia (43). Thrace became a procuratorial province in 46. Claudius took a decided step forward in granting the *ius honorum*, or right of holding office at Rome, to the whole

of Gaul. The army was raised in number and the conditions of service for officers were reorganized.


The domestic government of Claudius was wise and beneficent. The imperial freedmen, holding the important posts of *a rationibus*, *ab epistulis* and *a libellis*, were coming to play a part second to none in the government of the empire. Claudius was particularly amenable to the influence of his freedmen and, under him, Narcissus *ab epistulis*, Pallas *a rationibus* and Polybius *a libellis*, made their mark on the imperial policy. These men were bitterly hated at Rome and may, we can readily believe, have looked after their own interests well enough. But their ability was unquestioned, and the general imperial administration in their hands was vigorous and efficient. Claudius's main characteristics were pedantry and conscientiousness. He was a devoted antiquarian; he restored the obsolete *Comitia* and appointed quaestors once more to take charge of the *aerarium Saturni*. He had a positive passion for jurisdiction and spent much time and trouble on his duties as judge. In 53 an important advance was made in the development of the civil service; the emperor's financial agents, the procurators, received jurisdiction in all cases affecting the *fiscus*; up to then they had been obliged to sue in the ordinary courts of law. Two great new aqueducts—the *Aqua Claudia* and the *Anio Nova*—were built; a new harbour at Ostia was constructed and the Fucine Lake was drained. Whether the credit be due to Claudius or to his freedmen, there was nothing contemptible in this government.

Claudius, it was said, was the slave of his freedmen; but it was even more true that he was the slave of his wives. The empress Messalina was a beautiful but immoral woman, notorious for her amours and detested for her greed, and led her uxorious husband into a series of political crimes. But at last she went too far. In 48 she actually

went through a marriage ceremony with one of her lovers, C. Silius, and the freedman Narcissus secured the consent of Claudius to her execution. The question at once arose, who should fill her place. Several possible candidates for the emperor's hand were suggested ; but Julia Agrippina, sister of Caligula and niece of Claudius, resolved to gain the prize and set herself to secure her uncle's affections. The senate obediently pronounced the marriage of uncle and niece legal, and Agrippina became the wife and consort of Claudius. She soon gained a definite share in government and devoted her every thought to the securing of the succession for her son by a former husband, the young L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. Claudius had two children by Messalina, Britannicus and Octavia ; but, in February, 50, L. Domitius was adopted by the emperor under the name of Nero Claudius Caesar Germanicus and betrothed to Octavia, while Britannicus was thrust more and more into the background. Nero was hailed as *princeps juventutis*, admitted to the four great priestly colleges and marked out for the consulship. The celebrated M. Annaeus Seneca was recalled from banishment to act as his tutor. Following up her success, Agrippina succeeded in getting rid of the two praetorian prefects, who favoured the claims of Britannicus, and securing the appointment of a capable officer, devoted to her cause, L. Afranius Burrhus. In 53 Nero married Octavia. But Claudius had never actually put Britannicus aside and now began to show signs of repentance for his previous neglect of his son. Agrippina, therefore, resolved to wait no longer. In the absence of Narcissus, her enemy, the watchful friend of Britannicus, she had the emperor poisoned at supper, and Nero was at once accepted as successor by the guard and the senate. Accusations of poisoning are painfully common during this period and are often rather wild ; in this case there can be little doubt that foul play did take place.

SECTION 7. NERO (54-68 A.D.)

Great hopes were entertained of the young emperor. He was bright, fond of music and literature, and, apparently, of an amiable disposition. But, if ever man suffered from his artistic temperament, it was Nero; he was very susceptible to pleasure and utterly unable to govern his impulses, and despotic power was as poison to him. And so it came that a weak but not unamiable youth gradually degenerated into a monster of depravity and a very type of sin. At the start of his reign Nero was completely under the influence of his mother Agrippina and her ally, the freedman Pallas, the *a rationibus*. Seneca and Burrhus, however, definitely opposed this domination and, in a very short time, drove Pallas to retirement from office; Agrippina herself had to retire into strict privacy. The government of Nero, under the tutelage of Seneca and Burrhus, promised to be popular. Respect for the constitution was carefully shown, and the senate was constantly consulted on matters of importance. The lower classes were satisfied with games and reduction of taxes. In 57 Nero actually talked of abolishing all indirect taxes; but this wild idea was abandoned and he contented himself with some much needed reforms in the tax-collection. A strict watch was kept on provincial governors and various special abuses were expressly prohibited. But events soon took an ominous turn. Britannicus was always an object of suspicion to Nero and when Agrippina, resenting her repulse, espoused his cause, Nero had him poisoned. And this was only the beginning. Nero feared his mother and could not feel safe while she lived. In 59 he beguiled her into a false confidence by a feigned reconciliation and then attempted to murder her; the first attempt failed, but Anicetus, a freedman of Nero, carried the infamous project through. Burrhus and Seneca, if not responsible for the planning of the murder, must share the



Nero

guilt of having defended it. But their influence was on the wane, and Nero began to act for himself. He fell under the enchantment of the beautiful Poppaea Sabina, who, not content to be his mistress, aspired to become empress, and, after Burrhus had died in 62, Nero resolved to get rid of his wife Octavia, whom he had never loved. She was first divorced on a shameful charge of infidelity, then sent into banishment and finally murdered. Poppaea became empress ; she bore Nero a daughter, who died in infancy, and died herself in 65, as a result of brutal maltreatment by Nero. Seneca's influence was a thing of the past ; Nero's chief intimate now was the new praetorian prefect, Sofonius Tigellinus, a man of infamous character. Nero plunged into the wildest extravagance and debauchery ; but what shocked Rome even more than his immorality was his love of music and acting, which led him to encourage noble Romans to appear on the stage, and even to set the fashion himself. He introduced festivals on a Greek model, the *Juvenilia* and *Neronia*, into Rome, and constantly competed in public as singer and actor. In 64 a large part of Rome was destroyed by a terrible fire ; Nero was accused of having caused it himself and, to shift the blame, persecuted the Christians, as though they had been responsible. Discontent could not fail to be aroused by such a career, and in 65 a great conspiracy was formed round the person of the noble, Piso. It was accidentally discovered, shortly before the date fixed for action, and, among many others, Seneca and his nephew, the poet Lucan, suffered as conspirators. Nero, angry and alarmed, thirsted for blood, and other executions, even more wanton, followed, among them that of the noble Stoic, Thræsea Paetus. But, despite all cruelty and misgovernment, Nero was popular with the mob, and, as long as the guard was faithful, he had little to dread. In 66 a second conspiracy, the Vinician, was discovered and suppressed, and, undeterred by this warning, the emperor

carried out his darling project of visiting Greece. He competed as chariot-driver and singer at the great Greek festivals, which were crowded into a single year in his honour, and everywhere carried off the prize; in return for these honours he bestowed liberty on Greece. Late in 67 he returned to Rome and resumed his old course of life. The capital still seemed inclined to remain passive; but discontent was rife in the provinces, and a movement began in Gaul which speedily led to his overthrow.

But we must now go back some years to review the foreign policy of the reign. At the end of the reign of Claudius, as we have seen, there were serious troubles in the East. Nero and his advisers decided to interfere, and late in 54 the able general Corbulo was sent out as governor of Cappadocia. Tiridates, brother of Vologeses I of Parthia, had occupied Armenia, and this the Romans were not disposed to allow. But, for the moment, the army was not fit for serious fighting; Corbulo made a truce with Vologeses and devoted himself to the restoration of discipline. In 58 his preparations were complete. He invaded Armenia, captured Artaxata (59), and, a few months later, Tigranocerta. The Roman cause was triumphant, and a certain Tigranes was set up as vassal of Rome in Armenia. But in 61 Tigranes was expelled from Armenia and L. Caesennius Paetus was sent to Cappadocia to safeguard the threatened interests of Rome; Corbulo, meanwhile, was appointed governor of Syria. Paetus was a careless and incompetent general and, in 62, was defeated by Vologeses and forced to capitulate at Rhandaia. Corbulo, hurrying up from Syria, arrived too late to prevent the disaster. After this, Corbulo was again entrusted with the command and, for a second time, invaded Armenia. The Parthians consented to treat, and peace was arranged, on the understanding that Tiridates should rule in Armenia, as vassal of Rome. In 66 he appeared in Rome and in

a dramatic and magnificent scene was formally invested by Nero with the crown. The Roman policy in the East had not been lacking in wisdom or courage. But the vital question of Armenia was hard to solve, and, as success ebbed or flowed, the government vacillated between the various possible solutions—incorporation of Armenia in the empire, appointment of a vassal of Rome as its king, and, the solution finally adopted, the recognition of a Parthian prince acknowledging Roman suzerainty.

In Britain a serious revolt almost put an end to the Roman rule. Suetonius Paulinus was governor in 60 and was pushing on the conquest of Mona (Anglesey), when the Icenî, under queen Boadicea, maddened by unendurable wrongs and oppressions, rose against the Romans, stormed Camalodunum and slew every Roman on whom they could lay their hands. Suetonius hurried back to the rescue, but could not save either Londinium or Verulamium, and was finally compelled to give battle to vastly superior forces. Roman generalship and discipline won in the face of terrible odds and the revolt was speedily suppressed. But it was the narrowest of escapes. As it was, the Roman occupation of the island soon began to advance once more.

SECTION 8. THE FALL OF NERO AND THE GREAT CIVIL WARS (68-69 A.D.)

The movement which cost Nero his life and throne began in Gaul, where Julius Vindex, governor, probably, of Gallia Lugdunensis, raised the standard of revolt early in 68. He started by professing loyalty to the senate and people of Rome, and Ser. Sulpicius Galba, governor of Tarraconensis, joined his party and became a candidate for the throne. But the revolt of Vindex soon came to assume the

character of a national rising against Rome, and, as such, it was suppressed by L. Verginius Rufus, governor of Upper Germany. The victorious general steadily declined the empire for himself, though his soldiers pressed it on him. Galba's position seemed desperate; he tried to make terms with Rufus and began to raise troops, but he had little hope of success, until the praetorian prefect, Nymphidius Sabinus, seduced the praetorians by extravagant promises to desert Nero. Nero, once abandoned by his troops, was declared a public enemy by the senate and died by his own hand; the senate at once recognized Galba as emperor. These events occupied the early months (about February to June) of 68. Galba at once set out for Rome, but did not arrive until autumn. He spent some time in Gaul, and gave deep offence to the legions of Germany by showing favour to the Gallic communities which had supported Vindex. At Rome Nymphidius Sabinus, failing to obtain the rewards he had anticipated from Galba, attempted to gain the empire for himself, but the praetorians were weary of treachery and murdered him. Galba began at once to make mistakes. He offended public opinion by needless executions and, above all, on his entry into Rome, by the massacre of a body of troops from the fleet, enrolled in a legion by Nero. The German legions were already bitterly hostile; Galba now estranged the praetorians by refusing to pay them the sums promised by Sabinus. This strictness contrasted sadly with the license practised by Galba's favourites, T. Vinus, Cornelius Laco and the freedmen Icelus, who robbed and plundered at their own sweet will. On the first of January, 69, the legions of Upper Germany revolted, and, a few days later the new governor of Lower Germany, Aulus Vitellius, was proclaimed emperor by his troops and was at once acknowledged in the upper province as well. Vitellius himself was a sluggish, self-indulgent and incapable man; but in Caecina and Valens he had two capable



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legates, and an immediate invasion of Italy was planned. On receiving the evil news Galba resolved to strengthen his position by adopting a son and heir. The man of his choice, Piso Frugi, was personally blameless; but he was neither well-known nor popular, and his election gave bitter offence to another Roman noble. M. Salvius Otho, formerly a friend of Nero and husband before him of Poppaea, had been sent into honourable exile as governor of Lusitania when Nero married his wife. He had been among the first to join Galba and had cherished the hope that Galba would choose him as his heir. This hope was now frustrated and Otho could not brook the slight. He turned to the praetorians for support, bought their adherence by huge promises, and on January 15 was declared emperor in the praetorian camp. Galba and Piso, taken completely by surprise, were murdered in the streets, and the senate had unwillingly to recognize the new emperor. There were now two candidates for the empire. Vitellius was supported by the whole of the West—for Spain soon deserted Otho; but Otho could depend on Italy, Africa, Illyricum and the East, and the chances of the war were, on the whole, in his favour. Some attempt was made to reach a settlement by diplomacy, but the troops on both sides wanted war and the decision had to be sought on the battlefield. In the short period of his rule Otho showed wisdom and moderation; but the mob welcomed him as a second Nero and the senate distrusted him as such. The decisive campaign was fought in the region of the Po. Otho had ample forces and such able generals as Suetonius Paulinus and Vestricius Spurinna on his side. But he wasted all his advantages¹; he distrusted his best commanders and, instead of waiting for his reinforcements to come up, wantonly hurried on the decision. Caecina, who had marched from Upper

¹ It is only fair to Otho to add that some modern scholars give him credit for a well-considered plan of campaign, only spoilt by the errors of his generals.


Germany through Switzerland into Italy, was the first to arrive and suffered a severe repulse at Cremona. But Fabius Valens soon came up with the second invading column from Gaul, and the combined troops gained a great victory at Bedriacum. Otho, impatient of the uncertainty, refused to continue the struggle and committed suicide, and his followers had no choice left them but to submit. On the 19th of April, 69, Vitellius was recognized as emperor by the senate; the praetorian guard was disbanded, and Vitellius planned the creation of a new guard, which was to be an *élite* corps, recruited from all the armies. Rome and Italy were now at the mercy of the victorious troops and suffered terribly at the hands of the unruly soldiers. Vitellius himself, following behind his lieutenants, reached Rome in July and took the title of Augustus and the consulship for life.

But Vitellius's rule was not long left unquestioned. This time the movement came from the East. Towards the end of the reign of Nero the troubles that had so long been brewing in Judaea burst out into terrible activity. The Jews, with their intense feeling of nationality and national religion, hated the foreign rule; the Roman procurators failed signally in their first task—that of securing peace and suppressing brigandage—and the extremists among the Jews more and more gained the upper hand. Under the successive procurators Felix, Festus and Albinus (54–64) the feeling became more and more bitter. Under Gessius Florus the patience of the Jews was at last exhausted, and fighting began with a riot between Greeks and Jews in Caesarea, followed by similar outbreaks in other cities, in which ghastly massacres were perpetrated on both sides. Cestius Gallus, governor of Syria, intervened in 66, but was obliged to retreat with some loss; Jerusalem revolted and soon the whole country was in arms. The revolt was serious and the Roman government took prompt measures,

despatching Mucianus to Syria and Vespasian to Judaea. Early in 67 Vespasian began his difficult task. It was a war of sieges, not battles, and progress was slow. But the Romans gradually advanced, and when, on the death of Nero, Vespasian suspended operations, the siege of Jerusalem was the one great task remaining. For some time the eastern armies looked on as spectators at the struggles for the throne. But Mucianus was ambitious and saw an opportunity for a bold stroke; preferring, however, the rôle of emperor-maker to that of emperor, he composed a private feud with Vespasian and induced him to make a bid for the crown. Early in July Vespasian was proclaimed emperor in Egypt by the prefect Tiberius Julius Alexander, and the armies of Judaea and Syria swore fealty to him. Illyricum then declared in his favour, and an advance guard under Antonius Primus, a dashing officer, pushed on into Italy. Vespasian entrusted the command in Judaea to the elder of his two sons, Titus, and himself occupied Egypt and thus became master of the main corn-supply of Rome. The war was soon over. The troops of Vitellius had rapidly deteriorated through the indulgences that followed on victory; Vitellius himself was utterly incapable and treachery soon began to show itself among his friends. The fleet of Ravenna deserted to the enemy, and Caecina, who was the first to take the field, was only prevented from betraying Vitellius by his own troops. In a rash but brilliant campaign Antonius Primus pushed forward into Italy, defeated the Vitellians in a great battle near Cremona and took and sacked the city. Fabius Valens was captured and executed; many of Vitellius's remaining troops deserted him and on the 17th of December the Flavians entered Rome. Vitellius had made a convention a few days before with Flavius Sabinus, brother of Vespasian and prefect of the city, to abdicate and retire into private life. But his troops forced him to break his

pact ; the Flavians were besieged in the Capitol, which was stormed and burnt, and many, Sabinus among them, perished, whilst Domitian, the younger son of Vespasian, had a narrow escape. When Primus arrived in Rome with his troops, the last resistance was soon overcome, and Vitellius was taken and put to death. For the moment Primus was the leading figure. But Mucianus, who had been pushing on behind him with fresh troops, soon arrived in Rome, gradually ousted Primus from his position and assumed the control until Vespasian should arrive. Titus, resuming his task in Judaea, discharged it with brilliant success. In September, 70, Jerusalem was stormed, the temple was burnt to the ground, and the terrible revolt ended, as it had begun, in seas of blood.

But before the new government could rest, there was one more danger to be encountered. Julius Civilis, a Batavian noble, had, late in 69, raised a revolt among the Batavians and neighbouring tribes, nominally in support of Vespasian against Vitellius, but really with ulterior designs. Eight Batavian cohorts, serving in the Roman army, joined the rebels and the mass of the troops in the two Germanies, after several defeats and the storm of the camp at Vetera, deserted to the enemy. Civilis now threw off the mask and refused to acknowledge Vespasian ; and a revolt of the Treviri, Lingones and other Gallic tribes under Julius Classicus, Julius Sabinus and Julius Tutor added to the danger. But the Gauls and the Batavians could not long hold together, the legions repented of their dishonour and Q. Petilius Cerealis, who was sent out by Vespasian, soon forced the rebels to submit. To obviate the danger of fresh revolts among the allies, the auxiliary forces no longer served under native officers and were usually assigned to posts at some distance from their homes. Once again the Roman world was at peace.



Vespasian

SECTION 9. THE FLAVIAN DYNASTY (69-96 A.D.)

The new emperor came of a sound Italian family, hitherto undistinguished at Rome. He was no poetic figure, but he was practical, sensible and conscientious, and no one could have better performed the task awaiting him. The finances were in hopeless confusion, but, by rigid economy and careful management, Vespasian placed them again on a satisfactory basis. The Roman aristocracy was showing signs of exhaustion. Vespasian reinforced it by drawing to Rome the pick of the Italian upper classes. Vespasian repealed the reform of the praetorian guard made by Vitellius and went back to the old system; but, fearing to entrust the position of *praefectus praetorio* to an ambitious noble, he gave it to his son Titus, who received the *tribunicia potestas* and became his colleague in the empire in 71. In 74 Vespasian and Titus were censors, and in this censorship revised the rolls of senators and knights and added many new names. The necessity of strict finance prevented Vespasian from becoming really popular; but his sterling good qualities commanded general respect. The only real opposition came from a small section of uncompromising philosophers with republican sympathies in the senate; they gave constant trouble, and Helvidius Priscus, one of their number, was put to death. Abroad the policy pursued was one of peace. The defence of the Danube was reorganized. Judaea received a legion, and an important military command was placed under a consular legate in Cappadocia. Achaëa lost the liberty it had received from Nero and was restored to the senate, whilst Lycia with Pamphylia was transferred to the emperor. Commagene was annexed and attached to Syria. Vespasian was too economical to build on an extensive scale. But the Capitol was restored and the great Coliseum and a fine *templum pacis* were erected. Vespasian died in

harness on the 23rd of June, 79, and his elder son Titus succeeded him unquestioned.

Titus had proved himself a good soldier in the Judæan campaign and, since then, had loyally assisted his father in the duties of empire. He was of an open and generous nature and began his reign with a series of popular measures. He punished the hated informers and gave liberal assistance to the sufferers from an earthquake in Campania. He was lavish with his presents and erected buildings and exhibited games in lordly style. Yet men could not but remember how similar beginnings had ended before, and there were not lacking voices that prophesied that Titus might prove a second Nero when he had run through his father's hoarded treasures. The prophecy was not to be tested. Titus was already seriously ill when he became emperor, and he died in September, 81, after only two years of rule.

He was succeeded by his younger brother, Domitian. The young prince had received the honour of the consulship in several years and had held the honourable rank of *princeps juventutis*, usually given to a member of the royal house. But Vespasian never gave him that share in the government which Titus had enjoyed, and Domitian felt himself neglected and conceived a certain bitterness at this fancied wrong. He was a man of some force of character and ability, cultured himself and a patron of literature. But, first and foremost, he was an autocrat. He broke deliberately with the Augustan system of a divided government, systematically humbled the senate, and worked for the establishment of a complete autocracy. This policy naturally excited a strong opposition; Domitian was driven to fierce repressive measures and succeeded, for the time, in crushing his opponents; but the senate never forgave him, and the great writer of that party, Tacitus, has painted him in colours far blacker than his actual record of


government deserves. In 84 Domitian assumed the censorship and held it for life, thus securing a permanent control over the composition of the senate. In 88 L. Antonius Saturninus revolted in Upper Germany, but was speedily crushed. Domitian was driven by fear to violent measures and, in 89 and again in 95, banished the philosophers, who led the opposition, from Rome. The informer-class was encouraged and criminal actions were brought against Herennius Senecio, Junius Arulenus Priscus, Helvetius Priscus the younger and others. Despite this autocratic tendency, which led him to claim the hated titles of *deus et dominus*, Domitian was a strong and able ruler. He kept his subordinates in strict order, administered the finances wisely, was lavish in his buildings and entertainments and introduced a number of wise laws. But, for reasons no longer clear to us, he persecuted the Jews and Christians. Anxious to win popularity, Domitian adopted a policy of expansion abroad. In Britain under Vespasian Q. Petilius Cerealis had pushed north to Lindum and Deva and Frontinus had conquered Wales. In 78 Cn. Julius Agricola, father-in-law of Tacitus, was sent out as governor. He conquered the island of Mona, pushed north as far as the line of the Forth and Clyde, and in 84 gained a victory in Scotland at the Mons Graupius over the native leader, Calgacus. Agricola was an able general, but was too prone to neglect the development of the conquered territory in his eagerness to make fresh conquests, and, in 85, Domitian, distrusting further advance, recalled him. In 84 a successful campaign was undertaken against the Chatti and the fortification of the German *limes* began; this great frontier line, which was only completed after Domitian's death, added a large tract of land on the right bank of the Rhine to the empire and filled up the gap in the defence between the Rhine and Danube. In Dacia a dangerous power had arisen in the person of the

king Decebalus, and Domitian was not over-successful in his wars against him. In 86 Decebalus invaded Moesia, and, in the following year, the praetorian prefect, Cornelius Fuscus, fell in battle against him; the Quadi and Marcomanni joined him, and, after some hard fighting, Domitian made an unsatisfactory peace, by which he bound himself to money payments to the Dacian king. In 85-86 there was a small rebellion in Judaea, and in 86 the Nasamones in Africa revolted and were suppressed.

Domitian was not fortunate in his family life. He was suspicious and distrusted his friends; and two of his relatives, Flavius Clemens and Flavius Sabinus, were actually put to death. His empress Domitia was unfaithful to him, and he dismissed her from court, only to recall her later. But she did not feel secure and entered into a conspiracy against her husband, in which the praetorian prefects and the imperial chamberlain, Parthenius, joined. On September 18th, 96, Domitian was murdered. The senate, unmuzzled at last, annulled all the late emperor's acts and chose one of its own number, M. Cocceius Nerva, to fill the throne.

SECTION 10. NERVA AND TRAJAN (96-117 A.D.)

Nerva was a quiet, but able, man, of high reputation as a jurist, who had lived on good terms with the government and was, perhaps, chosen for that very reason. His short reign showed two marked tendencies—a strict respect for the rights of the senate and a close attention to the needs of Rome and Italy, rather than to those of the empire at large. On the one hand Nerva pledged himself to put no senator to death; on the other, he founded new colonies in Italy, and instituted the great system of *alimenta*, a sort of poor-law relief for needy children. His management of the finances was good, and great attention was paid to the public roads and aqueducts. The one thing




Trajan

lacking in Nerva's government was power. The guard had resented the murder of Domitian, and Nerva had been unable to resist the demand for the punishment of the murderers. But he bitterly regretted the necessity, and the sense of his weakness led him, in October, 97, to adopt the able and successful soldier, M. Ulpius Trajanus, then commanding in Germany. In January, 98, Nerva died and his adopted son succeeded him.

Nerva's choice had been a wise one. Trajan, a native of Italica in Spain, the first provincial to assume the purple, was a clear-headed man of affairs, an able general and a sensible administrator, with one marked defect—vanity, and one enthusiasm—war. The main interest of his reign lies abroad, but, before speaking of Trajan's wars, we must say the few words needed about his home government. Continuing the reaction started by Nerva against Domitian's undisguised autocracy, Trajan showed marked respect for the senate and enjoyed its confidence and esteem throughout his reign. Senators were exempted from the emperor's criminal jurisdiction and the informers were suppressed. But, when we come down to hard fact, we find that the senate gained little real power and suffered itself readily to be beguiled by a show of honour. Trajan was a thoroughly good ruler. He carried on Nerva's great institution of the *alimenta Italiae*, he built the *forum Traianum* and fine public baths, laid down the *via Traiana* from Beneventum to Brundisium, and constructed roads, harbours and bridges. The one weak point in his finance was a too lavish squandering of money on *congiaria*, or doles to the public. Hitherto the *municipia* of the empire had enjoyed fairly complete independence, but Trajan deemed it necessary to appoint commissioners (*curatores*) to exercise control, particularly in financial matters. The institution was probably required, but it marks the beginning of a decay of local vigour, ominous for the future of the empire. The

Christians were, on the whole, treated with toleration ; but the principle of persecuting them as political offenders was recognized, though not pressed.

Trajan's main interest lay in war, and an opportunity of winning military glory was not far to seek. He began by restoring discipline in the guard. In 97-98 he fought against the Suevi, and continued the policy of frontier defence on Rhine and Danube initiated by Domitian. In 101 war broke out with Decebalus of Dacia. We have seen above how that able prince had extorted a peace under favourable terms from Domitian. Trajan was not disposed to continue the humiliating bargain and soon gave Decebalus a pretext for war by stopping the payments of money. Trajan invaded Dacia in three columns, won a great victory at Tapae, and stormed the capital, Sarmizegethusa. Decebalus was driven to make peace, ceded land in the south of Dacia and became a vassal of Rome ; and in honour of the victory Trajan assumed the title of *Dacicus* (102). But Decebalus had not yet abandoned his ambitions, and his unsatisfactory conduct soon led to a second war. In the years 104-107 Trajan invaded Dacia in force, again took the capital and reduced the country to submission. Decebalus perished, and Dacia became a Roman province and received a large new population. In 106 a strip of Arabia along the coast of the Red Sea was annexed and formed into a province. Late in his reign, Trajan again found employment for his military ability. In 114 war broke out with Chosroes, king of Parthia ; the subject of dispute was, as usual, Armenia, which Chosroes claimed as an appanage of the Parthian throne. Trajan resolved to settle the question once and for all by a bold policy of conquest. In 114 he invaded Mesopotamia and advanced, *via* Samosata, to Satala in Armenia Magna. In 115 Mesopotamia and in 116 Adiabene and the ancient Assyria were conquered. The Parthians were disunited



Trajan's Column

and helpless to resist. Trajan invaded Parthia itself, and took Seleucia, Babylon and Ctesiphon. But a revolt broke out in his rear, Edessa and Nisibis rose against the Romans, and a general rising of the Jews throughout the East followed. Chosroes, whom Trajan had expelled, returned and drove out Trajan's nominee, Parthamaspates. Lusius Quietus, after hard fighting, suppressed the revolt; but in August, 117, Trajan died at Selinus in Cilicia and his successor at once reversed his policy.

SECTION II. THE REIGN OF HADRIAN (117-138 A.D.)

The new emperor, P. Aelius Hadrianus, like Trajan a Spaniard by birth, had been adopted by Trajan only just before his death. His succession was at once accepted in Syria and was not questioned in Rome. Hadrian was a man of immense energy, able, versatile, devoted to public affairs, and fired with a restless and unlimited interest in the world. His chief fault was a certain suspiciousness of character. He began by reversing the eastern policy of Trajan. Rightly or wrongly, he decided that the new provinces could not be maintained, and at once sacrificed all Trajan's eastern conquests and recognized Chosroes as king of Parthia. Armenia continued to be a debatable land, and it is probable that Hadrian was at fault in abandoning possession of it. Trajan's marshals naturally resented this change of policy, and in 118 Hadrian was seriously threatened by a military conspiracy at Rome. It was speedily suppressed but no doubt contributed to intensifying the natural suspiciousness of the emperor. The final danger was removed when Lusius Quietus was overpowered by Q. Marcius Turbo, whilst endeavouring to raise a revolt in his native Mauretania. Hadrian devoted himself everywhere to the task of defence. In Britain the Great Roman Wall was drawn from the Tyne to the

Solway Firth (c. 123-125), and the defence of the Danube and Rhine was pushed on. In 117 a war broke out against the Roxolani and Iazyges, and Turbo received a great command in Pannonia and Dacia. The latter province was afterwards divided into Dacia Superior and Dacia Inferior. In Numidia the great camp of Lambesis was founded (123-124). In Judaea, Hadrian, to crush all hopes of independence, founded the military colony of Aelia Capitolina on the site of Jerusalem, and this step caused a last wild revolt to break out against Rome under Simon Bar-Kokaba, which was only suppressed after severe fighting (132-135). The Jews in Palestine were practically exterminated, and a settled peace was secured in the approved Roman fashion¹.

But the main importance of Hadrian's government lies in his internal administration. He was the first emperor to devote special attention to the empire, as distinct from Rome and Italy; keenly interested in local conditions everywhere, he travelled widely and gained a personal knowledge of affairs that enabled him to govern wisely and well. He undertook two great journeys—the first, lasting from 121-126, through Gaul, Britain, Spain, along the Rhine and Danube, through Asia, Thrace, Macedon and Greece—the second, 129-134, through Greece, Asia, Judaea, Arabia and Egypt. In addition to this, he paid a special visit to Africa in 128. Everywhere his presence is attested by new cities and great buildings, and almost every province bore traces of his thought and care. Perhaps his chief work was his reform of the imperial civil service. The emperor's civil servants were, in theory, his private agents, and, in the first century A.D., freedmen were largely employed in these posts. But Hadrian restricted freedmen to the minor positions and, for all the more important, notably for the great imperial bureaux of *a rationibus*, *ab epistulis*

¹ "Ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant."



Hadrian

and a *libellis*, employed Roman knights—thus recognizing the virtually public character of these posts. Hitherto the entry of the knight into this career had lain only through military service as officer; Hadrian founded an alternative preliminary career that was civil in character, and to this the *advocati fisci*, whom he instituted, belonged. Other measures of considerable importance were the appointment of four *juridici* from among the ex-consuls to hold jurisdiction in Italy, the institution of a standing imperial council of salaried jurists, both senators and knights, the publication of the Praetorian Edict, and the re-organization of the imperial post. In 136 Hadrian adopted L. Ceionius Commodus Verus, under the name of L. Aelius Caesar, as his heir. But Aelius died early in 138, and Hadrian chose next for adoption T. Aurelius Fulvius Boionius Arrius Antoninus, who took the name of T. Aelius Hadrianus Antoninus. The new heir himself adopted L. Verus, son of L. Aelius, and M. Aelius Aurelius Verus. Hadrian's closing years were embittered by violent quarrels with the senate, and, after his death, his successor had to interfere to prevent that body from rescinding Hadrian's acts.

SECTION 12. THE AGE OF THE ANTONINES (138-192 A.D.)

The new emperor, known to history as Antoninus Pius, was a mild-tempered, amiable and thoroughly conscientious ruler. He was, however, entirely lacking in initiative. His reign was a period of somewhat unambitious peace; but the empire enjoyed undisturbed prosperity, and, in the troublous days that followed, men looked back on his reign as a very Age of Gold. Of the few small wars of the reign, in Africa, in Britain, on the Danube, and in Egypt, we have little but the bare mention. In Britain a second

great wall was drawn from Forth to Clyde (142–143). Of his two adopted sons, Antoninus chose out M. Aurelius as his successor ; Aurelius married the emperor's daughter Faustina and received the *tribunicia potestas* and the proconsular *imperium*. When Antoninus died in March, 161, Aurelius was at once accepted as emperor.

Marcus Aurelius—for by that name we know him as emperor—was a man of pure and earnest nature, devoted to the Stoic philosophy and convinced of the littleness of place and power in comparison with virtue. Though one of the best of men, he was not completely successful as an emperor. But it is highly to his credit that, when duty demanded, he laid aside his beloved philosophy and became a general. His first act was a generous, but possibly impolitic one. He raised L. Verus, the other adopted son of Antoninus, to an equal share in the empire. This step has been generally condemned by historians ; but it seems not to have led to any particular harm, and Verus, if neglected, might have been a source of danger. The reign was not without its wars. A mutiny in Britain had to be put down and the Chauci and Chatti were repulsed on the Rhine. There was more serious trouble in the East. An able king, Vologases III, ruled in Parthia and had driven out Sohaemus, the Roman candidate for the throne of Armenia. In 161 Rome resolved on war. The campaign started badly : an army was destroyed at Elegeia, and Edessa and Nisibis revolted. In 162 the emperor Verus went himself to the East, but the war was mainly entrusted to able legates such as Avidius Cassius and Statius Priscus. The tide of war soon turned ; Armenia was recovered and Sohaemus was again set up as king (163–164). Then followed a war of attack on Parthia, in which Mesopotamia was conquered ; it ended with a satisfactory peace (164–166). But, scarcely was this trouble at an end than a new and terrible danger appeared on the north-east of Italy. Along

the Danube line, which had been partially denuded of troops through the eastern war, the Quadi, Marcomanni, Hermundures and other barbarian tribes threw themselves on the empire, and burst in as far as Aquileia. Marcus himself took the field. Two new legions were raised and placed, one in Raetia, the other in Noricum, and new frontier forts were built. The war was one of small engagements, and, for a time, went badly for Rome. In 169 the emperor L. Verus died; a terrible plague fell upon Italy and a dearth accompanying brought terrible misery. Not till 172 were the Roman arms decidedly victorious. In the following years (172-175) the Quadi and, after them, the other rebels submitted. But, in the East, the able legate, Avidius Cassius, broke out in revolt; Rome needed a general, not a philosopher, was his plea, but Marcus was well-beloved and Cassius was soon crushed (175). Towards the close of the reign, war broke out again on the Danube and it was not yet ended when Marcus died, at the post of duty, in camp at Vindobona early in 180. During these wars began the settlement of barbarians in large numbers inside the empire—a step destined later to prove so ominous to the Roman state.

At home Marcus's reign was, on the whole, a happy one. The senate was treated with marked respect, but won back little of its old power. Marcus, unfortunately, was not strong enough to check the unwise waste of public money on largesses to the soldiers and people, and the debasement of the coinage, already begun, went on. Important advances were made in law, further extending the principle of equity. The *praefectus praetorio* now begins to be selected from the ranks of the jurists; the civil side of that office was rapidly overpowering the original military one. The *juridici* for Italy instituted by Hadrian, but abolished by Antoninus, were re-appointed. The one depressing feature was a certain loss of free life and

movement in politics—the beginning of that petrification which set in upon the declining empire of the third and fourth centuries A.D.

Marcus was succeeded by his son Commodus, who had already received the title of Augustus in 172 and the *tribunicia potestas* in 176. The young prince was not base by nature; but he was weak and dependent on others. His own interests lay in the gymnasium and the arena rather than in politics, and he fell entirely under the influence of favourites, who misgoverned in his name. Only the emperor's authority counted in the state, and that authority was wielded by officers and freedmen. The first act of the new reign was the conclusion of peace on the Danube. The terms of peace were honourable, but no final settlement was made—a serious and ominous mistake. The history of the reign is simply that of the reigning favourites. Perennis, the praetorian prefect, was, at first, in power, till he fell in 185; his successor Cleander held his position until 189. The senate was helpless, the soldiers and mob were humoured with gifts. But reckless extravagance led to a serious financial crisis. Taxation was heavy and the informers flourished, as convenient instruments of extortion. Commodus became more and more contemptible; and, his pride growing with his demerits, he claimed to be a god, the Roman Hercules. Abroad there were revolts in Germany, Britain, Mauretania, Judaea and Gaul; but the armies were loyal, suppressed all risings and held the empire together. A conspiracy at Rome was suppressed in 183. In December, 192, a court plot brought Commodus to his death. His memory was condemned, and the praetorian prefect, Q. Aemilius Laetus, chose out P. Helvius Pertinax, an eminent senator, as his successor. Pertinax ruled entirely in the interests of the senate, and made an honest attempt to restore the finances. But his reign was cut short in March, 193, by a mutiny of the guard;



Marcus Aurelius

M. Didius Julianus, the highest bidder for the soldiers' support, was raised to the throne, and the senate and people accepted him, though without enthusiasm. But now the provincial armies took a hand in the game. In Syria C. Pescennius Niger, in Britain D. Clodius Albinus, in Upper Pannonia L. Septimius Severus all rose against Julianus. Severus was the nearest to Rome, and it was he who struck the first blow. He marched straight on the capital, refusing to treat with Julianus; the latter was deposed and executed, and Severus, on his arrival, was recognized as emperor (June, 193). Septimius dissolved the praetorian guard, which had supported his rival, and formed a new one on the old plan of Vitellius out of the *élite* of the armies. After only about a month's stay in Rome he set out to the East to settle with his rival Niger; the other rival, Albinus, was, for the time, practically accepted as a colleague in the empire. In a great battle not far from Antioch, Severus gained a decisive victory, and Niger was slain (end of 194); but Byzantium still held out against the victor and only surrendered after a desperate siege in 196. While Severus fought in Osrhoene against the tribes which had supported his rival, Albinus in the West assumed the title of Augustus, and Severus returned hastily to Rome to make a settlement with this second foe. The decisive battle was fought near Lugdunum early in 197, and, after fierce fighting, ended in the defeat and death of Albinus.

SECTION 13. THE DYNASTY OF SEPTIMIUS SEVERUS (193-235 A.D.)

Severus now crushed the remains of the rival party in the West with uncompromising sternness. At the start of his reign he had been well disposed to the senate; but that body had inclined to the side of Albinus, and Severus retorted on it with confiscation and massacre. So extreme was his

severity that the upper classes of the western provinces probably never recovered entirely from it. Not yet, however, could he rest from his wars. In the autumn of 197 he was called to the East to oppose a Parthian invasion of Mesopotamia and was engaged there until 202. He occupied Osrhoene, invaded Parthia and took Ctesiphon (197-198), but did not make a final and satisfactory settlement. On his return journey he visited Egypt and Judaea and held a triumphal entry into Rome in the autumn of 202. In 198 his elder son, Bassianus (generally known as Caracalla), became Augustus with the tribunician power, while the younger brother, Geta, became Caesar. For some years the active emperor was able to rest. But there were troubles in Britain in 197 and 205, and in 208 Severus resorted to the province and took the field against hostile tribes in the north. In 211 Severus died at York, leaving his throne to his sons Caracalla and Geta—the latter having been made Augustus in 209.

Severus was an energetic and able ruler. Himself a provincial—he was born at Great Leptis in 146—he had little sympathy for the special claims of Rome and Italy and showed them no special favour. One of his new legions, the *II Parthica*, was stationed on the Alban Mount, and the proconsular *imperium* was extended to cover Rome and Italy. We have seen how he came to adopt a policy of positive hostility to the senate. Above all he was a soldiers' emperor. He watched over their interests and introduced reforms in the civil service entirely in their favour; the procuratorial posts came to be employed more and more as rewards for military service, that is, the stress was laid now on the military and not on the civil side of the service. The pay of the troops was raised, fresh privileges were assigned them and three new legions, *I, II and III Parthica*, were formed. The numerous confiscations had gone mainly to swell the private possessions

of the emperor; these were now organized as a separate financial department under the name of the *res privata*. The praetorian prefect was now recognized as the permanent deputy of the emperor. In this post C. Fulvius Plautianus rose to great power, and his daughter married Caracalla. But Plautianus quarrelled with his son-in-law, and this feud cost him his life (205). Two prefects were then appointed once more—Laetus and the eminent jurist Papinian. A deliberate policy was pursued of breaking up the big provincial commands; Britain and Syria were both divided into two provinces and Numidia was separated from Africa. Osrhoene became a vassal state and Mesopotamia a province, with the legions *I* and *III Parthica* for garrison.


The two brothers, Caracalla¹ and Geta, had long been at feud, and, after the death of Severus, Caracalla soon found occasion to put his younger brother out of the way. Any unpopularity that might have arisen out of this fratricide was met by lavish gifts and an amnesty. Caracalla was of an excitable and unhealthy nature, but not devoid of vigour and talent. His main interest was in war and he found exercise enough for it. In 213 the Alamanni broke in over the *limes* and invaded Gaul, but the emperor repulsed them and recovered the line of the Neckar. Then, turning to the east, Caracalla annexed Osrhoene and subdued Armenia, while a revolt in Egypt was repressed. In 216 he began a campaign against Parthia, but fell victim to a military conspiracy, headed by M. Opellius Macrinus, his praetorian prefect (April, 217). Caracalla's reign was marked by the same tendencies as his father's—regard for the army and disregard for the senate. The senators now began to be excluded from all military commands. The wars and other expenses of the government led to the imposition of new taxes and the raising of the tariff of the old ones. In 212 Roman citizenship was extended over the whole empire—a

¹ His official title was M. Aurelius Antoninus.

step dictated, in the main, no doubt, by a consideration for the provinces, but probably also, to some extent, by financial considerations.

The new emperor, Macrinus, had risen from the ranks and was the first knight to assume the purple. He was a lenient commander and was popular with the troops ; and, for the time, he paid court to the senate and obtained its approval. But he could not hide the fact of his usurpation. Julia Domna, the mother of Caracalla, had committed suicide after his murder. But her sister Julia Maesa, with her daughters Julia Soaemias and Julia Mamaea, was living at Emesa, where the young son of Julia Soaemias was priest of the sun-god. The troops had loved the dynasty of Severus, and, on May 28th, 218, a revolt broke out against Macrinus in Syria, and this young man was proclaimed emperor as M. Aurelius Antoninus. Macrinus proclaimed his son Diadumenianus emperor with himself and attempted to hold his position by bribes. But he was defeated in battle and put to death together with his son. The new emperor, known in history as Elagabalus—a name taken from his priestly office—was acknowledged in Syria and then in Rome. Elagabalus was a young man of great personal beauty, but of weak and morbid character. His only interests were in immorality, senseless luxury and the sun-worship of Emesa, which he tried to introduce at Rome. Political power fell largely to his grandmother, the able Julia Maesa ; but the government was corrupt and weak, and signs of growing discontent led Elagabalus first to adopt and then to take as colleague his cousin Severus Alexander, son of Julia Mamaea. But even so he could not save himself ; he was murdered, with all his family, by the soldiers in 222.

The young Severus Alexander succeeded to his cousin's place. He was only a boy—he had been born in Phoenicia in 208—and the government was in the hands of his mother,



Caracalla

Julia Mamaea, who sought the support of the senate and of the eminent jurist Ulpian, then praetorian prefect. Under these circumstances the senate regained a hold on politics and recovered much of its former privileges. The government was intelligent and benevolent. Finance was carefully handled, coinage was improved, and checks were placed on the senseless excesses of luxury. The emperor took a keen interest in the army; but he was not himself a soldier, and the troops resented the new style of government. The praetorians were constantly causing small mutinies, and in one of these the prefect Ulpian fell; and Alexander had to dismiss a trusted governor, the historian Dio Cassius, from Rome, simply because of his unpopularity with the army. In this period purely frontier armies were being developed under *duces limitanei*; and these armies, bearing the brunt of imperial defence, began more and more to claim a direct influence on politics. In the East, a new danger, far more serious than the Parthian, suddenly appeared. In 226, Ardeschir I of Persia, a state hitherto subject to the Parthians, defeated them in battle and established the new Persian (or Sassanid) Empire. The new power was based on a revival of national and religious feeling and was avowedly hostile to such an alien influence as that of Rome. By the year 231 Ardeschir was ready to begin the attack on Rome and threatened Mesopotamia and Cappadocia. Alexander hurried to the East and, by great efforts, raised an army to repel the attack. The campaign, though not brilliantly successful, was not disastrous, but serious trouble elsewhere compelled the emperor to abandon it. The Marcomanni crossed the Danube and, at about the same time, the Alamanni broke in through the *limes* upon Gaul. Alexander hurried to Germany, only to be assassinated by the troops at Mainz. They had no confidence in the unmilitary emperor and set up in his place C. Julius Verus Maximinus,

a rough and uncultivated, but efficient officer. The fate of Alexander calls for genuine regret. He was a refined and amiable man, gentle and broad-minded, with the will to govern well; but he lacked the sheer physical vigour which was essential in that iron age.

SECTION 14. MILITARY EMPERORS AND PRETENDERS (235-268 A.D.)

The new emperor was a good soldier, but had no wider interests and was entirely out of sympathy with the senate. That body, naturally enough, did not welcome his rule and was continually plotting against him; and Maximin retorted by confiscations and executions. He himself was never in Rome; his interests there were entrusted to his praetorian prefect, Vitalianus. His main duty, however, was the defence of the northern frontier and here he acquitted himself well. In 235-236 he restored the *limes* and, in 237, fought with success against Dacians and Sarmatians. Maximin is accused of having neglected the games and the corn supply, and the charge is very probably deserved; but it is really no very serious one. If he neglected the amenities of life, he at any rate discharged its necessary duties well. But he could not hold his position. In 237 a peasant revolt broke out in Africa against Maximin's procurator and the rebels proclaimed M. Antonius Gordianus, the governor of the province, emperor. The senate rushed blindly into trouble, by immediately recognizing the usurper with his son as colleague and starting to massacre Maximin's friends. Within a short time Gordian and his son had been executed by the legate of Numidia; and the senate was left hopelessly compromised. The only thing to do was to fight; no mercy could be expected. Two emperors, Pupienus and Balbinus, were appointed, with a council of twenty

senators to advise them, and Gordian III, grandson of the governor of Africa, was made Caesar. Balbinus was a man of rank and standing: Pupienus owed his choice to his qualities as officer. The cause of the senate seemed cheerless at the start; but Maximin wasted time, and Italy responded with alacrity to the call to arms. When Maximin at last appeared in Italy and attacked Aquileia, he was decisively checked. His troops then repented of their contumacy towards the senate and murdered Maximin and his son Maximus.

The senate had triumphantly asserted its authority and proposed to resume the direction of affairs. But difficulties soon arose. The two emperors could not agree, the soldiers were irritated by severe treatment and at last Pupienus and Balbinus were murdered and Gordian III, a boy of fourteen, was proclaimed emperor by the guard. In the first two years of the new reign the government was weak, but in 241 or 242 Gordian married Tranquillina, daughter of C. Furius Sabinus Timesitheus, and this able man became praetorian prefect and virtual ruler of the empire. He displayed great vigour and skill and repulsed the Carpi and Goths on the Danube. But war again broke out in the East. In 240 Sapor I succeeded Ardeschir I on the Persian throne and at once attacked Syria and threatened Antioch (241). In 241 Gordian took the field against him. Osrhoene was friendly and Carrhae and Nisibis were speedily recovered; but just at this point Timesitheus died, and his successor as prefect, the Arab M. Julius Philippus, murdered Gordian and made himself emperor (early 244). Philip patched up a peace with Persia and moved to Dacia and Moesia, to repulse the invading Carpi. In 247 Philip his son was made Augustus, and in 248 the millenary of the foundation of Rome was celebrated. The emperor was not too popular, and several pretenders were set up in the provinces. Jotapianus in

Syria and Marinus in Moesia were raised only to fall; but in 248 the Danube army set up its general Trajan Decius, and this time Philip had to fight for his life. The Goths were beating against the Roman defences all along the Danube, and the troops demanded a leader whom they knew and trusted. Decius invaded Italy and defeated and killed Philip in battle at Verona; the younger Philip was murdered at Rome.

Decius was a native of Sirmium and thus the first of the emperors from the Danube provinces, which now began to take the place of declining Italy. The troops still fought bravely and, in spite of all alarms, the empire stood. But the barbarians again and again burst in over the frontiers; emperors rose and fell with bewildering speed and the empire steadily declined in prosperity. Decius made his two sons Herennius Etruscus and Hostilianus Caesars, and set up a friend of his, Valerian, as a sort of second emperor with distinct civil functions and jurisdiction, from which only the consuls and the *praefectus urbi* were exempted. In 250 Decius recovered Dacia; but the Goths poured southward towards Macedon, and Decius was defeated. He attempted to check their retreat, but died in battle. The army then chose as emperor Trebonianus Gallus, governor of the two Moesias, who made the son of Decius, Hostilian, Augustus and his own son, Volusian, Caesar, and later, after Hostilian's death, Augustus. Gallus made a dishonourable peace with the Goths and then marched to the capital. In his absence M. Aemilius Aemilianus, governor of Moesia, defeated the Goths and the grateful army proclaimed him emperor. Aemilian was acknowledged in the East, and Gallus and Volusian fell in battle against him; but he did not live to enjoy his victory, for his own troops rose and murdered him. Valerian, the colleague of Trajan Decius, was raised to the throne by the troops in Raetia and at once, to ensure efficiency

in government, took the dangerous step of appointing his son Gallienus emperor in the West while he himself held the East. These were evil days for the empire. On the Rhine the Franks and Alamanni, on the Danube the Goths were a continual menace. A terrible plague had been raging in the provinces; to add to all this, the executive had never been so weak, and pretenders were constantly rising and enjoying a longer or shorter term of independence.

The period is full of wars. In 256-257 the Alamanni were repulsed, but in 259-260 they broke in as far as Ravenna and were defeated at Milan. Raetia was permanently lost to the empire. In 256 the Franks broke through Gaul into Spain and maintained themselves there till 268. The outlook was equally black on the Danube. In 258 a revolt in Pannonia was suppressed and there was steady fighting against the Goths and Marcomanni. From about 253 the Goths began to raid the empire by water, sweeping down from the Black Sea and spreading terror and destruction over the coasts of the Aegean. Specially severe were their raids in the years 256-258; there seemed to be no power of local resistance left, and almost all Bithynia fell temporarily into their hands. Africa was in equally sorry plight through the incursions of rebel Moors. The Persians again harried the unhappy Romans. In 256 Sapor captured Nisibis, Carrhae and Antioch and laid siege to Edessa. Valerian, who hastened to the spot, soon recovered Antioch, but was defeated on his way to relieve Edessa and taken prisoner. His son, Gallienus, apparently would not or could not assist him in his humiliation, and he died in captivity (probably c. 260). Sapor overran Syria, Cilicia and Cappadocia and then withdrew in triumph; but two of Valerian's officers, Macrianus and Balista, maintained some show of resistance around Sarnosata. The further eastern provinces were thus practically

lost to the empire. But these very provinces, unsupported by Rome, began to learn how to help themselves. The wealthy desert city of Palmyra, formerly not too friendly to Rome, now sought close alliance with her. The Palmyrenes, led by Septimius Odaenathus, with the remnants of the Roman forces, attacked Sapor as he withdrew and defeated him near Ctesiphon. In reward for this service Gallienus conferred on Odaenathus the title of *dux orientis* (262). The central government was not strong enough to hold control over the empire, and a number of independent powers, some of very brief duration, arose in the provinces. The cause lay not so much in active disloyalty as in a weariness of the slack government and a resolve to attend to their own safety. Gallienus had raised his sons, Saloninus and Valerian II, to be his colleagues. Valerian II received command in Gaul, but was put to death by Gallienus's general Postumus, who, pressed by his troops, assumed the purple. He defended the frontiers, restored security in Gaul, and was recognized in that province and in Britain. Gallienus hardly made any serious attempt to quell him, and one of his own generals, Victorinus, deserted and became colleague of Postumus. Postumus was murdered by his troops, and the same fate befell his successor Laelianus; after him, Victorinus ruled in Gaul from 265 to 268. The subsequent fortunes of this Gallic Empire will concern us later. In the East the two sons of Gallienus's general Macrianus, Macrianus junior and Quietus, were proclaimed by their father and his ally Balista (261). But Odaenathus of Palmyra declared against them, and Aureolus, commanding for Gallienus, defeated and put to death the two Macriani. The revolt ended with the capture of Quietus and Balista at Emesa (261). Other ephemeral emperors need only be named; such were Antoninus, Saturninus and Celsus in Africa, Aemilianus in Egypt, Trebellianus and Regalianus in Illyricum,

Ingenuus in Moesia and Pannonia. Odaenathus actually was allowed to bear the title of "αὐτοκράτωρ." In 262 the great city of Byzantium revolted and had to be crushed. And amid all these troubles the Goths returned again and again to the attack. From 262 to 267 they poured down over the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor, and worked indescribable havoc among the defenceless cities. In 267 the distinguished general Aureolus revolted in Raetia. Invading Italy, he was driven to take refuge in Milan, but Gallienus, advancing against him, was murdered by his officers. For his successor they had chosen the right man in the able general M. Aurelius Claudius, whose surname *Gothicus* attests his great triumph over the worst enemies of the harassed empire. The reign of Gallienus was one of confusion and dissolution, and the government was too weak and perplexed to pursue any very deliberate policy. Finance was hopeless, and the debasement of the coinage reached its acme. But two points demand notice. Senators were now finally excluded from military commands, and the distinction between senatorial and imperial provinces, between *aerarium* and *fiscus*, rapidly disappears. The senate was steadily being pushed out of its place in the constitution.

SECTION 15. THE REVIVAL: CLAUDIUS II, AURELIAN, PROBUS, DIOCLETIAN

After the death of Gallienus, Aureolus was deserted by his troops and died, and Claudius undertook the great task of facing the barbarian invaders. He began well by defeating the Alamanni in Raetia and then turned eastward to encounter the most terrible Gothic invasion that had yet been known. One band assailed Byzantium and the surrounding country, a second sailed into the Aegean, while the main attack fell on Moesia. The struggle was one of

life and death, for this was no mere raid ; the barbarians planned conquest and came prepared to settle inside the empire. Claudius played a masterly waiting game ; he let the tide of invasion roll past him upon Macedon, then blocked the retreat of the Goths and gained a decisive victory at Naissus in Moesia (269). The remnants of the defeated army were driven south and practically annihilated. Victory at sea crowned the triumph and, for many years, all serious danger from the Goths was at an end. In the full flush of his glorious victories, Claudius, to the sad loss of Rome, died at Sirmium of plague in 270. His brother Quintillus was proclaimed emperor by the troops at Aquileia ; but the main Danube army chose Aurelian, and Quintillus at once fell.

Aurelian, a native of Sirmium, born in 214, was a man of strength and ability and a general of unusual talent. He was resolute and unflinching and went straight towards his object ; but for all his sternness he was not cruel or reckless. Most of his short reign was spent in fighting on the frontier. In 270 he drove off Jutung invaders from Italy ; in 271 he was defeated by Alamanni and Jutungs at Placentia, but soon revenged the defeat and broke up the invading forces. Dacia was definitely abandoned, but Aurelian sought to secure peace by commercial treaties with the Goths and Vandals. Aurelian found Gaul still divorced from the empire. Victorinus had been murdered in 268 ; but the troops would not abandon the Gallic Empire and forced Tetricus, governor of Aquitania, against his will to assume the purple. In the East there was a respite, as far as Persia was concerned ; but a breach began to arise with the chief ally of Rome, Palmyra. Odaenathus had died in 266 or 267, and his widow Zenobia succeeded him as regent for his son Vabalathus. Zenobia recovered Egypt for Aurelian from a pretender ; but she was already beginning to cherish the thought of an

independent Empire of the East under the rule of Palmyra. Aurelian was not uninformed as to her ambitions and resolved to anticipate them, and Zenobia, on her side, moved troops into Asia Minor. But Egypt, still in her hands, was recovered by Aurelian's general, Probus, and, when Aurelian appeared in Syria, Antioch surrendered to him. Pushing forward, he gained a victory at Emesa, besieged and took Palmyra, but granted favourable terms of peace. A second revolt ended in the sack of the city (273); it never regained more than a shadow of its short-lived greatness. Persia meanwhile was distracted by internal troubles; the great Sapor had died in 269 and his son Hormuzd I was dethroned in 271 by Varahran I, who ruled till 274. Aurelian put down a certain Firmus, who had revolted in Egypt, and then proceeded to his next task, the recovery of Gaul. Tetricus had no will to resist and himself welcomed the easy victory which soon fell to Aurelian. Spain, it seems, had already been regained. Aurelian was an absolute monarch and surrounded himself with Oriental pomp and ceremonial. The senate played no real *role* under his rule. But his reign was a time of much-needed rest and recuperation for the empire; agriculture and vine-culture to some extent revived, and new buildings replaced some of those that had been destroyed. The coinage was in a desperate state, and Aurelian carried through well-intentioned reforms, introducing new provincial mints and imposing efficient checks on the moneyers. This wise severity led to an outbreak of the moneyers at Rome under the *rationalis*, Felicianus, which was only suppressed after fierce fighting. Aurelian was murdered near Byzantium in 276 on his way to war against Persia. He was only 61 years of age and his death was a disaster to the empire. He had given the provinces a time of peace and refreshment, and the title of *Restitutor orbis* on his coins is a fair witness to his merits in restoring the shattered imperial unity.

Aurclian's murder had been the work of a small faction ; his troops resented it and, to attest their sorrow, called on the senate to appoint an emperor. The aged Tacitus was selected, and, for the last time, the senate held the reins of government. But the restoration was a brief one ; Tacitus was murdered at Tyana, on the march against barbarian invaders of Asia Minor, and his brother Florian, who was proclaimed by the troops, soon fell when the news arrived that the Syrian army had declared for Aurelian's able general, Probus. Probus, though himself a keen soldier, recognized the need of a civil counterpoise to the power of the army and sought this in the senate, allowing that body a considerable share in the government. Like most emperors of the time he spent his whole reign in war. In 277 he defeated the Alamanni and Franks and recovered the German *limes* ; in 278 he defeated the Alamanni, Goths and other tribes in Raetia and in 279 he was in Asia Minor restoring peace to that much-vexed land. Varahran II of Persia offered him alliance, but Probus felt himself strong enough to decline it. But even this vigorous reign was full of troubles. A band of Franks sailed from the Black Sea, plundered the coasts of Greece and Asia Minor, and finally made their way round past Gibraltar to the mouth of the Rhine. The usual crop of rival emperors was not wanting ; Saturninus in Egypt, Proculus and Bonosus in Gaul had to be fought and suppressed. To one of these risings Probus at last succumbed. The troops in Raetia proclaimed their general Carus emperor ; Probus failed to nip the rebellion in the bud and was murdered in a mutiny near Sirmium (October, 282). We may note, in passing, that Probus drew a sharper distinction than had as yet been drawn between the civil and military officials in the provinces—between the general, *dux*, and the civil governor, *praeses*. Carus gained general recognition and made his sons, Carinus and Numerianus, his colleagues.

In 282 he was in the East and waged a successful campaign against Varahran II of Persia ; but in December, 283, he met the normal fate—he was murdered in camp. Carinus, who had remained in the West, and Numerian, who was in the camp, both assumed the title of Augustus. But Numerian was speedily murdered, and at Chalcedon the troops met and elected C. Aurelius Valerius Diocletianus emperor. Aper, the praetorian prefect, the murderer of Numerian, was put to death. Carinus held the West for the time ; but in the end he was defeated and killed in Moesia, and the empire was united in the hands of a man who was destined to give it a new constitution and to secure another century and a half of life for the West and a career extending far down into the Middle Ages for the East. The Augustan constitution, long weakened, and altered out of all recognition, was finally set aside. The day of the absolute and undisguised autocracy had arrived.

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CHAPTER X

THE DECLINE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (DIOCLETIAN TO ROMULUS AUGUSTULUS)

SECTION I. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE EMPIRE

WE have now arrived at the end of the first period of the Roman empire and must pause in our narrative to view the conditions then prevailing and to consider in some little detail the new constitution which Diocletian introduced. The emperor had become, in practice, an absolute monarch and owed his appointment to the soldiers. The senate had lost piecemeal the large share of influence left to it by Augustus ; as a body that connected the present by a continuous chain with the great days of the republic, it still maintained certain pretensions and enjoyed a certain prestige ; but the army had come to feel its power and was ready to use it in a way that threatened the stability of the state. Yet, though here so dangerously strong, it was not strong enough for its real task—the defence of the frontiers against the ever-repeated onset of the barbarians. Throughout the empire terrible financial distress reigned. Largely owing to economic causes local life and patriotism declined, and the empire was already decaying in its parts before its external structure broke down. Art and literature ceased to play any active part in life ; the power of initiation and free movement gradually became obsolete, and society drifted more and more into a sort of hereditary caste system, composed of guilds and professions, in which

the son regularly succeeded his father. One great force, full of fresh life, was moving on these troubled waters. The religious question forced its way more and more to the front, and Christianity rose, from being a despised sect, to the position of a powerful party in the state. Of the stages of this progress we know little. We hear, for example, of persecutions under Marcus Aurelius and Trajan Decius, but these seem to have been anything but universal. Christianity might lead its followers to refuse the normal expression of loyalty to the empire, and this offence the state was prepared to punish; but, considered simply as a religion, it enjoyed, in the main, the general toleration and, especially during the third century, was able to grow with little interruption. Such, in brief, was the situation that Diocletian found before him. He could not breathe new life into those elements of the empire that were dead; but he could and did devise a constitution adapted to the special needs and special weaknesses of the time, and staved off for a season the dissolution which had often loomed so near. The system of Diocletian was completed and modified in many details by Constantine the Great, and it is impossible, in a short sketch, to define what precise elements in it are due to each. The constitution that we are about to describe must therefore be understood as that which Diocletian originated and Constantine completed.

We start with the position of the emperor. In actual fact, his election now lay in the hands of the soldiers; only in form was the recognition by the senate still required. A new imperial titulature arises; *Dominus noster...Pius Felix Augustus* becomes the normal form. The title of *deus* is freely bestowed, and such epithets as *sacer* and *divinus* become regular equivalents for "imperial." The forms of eastern monarchy are definitely adopted; the emperor wears the diadem, his court is arranged on an eastern model, he receives homage from his subjects. The *princeps*

had never, in point of law, possessed legislative power; now, the expression of the emperor's will (*constitutio generalis*) carries binding force, even after his death; and the same validity belongs also to the imperial *orationes*, *edicta* and *rescripta*. As early as the reign of Marcus Aurelius and L. Verus, the empire had known two emperors; but hitherto there had been no division of power between the colleagues¹. All this was now changed. Diocletian divided the empire into an eastern and western section; each section had its own Augustus, and each Augustus had under him, as his first official, a Caesar, who normally succeeded, on the death or retirement of the Augustus, to his place. This virtually amounted to a division of the empire, and, although the complete unity was again more than once restored, this division was destined to be a permanent one.

The senate, in the new system, was robbed of all serious political power. It still appointed the *consules suffecti*—but not the *ordinarii*—the praetors and the quaestors, it administered the *aerarium Saturni*, now no more than the city chest of Rome, and it still passed decrees—subject to the imperial sanction. But here its competence ended. Senatorial rank became hereditary and many new members were enrolled, so that the numbers soon mounted into thousands; but of these only a limited number actually sat in the senate. Constantinople, on its foundation by Constantine, received its own senate, modelled on the Roman. The senator was still a man of high distinction and bore the title of *clarissimus*; but he had to pay for this honour by submitting to certain special taxes, notably the *follis*, a land-tax, and the *aurum oblativum*, in the form of a free gift.

The civil administration was finally separated from the military, and the two branches were entrusted to distinct sets

¹ Except for short periods—e.g. at the beginning of the reign of Valerian and Gallienus.

of officials—the change begun in the third century A.D. was now carried to its logical conclusions. At the head of the civil power stood the new *praefecti praetorio*, usually four in number. The unit of government was the diocese, a complex of several provinces; of these there were five in the East—Oriens, Pontica, Asiana, Thracia, Moesia—and seven in the West—Pannoniae, Galliae, Viennensis, Britanniae, Hispaniae, Africa, Italia. Each diocese was under a *vicarius* and each province under a *praeses*. Above them stood the prefects, who were annually appointed to the following four districts: (1) Galliarum, (2) Italiae, (3) per Orientem, (4) per Illyricum. They ranked immediately after the emperor and had general control over all officials, with a large share in their appointment, and their edicts (*formae generales*), interpreting but not creating law, had binding force. In law the prefects acted as a high Court of Appeal, and, after 331, no appeal was allowed from their decisions to the emperor. Of their actual military authority nothing remained; but they had charge of the army commissariat and, therewith, an important financial competence. The *vicarii* were restricted in function to their separate dioceses but, in order that they might act as a check on the prefects, were not absolutely subordinated to them. They could judge as deputies of the emperor, but only subject to an appeal to him. Under the *vicarii* stood the provincial governors (*praesides*), mainly charged with the task of administering justice. In Asia, Africa, and Achaëa proconsuls, with wider powers, were still appointed. The *cursus publicus* was managed by distinct officials, the *magistri officiorum*. In Rome, and for a radius of 100 miles round it, the *praefectus urbi* was the head of justice and civil government. He was the chief of the senate and commanded the *cohortes urbanae*; and under his control stood such important officials as the *praefectus annonae*, *praefectus vigilum*, *rationalis vinorum*

and *tribunus fori suarii*. Another subordinate of his, the *magister census*, supervised the incomes of senators and the editing of the proceedings of the senate. By the side of the *praefectus urbi* stood a *vicarius*, designed as a check on him. Constantinople received a *praefectus urbi* of its own. At the head of the law stood the emperor; but most of his legal work was delegated to the *judices sacrarum cognitionum*. His council (*consistorium*), in essence a legal body, which, however, became a sort of council of state, was presided over by the *quaestor sacri palatii*. It consisted of officials of two grades, the *ducenarii* and *sexagenarii*, so-called after the scale of their salaries.

Diocletian found the state finances in a desperate plight. As there was no possibility of cutting down expenditure, he took the only other possible course. He undertook a new survey of the empire, to form a new basis of taxation and to enable his subjects, by an equitable distribution, to bear their necessary burdens. The chief taxes now were the land-tax, payments in kind (*annonariae functiones*), a tax on business (*lustralis collatio*), and a poll-tax (*capitatio humana*). The taxes were revised once in every fifteen years. All state property was claimed by the emperor; but we still find, beside the *fiscus* under its *rationalis summae rei* (later *comes sacrarum largitionum*), the *res privata* under the *comes rei privatae*. The finance of the provinces was administered by the governors, subject to the supervision of the *rationales*; while procurators were still appointed to look after mines, mints, imperial factories and similar services. The *comes rei privatae* had under him a large staff of procurators and *rationales*; to his department fell the whole of the imperial lands and palaces and such dues as *bona caduca et vacantia*, which were now claimed as the emperor's private property. A third treasury, under the control of the praetorian prefects, received payments in kind for the army, the court and the capital

cities. The demands made on the pocket of the Roman citizen were great enough. But the state was not done with him even yet, and he was called upon to perform all manner of forced labour. The maintenance of roads, the transport of corn and a dozen other things were entrusted to specially organized guilds, in which son regularly succeeded father. Thus the state, to ensure the maintenance of state service, took its share in stifling free movement in society. In this context we must briefly notice the importance of the *colonus*, an institution which had certainly started some time before Diocletian. The *colonus* was the tiller of the soil, bound to the clod (*glebae adscriptus*), personally free but compelled to till his land in return for a portion of its yield. This institution is a sample of the entire subordination of the individual to society, so characteristic of this period; and it suggests the not unneeded moral, that individual and not social welfare must always, in a sense, be the first object, as even the society for which the individual is sacrificed only concerns us as a society of individuals.

The maintenance of the army was carefully provided for. Every landed property was bound to supply its quota of recruits, and the state thus shifted its responsibility on to private shoulders. Military service was mainly confined to the poorer classes, who were less able to serve the state by financial services, and tended to become hereditary. The number of legions was considerably raised, and, though the average strength of each may have been reduced, there was certainly a net increase in the size of the army. Apart from the legions we find *auxilia* and *numeri*—the latter composed mainly of barbarians. The cavalry was organized in *auxillationes* and *numeri*; the distinction between these two terms has not been properly made out. We may also mention here two special bodies of troops, consisting of barbarians, settled in the empire and confined to service on the spot, the *Laeti* in Gaul and

Germany and the *Gentiles* on the Danube. At the head of the army stood the *magistri militum*, with *comites* and *duces* as their subordinates. The field army consisted of the palace-troops (*palatini*) and the *comitatenses* and occasional detachments¹ from the frontier armies. These latter defended the frontiers; they were named *riparienses* or *limitanei* and stood under the command of *duces*. Service here ranked lower than that in the field army. In certain important districts the title *comes* supplanted that of *dux*; and thus we find a *comes litoris Saxonici*, a *comes limitis Aegypti* and a *comes Britanniae*. Fleets were stationed at Ravenna and Misenum, on the Rhine, Danube, Euphrates, Rhone and other rivers. The soldier enjoyed great advantages. He was exempt from the poll-tax, he was carefully cared for and richly rewarded and was provided for on retirement. All Diocletian's efforts could not, it is true, restore to the army the power of its best days; but he made it again a serviceable fighting machine and entirely deprived it of its dangerous influence on politics. The praetorian guard was dissolved by Constantine the Great after the defeat of Maxentius; and its place was taken by a new imperial guard (*scholae*), consisting mainly of barbarians. About the emperor's person we also find the *protectores* and *domestici*, who formed a species of military staff and supplied many of the officers.

The court plays an entirely new part in public life. Under Augustus it had been a private establishment, managed by slaves and freedmen. Hadrian had recognized the importance of the chief court posts by entrusting them to knights. But Diocletian raised his court appointments to the rank of high public employments. The chief court official, the *magister officiorum*², had a very wide competence and general jurisdiction over all court officials.

¹ *Pseudo-comitatenses*.

² Probably first appointed by Constantine.

The various imperial *scrinia*—the *scrinia epistularum, libellorum, dispositionum, memoriae* under their *magistri*—were all under him, as were also the *officium admissionum* and the secret service. The members of this service (*agentes in rebus*) were mainly picked soldiers and were employed in all manner of confidential tasks. The chief minister of justice was the *quaestor sacri palatii*, who edited imperial laws and rescripts and presided in the imperial council. All these offices were of a semi-public nature. But there were also employments strictly confined to the court—that of chief chamberlain (*praepositus sacri cubiculi*), Master of the Robes (*comes sacri vestis*) and a number more. The *consistorium* employed large numbers of secretaries, and a regular class of *advocati* were kept in state service. The whole service was military in colour. A sort of rough order of preferment became usual, and a man might become in turn *advocatus, praeses, magister epistularum, vicarius* and perhaps, to crown his career, praetorian prefect. We find three classes of rank—the *illustres*, the *spectabiles* and the *clarissimi*; but the highest nobility lay in the patriciate, which was restored by Constantine. Appointments to office were usually for one year and all offices were salaried. Here too the hereditary principle came into working and a class of civil servants arose, whose bad government caused serious oppressions.


The condition of the smaller centres of life in the empire, the *municipia*, was indeed a sorry one. Municipal freedom had almost vanished: at the head of each town stood a *curator reipublicae*, chosen by the local council, subject to the emperor's approval. About the year 364 *defensores* were substituted for *curatores*; they were designed especially to safeguard the interests of the poorer classes. The provincial *concilia* continued to meet, but mainly for religious purposes. As one of the first signs of a new order we must note that Constantine recognized as legal the


informal courts of justice that had grown up round the bishops, and gave them the power of giving a final decision when both (or later when one of the) parties chose to appear in them.

SECTION 2. FROM THE ACCESSION OF DIOCLETIAN
TO THE TRIUMPH OF CONSTANTINE THE GREAT
(283-324 A.D.)

The man who devised this constitution in its main outlines must clearly have been gifted with great statesmanlike ability. And, indeed, Diocletian was a man of exceptional powers. Before he became emperor, he had been governor of Moesia, consul and praetorian prefect. He had seen the maladies of the state and he had formed his own ideas of the appropriate remedies. He could think, and he could keep his thoughts to himself till the time came to put them into execution. He was ambitious, but his ambition lay mainly in a desire to serve the state. He was severe against offenders, but never wantonly cruel; strict in his finances, but open-handed when a worthy object demanded his aid. The army was held well in hand and not allowed to interfere in affairs of state. Diocletian was a devout worshipper of the old gods, and Jupiter and Hercules figure constantly on his coins and on those of his colleagues. But of this side of his life we shall have to speak later in connexion with the persecution of the Christians.

The first act of his reign was a campaign against the German tribes who had invaded Gaul. This danger averted, he proceeded in September, 285, to realize his scheme of the divided empire. Maximian was made Caesar and in April, 286, was raised to the rank of Augustus. Diocletian was to be the brain, Maximian, an able but unimaginative soldier, the sword-arm of the government.





Serious trouble arose in Gaul. The peasants, suffering from bitter distress, rose in revolt and declared their leaders, Amandus and Aelianus, emperors. Maximian proved his value by speedily repressing this rising and followed up his success by repulsing a barbarian invasion. M. Carausius, a Menapian by birth, had been sent to command the Channel fleet against the Frankish and Saxon pirates. Condemned to death by Maximian for abuse of his official position, he revolted and seized Britain; the expedition sent against him was destroyed (289), and for the time the Augusti had to acknowledge him as a colleague. In March, 293, C. Galerius Valerius Maximianus married Diocletian's daughter, Valeria, and M. Flavius Valerius Constantius married Maximian's step-daughter, Theodora; both were raised to the rank of Caesar, and the first tetrarchy was thus formed. Galerius, a rude but energetic soldier, was designed for service in the Danube lands, but actually served mainly in the East. Constantius, a nobleman of ability and character, was employed in Gaul. His first task was to make a settlement with Carausius, and in 293 he captured Gesoriacum and prepared to invade Britain. Carausius, a man of no mean ability, had won the affections of his subjects by good government. But he was murdered by his prefect, Allectus, and the murderer was defeated and put to death by Constantius in 295. On all sides the government justified itself by brilliant successes in war. Constantius defeated the Alamanni and restored the defences of the Upper Rhine in 298-299. Maximian put down a dangerous revolt in Africa in 297, whilst Galerius, on the Danube, defeated the Marcomanni, Quadi and Carpi, restored the defences of Raetia, and settled Sarmatians in the new province of Valeria. In 295 Egypt revolted and Alexandria had to be taken and sacked (March, 296). Diocletian, meanwhile, had been in residence at Sirmium, organizing the successes of his

colleagues. Persia had so far not troubled the Roman government. But when Tiridates, son of Chosroes the Arsacid, was sent out by Rome and recovered the kingdom of Armenia, Narses, son of Varahran IV, who had succeeded to the throne of Persia in 291 or 292, accepted the challenge, drove out Tiridates and defeated Galerius near Carrhae in 296. Diocletian himself appeared on the scene. Galerius redeemed his reputation by routing Narses in Armenia and restoring Tiridates. In a brilliant campaign Diocletian pushed the Roman frontier as far east as the Tigris, incorporating a large extent of new territory, and won a triumphant peace that lasted for some fifty years.

Not less successful, on the whole, had been the internal administration. Legislation proceeded steadily on the lines of reason and equity. The coinage was submitted to a much-needed reform, and a large number of provincial mints turned out coins for the use of the empire. Such mints were, for example, Londinium, Lugdunum, Treveri, Rome, Siscia, Alexandria and Antioch. New coin-denominations were introduced and the old abuses were stopped. These reforms must have been invaluable for trade and commerce throughout the empire. The building activity of the government was great, especially in Rome, Treveri, Nicomedia and Milan. In 301 Diocletian issued an edict (*De Pretiis Rerum*) fixing maximum prices for articles of commerce. It was meant to reduce exorbitant prices, but seems to have produced rather the opposite effect; but we do not know enough of the circumstances that prompted it, to pass final judgement on its wisdom or folly.

One very serious problem faced the government—that of the treatment of the growing Christian Church. Diocletian, we have observed, was himself a devout pagan and may well have believed that Christianity, with its other-worldly notions and its new aggressive attitude, was a positive danger to the common weal. The policy of

repression was chosen and the persecution began in 297 ; but it was mainly directed at first against the sect of the Manichees and hardly affected the Church at large. In 303 Diocletian published his first edict directly aimed at the Christian faith. It was believed that he was largely influenced in this by Galerius, and the report may very probably be true. At first the attack was directed against the churches and their sacred writings, and bloodshed was, as far as possible, avoided. But the Christians were accused of a plot to murder the emperor, and the time of martyrdoms began. The persecution raged most fiercely in the East ; Gaul and the West suffered little, for Constantius, an enlightened and humane man, had no heart for the work. Of the numbers that suffered we can form little idea. Needless to say, thousands recanted ; but the blood of the martyrs was the seed of the Church, and this great ordeal of blood and fire was to lead directly to the triumph of the persecuted faith.

In 303 Diocletian celebrated his *Vicennalia* ; soon after he fell seriously ill and on May 1st, 305, he abdicated and caused his colleague Maximian to follow his example. The new Augusti were Galerius in the East, with his nephew Maximin Daza as his Caesar, and Constantius in the West, with Flavius Valerius Severus for his. Diocletian went to reside at Salonae, while Maximian, still at heart devoted to public life, retired to Lucania. The system of Diocletian soon began to totter when his steadying influence was removed. Constantine, son of Constantius, had hitherto received no high employment and was at bitter feud with the emperor Galerius ; but he was now summoned to the West to assist his father and, when Constantius died at York in July, 306, the troops proclaimed him imperator and Caesar, and Galerius had perforce to recognize the accomplished fact.

In 306 Constantine fought with success in Britain and

on the Lower Rhine. With Severus he had a friendly understanding; but, despite this, fresh complications ensued. Rome was discontented at the heavy taxes and, in protest, proclaimed Maxentius, son of Maximian, Caesar; Severus marched against him, but was deserted by his troops and taken prisoner, and, when Galerius marched on Rome, Maxentius retorted by putting Severus to death. Galerius was not confident of success, and he therefore induced the old Diocletian to call a conference at Carnuntum (November, 307). Maximian, who had returned to power to help his son, had again to abdicate, and Valerius Licinianus Licinius took his place. At the same time, Constantine and Maximin Daza also assumed the title of Augustus; Maxentius was excluded from the arrangements. Maximian, still restless and discontented, withdrew to Gaul and courted Constantine's favour—not without success, for the latter did, in fact, marry his daughter Fausta. But he gained no stable position. He went back to Italy and failed in an attempt to overthrow his son Maxentius; Galerius would have nothing to do with him, and he returned to Gaul. Here he began to raise an army against Constantine, but was defeated and committed suicide (310). It was a sad end to a distinguished career—the melancholy spectacle of a man whose ambitions have outlived his abilities. Maxentius, meanwhile, in 308, had defiantly proclaimed himself sole Augustus. Constantine resided mainly in Treveri, while Galerius was for the most part in Illyricum. In the East, Maximin Daza exercised an independent power. The bloody persecutions continued until April, 311, when Galerius, stricken, we hear, by a foul disease, issued a general amnesty. He died in May, and Licinius turned to contest his heritage with Daza. An agreement was finally arrived at, by which Daza kept the East, Licinius took the Nearer East, while Constantine was recognized by both as Augustus in the West.

Maxentius, meanwhile, retained possession of Italy, Spain and Africa; the last-named province had revolted in 308, only to be subdued in 310. He had deliberately courted Constantine's favour, but without success, and now Constantine and Licinius agreed to set him aside. Maximin Daza, who felt himself also threatened by the new coalition, did not carry his sympathy with Maxentius to the point of alliance. Constantine did not take long to settle with his enemy. He gained a great victory at Verona, pushed on towards Rome, defeated Maxentius at the Mulvian bridge and put him to death (312). Constantine was now master of the whole of the West, and Diocletian, who died at about this time, may have found some consolation for the overthrow of his system in the sight of Constantine's energy and ability. Licinius now turned against Daza. Daza had persecuted the Christians, and Licinius and Constantine agreed on a policy of toleration; the fact that Daza now accepted the new policy could not win back to him the alienated sympathies of the persecuted Church. The campaign was short and decisive: Daza captured Byzantium, but suffered defeat near Adrianople (April, 313); he fell back on the Taurus passes and died there of illness. Licinius, supreme in the East, celebrated his victory by a shameful massacre of all the surviving members of Diocletian's household.

Constantine and Licinius now shared the empire between them; but both men were ambitious, and a breach soon came. In 314 Constantine attacked Licinius and defeated him at Cibalae on the Save. Licinius made his general Valens Augustus; but he suffered a second defeat in Thrace and consented to a peace. Valens was forced to abdicate, and Licinius surrendered all his possessions except Thrace, part of Moesia, Asia Minor and the East. In 316 Crispus and Constantine II, sons of Constantine, and Licinius II, son of Licinius, were created Caesars, in the old use of the

word—i.e. not as subordinate officials, but simply as prospective heirs to the throne. The peace between the emperors was not a final one. In 322 Constantine, fighting against the Goths, trespassed on Licinius's territory; war ensued, and Constantine won a battle near Adrianople. Licinius, in Byzantium, proclaimed his general Martinianus Augustus; but Crispus gained a decisive victory at sea, Licinius gave up Byzantium, and was again defeated at Chrysopolis, and he himself and his colleague Martinianus were put to death. The unity of the empire was again restored (324).

SECTION 3. CONSTANTINE THE GREAT

Constantine was a man of immense ability, a fine soldier, a consummate statesman, generous, mild and clear-headed. His resolution was inflexible and, in case of need, he could be unmercifully severe. On the whole he well deserves the title of the "Great"; though it is only fair to add that Christian writers, grateful to the man who gained the victory for their Church, have glorified his virtues and obscured his faults. Under his strong rule the empire enjoyed a settled peace. In 332–334 the Goths were defeated on the Danube and large bodies of barbarians were settled within the empire. In 326 a start was made with the building of the new capital of the East, Constantinople, out of the old Byzantium. It was completed in 330. The new city was magnificently equipped with buildings, and most of the city institutions of Rome were transferred to it. The step thus taken was, no doubt, in the long run, inevitable; Rome had ceased to be the centre of the empire, and the change was bound to be reflected in a change of capital. The expenses thus incurred involved heavy taxation and severe enforcement of fiscal claims. The coinage was again reformed, and the weight of the *aureus* was

reduced. In civil law Christian influence can be plainly traced.

Constantine is best known in history as the first Christian emperor and, indeed, the triumph of Christianity is of such great historical importance that we must devote a close study to Constantine's religious policy. The failure of the persecutions to crush the Church implied its final triumph. Constantine, with wonderful acuteness, perceived this fact. He first adopted a decidedly friendly policy towards the Christians during his war with Maxentius; then, from 312 to 323, followed a number of edicts, extending various rights to Christians; in 321 the Church was empowered to receive bequests. Licinius at first followed a similar policy but, later, seems to have changed his line, and Constantine could pose as the protector of the Christians in his wars with him. The development of Constantine's Church policy can be traced, in an interesting manner, on his coins. After about 317, pagan types disappear from Constantine's own coins, though they survive on coins struck with his head by Licinius. Neutral types (personifications such as *Beata tranquillitas*) follow; then Christian symbols begin to appear—and finally we find the distinctive Christian sign χ , occurring as reverse type. We see how Constantine gradually moved nearer and nearer to Christianity. Starting with the principle of toleration, he gradually became a decided partisan; he surrounded himself with Christians, gave his sons a Christian education, put down heretics, such as the Donatists, and finally received baptism himself on his death-bed. He too it was who called the Council of Nicaea and presided over its deliberations. Christianity had not yet become the state Church; but the conception had been suggested and was destined to be realized in fact within a short time of Constantine's death.

Constantine's private life had its tragic side. In 326

he put his eldest son Crispus to death, on the instigation of his wife Fausta; soon afterwards Fausta herself met the like fate, but we do not know the true explanation of these tragic events. Constantine had three other sons—Constantine II, appointed Caesar in 316, Constantius II, Caesar in 323, and Constans, Caesar in 333. In 335 a division of functions between the princes took place; Constantine II received the *praefectura Galliarum*, Constantius II the *praefectura Orientis*, and Constans the prefecture of Illyricum, Italy and Africa. The two sons of Constantine's step-brother Dalmatius, Dalmatius and Hannibalianus, received commands in east Illyricum and the kingdom of Pontus respectively. They probably owed their elevation to the influence of the praetorian prefect Ablavius and other court favourites. In May 337 Constantine died at Nicomedia on the march against Sapor II of Persia who was now laying claim to the provinces beyond the Tigris, which had been won by Diocletian.

SECTION 4. THE FAMILY OF CONSTANTINE (337–361 A.D.)

Very soon after the emperor's death the soldiers rose and put to death all the members of the house of Constantine, except his three sons and two boys, Constantine Gallus and Julian. On September 9 the three brothers in whose interests the massacre had been planned were proclaimed Augusti; the territory of the murdered Dalmatius and Hannibalianus fell to Constantius. But the peace of the family was not long unbroken. War broke out between Constantine II and Constans; in 340 the former fell in battle at Aquileia, and Constans took over his share of the empire. Constans was a strong and capable ruler, who showed marked favour to the German troops; but in 350 he was murdered in Gaul by a German officer, named

Flavius Magnus Magnentius. Constantius had been engaged in a long and difficult frontier war with the Persians (337-352). Neither side gained any decisive successes, but Rome lost Armenia and could not fully recover it. The most notable feature of the war was the heroic resistance of the city of Nisibis against the Persian besieging army. Constantius was a man of ability and high character, a Christian by education and conviction, conscientious and devoted. But he was not a soldier by nature. Autocratic in the extreme, he yet depended too much on his court officials and was led by them into many blunders. On the death of his brother in 350 he took the field against the murderer. Magnentius was a man of no education, but strong, self-confident and cunning; he was soon recognized throughout the West, and in the East sought the support of Athanasius and his followers, who were hostile to the Arian Constantius. The armies of Illyricum declared their own general Vetranio emperor; but he was loyal to Constantius, allied himself with him and in December, 350, resigned in his favour. In Rome a certain Nepotianus was made emperor, but was put down by the friends of Magnentius. Magnentius invaded Pannonia, suffered defeat in a murderous battle at Mursa (September, 351), retired to Aquileia, and was again defeated in the Cottian Alps. He then fled to Gaul and committed suicide; soon after him died his brother Decentius, whom he had created Caesar.

Having now traced the external course of history down to the union of the empire under Constantius in 353, we must attempt to follow the religious development during the period. Some points that really belong to the time of Constantine have been reserved till now, in order that the continuity of our narrative may not be too frequently interrupted. What was the condition of the Church in the first period of its triumph? Its originally simple organization had gradually become more and more complicated. Out

of the humble position of elder in the Church had arisen the important office of bishop. In theory all bishops were equal, but, in practice, the metropolitan bishops claimed a superiority. Higher still in the hierarchy stood the patriarchs and exarchs. The bishops had, on the whole, gained new credit in the Diocletian persecution, and Constantine raised their prestige still higher. He assigned special privileges to the clergy, and the bishops had easy personal access to the emperor. The Church began to call in the worldly power to decide between it and heretics; the Donatists in Africa were condemned by the council of Arles, summoned by Constantine in 314, and by the emperor himself, at the council of Milan, 316. The sect, now declared heretical, suffered bitter persecution, and the peace of the province of Africa was long disturbed by the feud. But more serious and more general was the great controversy that arose on the subject of the nature of Christ. Bishop Arius of Alexandria, seeking to reconcile faith and reason, claimed toleration for the view that Christ was not of the same, but of like substance, with the Father (*ὁμοιούσιος* not *ὁμοούσιος*). The other party, holding fast to the utmost rigours of faith, deposed Arius, and a fierce literary strife ensued. The council of Nicomedia, convoked in 323, declared in favour of Arius, but the feud raged on and in 325 Constantine called the great council of Nicaea to decide finally on the question. Athanasius appeared as a fierce partisan against Arius; Arius was condemned, few of the bishops refused to submit to the decision, and a persecution of the Arians began. In 328 Athanasius became bishop of Alexandria. In 330 Arius and a number of his followers made their peace and were received back into the Church. But Athanasius absolutely refused to accept him; for this refusal he was called before the council of Tyre (335) and, though he cleared his private character of the infamous charges brought against it, he

was condemned for abuse of power and banished to Treviri. In 338 Constantius, for political reasons, restored him to Alexandria. That emperor himself, with the East as a whole, was for Arianism, but Constans and the West ranged themselves on the other side. In 340 Constantius called the synod of Antioch, and a moderate formula, intended to satisfy both parties, was drawn up; Athanasius, uncompromising as ever, was again deposed and fled to Rome; he had strong support in Alexandria and Asia Minor, in the emperor Constans and in Julius, bishop of Rome. A general council at Serdica (344) returned to the formula of Nicaea; but, as the Arian party seceded and found a formula of their own, little progress was made. However, Constantius, for the time, gave way to pressure, and Athanasius returned to Alexandria (346). After the defeat of Magnentius, Constantius returned to the attack. The council of Arles (353) excommunicated Athanasius, and, when Liberius, bishop of Rome, protested, Constantius called yet another council at Milan in 355. By force of threats he broke the opposition; Liberius and a few followers, who still resisted, were driven from their sees. After serious rioting Athanasius was driven from Alexandria and lived for years a refugee in the Thebais. The Athanasians suffered persecution in their turn, and the councils of Ariminum and Seleucia (359) confirmed the Arian creed. While the rival sections fought for the possession of the Church, the cause of Christianity, as a whole, continued to triumph over paganism; the pagan temples were ordered to be closed (353), and the privileges of the pagan priests were gradually transferred to the Christian clergy.

Our previous narrative will have made it plain how much of the history of the reign of Constantius is directly concerned with the affairs of the Church. The Christian influence can be clearly traced in legislation, notably in the

heavy penalties imposed on offences that were at the same time serious moral crimes. The empire at large suffered under the burden of taxation, a burden that fell, perhaps, most heavily on the local senators (*curiales*) in the towns. There was a great waste of money on court expenses ; and the innumerable Church councils, involving so much travelling at the state-charge, made the state-post a serious financial oppression.

Constantius had no children and, compelled to look about him for a successor, decided on Gallus, step-nephew of Constantine the Great, who, with his brother Julian, had survived the massacre of 337. In 350 Constantius appointed him Caesar, with the name of Constantine Gallus, and gave him the command in the East when he himself marched west against Magnentius. Gallus was an utter failure as emperor ; he was lazy, passionate and selfish, and was spoiled by evil counsellors. Constantius, vexed with his failure, sent two high officials to summon him for trial to Italy, but Gallus arrested them and put them to death. The only thing that could now have saved him was open rebellion, but for this his courage failed him. He was summoned to Italy, tried and condemned, and put to death (end of 354). Julian, younger brother of Gallus, had been brought up under close watch ; he was now summoned to Italy to stand his trial for complicity in Gallus's offences. He was, however, acquitted and won the favour of the empress Eusebia ; and, through her influence, Constantius called him in 355 to take up a high command in Gaul.

Of Julian's general character and ambitions we must speak more fully later. At present we must learn to know him as an able soldier and administrator. For some time there had been unrest and trouble in Gaul. In 354 a certain officer, Arbetio, was deposed after a defeat in Switzerland ; jealous of his successor, Silvanus, he plotted against him, and Silvanus, fearing for his life, revolted

and proclaimed himself Augustus, but was entrapped and executed by Ursicinus, an officer sent by Constantius. Julian found his position very difficult. The country was in utter misery, and there was no real defence against the barbarians; his own powers were undefined and he had bitterly to complain of the covert hostility of the high officials round him. Above all he had no troops at his disposal. But, in spite of this, he soon gained distinction; in 356 he hurriedly raised a corps, relieved Augustodunum from the Alamanni and defeated the invaders. In 357 he complained at court of his unsatisfactory relations with the officials; his complaints were heard, and new men, devoted to his cause, were sent. In 357 Julian gained a great victory over the Alamanni at Strassburg—and this despite the fact that the Roman commander on the Upper Rhine, Barbetio, had quarrelled with him and left him in the lurch. In 358 he built a channel fleet and restored peace on the Lower Rhine, and in 359 he recovered the Batavian territory for the empire. In 360 and 361 his officers repelled the Picts and Scots in Britain, and he himself gained fresh victories over the Alamanni. In addition to this he devoted much interest to the well-being of Gaul and equitably re-organized the system of taxes. With great difficulties to contend against, he had performed a grand work and had won immense popularity and prestige. Constantius, meanwhile, had not been idle. In 358 he was fighting against the Quadi and Sarmatae on the Danube, and in 359 he entered on a fresh war with Sapor II of Persia. In 360 Constantius decided to take the field himself and called off large detachments of troops from Gaul. This step was bitterly resented and the soldiers proclaimed Julian emperor at Paris. Constantius stood on the defensive against the Persians during the year 360; in November 361 he died in Cilicia. He had refused to recognize Julian as colleague, and the latter had advanced into Illyricum. His prospects of

success were extremely dubious, when the death of Constantius gave him a bloodless victory.

SECTION 5. THE REIGNS OF JULIAN AND JOVIAN
(361-364 A.D.)

Julian was now sole emperor and was able to approach the tasks which he had long had in mind. He had been brought up under strict Christian influences, and the constraint then exercised on him had given him a bias against the Christian religion. But his was a deeply earnest nature, with a leaning towards asceticism, and his moral enthusiasm, estranged from Christianity, had been turned by his friend and teacher, the philosopher Maximus of Ephesus, towards a reform of the old pagan religion. His plan was to promote a moral regeneration of paganism—to found a morality as high as the Christian on the basis of the old beliefs and cults. He revived the pagan worship and mysteries, he fostered religious education in schools, he restored the ruined temples and withdrew from the Christian Church its possessions and its privileges. Christian teachers were excluded from classical studies and, in all appointments, Christians were uniformly passed over in favour of pagans. In fact, Julian, without actually persecuting the Church, showed a strong bias against it; the devout retorted with a sincere and passionate hatred, they strove to blacken the emperor's character and have fixed on him for all time the epithet of the "Apostate¹." Yet Julian's reign was full of well-intentioned and partially successful measures. He strove to relieve financial burdens and ensured a good coinage. He stopped the waste on the court and on the state-post, but showed an insufficient sense of his princely

¹ But the Christian poet Prudentius shows some appreciation of Julian's greatness in the famous line

"Perfidus ille deo, sed non et perfidus orbi."

dignity. He was too versatile and too theoretical and suffered from a certain philosophic arrogance. In the Church, he showed no favour to any one sect. Athanasius returned to Alexandria in 360 but was deposed by Julian in 361. Nevertheless the mere fact of the emperor's neutrality ensured the final victory of the Athanasians.

Julian was determined to restore Rome's prestige in the East by a campaign against Persia. The year 362 was spent in preparations; in March, 363, Julian set out to the war from Antioch. One division marched through Armenia, while Julian led his main army down the Euphrates. But in June, 363, Julian fell in a skirmish, on his way along the Tigris to join the northern army. He is said, on his death-bed, to have confessed the failure of his life-work in the utterance "*νενίκηκας, Γαλιλαίε.*" The tale is picturesque and, in its essence, true. Paganism was dead, and no fresh moral life could be breathed into its corpse. The victory remained with the Church; but it is sad that it should have dishonoured that victory by boasting, probably without reason, that the credit of having slain the emperor belonged to a Christian soldier in his army!

Paganism had made its last effort, and Christianity began to extend its influence on all sides in the state. And another dissolving force worked with it to destroy the old Roman character. The barbarians serving in the army more and more displaced the native Romans; Roman civilization gradually breaks down under these two influences, and, at the close, we shall find it vanquished, materially and politically, by the barbarian invaders of the West, and succumbing, intellectually and morally, to Eastern influences in the empire of the East.

Julian had not named a successor, and the army had to find itself a general. The Roman party among the officers triumphed and raised to the throne Jovian, an earnest Christian, but an incapable officer and incompetent ruler.

He failed signally to deal with the immediate military problems. The position of the army was difficult, but not really perilous; Jovian, by his indecision, incurred two defeats, and finally, to avoid further disaster, made a shameful peace, resigning to Persia the four provinces beyond the Tigris, with Armenia, Nisibis and Singara. His Church policy, however, gave entire satisfaction; he restored to the Church all its privileges and recalled Athanasius to Alexandria. But in February, 364, he was murdered, probably by the army, in which discontent at his incompetence was rife. The officers and high officials then met at Nicaea and chose Valentinian, a capable officer, to be emperor; he named his brother Valens to be his colleague, and, in July, 364, their spheres of activity were defined, Valens holding the East, Valentinian Illyricum and the West. In the September of 363 a kinsman of Julian, Procopius, was proclaimed at Constantinople. But the officers held true to Valens, and Procopius was defeated and put to death (May, 366).

SECTION 6. FROM THE ACCESSION OF VALENTINIAN AND VALENS TO THE DEATH OF THEODOSIUS I (364-395 A.D.)

The two new emperors were both gifted with considerable ability. Valentinian was a fine man and a good soldier, and an able ruler beside; Valens was equally able and devoted, but lacked his brother's military qualifications. The general spirit of the government was the same in East and West. Great favour was shown to the officers, to whom the emperors owed their power; and, on the other hand, a determined attempt—only partially successful—was made to check the tyranny of the bureaucracy. Both in East and West barbarians were settled in force within the empire, and barbarians, especially Germans and Goths, claimed more

and more of the high military commands. Finance was carefully and wisely handled and the coinage was good ; the *municipia* received careful attention, and new officials, *defensores*, were appointed to look after the interests of the poor. In religious matters the general principle of toleration was adopted. Valentinian was himself an Athanasian, but he adopted the wise policy of refusing to subordinate the state to the Church ; he restored Christian privileges and confiscated pagan temple property for the state, but beyond this paganism was not persecuted. The bishop of Rome had become, since the transference of the empire to Byzantium, one of the first men, if not the first, in the city. Liberius, expelled in 355, returned in 358 ; Felix, who had held the see in his absence, disputed his claim but died before the dispute became critical. In 366 Liberius died, and a new struggle for the bishopric arose between Damasus and Ursinus, the candidates supported by the parties of Felix and Liberius respectively. After some fierce rioting Damasus triumphed, and Valentinian broke his good rule of non-interference in church affairs by countenancing the persecution of Ursinus and his friends. He also gave the bishop of Rome jurisdiction over the clergy of the city and its immediate neighbourhood. The Donatists and Manichees were persecuted—perhaps rather as disturbers of the public peace than as heretics. In Milan the able Ambrosius was bishop, but his great influence does not begin until the next reign. In the West the Athanasian cause was steadily winning the day ; in the East Valens was an Arian, but Athanasius was allowed to hold his see until his death. He was a great personality, fired with a passionate enthusiasm for the truth as he saw it and with an equally passionate hatred for all heretics ; we see in him the blessings and curses of religious fanaticism in their most extreme form. The monastic movement, starting in Egypt about 250, was spreading rapidly in the East, and Valens,

pleading with some justice that men made it a pretext for evading their duties to the state, took steps to repress it. Valens, like his brother, aimed at a policy of moderation, but the virulence of the Athanasian bishops made strict toleration impossible.

Both in East and West there were wars to be encountered. Valentinian made a great effort to strengthen the army and organized a system of forts on the frontiers. In 365 he was in Paris and in 366 gained successes over the Alamanni; the war continued in 367-368, and relief was gained by the murder of the German prince, Withikab. We see how low Rome had been brought, when she had to resort to such means of defence—and that, too, under the rule of a brave and able prince. On the Upper Rhine the Burgundians begin to appear, and their feuds with the Alamanni were turned to some advantage by the Romans. The north coast of Gaul was plundered by Saxon pirates, and Britain was threatened by a great invasion of the Picts and Scots; but Theodosius, an able soldier, suppressed the revolt and established the new province of Valentia to the north of the Wall of Hadrian. Africa suffered from the misgovernment of the *comes* Romanus, an unscrupulous but powerful scoundrel. Encouraged by his negligence, the Moors revolted in 371 and Theodosius had to be despatched to suppress the revolt (372). He afterwards suffered for his efficiency, for the friends of Romanus secured his execution. In 374 the Quadi poured over the Danube, and Theodosius the younger distinguished himself in fighting against them; Valentinian himself hurried up to the front in 375, but died in November of that year. He left his inheritance to his son Gratian whom he had made Augustus in 367; but the German officers in the army set up Gratian's younger brother, Valentinian II, as co-ruler.

In the East Valens had wars to wage against the Goths

on the Danube in 367-369 and frontier troubles with Persia over the question of Armenia in 371-376. In 373-374 a certain Theodorus revolted and was put down. About the year 371 the terrible Huns began to invade Europe and, hard pressed by the invaders, the Goths sought admission within the empire (376). Valens granted the request but insisted that they should give up their arms. This demand was perhaps necessary, but the wanton folly of his officials in carrying out his instructions led to terrible disaster. They insulted the new-comers but omitted to disarm them; a general rising was the result, and the Goths, followed by Huns and Sarmatae, swept over the whole of the Balkan peninsula. Both Gratian and Valens arranged to take the field against them. In 378 Gratian, after a victory over the Alamanni, was ready to assist; but Valens rashly gave battle before his nephew arrived; he was defeated in a great encounter at Adrianople and lost his life (early 378). Gratian appointed Theodosius the younger emperor for the East and permanently transferred Illyricum to the Eastern Empire. The new emperor was not unworthy of the title of "Great," which he bears in history. He was a hard worker, a conscientious ruler, a great soldier and administrator. He looked every inch an emperor. His chief fault was a wild and ungovernable temper, which led him into acts of severity, followed by bitter fits of tardy remorse. By 379 Theodosius, working from Thessalonica as a base, had begun to master the revolt. By 382 the Goths had submitted and were settled in Thrace and Macedon; it is, however, doubtful, whether the line of the Danube was recovered.

Gratian, the senior emperor in the West, was a refined and lovable prince, well-intentioned, but weak and too ready to submit to guidance. In 383 Magnus Maximus revolted in Britain, invaded Gaul and, after the murder of Gratian at Lugdunum in 383, won Spain as well; in 384

Valentinian II and Theodosius recognized him as colleague. Maximus was a man of little character but great ability; he posed as the supporter of orthodoxy, suppressed the heresy of the Priscillians in Spain, and made his position strong in the West. But Maximus would not be content with these successes and, in 387, attacked Valentinian II, expelled him from Italy and won the peninsula. Theodosius thought the time had come for armed intervention; he gained two victories in Illyricum, captured Maximus at Aquileia and put him to death (July, 388), while his general Arbogastes put Maximus's son, Flavius Victor, to death in Gaul. But Arbogastes was over-ambitious. In 392 he murdered Valentinian II and, not feeling qualified to hold the empire himself, placed a certain noble, Eugenius, on the throne. Italy acknowledged the new government and Africa wavered. But Theodosius took speedy measures, gained a decisive victory on the Frigidus in north Italy, and put Arbogastes and his nominee to death. In January, 395, Theodosius died at Milan. The East had enjoyed a settled peace during his reign; Sapor II had died in 379, and his successors Ardeschir II (379-c. 383) and Sapor III (c. 384-386) had not molested Rome.

We must now return once more to the religious policy of these reigns—a question that steadily re-appears as one of the first moment in politics. Christianity was now definitely established as the state religion. The bishop of Milan, Ambrosius, a courtly and polished man of the world and a keen cleric, exercised the greatest influence over the emperors. The Arians and Donatists were persecuted by Gratian, and the jurisdiction of the bishops was extended. Ambrosius was really the first to introduce the worship of the Virgin Mary and the monastic ideal to the West—ideas destined to exercise a vast influence on the religious development of the following centuries. In 381 the council of Aquileia expelled the last Arian bishops

from their sees. But the empress Justina, with her son Valentinian II, espoused the Arian cause and came into violent conflict with Ambrosius, in which the bishop successfully maintained his claims. In 386 Valentinian II granted freedom of worship to the Arians in the West, and Maximus was able to gain support by posing as the champion of orthodoxy against him. Theodosius, however, after he had disposed of Maximus, turned the young prince from his purpose, and, as the empress Justina was now dead, the cause of Arianism was definitely lost. Theodosius was a devoted son of the Church. In 380 he passed a law against heretics, denouncing heresies as sins against the Catholic faith; a synod of Constantinople (381) accepted the Nicæan formula, and Arian bishops were expelled by violence from their sees. Faith had triumphed over rationalizing tendencies, and Arianism, a lost cause in the empire, found its last refuge among the newly converted Goths. Everywhere Church influence grew. There is something strange in the sight of Theodosius abasing himself in penitence before Ambrosius and doing penance for a massacre which he had ordered at Thessalonica. We seem to have come already to the days of the Church's dominion over princes. In spite of prohibitions, the clergy claimed and exercised the right of interceding for condemned men, and the right of asylum was claimed for churches. But in some points Theodosius was firm; he refused, for example, to establish the claims of the sees of Rome and Milan to supremacy over the Eastern Church. Paganism was rapidly declining as an independent force and was doomed to death—even without the accelerating influence of persecution. The last fights for the old faith centred in Rome and were finally suppressed by Theodosius after his victory over Eugenius. But the old beliefs that had dominated men's imagination for centuries did not disappear without leaving some traces behind them; and

many elements of classical mythology may even now be traced by the student, embedded in the mass of the Catholic legends of the Saints.

SECTION 7. THE EASTERN EMPIRE (395-457 A.D.).
ALARIC AND HIS GOTHIS

Theodosius the Great died in January, 395, leaving the rule in the West to his younger son, Honorius, in the East to Honorius's elder brother, Arcadius. Stilicho, the Vandal, was left as a sort of guardian to the two young emperors. His influence in the East was contested by Rufinus, the praetorian prefect, at Constantinople; but Rufinus had a serious rival in the Lord High Chamberlain, the eunuch Eutropius, and, after Arcadius's marriage to Eudoxia in 395, lost much of his power. Stilicho was not too well pleased that his intervention was not required in the East, and, when Alaric, king of the Visigoths, overran Moesia and Thrace, he detained the imperial forces in the West. Late in the year he marched to Thessaly, as if intending to intervene in person, but Arcadius protested, and Stilicho sent on the troops of the East to Constantinople and returned to Italy. To this army Rufinus fell a victim, when it reached the eastern capital. Alaric, meanwhile, invaded Greece; Stilicho met him with an army in Elis but soon retired to Italy, having probably concluded a secret convention with the Gothic king. Arcadius then secured peace with Alaric by granting him the title of *magister militum per Illyricum*. But, even apart from this, the East was sorely vexed. The Huns, swarming down from the Caspian, invaded Syria, and the Isaurian pirates were a constant annoyance. There were three parties in the Eastern Empire—that of Eutropius, consisting mainly of his personal adherents, that of the Germans in the army, led by the general Gainas, and a third, representing the true Romans, headed by the noble,

Aurelian. Aurelian's brother, known to us only by the opprobrious nickname of Typhos, attempted to thwart his brother's policy, in support of the German party. In 398 Aurelian and his friends gained the day in Constantinople. But the Ostrogoths, under Tribigild, revolted in Phrygia, and Gainas, when sent against them, deserted to the foe; Leo, the favourite general of Eutropius, was betrayed and fell, and Gainas now threw off the mask and wrote to Constantinople, recommending peace with Tribigild and demanding the sacrifice of Eutropius as his price. The chamberlain was deserted in his calamity and fell at once from power (autumn, 399). He was afterwards put to death, after his life had been promised him. Gainas and Tribigild then appeared together before Constantinople as avowed enemies of the state, but consented to make peace on condition that Aurelian and two other men of note were surrendered to them. Gainas obtained admission to the city with his troops and Typhos came into power (late 399). But in July, 400, in the absence of Gainas, a riot broke out in the city and a great massacre of Goths took place; at the same time Typhos fell from power. Gainas, in revenge, ravaged Thrace, but, in attempting to cross into Asia, he was defeated by Fravitta, a loyal Goth, and met his death on his flight.

We must spare a word here for the relations of the Patriarch of Constantinople and the court. John Chrysostom, a brave and fearless man, who at this time held the office, gave deep offence to the worldly empress Eudoxia by his outspoken criticisms of her ways. Other prelates, Severian of Gabala, and later Theophilus of Alexandria, as enemies of John, were drawn into the conflict; but John was the idol of the people and held his own. In 403 his quarrel with the court became acute. He was deposed in June 404 and finally died in banishment in 407. The court of the West had been disposed to support John's cause, and

his deposition led to a temporary coolness between the governments of East and West.

In 401 Alaric, ever restless, turned westward to invade Italy, but was defeated by Stilicho at Pollentia (402) and retired to Illyricum. In the same year Honorius transferred his court from Rome to Ravenna. Stilicho continued to act as the sword-arm of the West and destroyed a host of German invaders at Faesulae (405). It seems that he intended in 407 to join Alaric in an attack on the Eastern Empire; but the rebellion of the usurper Constantine in Britain and Gaul detained him, and the disappointed Alaric had to be satisfied with bribes. Arcadius died in May, 408, and in August of the same year Stilicho, discredited at court by private enemies, was put to death at Ravenna. He had always been regarded with suspicion at Constantinople, and his fall contributed to the re-establishment of good relations between the East and the West. But with Stilicho dead there was no one capable of opposing Alaric, and the Gothic king quarrelled with the Western government, and marched on Rome. In negotiations with Honorius he showed a willingness to be content with the possession of Noricum; but Honorius was obdurate, and Alaric, in revenge, took Rome and appointed Attalus, the prefect of the city, emperor. We shall meet many similar king-makers and puppet kings in what remains of our history. The throne of Honorius seemed to be tottering to its fall. But reinforcements came up from the East, Heraclian, the count of Africa, was loyal, and Alaric failed to take Ravenna. Alaric now quarrelled with his emperor Attalus and deposed him; but, when Honorius, who had found a Gothic captain Sarus to assist him, still refused to come to terms, Alaric took and pillaged Rome (August, 410). His next step was to have been an invasion of Africa, important as the chief granary of Italy; but death overtook him in Bruttium.

In the East the new emperor, Theodosius II, was entirely under the influence of the praetorian prefect, Anthemius, and later of his own elder sister, Pulcheria, a woman of strong character, who received the title of Augusta (from c. 414 onwards). In 421 Theodosius married the daughter of a pagan philosopher, Leontius, who, as empress, changed her former name of Athenais for that of Eudocia. Friction arose between her and Pulcheria and the latter lady retired into private life.

The government was wise and successful; peace was secured on the Persian frontier, Uldes, king of the Huns, was repulsed from Thrace, and the Danube defences were strengthened. Between the years 429 and 438 the great Theodosian Code of Law was drawn up, and was finally issued in 438, as law for the whole empire, by Theodosius II and Valentinian III, son of Honorius, conjointly. The bonds between the courts were drawn closer by the marriage of Valentinian to Theodosius's daughter, Eudoxia (437). The empress Eudocia lost her husband's favour and withdrew in 443 to Aelia Capitolina. Theodosius himself died in 450. He left no heir to the throne—his only daughter Eudoxia had, as we have seen, married Valentinian—but he had marked out as his successor a distinguished senator named Marcian, and, to legitimize his succession, Marcian married the dead emperor's able sister, Pulcheria. The new emperor governed quietly but wisely. The Huns regularly demanded tribute, but Marcian at last found occasion to refuse it. The important Church council of Chalcedon in 451 established a standard of orthodox belief on the vexed question of the two natures of Christ, which was then harassing the minds of believers. Pulcheria died in 453 and Marcian followed her to the grave in 457.

SECTION 8. THE WESTERN EMPIRE (395-451 A.D.)

The East had emerged safely into quiet waters out of the dangerous storms that had threatened it. The history of the West was not so happy; another half-century of tumult and confusion, and the historic empire was to dissolve into a number of barbarian states. In Britain a number of pretenders—Marcus, Gratian, Constantine—in succession assumed the purple. The last-named succeeded in establishing his position firmly and, crossing to Gaul, took possession of that province (404). But his mastery was seriously challenged by a horde of Vandals, Suevians and Alans, who broke the frontier defences in 406 and had free play in Gaul till 408 or 409; it has been supposed that Stilicho may have instigated this attack, hoping thus to hold Constantine in check and afterwards to deal with his barbarian allies at his leisure. After repulsing the imperial forces from Gaul (408) Constantine occupied Spain, and Honorius was compelled to recognize him as a colleague. But Gerontius, a general of Constantine, rebelled against him in Spain and made a certain Maximus emperor, and the Vandals and their allies were called in to support the new usurpation. Gerontius was strong enough to advance against Constantine in Gaul and besiege him in Arelate. But Honorius was at least able to interfere; his army drove off the besieging troops of Gerontius and took over the siege of Arelate themselves. Constantine's allies were beaten off and the usurper himself was taken and put to death (September, 411). Gerontius, fleeing to Spain, was put to death by his own troops.

On the death of Alaric his brother, Athaulf, succeeded to the throne. He began by continuing the feud with the court of Ravenna, but in 412 came to terms and proceeded to Gaul, to fight the enemies of the Romans in that province; but the fact that he forcibly carried off Honorius's sister

Placidia with him shows that his friendship was a doubtful asset. The Burgundians and Alans had set up an emperor of their own, a certain Jovinus, at Mainz (411), and it might have been expected that Athaulf would join them against Honorius. As it was, he quarrelled with these prospective allies and defeated and put to death Jovinus (late 413). In Africa count Heraclian, hitherto loyal, rebelled against Honorius and sailed against Italy; but he was repulsed and was slain at Carthage. In 413 Athaulf again quarrelled with Honorius and in 414 compelled the emperor's sister, Placidia, to marry him; Attalus, Alaric's puppet-emperor, was again invested with the purple. Retiring from Gaul to Spain, Athaulf was murdered at Barcelona, and Wallia seized the vacant kingship. The new king, after a vain attempt to invade Africa (416), made his peace with Honorius and, in consideration of receiving free supplies of corn, agreed to abandon his nominee Attalus, and to fight the Roman battles against the other barbarians of Spain. Attalus was sent into banishment at Lipara, and Placidia was restored to her family. She was forced to marry Honorius's chief minister, Constantius, and, of this marriage, two children, Honoria and Valentinian III, were born (418 and 419). In 420 Constantius was adopted by Honorius as co-ruler, and Placidia received the title of Augusta.

In Spain the Vandals, Suevians and Alans had, since 409, been harassing the miserable natives. Wallia, true to his engagement, crushed a body of the Vandals and the Alans and, in 419, received the south-west of Gaul as a home for his followers. About the same time the Burgundians received settlements on the Middle Rhine. The Vandals in Spain fought with the Suevians and occupied Baetica (420); an attack by the imperial troops was repulsed (422). Constantius, who had never been recognized by Theodosius II, died in 421, and his widow, Placidia, quarrelled

with Honorius and retired to Constantinople. Honorius died in 423 ; the succession was for the moment uncertain and a usurper, John, assumed the purple at Ravenna. But Theodosius decided to lend his support to the infant Valentinian III, son of Placidia and Constantius ; an expedition was equipped against Italy, and John was taken and executed. His general Aetius, of whom we shall hear more, was engaged in bringing up an army of Huns to his aid, but the new government pardoned him and took him into favour. In October, 425, Valentinian III was proclaimed Augustus.

The Huns now appear constantly on the scene. Coming originally from the Caspian, they had settled from the river Don as far as Pannonia ; in 424 we find Theodosius II paying tribute to their king Rugila, and in 433 the Western Empire ceded part of Pannonia to him. On Rugila's death his nephew Attila, "the Scourge of God," came to the throne and between 434 and 440 founded a great kingdom in central Europe. In 441, when the Eastern Empire was engaged simultaneously in war against the Vandals and the Persians, Attila invaded the Balkan peninsula and pushed into the neighbourhood of Constantinople. He had to be bought off with heavy bribes, and a second invasion in 447 followed. The government of the East had to pay regular tribute, until Marcian, taking advantage of Attila's engagements elsewhere, declined payment.

The government of the young Valentinian soon found itself involved in difficulties. Boniface, count of Africa, who had distinguished himself by repulsing barbarian tribes in 422, refused a summons to court in 427 and defeated the imperial forces sent against him. A second expedition was despatched and the situation was complicated by the Vandals, who took the opportunity of invading Africa. The disunion in the imperial camp gave them an easy task (429) in conquering the province. Boniface, after fortunes

unknown to us, re-appears in 432 in Italy as general of the empire against Actius, who had fallen into disfavour. The trial of strength between the two generals ended in the defeat and death of Boniface and the restoration of Aetius to power. In 435 the Vandals made peace with the empire ; they agreed to supply corn and oil and received the right to most of Africa. But the treacherous barbarians could not keep their compact ; in 439 king Gaeseric conquered Carthage and other places hitherto not under his jurisdiction, occupied Corsica and Sardinia and attacked Sicily. Aetius was the chief man in the West. In 437 he destroyed the Burgundian kingdom on the Middle Rhine and settled the survivors near Lake Lemane ; the Alamanni filled the vacant place. Aetius also checked the Franks of north Gaul from an advance south and confined Theodoric, successor of Wallia as king of the Visigoths, to his assigned territories in the south-west. Aetius had had many dealings with the Huns and had actually enjoyed their aid, but he was soon to be thrown into violent collision with them. In 451 Attila led his forces against Gaul. For this step he had several motives ; he was anxious to strike a blow for his friend, the Vandal king Gaeseric, against the Visigoth Theodoric and, at the same time, as prospective husband of Valentinian's sister Honoria, who had offered him her hand, he claimed his share of the Western Empire. The danger was an urgent one ; but Aetius rallied the Visigoths, the Burgundians and the Franks to his standard and, in the great battle of the Catalaunian Fields near Troyes, (June, 451) checked Attila's vast hosts. Attila, having had enough of fighting, retired to his kingdom. A little later, he invaded Italy and plundered Aquileia, and Rome itself was threatened ; but Leo I, bishop of Rome, induced Attila to spare the city. Aetius did not long survive his triumph. Maximus and Heraclius, his enemies at court, denounced him, and Valentinian consented to his murder (454). As a

result of this crime Valentinian himself fell in 455, leaving no male issue. The work of Aetius was a great and abiding one. The Western Empire was doomed, but it made a vital difference who should be its heirs ; the Teutonic races, by their rally against the Huns in 451, justly earned their right to the succession.

We have seen above how Leo, bishop of Rome, could step forward in defence of his city, when the state could lend no aid. The transference of the court to Ravenna had allowed the Roman bishop to increase his power unchecked, and he now began to lay claim to supremacy in the Church—a claim which the patriarch of Constantinople, in particular, could not willingly acknowledge. The complete severance of the Churches of the Roman West and the Greek East began to be foreshadowed. While the Eastern Church was sorely vexed over the controversies as to the two natures of Christ and the heresies—the Nestorian, the Apollinarian and the Eutychian—arising therefrom, the West achieved some finality on points of pure metaphysics and devoted its interest to more human problems, such as that of free-will and predestination ; the heretics here were the Donatists, of whom we have already heard, and the Pelagians, who supported the doctrine that man's will is free.

SECTION 9. LEO THE GREAT AND ZENO THE

• ISAURIAN (457-491 A.D.)

With the death of Marcian, the husband of Pulcheria, the house of Theodosius was extinct in the East, and Aspar, an Alan, the *magister militum per Orientem*, raised the Dacian Leo to the vacant throne (457). At home the history of the reign is that of the struggle of Leo against the predominating influence of the king-maker, Aspar. Leo refused to submit to tutelage and in 471 put Aspar and two of his sons to death. Constantinople suffered in 465 from

a great and devastating fire. Abroad the chief event was a great expedition, undertaken in concert with the Western Empire, against the Vandals, of which we shall speak later. Leo owes his title of "the Great" to the admiration of the orthodox, whose champion he was; but his chief claim to the title lies in the fact that he sought to provide a counterpoise for the foreign element in the army by enrolling natives of the Eastern Empire, notably the warlike Isaurians, in large numbers in the ranks. Leo died in February, 474, and Zeno the Isaurian, husband of his daughter Ariadne, succeeded him, at first as co-regent with his infant son Leo, then, on the child's death, as sole emperor. The new emperor was unpopular and in 475 was forced to flee to Isauria; the Isaurians in Constantinople were brutally massacred, and Basiliscus, brother of Leo the Great's empress, Verina, seized the throne. But in 477 Basiliscus fell and Zeno returned to power. Zeno is no favourite of the historians, but he was apparently a conscientious ruler whose chief fault was a tendency to squander public monies. The Isaurian general Illus was his chief minister, but in 484 he joined a certain Leontius in a revolt against the empire in Syria. Zeno, however, held his throne secure till his death in 491.

Here we must leave the history of the East. Constantinople has still a long and important history before it, but the Western Empire has already vanished from the scene, and the Roman character of the Eastern Empire is steadily on the decline. There is, it is true, no abrupt transition, no sudden breach with the past; but any work on history must choose some event as its goal, and we must refer all those who would follow the later fortunes of the Byzantine Empire to the historians of the following period.

SECTION 10. THE FALL OF THE WESTERN
EMPIRE (451-476 A.D.)

Only the last chapter in the history of the Western Empire remains to be written. On the death of Valentinian III, a usurper, Maximus, seized the throne but could not induce the empress Eudoxia to marry him and legitimize his claim. Gaeseric the Vandal profited by the occasion to invade Italy; he put Maximus to death and occupied Rome (June, 455). In Gaul, a new emperor, Marcus Maecilius Avitus, was proclaimed (June, 455); he had the support of the Roman element in the province and of the Visigoths and had a strong position in Gaul. Meanwhile Ricimer, the Suevian, a general in Roman employ, defeated Gaeseric's fleet at the very moment when Theodoric II, king of the Visigoths, was defeating his countrymen, the Suevians, in Spain.

In Gaul Avitus was strong, but he aspired too high. He marched and took possession of Rome, but could gain no sure footing there and was deposed (October, 456). Not till April, 457, was a new emperor, Majorian, suggested by Leo and approved by Ricimer, appointed. Ricimer was the real power behind the throne. There was trouble in Gaul, where Avitus had been popular; but his friends were defeated and peace was concluded with the Visigoths. In 460 a great expedition against the Vandals failed, and, probably as a result of this failure, Ricimer's officers put Majorian to death (August, 461). In November, 461, Libius Severus, a mere figure-head, was made emperor. Aegidius, a general of Majorian, who might have resented his emperor's death, was engaged against the Visigoths in Gaul (463). To complicate matters, Marcellinus, who had been commanding in Sicily, made himself independent in Dalmatia, while Gaeseric, resolved to have his own emperor, invested Olybrius with the purple. The Vandal raids on Sicily and south Italy continued. In November, 465,

Severus died and Leo sent Anthemius to be his successor. The governments of East and West drew close together and a great joint attack on the Vandals, under Basiliscus and Heraclius (from the East) and Marcellinus (from the West) was planned. A great fleet was mustered and success should have been certain; but gross mismanagement on the Roman side and skill and resolution on the part of Gaeseric brought about the defeat of the great armada. It was a terrible blow to Roman prestige. We cannot but suspect that the failure was largely due to the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the leading statesmen, Aspar and Ricimer, who allowed indifferent generals to be appointed. A coolness now arose between Ricimer and the emperor Anthemius, which ended in an open breach. Ricimer besieged Rome, took Anthemius and put him to death (472), and made Olybrius, the former *protégé* of Gaeseric, emperor. Six months later Ricimer died, and two months after him Olybrius (early 473); Gundibad, nephew of Ricimer, succeeded him in power and made Glycerius emperor (March, 473). But Leo disapproved and selected his niece's husband, Julius Nepos, for the vacant throne; Glycerius was deposed and Nepos was accepted as emperor at Rome (474). Nepos did not reign long; he was deposed by the patrician Orestes, who made his young son, Romulus Augustulus, emperor (October, 475). But in August of the following year, Odovacar, the Scyrian, an officer of Orestes, headed a mutiny against his master, put Orestes to death and deposed young Romulus. Zeno, emperor of the East, strongly urged Odovacar to recognize Julius Nepos as Emperor. But the general declined; he was willing, he said, to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Roman emperor of the East, but of a special emperor for the West he had no need.

Thus ended the Western Empire. The deposition of Romulus Augustulus was not in itself an event of great historical importance; the emperors of the West had for years been mere puppets of their generals, and it was

only a matter of time before they should disappear altogether. But the historian must chart out his way by convenient landmarks, and the date 476 may reasonably be retained as an arbitrary line of division between the history of Rome and that of the barbarians who succeeded to her inheritance. And now we will take a final view of the West before we leave it to enter on a new phase of its history. Gaeseric died in 477, and under his less competent successors the Vandal power in Africa began to decline. Julius Nepos, who still held Dalmatia, died in 480, and Odovacar annexed this province in 481. But a new enemy now appeared in the West. After the death of Attila in 453, the subjects of the Huns rose and defeated their masters, and the chief of the victorious rebels, the Ostrogoths, settled in Pannonia. For many years their attention was directed towards the East, and Leo and Zeno were compelled either to pay tribute or to play off the two chief Ostrogothic princes, Theodoric, the Amal, and Theodoric, the son of Triarius, against one another. But, in 481, the son of Triarius died and left his rival in undisputed possession. To secure peace, Zeno heaped honours on Theodoric the Amal and in 484 granted him the consulship. In 488 the Ostrogoths, like their kinsmen the Visigoths before them, turned their steps westward. In the years 489-493 Theodoric attacked and defeated Odovacar in Italy and in 498 made his peace with Anastasius, emperor of the East. And here on the threshold of a new age we must stay our steps. The Ostrogoths hold Italy, the Vandals Africa; in Gaul and Spain we find four independent empires—in the north of Gaul the Franks, who had risen under Childeric and Chlodwig to be a power in the world, the Visigoths in south Gaul and the whole of the east of Spain, the Suevians in the north-west of Spain, and the Burgundians on the Rhine. To these nations and not to the declining Romans the future belonged.

LISTS OF KINGS

(TO ILLUSTRATE THE HISTORY OF THE EAST AFTER
THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT)

Macedon

Philip Arrhidaeus	323—317 B.C.
Olympias (for the young Alexander)	317—316
Cassander	316—298/7
Philip	298—297
Antipater and Alexander	297—294
Demetrius Poliorcetes	294—288
Lysimachus and Pyrrhus	288—285/4
Lysimachus alone	285/4—281
Arsinoë (for her son Ptolemy)	281—280
Ptolemy Ceraunus	280—279
Meleager	279
Antipater	279
Sosthenes	279—278
Period of anarchy	278—276
Antigonus Gonatas	276—240/39
Demetrius II	240/39—229
Antigonus Doson	229—221
Philip	221—179/8
Perseus	179/8—168

Egypt

Ptolemy I Soter (as satrap)	323—305/4 B.C.
„ „ (as king)	305/4—285/4
Ptolemy II Philadelphus	285/4—247
Ptolemy III Euergetes	246—222
Ptolemy IV Philopator I	222—204
Ptolemy V Epiphanes	204—181
Ptolemy VI Philometor I	181—146
Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II	146—117
Ptolemy X Soter II	117—107/6
	88—81
Ptolemy XI	107/6—88
Ptolemy XIII Auletes	81—52
Ptolemy XV and Arsinoë	47
Cleopatra VII Philometor	52—30

Syria

Seleucus I Nicator	312/1—281/0 B.C.
Antiochus I Soter	281/0—262/1
Antiochus II Theos	262/1—247/6
Seleucus II Callinicus	247/6—227/6
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
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
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